Islam, Muslims and the Modern State

Case-Studies of Muslims in Thirteen Countries

Edited by

Hussin Mutalib

and

Taj ul-Islam Hashmi

Also by Hussin Mutalib

ISLAM AND ETHNICITY IN MALAY POLITICS
ISLAM IN MALAYSIA: From Revivalism to Islamic State?

Also by Taj ul-Islam Hashmi

PAKISTAN AS A PEASANT UTOPIA: The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal
COLONIAL BENGAL [Bengali]

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Contents

If we treasure
The real meaning of life

If we treasure
Love
Peace
Justice

Will we treasure
Humanity
The earth's bounty
Together?

Iza Riana

Preface

With the revolutionary changes in Iran consequent to the sudden overthrow of the pro-Western Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 by the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini, the whole world, especially the West, began to take a keener interest in the affairs of Muslim countries. Both the developed and rich West, and the not-so-developed and relatively poor socialist/communist countries as well as the Third World countries (including those with predominantly Muslim populations) could no longer ignore what came to be known as the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence or revivalism. Countries in the Muslim hinterland, such as Saudi Arabia and its neighbours in the Middle East, which profess to be 'Islamic' but are often ridiculed in Western media, fictions and movies as remnants of the decadent feudalistic past, were similarly alarmed at the new development not only in neighbouring Iran but among a large section of their own domestic populations.

Recent changes in the socio-political and economic landscape of Muslims in countries like Sudan, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt, Malaysia, and even among Muslims living in non-Muslim environments such as Europe, America and Australia, have caught the attention of many people around the globe; including many Western writers. It is still an enigma to many scholars and laymen how 'all of a sudden' Muslim men and women, many with modern Western education, habits and worldview, have turned 'Islamic'. The way millions of young and 'Westernised' Iranians welcomed Khomeini on the streets of Tehran in 1979 baffled the West. The pro-Islamic propensity of a large number of Turkish Muslims, which, among other things, brought back the once-banned 'Islamic' custom of women wearing the veil, is equally a difficult phenomenon to explain if one has little understanding of Islam and the problems confronting Muslims in the 'modern' states of today.

Since the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and its perceived domino-effect on the rest of the Muslim World, scores of books and essays have come off the press in English and other languages, which, more often than not, have highlighted the spectre and bogey associated with the assumed and imminent rise of 'militant Islam'. Consequently, blanket terms are liberally used, such as 'Islamic Fundamentalism', 'Islamic Extremism', 'Political Islam' or 'Islamic Fanaticism', to describe the reassertiveness of the Islamic ethos around the world. One senses a great ambivalence, if not double-standard, in the attitude of most Western countries and their Eastern (non-Muslim as well as Muslim) allies towards Islamic movements and regimes. More so if such regimes are

committed to the establishment of *Shariah* or Islamic law, as the guiding principles of the State. We have seen, for instance, how since 1979, Iran, along with Libya, Sudan, Algeria and some other 'Islamic' countries, has been quickly stigmatised as regressive and oppressive by the West for espousing 'Islamic fundamentalism', when the most fundamentalist country of all, Saudi Arabia, receives the most-favoured nation status from the West. Pakistan under Zia-ul-Haq and the Afghan *mujahideen* also receive favourable treatment from the West because it is in Western interest (political, strategic or economic) for them to do so. Compare this to the situation in Bosnia, where Western intransigence has led to ethnic cleansing and Croatia allowed more than 20 000 Muslim women to be raped by Serbian forces. One thus finds the Islamic world today being arbitrarily segmented, if not polarised, into the 'extremist' (anti-West) and 'moderate' (pro-West) blocs.

Against the above backdrop of Islam and its adherents, this compendium of scholarly articles is a small attempt to place in perspective the common notions about Islam and Muslim political culture, and, in the process, address the myth about the so-called *ummah*, or the followers of Islam, as a homogeneous and united force that is assumed to be hostile to the West or to the modernisation process. Many publications have dealt only with Muslim-majority countries, especially those in the Middle East and North Africa. This book covers a much wider canvas and is an attempt to understand, and come to better terms with the many facets of Islam and its adherents – the orthodox and the liberal, militant and pacifist, conservative and progressive, rigid and accommodating. Within the extremes of this spectrum lie many forms of Islam. At the more macro level, the response of Muslims to prevailing events in the world today has also to be seen in the context of developments in the international arena. Hence, included in this collection are two articles which address the theme as viewed through a wider lens.

This book approaches the issue of Islam and the Muslims from a micro, case-study perspective. Comparing and contrasting studies about personalities, regions and ideologies, especially after the decline of East-European communism, the end of the Cold War and the inconclusive tensions that followed the conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere, are deemed essential for a more balanced understanding of Islam and its adherents, especially with Islamic resurgence being increasingly perceived as the *third* force in the newly emerging international power configuration of the 1990s.

This study is also intended to highlight how the variables of class, ethnicity and communal politics are playing vital roles in influencing local and regional politics as well as Islamic movements worldwide. We see, for instance, how military rulers manipulate and even champion the cause of

Islamic resurgence in Pakistan and Bangladesh, while Indonesia adopts an equi-distance strategy towards Islam-oriented groups. We also come to acknowledge the heterogeneity of the 'Muslim world': between the 'reactionary Islam' of groups in South Asia and the 'progressive Islam' of the lower classes; between the 'pro-Western Islam' of the kings and *ameers* and the radical Islam of the down-trodden in Lebanon and the West Bank. So, too, with the fact that the actions and responses of Muslims in confronting the vicissitudes of life in many states are very much influenced by factors such as the nature and orientation of the state, as well as the relative collective strength of the Muslims *vis-à-vis* non-Muslims and the ruling regime. It has also become apparent that while Islamic resurgence has become a convenient tool by which to perpetuate the hegemonic tendencies of regimes against the discontented masses, on other occasions it has given meaning and a certain unity of purpose to such masses.

The 'Muslim world' is today faced with an unenviable dilemma. On the one hand, there is widespread disenchantment with what they see as the spiritual bankruptcy and oppressive practices of the West and its allies. On the other, however, Muslims realise the necessity of acquiring Western technology and other material support to make them stand tall *vis-à-vis* others in the modernising environment of today. In their quest to resolve this dilemma, Muslims in different countries and settings have resorted to a variety of actions and strategies. With a commitment to their ideals and a judicious blend of ingenuity and creativity, some have succeeded. Many however, continue to grapple with the challenges posed by the harsh realities of modern life, a challenge which is bound to become even more acute with the approaching twenty-first century.

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Part I
Islam and Muslims in the Global Perspective

1 Towards a New World Order: US Hegemony, Client-States and Islamic Alternative

Cyrus Bina

The rise of Islam as ■ political force cannot be studied in isolation as a regional or localised phenomenon; rather, it has ■ positive correlation with the political events and changes taking place globally. This is especially so since the decline of *Pax Britannica* and the corresponding rise of *Pax Americana*, following the Second World War. The rise and fall of the Soviet Union and Stalinism in the post-1945 international order, and the global reassertiveness of Islam since the Iranian revolution in 1979, have also influenced the 'Muslim World'. The revival of the latter ■ one stage was lacking in direction and ambiguous in its search for identity. The absence of modern political economic institutions, and the challenges posed by the powerful currents of secularism and democracy, may explain the plight of the Muslims.

Meanwhile, one can argue that the fall of the Soviet Union combined with the decline of the United States as an economic and political force, ■ decline which is not easily noticeable, is responsible for the destruction of tiny Iraq. This 'victory', among other things, has created the myth of a 'unipolar' world under US hegemonic leadership. Islam has emerged as a 'third force' in the vacuum created by the decline of Soviet Communism (or more correctly, state monopoly capitalism) and the eventual demise of US global supremacy.

Consequently, following the US reaction to its hegemonic decline, reflected in its questionable involvements in conflicts in the distant Middle East, one is witnessing signs of global disorder. Islamic resurgence has assumed greater significance in this global disorder at a time when the disintegrating client-states are desperate in their search for new patrons for the sake of stability. Islam is emerging as the new patron, offering the 'City of God' alternative to the otherwise secular, capitalist Western model (and/or Eastern Stalinist model) in ■ world which is expected to continue to be unstable in the coming years.

The last decades of the twentieth century are seemingly pregnant with what may become of the twenty-first century, as perhaps the late nine-

teenth century was, long before the eclipse of *Pax Britannica* and the succession of *Pax Americana*. Inspired by the French Revolution (1789), the tensions of unfinished social revolutions were present everywhere, especially during the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe. These tensions were renewed unexpectedly and flourished on a global scale through the Russian Revolution (1917), Chinese Revolution (1949), and many more revolutionary movements in the Third World during the twentieth century. Finally, despite the centuries of struggle for separation of church and state, the late twentieth century is revealing its latest drama in a series of political surprises posed by countervailing ideological and political currents. It looks as if the 'City if God' is descending upon earth once again. At least rhetorically, Islam of today seems to present itself as a *third* ideological alternative.

Despite the many events of lasting significance, the twentieth century, it may be argued, may well be remembered for two super-events of epoch-making quality that are now close to their final stages. These are the rise and fall of Soviet 'communism' and the rise and fall of American global hegemony.

The fall of the Soviet Union, long ago considered unthinkable, is now an established fact. But the fall of US hegemony and its cause, especially since the recent Kuwait–Iraq crisis and the US military 'victory' against the tiny nation of Iraq, has not yet received wide recognition, particularly in the United States. A typical argument within established political circles run as follows: With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States automatically obtained further dominance over the entire world. Hence, the New World Order is but the 'unipolar' world of unrivalled America. This assessment is, to some extent shared equally by the left, including the radical left, as well as the right within the existing political spectrum almost anywhere in the world.

It is now common to employ the lack of Soviet deterrence in explaining, for instance, the severity and asymmetric nature of US aggression against Iraq. But this sort of reasoning relies primarily on the assumption that the current status quo in politics – the strategic arrangement associated with the postwar international system minus the Soviet bloc – is a viable arrangement for world stability. The above view, which focuses solely on the Soviet decline as the triumph of capitalism, neglects to consider that the rise of Japan and the potential of transnational unity in the European Community alone are the result of more fundamental changes that have ravaged the configuration of the post-1945 global economy.

In addition to Western capitalism, if one looks upon the Soviet Union and its former client-states as a particular form of *state capitalism*, one can see, in unison, the entire spectrum of global crisis that has fallen upon the existing international system of nation-states. This view of reality, of course,

is contingent upon the acceptance that twentieth century capitalism has taken divergent institutional forms, and that, to begin with, one has no solid reason to view such variations as *bona fide* socialism.

Essentially, the Soviet disintegration was not the cause but the catalyst of the US military action against Iraq. The size of the expedition, the flimsiness of the target, the manner of response, the dubitable political objectives, and the lack of concern about the enduring and harmful political consequences, on the part of the United States are, together, an indication of circumscribed hegemony. After all, such a colossal military power was unleashed against a junior partner which itself was an active participant in the US (Persian Gulf) policy for a good number of years. While it is tempting to be dazzled by the shining armour of US military capability, one wonders whether or not such a military 'victory' was really a sign of US strength. Rather, this military intervention symbolises US doubt about its future role in the New World Order. And it is a reasonable doubt indeed. Beneath this magnificent and unwavering show of force is a detectable sign of political despair.

In the absence of a strong secular movement in the Islamic world, the crisis of the client-state system have manifested themselves in the form of Islamic reassertiveness. Islamic revivalism, therefore, can be regarded as a political response to the decline of the client-state system in the Muslim nations. With the decline of both Western and Soviet political models, the Islamic political movements are increasingly presenting themselves as alternatives.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section I provides an introduction to the global system under *Pax Americana* and a critical interpretation of the US Cold War policy, in conjunction with three broad containment objectives. Section II discusses the global oil order under *Pax Americana* and its transformation into a truly transnational industry, beyond the reach of any one nation, and the decline of US hegemony in the face of the globalisation of the world economy and polity beyond the nation-state. The rise and fall of the client-states in the age of Islamic revival is discussed in Section III, where we also analyse how the Iranian political experience has an impact for the entire Muslim world. In Section IV, we attempt to reveal the crisis of US hegemony through the recent US intervention in the Persian Gulf.

I. THE COMING OF *PAX AMERICANA* AND THE US DOCTRINE OF COLD WAR

The basic nature of the present global crisis can be seen from the US military interventions since the 1980s, especially the most recent one in

the Persian Gulf. These are they symptoms of a degenerate status of global order that sprang up in the inter-war period (1919–39), and that quickly paved the way for the ascendancy of the American global position. This global order acquired a hegemonic structure following the Second World War, but, unlike its predecessor, was not essentially dependent upon outright colonial conquest.[1] The First World War put an end to the European monarchies of the old imperial order; with the Second World War, the age of the new form of imperialism had begun.

What can be learned from this history, among other things, is that the essential mission of the emerging world order, known as *Pax Americana*, was to achieve hegemony over the global economy, global polity and the socio-ideological fabric of the world community as a whole.[2] As this hegemony has been challenged from time to time, the United States had to resort to the rule of force through overt and/or covert military interventions of varying magnitude. Here, besides the inherent fragility of such a hegemonic rule, the option of gunboat diplomacy was a last-resort, contradictory and premature exercise in search of the total obedience of the entire world, the old and the new alike.[3] Nevertheless, the mission of these military interventions was qualitatively different from that of the old order during the ascending decades (1945–75) of *Pax Americana*.

These military interventions were not for colonial plunder, but rather, geared toward something more profound, i.e., the establishment and control of institutions that were conducive to the transnational accumulation of wealth. The attempt at a systematic and universal transformation of the periphery was made through a twin objective: (1) transformation and integration of the Third World within the global economy, and (2) imposition of authoritarian political control over the Third World to keep the status quo within the global polity.

The origin and nature of the US hegemony since the Second World War, therefore, cannot be adequately understood by reflecting on US military activities alone. For instance, one wonders why the continued US military superiority alone has not been able to save the United States from its sharp economic and political decline since the mid-1970s. The United States has now lost its national industrial base, has become the largest debtor nation in the world, has accumulated a $4 trillion national debt, has developed an urban decay and rural poverty of proportional magnitude, and, to say the least, has lost its technological edge *vis-à-vis* Japan and the European Community. What has given the United States the status of a global hegemon, since 1945, is precisely its economic strength, combined with the dominance of its rising political power and the might of its firmly established international political institutions. Thus, contrary to neo-

conservative visions, such as '*the end of history*', and despite the unparalleled popularity of the 'unipolar' thesis, the US global decline would not seem reversible.[4]

All global orders come with their own corresponding security arrangements. The present world order is descending, so is its arrangement for global security. Thus, the present discussions by the elite and the intellectual community in the United States on the issue of global security resemble the reappointment of the fox to guard the chicken house. As the Hegel/Marx saying goes, history repeats itself: 'the first time as tragedy, the second as farce'. The 'American Century' is over.[5]

From the standpoint of economic hegemony, the world order of post-1945 bestowed upon the US dollar the status of universal currency. Institutionally, the powerful US dominated global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, came to oversee and influence the *modus operandi* of global development, as the ground was paved for the proliferation of US dominion throughout the world. Hence, for instance, the advent of a newly-devised international monetary arrangement in 1944, known as the Bretton Woods System.[6] This arrangement – coupled with the Marshall Plan for the post-war reconstruction of Europe, and the Agency for International Development (AID), dealing with the Third World – radically furthered the scope of the IMF and the World Bank in the global economy.[7]

A common characteristic of all the US engineered land reforms in the Third World has been a strong authoritarian tendency, without appropriate political reforms conducive to genuine democratisation. Instead, these programmes have been allowed to be carried out almost universally from above, often by the same dictatorial regimes who, as darlings of Washington, have pledged to crush all democratic movements at inception, and who have brutally dismantled the budding and fragile institutions of democracy in order to safeguard the last outposts of postwar neocolonial legacies.[8] Rhetoric aside, in the minds of many, it is doubtful that Washington has ever been interested in democratisation of the Third World, let alone democratisation of the Islamic world.[9]

From the standpoint of political hegemony, the United States tried to preserve the global status quo in terms of a broad dual objective: (1) containing the Russians on all possible fronts, and (2) containing Third World nationalism, under the convenient rubric of anti-communism.[10]

The annunciation of the above twin goals was officially celebrated by the Truman Doctrine (upheld, in principle, by all the US presidents up to and including George Bush) that set the entire course of the postwar global polity on the offensive of the Cold War.[11] The US political strategists and

policy makers deliberately partitioned the postwar international system into two separate political entities, each with a divergent concept of national sovereignty. These were the *de facto* orbit of client-states and the realm of independent nation-states. In the client-states, the US national interest has always taken precedence over national sovereignty, a fact which is often justified for the sake of US 'national security'. Such an Orwellian logic has manipulated the core of the American psyche, so much so that even a slight diversion from the norm sounds *un-American*. Finally, to the above goals one must add the *internal* containment, which has restricted social, political and democratic freedoms within the United States. This domestic containment, however, has been undeclared and was born out of real or imagined external threat. McCarthyism is only one example of such after-effects that are still haunting the remains of American democracy. America has yet to recover from chronic insecurity, archaic nationalism and, above all, from the injuries sustained to its collective consciousness.[12]

As we have seen, the doctrine of Cold War containment provided a sensible basis for the calibration of American global hegemony. This doctrine consisted of a composite triad of containment that had woven the fate of the Soviet block, Third World nationalism and the destiny of American democracy together. Here, both Americans and non-Americans have paid heavily for the preservation of the US global hegemony; those who paid most dearly by far are the latter. On the face of all this, it is ironic that the US government is still blaming the Third World people for the lack of democracy, without admitting its own historical appetite for installing dictatorial regimes all over the world. The examples are plenty and victims are numerous. To name a few, one may recall the US overthrow of Mossadegh (Iran, 1953), Arbenz (Guatemala, 1954), Goulart (Brazil, 1964), Bosch (Dominican Republic, 1965), Estenssoro (Bolivia, 1964), Sukarno (Indonesia, 1965), Lumumba (The Congo [now Zaire], 1960), and Allende (Chile, 1973); all to be replaced by hand-picked, US-supported tyrannical regimes.[13]

II. FROM AMERICA'S OIL TO GLOBAL OIL AND BEYOND THE NATION-STATE

Historically, since oil has been a constituent part of US global hegemony, it would seem necessary to include it here in our argument. Today, the public perception of oil and the issue of American intervention in the Middle East enjoy a formidable support from across the entire political spectrum, especially after the recent US involvement in the Persian Gulf against Iraq.

In spite of this pervasive opinion, the present writer categorically differs in his assessment. Since the early 1970s the oil industry has become a transnationalised industry; thus the variation in the geographical boundaries in the Middle East would have little to do with the pricing of oil. More explicitly, we argue that: (1) the global economy is now setting its own rules despite the nation-state; (2) the international oil industry is no longer following the pattern of national price determination; (3) the post-Second World War international system (of nation-states) is no longer viable; (4) as a consequence of (3), the American global hegemony is on the decline; and (5) the emerging transnational economy is such that the availability of a particular resource to a nation-state (i.e. a modern nation-state with no economic boundary) is no longer a significant matter.[14] These points altogether invalidate the necessity of physical access to the so-called cheap Middle Eastern oil by the United States. At the same time, as we have argued earlier, the recent American intervention in the Persian Gulf is not the sign of US hegemonic ascendancy.[15]

The entire history of Middle Eastern oil has gone through three stages of development: (1) the era of international cartelisation [1901–50]; (2) the era of transition [1950–70]; and (3) the era of post-cartelisation and unified (global) market pricing (since the oil crisis of the early 1970s).[16]

At the present stage, the oil price determination rests on the worldwide competition among various oil regions. Having the advantage of garnering additional revenue, the low-cost oil regions produce a higher rate of profit than the industry's average. This additional profit, called 'oil rent', originates from the differential profitability of competing oil regions. According to the volume of oil production, an oil region may garner more or less revenue in the form of oil rent. Since the highest-cost region will set the price, such a revenue is treated as an added cost by the market. But the price so determined is universal and, once it is established, has nothing to do with the location of a particular oilfield or oil region.

The global spot (and futures) markets in oil are the consequence of: (1) the globalisation of the oil industry, having to do with progressive integration of the oil-producing countries in the global economy; (2) the critical influence of US oil cost structure in determination of the world price; (3) the unification of global oil under one pricing rule; (4) the replacement of the cartelised arrangements by the inherently unsettled global market forces, and, by implication, (5) the development of OPEC as a rent-collecting agency with no immunity from the grip of (oil) market fundamentals.[17]

The onset of the post-cartelisation had its origin in the oil crisis of the early 1970s that restructured the entire oil industry globally. The consequence was to generate worldwide competitive prices based on the

costliest oil region, namely, the United States. Thus, contrary to popular belief, it is not OPEC, but US oil that is critical in determining the price of oil worldwide.[18] Given the above analysis, we venture to argue that even a total US military control of Saudi oilfields would not deter the decline of US hegemony, unless, of course, the world is prepared to do away with the institutions of the capitalist oil market globally. No military control, however, can be a perfect match for the hegemony of capital.

The postwar development of global capitalism emerged both intra-nationally (within the nation-state boundaries) and inter-nationally (beyond such boundaries), the complex unity of which can be demonstrated through the following transformations: first, the continuing triumph of capitalism over the traditional socio-economic institutions in the Third World; secondly, the continuing development of capitalism in the advance capitalist countries beyond the nation-state; thirdly, the eventual disintegration of the Soviet bloc into market economies of divergent structure; and fourthly, the contemporary development of the world as a whole toward a trans-nationalised socio-economic order. Today, these interrelated changes are the basis of the global economy and its corresponding global polity.[19]

The postwar transformation of the Third World, through the stage of 'primitive accumulation', is tantamount to a departure from the *colonial* world order, the maintenance of which centred on politico-military dominance. Under *Pax Americana*, the *raison d'être* of global hegemony originated in socio-economic reproduction. Here, contrary to outright plunder, the motivating factor has been to penetrate into every corner of the globe and to remove every shred of pre-capitalist structure that may stand in the way of global capitalist production, as long as it serves the hegemony of the United States. The significance of the four decades of import-substitution and export-led development in the Third World since the 1950s has thus come to light.[20]

The further the above system became engaged in a worldwide eradication of traditional social relations, the further it extended the scope of the globalisation process. At the same time, the broader the extent of globalisation, the narrower the hegemonic sphere of the nation-state, including that of the United States of America. In fact, the key to the decline of *Pax Americana* lies in the above conundrum. The greater the extent of US hegemony, the stronger the potential for the transnationalisation of the world. The wider the domain of the transnationalisation process, the narrower the confines of US hegemony. This, in part, provides the gist of the present global upheaval in search of a new world order. At the same time, given the globalisation of the world economy, the tripartite division of the world has been losing its applicability. Now that the 'Second World' has gone

under and the 'First World', particularly the United States, has developed substantial internal zones identical to the 'Third World', what is the significance of usage of such a world division anymore? For the lack of a better term, only metaphorically, we will continue to refer to the less (capitalistically) developed countries as the Third World.[21]

An important dimension of the US containment of the Third World is the blanket accusation and indeed mischaracterisation of the Islamic world. Aside from the approval or disapproval of the peculiar political forces in the Islamic world, the prejudicial characterisations of its peoples, by the Western world in general and by American society in particular, cannot be easily overlooked. This is a significant issue, especially with the arrival of the *New Right* in the centre of the political stage in the United States during the Reagan and Bush administrations. Demonising, through such labels as 'terrorist nations', 'Muslim terrorists', or even the attempt to indict an entire region, have been the rule rather than the exception. Since the US Supreme Court ruling of June 1992, kidnapping of foreign nationals from their own territory, or from a third country, is the law of the land and thus must be upheld in the US courts. The covert mining of the Nicaraguan harbour in the 1980s and refusal to accept the verdict of the World Court, for instance, may lead others to accuse the US of contempt for international law. But seeking help from the highest court to invent 'constitutional reasons', for kidnapping and piracy, within the international arena, is naked aggression against international law and perhaps betrays the spirit of the US Constitution. The insatiable appetite for breaking the law seems to have been enacted into law itself.

In sum, in the absence of economic and political hegemony, given the diehard habit of US containment, one may expect that such attacks against the Third World nations will occur with increased frequency during the 1990s.

III. FROM ISLAMIC REVIVAL TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

1. Peculiarities of the Client-states

Islamic ideology, it can be posited here, would not have received as much attention as it did during the last decade, had it not been for the 1979–80 Khomeini seizure of power in Iran. That is why post-1979 Iran can be considered as the precursor of *de facto* Islamic revival worldwide, even though, in the first place, resorting to Islamic discourse never was abandoned in

the Muslim world. Thus, the case of Islamic revival in Iran must be viewed as an illustration *par excellence*, which has far-reaching implications for both the client-states and the post-colonial states in the Muslim world. As we have witnessed, the singular target of the revolt, both secular and Islamic, was the regime of the Shah, whose return to power in 1953 had been engineered by the United States.

Although the secular political movement was the main target of the Shah's regime, from the early 1960s the religious opposition had also been taken to task. As the general political repression by the regime increased, there emerged a new form of political movement, namely, the *armed struggle*, against the regime and against its keeper, America. This form of struggle had been clearly *imposed* by the client-state system itself. The theoretical foundation of guerrilla activity was thus laid in the mid-1960s and carried out in the 1970s, mainly, by two separate organisations, known as the Organisation of the Iranian People's Fedayee Guerrillas and the Organisation of Iranian People's Mojahedin; respectively, one with secular (independent Marxist) and the other with militant (anti-imperialist) Islamic tendencies.[22] These guerrilla groups have since been known as *Fedaian* and *Mojahedin*.

As a result of the political pressure endured by the clergy for more conformity with the regime, there emerged a division between those who were neutralised, in one way or the other, and those who developed a lasting militant tendency against the Shah's regime. The massacre of 1963, however, deepened the sense of resentment among people of all political persuasions, including those within the ranks of the clergy in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini represented the militant faction of the clergy, who, among others, opposed the US-led reform programmes in Iran at this time. On 3 June 1963, in the afternoon of '*Ashura*, Khomeini, in a speech, launched his first major attack against the Shah:

> Let me give you some advice, Mr. Shah! Dear Mr Shah, I advise you to desist in this policy and act like this. I don't want the people to offer thanks if your masters should decide one day that you must leave. I don't want you to become like your father.[23]

This political stance instantly elevated Khomeini to the position of a national leader, despite the fact that he was little known at the time. This in turn conferred upon the militant clergy a powerful moral position *vis-à-vis* the traditional clergy, who at best had adapted ambiguous political positions in dealing with the ideological views of the regime. Khomeini was exiled but his political and ideological network remained behind. More

important, Khomeini, both as a clergyman and as a political leader, had been benefiting from the remaining *traditional* social institutions, namely, the intricate network of mosques and the generosity of merchant capital from the *bazaar*. These traditional establishments had neither been taken over by the regime nor been suspected of presenting a serious challenge to the *modern* state institutions, as alternative political arenas. On the secular side, however, the regime tried to exclude the possibilities of allowing political representation by any political group or party, outside the narrow and isolated circles of the regime itself. This is, of course, a well-known Cold War prescription.

To find the real and single source of political power that carried the Shah forward, especially after 1963, one has to look no further than the CIA-trained party of SAVAK, the notorious secret police of the Shah, the ideological core of the regime, with far-reaching political power in Iran.[24] Historically, this shows that the *Pax Americana* client-states in general, and the client-state under the Shah in particular, tended to preclude the formation of a set of mediating political institutions indispensable for carrying out the task of social transformation.

Conventional and traditional discussions have tended to blame the Shah for not permitting the participation of moderate political opposition in politics, side by side with the government. On the contrary, under such a system it is intrinsic to treat all meaningful (i.e. independent) political movements as an *alien* activity and to deal with them accordingly.

To be meaningful, one has to pursue a totally separate and independent political path. As early as 1963, other than leaving the country, two incongruent options were open to the opposition: (1) giving up the *overt* political activities that would require the involvement of the state machinery, and opting for the more peripheral and traditional channels that were still unbridled and, thereby, remained fairly safely outside the political command of the Shah's regime; and (2) going underground in order to confront the regime on its own terms through armed struggle.[25] The regime allowed no middle ground, not even a road for those political tendencies who would have like to position themselves in the middle of it. Armed struggle, therefore, was a political discourse imposed upon the political opposition by the state itself. It was an imposed strategy that, once proven successful, would soon reveal the political fragility of the regime and its limited power base, despite its powerful appearance.[26]

In Iran, during 1971–77, both the *Fedaian* and *Mojahedin*, among others, exposed the weakness of the Shah's regime and its *client* character. Khomeini's success, on the other hand, although by no means inevitable, can be attributed, in part, to the first possibility – i.e., exploiting the avail-

able traditional channels – that, in retrospect, had a significant role in mobilising the masses during the 1989–79 revolutionary upheaval in Iran. He also, without doubt, reaped all the benefits that came from the activities of the above groups. With this background in mind, we now turn to the role of Islamic ideology in the aftermath of Khomeini's (1979) seizure of power in Iran.

2. Islamic State under the *Velayat-e Faqih*

The Islamic Revolution in Iran is the most recent institutional expression of … [the transformation of Islam from] a universal religion to a political ideology with universal claims.[27] Hence the term: *Islamic ideology*, whose historical roots can be traced to the works of such pioneers as Jamal al-Din Asadabadi Afghani (1838–97), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935).[28] As for the *corpus* of the present discourse on Islamic ideology in Iran, it comprises several doctrines of variant tendency, whose notable exponents are Mahmoud Taleqani (1911–79), Ali Shari'ati (1933–77), and Murteza Motahhari (1919–79).[29] But it was the doctrine of the *velayat-e faqih* (the guardianship of religious jurisprudence), by Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–89), that, soon after the fall of the Shah, came to prominence and forcefully outshone the rest.[30]

By the spring of 1979, invoking the dictum of *velayat-e faqih*, and enforcing the regime of the *Islamic republic* onto the defunct realm of monarchy, the new *state* came into existence.[31] The new regimes, however, soon embraced the most distinctive characteristic of the Shah's regime, i.e., autocracy, despite its revolutionary rhetoric and populist outlook.[32] The *velayat-e faqih* must thus be taken seriously both from the standpoint of theory and in its practice since 1980 in Iran. Moreover, we believe that the contemporary form of *state* in Iran is living proof of the dialectical relations of both theory and practice of the *velayat-e faqih* and, as such, it is a typical model that has to be understood on its own, separate from its ritualistic connotation.

'Despite all his diatribes against despotism and his revolutionary language, it is quite clear that the system of government that Khomeini proposes is no more democratic than Maududi's [a Pakistani Muslim thinker] Islamic state. Although it is meant to be government for the people, it is certainly not government by the people.'[33] Khomeini himself is explicit on this point where he maintains 'The governance of the *faqih* is a rational and extrinsic matter; it exists only as a type of appointment, like the appointment of a guardian for a minor.'[34] The nature of governance under the *velayat-e faqih* is thus analogous to guardianship under the latter

category. Finally, the most devastating aspect of such an analogy originates from its very construct through the fallacy of composition, i.e., leaping from the individual to the nation as a whole.

Another issue is the anticipation of adequate measures against the probable abuses that may arise from the *faqih*'s improper governance, once the *velayat-e faqih* becomes the law of the land. Given the twofold nature of the *velayat*, there can be two types of rulings: first, a purely religious order or *al-hukm alkashif*, having to do with the task of *marja'iyyat*, which would not require Muslims to do anything that had not already been demanded of them; secondly, a custodial order or *al-hukm al-waliyati*, which is given according to the *faqih*'s own perception of what is good for the Muslim community.[35] Here, the orders of both kinds must be observed by the *umma*, but only ordinances of custodial type are obligatory for other *foqaha* to follow.[36] The significance of the latter point, however, had already been anticipated by Khomeini in his Arabic version of the *Book of Sale (Kitab al-bay)*, where he 'clearly asserts the superiority of the *faqih* who has acquired the status of political ruler (*hakem)* over the others.'[37] 'The emerging system is thus an autocracy, which cannot possibly be reconciled with republicanism or democracy as understood in the West.'[38] Finally, the precarious nature of *velayat-e faqih*, i.e. the treatment of the nation as a minor (or imbecile), can be consistently revealed through its widespread application under the Islamic Republic, since 1980, in Iran. This might be the proof of the pudding, so to speak.

The Islamic republic is a contradictory phenomenon in both theory and practice. First, it cannot remain a republic anymore in the presence of *velayat-e faqih* and its imposing concept of guardianship, as has been explained above, For instance, in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 'no mention is made of the principle of consultation *(shura)* or democracy' except in Article 7, in which the whole process is subsumed under the hegemony of *Imamate*.[39] Secondly, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not Islamic to the extent that the ruling *faqih* affects the lives of the *foqaha* through the mandates of custodial order, a binding rule that may very well diminish the capacity to carry out independent religious orders. This is nothing except subordination of the task of the *marja'iyyat-e taqlid* to the authority of *velayat* itself. 'With the establishment of Islamic government *marja'iyyat*, in practice and officially [*sic*], took the form of the leadership and rule over the society; and the *velayat-e faqih*, with this revolution reached perfection in practice and occupied its true station.'[40] One also has to remember, among other things the early test of the above point in connection with the demotion and confinement of Seyyed Kazem Shari'at-madari, a Grand Ayatollah, in April 1982 in Iran.[41]

As for the role of the state in the political reproduction and ideological renewal, there are certainly many parallels between the Islamic Republic's and the Shah's governments. The most important is the centralised control over the realm of political activity and thus exclusion of the entire political spectrum, except those factions that are directly commanding the political structure. Again, under the banner of the *velayat-e faqih,* no serious attempt has been made (and, so far, all attempts have been frustrated) to create adequate political infrastructure for the task of political and ideological mediation.The essential point, once again, lies in the structural incompatibility of the state rather than in the willingness of its apparent functionaries in this case.

3. Islam and the Challenge of a New World Order

To understand the nature of the Islamic Republic, and the subsequent worldwide reassertiveness of the Islamic ethos, one needs to examine the historical as well as the global context that has led to its ascent. The decline of the international system of nation-states under the *Pax Americana* and, with it, the fall of the client-state system, must be considered as a precursor to the fall of the Shah. Khomeini's assumption of power in 1979 provided a powerful antithesis to the Shah (rather than the regime), in terms of the *velayat-e faqih.* From the standpoint of political and ideological mediation, however, the basic character of the state under the Islamic Republic has remained unchanged. In other words, despite the differences, the most distinguishing feature of the state remained the same.

On the global plane, the decline of the *Pax Americana* is tantamount to the transnationalisation of the world economy and polity. Such a globalisation also presents itself as the antithesis of the old client-state system worldwide. The result is the further integration of such states into the global economy and global polity. Thus, a simple departure from the status of a client-state, in the presence of rapid global integration, is not sufficient for achieving democracy or independence. Moreover, further integration into the world economy is incompatible with the policy of economic independence. Hence, inevitably, as soon as the Islamic movements obtain the political power in the declining client-states (or the post-colonial states), they will be subject to the pressure of integration into the emerging global system, despite all utterances to the contrary. In other words, the would-be Islamic republics of the future will, by necessity, have to become part and parcel of the global synthesis. To the extent that Islamic movements are unable to assume political power, they will remain, covertly or overtly, as critical ideologies within their own national boundaries, including the ones

with the repressive regimes. This clearly indicates the adaptability of Islamic ideology to the modern global system. It also shows the compatibility of Islam with modern capitalism, in general, and state capitalism and global capitalism, in particular.

One will scarcely find any irreconcilable discord between adopted Islamic political ideas, on the one hand, and the imperatives of the imposing social formation and socio-economic structure, on the other. The Islamic Republic in Iran is a case in point, where the social formation and the essential features of the state have not been altered.

> Iran has resurrected and amended a foreign investment law from the overthrown monarchy that allows foreign partners a 49 per cent stake in joint ventures and full ability to take their profit out of the country.[42] It is widely believed that Iran's biggest problem today isn't the heralded struggle over ideology between revolutionary hard-liners and pragmatists – President Hashemi Rafsanjani has that battle well under control. It is the struggle over money.[43]

Having said that, one may not put the two regimes in the same category, from the standpoint of concrete political and ideological imperatives. Our point of reference here is the global order again. A comparison can be made between the two regimes, respectively, from the perspectives of sovereignty, legitimacy and governance. The sovereignty of the Shah's regime was contingent exclusively upon *Pax Americana,* whereas the Islamic Republic is exceedingly constrained by the imperatives of global capitalism beyond the nation-state, the antithesis of the global system under the *Pax Americana*. The legitimacy of the Shah's regime was dependent upon the appeal to past history (of Persian Empires: Cyrus the Great and all the rest) and, of course, the Cold-War rhetoric, whereas the Islamic Republic's appeal is generally to God Almighty, Himself, and the rhetoric of 'neither East, nor West'. As for governance, while both regimes are distinctly authoritarian, the Shah's regime, being manifestly isolated from civil society, was quintessentially bureaucratic and hierarchical. Under the Islamic Republic, on the other hand, the governance has moved towards totalitarianism.

Despite its seemingly invariant message, Islamic ideology differs considerably, from country to country or movement to movement. It delineates a wide spectrum of thought, from transparently ultra-conservative to a convolution of eclectic liberal ideas, attempting to respond to Eurocentrism, particularly its American version. It is thus inappropriate to categorise all these movements as 'fundamentalist'. If applied indiscriminately, the yardstick of fundamentalism runs counter to the very act of reconciliation of

Islam with the existing social formations that are, by necessity, transitory and historical. 'What is most important in history is [*sic*] the deep tendencies flowing from economic, political, and social situation, and ideologies must adapt or die.[44]

As suggested above, the resurgence of Islamic ideology is a historic reaction to the inadequacies and failures of the two powerful global ideologies that have shaped the world during the last several decades, namely, under the *Pax Americana* and its Soviet counterpart. But, it is one thing to pose as a reaction, quite another to become a new paradigm. '[But, if history is any guide,] the precepts of Islam have nowhere created a social or economic structure that was radically new.'[45] This must be a cause for concern for the dispossessed majority in the Third World in general, and those in the Muslim world in particular, where the paradigm of modernisation of market capitalism *à la* USA, and the model of state capitalism *à la* Soviet Union (now a defunct paradigm), have not been proved entirely successful as a viable alternative to the existing traditional way of life globally. It is doubtful that Islam will do better. 'Muslim spirituality may exert a beneficial [or, for that matter, a harmful] influence on the style of practical politics adopted by certain leaders. It is dangerous to hope for more.'[46]

Today, the signs of resurgent Islam are everywhere. In the Sudan, where Hassan al-Turabi's National Islamic Front controls the military government, 'the vacuum left by the failures of Western-inspired African socialism and Arab nationalism' has been filled by the Islamic ideology. However, many Sudanese argue that Turabi's vision of an Islamic world held together by religion and economic interdependence could be taken less seriously if it were not for two factors.' First, an appeal to those who are both poor and religious. Secondly, a close link with the Islamic movements in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, including a multi-million trade (dollars) and assistance programme from the Islamic Republic of Iran.[47] Al-Turabi, however, upholds that 'Islam is the only force that remains in this part of the world.'[48]

In Algeria, the challenge of the Islamic Salvation Front is unmistakable. 'Nearly 7000 members of the front are held in desert camps, many arrested shortly after the Government cancelled the (democratic) elections in January [1992] when it became clear the fundamentalists were well on their way to winning control of Parliament.'[49] 'The military and the police have stepped up arrests of Muslim fundamentalists since the new ruling council vowed to enforce new regulations against political activity in and around mosques.'[50] The support that the US renders to the regime also explains not only our earlier 'client-state' argument, but the survival of this repressive government.

In Saudi Arabia, where the ruling royal family was undermined by the recent American intervention, there emerged a movement consisting of both liberals and militants against the ruling monarchy. '[Since the Persian Gulf war,] the militant fundamentalists have been building a growing following in the religious institutions and universities that thrive throughout Saudi Arabia. The movement [known as the Islamic Awakening] has fed off the frustrations of hundreds of thousands of university graduates who have been unable to find jobs.' These assertive Muslims are also displeased with the Women's Renaissance Association, a liberal women's group in Saudi Arabia.[51] 'To understand change here,' noted an observer, 'one must first grasp the status quo, no simple task in a nation where there is no recognizable public discourse, where the media offer disquisitions on Yugoslavia and the West Bank but limit national news to lists of brotherly telegrams sent by Fahd and Crown Price Abdullah.'[52]

Islam has long been playing as a double-edged sword in the hands of the contending political forces in the Muslim world. Afghanistan, for instance, is a typical case in which *Pax Americana* and Islam (Afghan Mojahedin) have become intimate bedfellows in the struggle against the 'Russian infidels.'[53] The Afghan Mojahedin (not to be confused with Iranian Mojahedin) are militant and, at the same time, exhibit a strong 'fundamentalist' tendency within their ranks. Yet, contrary to the stereotypical rule of thumb, they have never been targeted in the US media as Muslim fanatics. Had there been no gain from the Islamic swords, the US policy toward Afghanistan might have been diametrically opposite. It has become increasingly clear that fundamentalism, as real as it may seem, is more of a convenient cover for concealing the real issues: 'It is one of those interesting words that have two contradictory meanings. Applied to an opponent, it is abuse; applied to someone you agree with, it is praise.'[54]

IV. A FRACTURED HEGEMONY, A PERVERTED CLIENT-STATE

In order to illustrate the contradictions embodied in the client-state system and in US hegemony, let us choose the recent Middle East crisis, the Persian Gulf War. It is now widely recognised that Saddam Hussein of Iraq is a brutal dictator, who has now fallen out of favour with the US government.[55] But he is presumably no better or no worse than other dictators in charge of other client-states, who are still harboured, or even honoured, by the United States throughout the Third World. The question

is: why a sudden displeasure with Saddam Hussein, when the US government knew all along who he was in so far as the question of democracy was concerned, and how he had previously struck his own and other people with weapons of mass destruction?

But the US's principal grievance against Saddam Hussein is the fact that he has violated the sacred rules of the household, despite the prevailing war cry by the United States that he poses a threat to 'freedom' in Kuwait. The evidence is now crystal clear in the case of Kuwait: the Emir (of Kuwait) is back, the Kuwaitis who courageously stood up and fought against the occupation are now displaced, and the US government is no longer interested in democracy in Kuwait.[56] The latter point is explicable in light of the universal evidence that the US government has always preferred 'stability' to democracy (in the Third World), thus, following the long-standing tradition, it had to reply on the rhetoric of democracy to provide the necessary illusion.

One can in fact say, as the record shows, that Saddam Hussein is a microcosm of American's own global policy in the Middle East. Similar, or even worse, client regimes, namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco and the tiny Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms, just to name a few, are now enjoying an intimate relationship with the US government such that makes their credibility suspect amongst Muslims in many parts of the world. President George Bush had paid lip service to the cause of democracy globally and it is not expected that Bill Clinton will radically change this US orientation, despite 'human rights' espousals.

Another important factor is the role of Israel in the American order, especially in the Middle East. Despite the recent Israeli–PLO accord, Israel is no stranger to the postwar American hegemony and its triad of containments. First, Israel has played a decisive role in assisting the United States in containment of the Soviet Union. In fact, the containment of the Soviet bloc made Israel an organic part of the *Pax Americana*. Secondly, Israel has gradually been given a free hand to pursue its own regional interests, virtually without limit. In other words, the containment of the Middle East, from neutralising Arab nationalism to disrupting radical political movements in the region, has become synonymous with the existence of Israel. Ironically, this role of Israel has also been reinforced by the very US client-states in the Arab World that have shown open animosity toward Israel. Finally, Israel has been given the privilege of playing a vigorous role in US domestic politics. Cases in point are the roles of the Israeli lobby in the US Congress and the US presidential elections. Documents suggest that Israel has been the right hand of the US government in the Middle East, being known in foreign-policy circles as the 'strategic asset'. As an inseparable part of the now defunct *Pax Americana*, aside

from the Palestinian question, Israel may have to adapt to the realities of the emerging world, in one way or the other.[57]

The picture becomes more complex if one includes (1) the reactions of backward-looking political forces within the client-states, including the Islamic countries, that are both against US domination and hostile to democratic values, and (2) the state of American political consciousness. The first point is of considerable importance, but it falls outside of our main focus in this chapter. As for the second point, that is, the ideological pecularities of American society, the experience of the Persian Gulf War is a good indication. For instance, the act of hiding behind yellow ribbons during the Persian Gulf War might be explicable in terms of society's own despair in dealing with this suddenly imposed war. Moreover, for many, the lack of interest in the origin of this tragedy may be a sign of resignation, and escape from the responsibility of adequate soul-searching. Whatever the case may be, this is an objectionable part of nationalism. What is worrisome about this national ritual of hypocrisy is the indifference of those who cry easily against a slight impropriety, but do not mind supporting their troops, despite the fact that they themselves have seen the slaughter on television, all day and all night long, as in the case of Bosnian Muslims. The question is: Why should the Iraqis be subjected to such a genocidal ordeal for the crimes of Saddam Hussein? The lack of political sophistication is one thing, the absence of compassion is another.

The Pandora's box has already been opened. In the present era of transition, the US threat to peace is not from strength but from weakness. Rhetoric aside, one may ask: What is the idea of being the only superpower in the world and not being able to compete against 'lesser powers' in the marketplace? What is the significance of 'winning World War III, without firing a shot', where the global order invokes different winning standards through the transnationalisation process?[58] It is apparent that at the present historical crossroads there are more questions than answers, but what is certain is the irreversibility of what has already taken place. We are now moving toward a multipolar world of transnational configuration in which US domination will undoubtedly be cut down to size. This does not mean that there will be a just and non-imperialist world. It does not even mean that, in an immediate sense, there will be a better world. It only means that the United States is no longer a global hegemon. President Brush's declared aims to continue to perpetuate the 'American way of life' in his dealings with the world community, are clear. He resorted to such a dictum in deciding to teach Iraq, a lesson.

The same theme recurs in his 1992 State of the Union Address. Pageantry aside, his initial intent is unmistakable:

> There are those who say that we can turn away from the world, that we have no special role, no special place. But we are the United States of America, the leader of the West that has become the leader of the World. As long as I am President we will continue to lead ... for the safety and security of our children.[59]

What Bill Clinton will do now is less clear, but it is difficult for him too to shed the American perception of world leadership and to preserve what Bush described as 'the American way of life'.

'The American way of life', of course, means different things to different people. In other words, the American way of life, just like beauty, finds meaning in the eyes of the beholder. One wonders what 'the American way of life' has in common with the preservation of the Saudi and Kuwaiti regimes.[60] Buying off and neutralising the Arabs with their own source of wealth is a 'neat' and powerful idea that has long been pursued by the US government for the sole purpose of extending American hegemony.[61] Here, crying for democracy and preventing it simultaneously has been the rule rather than the exception, as the above CIA interventions show. This has been the postwar US foreign policy *par excellence* in the Middle East and throughout the Third World, for as long as one can remember. The irony is that all this has been done in the name of the American people.

One is even tempted to say that the American global hegemony tends to take precedence over the cause of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, especially in the client-states.[62] The spillover of this peculiar policy has eventually blemished the cause of freedom and democracy in America itself.

From the standpoint of political hegemony, the nation-state system under the *Pax Americana* has lost its significance. The client-state system has been challenged by Third World resistance. The Vietnam experience, particularly, is a classic example that inspired many Third World countries, and that set the stage for an all-encompassing crisis that swept through the underpinning of the US client-state system. Other challenges have presented themselves in a variety of forms and under divergent manifestations, including Islamic resurgence. The Islamic political developments in Iran, the Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, many parts of South-east Asia and, even, the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union, are all reflecting the breakdown of the old state structure. At a more general level, the client-states [illegible] in [illegible] state of decomposition worldwide.[63]

The world of the future will be shaped accordingly, despite the rhetoric advanced by the US elite.[64] The days of American global hegemony are numbered, with or without the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has

been a catalyst that has only magnified the existing symptoms in the global polity. Accordingly, the crisis of the US-sponsored client-state system is a visible sign of demise within the entire system. All this points to the decline of American hegemony. At the same time, the transnationalisation of oil has provided ■ formidable challenge to the United States since the early 1970s. No amount of conquest, not even the total military takeover of Saudi Arabia, can alter the decline of US global hegemony at this stage of global transformation.

Meanwhile, the US reaction to its hegemonic decline could pose problems for world peace. This is ■ sign of global disorder. The world order under the *Pax Americana* is no more. The New World Order has yet to arrive. The present world order is in a state of limbo, depicting a New World Disorder. The recent war and the continued US military presence in the Persian Gulf show that the United States is unwilling to accept the reality of its modified role in the emerging world. Thus, in this transition stage, we have no choice but to bear the risk of seeing more political upheavals, including those coming from Muslim countries, such as what we have seen so far, at least for the remaining part of the 1990s.

NOTES

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Harvard University. The usual disclaimer, however, is in order here, as I alone am responsible for the views and any remaining errors.

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2 Minority Crises: Majority Options

Syed Zainal Abedin

Like other ethnic or religious minorities elsewhere, Muslims as minorities also face tremendous difficulty in different parts of the world. There are no easy solutions to redress the grievances of Muslim minorities. Had there been a major Muslim power, parallel in strength and influence to the USA or Israel, it could have solved the problem by resorting to one of three options: (i) intervene militarily, as George Bush did in Panama, to force the country concerned to treat its Muslim minority as equal to the majority community in all respects; (ii) negotiate and arrange repatriation of the minority Muslims to a Muslim majority country, as Israel has been doing with regard to Russian or Ethiopian Jews; and (iii) pursue the path of quiet diplomacy and peaceful negotiations with the country concerned. But Muslims today have little latitude to act according to their goals and interests.

There is no Muslim superpower and the *Ummah* (the global Muslim community) is nothing but a myth. The *Ummah*, controversially represented by the OIC, is more interested in maintaining the status quo and in promoting commercial interests of Muslim countries than imposing sanctions against countries (Bulgaria, for example) which do not accord equal treatment to their Muslim minorities. Unless minority Muslims worldwide review their extra-territorial ideology and psyche, appreciate the reality of nation-states, and Muslims in general learn to be less rhetorical and emotive, and live peacefully with non-Muslims, there is little hope of restoring confidence in the non-Muslim mind.

The 'Muslim World' today is faced with so many challenges; more so, Muslim minorities. Theoretically speaking, the Muslim *Ummah* faced with a situation of crisis in places where Muslims are a minority has three possible avenues of action open to it:

Option One:

Use its awesome power – economic, political and military – and its considerable access to and influence in international forums to resolve by unilateral initiative the predicament of the Muslim minority. Something

of the order of what former President, George Bush, on the pretext of protecting American citizens in Panama, did to solve the Manuel Noriega problem. Or what Mikhail Gorbachev, on the pretext of protecting the 30 per cent Russian minority that lives there, did in the case of the two Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia.

Option Two:
Negotiate and arrange the repatriation of the affected minority community to a Muslim-majority country. Something that Israel is doing in the case of Soviet Jews, or has done in the case of the Falashas of Ethiopia or the ancient Jewish community of the Indian sub-continent.

Option Three:
Pursue the path of peaceful negotiations, quiet diplomacy and discreet persuasion exercised on both the minority community concerned as well as its host non-Muslim government.

The choice of the right option from the above would, to a considerable extent, be determined by the *Ummah's* immediate aims and objectives. In other words, the *Ummah* would need to determine whether its primary and immediate aim was to:

Relieve the desperate situation of the Muslim minority concerned, mitigate the hostility of the non-Muslim majority against it and help reduce the severity of the brutal measures enforced by those in power, or,

Engage in investigating the origins and roots of the problem, determine culpability and with this evidence in hand, mobilise world opinion against the offending party, thereby hoping to seek redress and restitution for the Muslim minority.

In so far as the second aim is concerned, it usually involves a long drawn-out process. For, besides the fact that accusation never leads to conversion, it should be kept in mind that, in any situation of conflict, no one side has ■ monopoly on accusatory strategies.

THE CASE OF BULGARIA

Bulgaria is a case in point. When, in 1987, the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs published the Organization of the Islamic Conference's 'Report on Bulgaria' in its journal, the Bulgarian government insisted on

the right to reply. The reply, when received, was in the name of a Bulgarian Muslim *mufti*, and a reading of it made clear that it was not only the Turks who could conjure up a staggering volume of accusatory material; the Bulgarians possessed their own plentiful supply of explosive substances. They even had a peculiar advantage. Whereas the Turks could go back to a period of less than one hundred years of Bulgarian perfidy, the Bulgarians had a continuous block of at least five hundred years or more, when they were under the occupation of the Ottoman Turks, from which to draw all manner of self-serving conclusions. Many Muslim scholars, on reading the *mufti's* report, asked the Institute for permission to compose a rebuttal. But in all such situations the question to ask is: Where will it all end? To adopt the accusatory mode in a crisis situation is to tread a dead-end path. In the meantime lives continue to be lost and Muslims continue to suffer.

Nevertheless, for the sake of argument we may take the instance just noted and imagine a scenario in which, through the superior use of evidence provided by our historians, it is possible to establish the one-sided malfeasance of the Bulgarian government. Even if this could be done, would Bulgarians, embarrassed by the disclosure of their stark culpability and exposed before world public opinion, agree to make restitution? Did such a thing happen at any time in the contemporary period? It did not happen in the cases of Panama, Romania, Albania, or even in the case of the Soviet Union prior to Gorbachev and Yeltsin. So why should it have happened in the case of Bulgaria?

Impetus for Change: The Internal Factor

In all the cases cited above, changes occurred because of one of two factors: the internal factor, or the external factor. By the internal factor is meant the bold initiative of the victims of repression themselves, the aroused citizenry of these countries. Could the Bulgarian Muslim minority have done this successfully? To their credit it must be said that they tried to organise protests in defiance of the brutality of their government. But in our times it is extremely difficult for a minority, however large, to challenge successfully the machinery of a modern state, however small. The risk is worth taking only in extremely critical situations and with full comprehension of the incalculable price that would have to be paid in terms of human lives and material goods. Could the Bulgarian Muslims have done it with the help and assistance of other repressed groups within the country? This question is relevant because it is sometimes overlooked that the Bulgarian Turks were not the lone target of the policies of their government. Evidence now available confirms the view that, except for

the Communist Party, almost every other group among the Bulgarians suffered under the Zhivkov regime. The same was true in other East European states as well.

But the prospects of such collaborative effort had been sealed long ago. The Bulgarian Turks, as a result of both subjective and objective factors, had not been involved in mainstream national life. Subjective in the sense that, since they were the former ruling elite, once power passed into the hands of the non-Turkish majority, the Turks shrank into themselves and became ghettoised. Objective in the sense that since the Slavs had, after a protracted struggle, won back power they were obsessed with the fear of a Turkish revenge, and hence maintained a very restrictive and harsh policy towards the Turkish minority. Thus the possibility of the Bulgarian Turks mobilising against their government, in a collaborative effort with other suffering groups in their country, did not exist.

One such opportunity did, however, come their way when, at the outset of the national crisis in 1989, the democratic forces in the country rose up in defiance of Zhivkov. But the Turkish Muslims, although perhaps the worst sufferers, kept aloof from the national struggle and hence reinforced their alienation. It was only after the democratic forces had successfully dislodged Zhivkov and the more liberal Mladenov had come to power, that the Turks organised a separate rally demanding restoration of their rights. Up till then, the main hostility against the Turks came from the Zhivkov government.

Added to this is the fact that the Turks of Bulgaria occupy, from the viewpoint of their government and compatriots, a strategically sensitive region. It is strategic in the sense that it is contiguous to Turkey, with whom over the last hundred years or so Bulgaria has had a very uneasy relationship. The Bulgarian Turks, on the contrary, have quite naturally regarded Turkey as a fraternal state with which they have close linguistic, cultural and religious ties.

It should also be noted here that in all East European states the democratic opposition was not a unified, well-integrated whole. It comprised several large and small opposition groups, each having its own structure, policy and goals. But each of them joined hands to fight the Communist monolith under the shared banner of democracy and freedom. So one could see how natural it would have been for the long-suffering Turkish minority to join hands in this effort and how conspicuous they would have become in the eyes of the freedom fighters by their failure to collaborate and assist in this long-cherished and widely shared goal.

It should therefore have come as no surprise that certain groups in Bulgaria, after the overthrow of Zhivkov, changed course and pleaded with the then new Mladenov government not to restore full democratic

rights to the Turks lest national security be jeopardised. And the world witnessed the most unlikely spectacle, of a government with such a record of 'democracy' standing up in defence of the civil and human rights of the Muslim Turks and attempting to pacify the general public against them.

The External Factor

Now let us briefly discuss the external factor. It is useful to ask: could the neighbouring Muslim state of Turkey have undertaken any Bush-like redemptive effort on behalf of the Bulgarian Turks? This question sounds preposterous on the face of it. And it is perhaps so. But it was Turkey which, with all its limitations, kept the issue of the Bulgarian Turks alive. It was because of this, perhaps, that the Bulgarian case (with the exception of Bosnia Herzegovina) has received more international attention than any similar Muslim-minority case elsewhere in the world in recent times. Not only the Muslim world, but the Western and the Eastern non-Muslim worlds as well, became acutely alive to the issue. Within the Muslim world, it was Turkey's perseverance that finally persuaded certain extremely cautious and politically circumspect Muslim countries to publicly come out in support of the Bulgarian Turks. It could also be Turkish pressure that nudged the normally fractious Muslim member states of the OIC to agree, in 1987, to the sending of a fact-finding commission to Bulgaria.

Beyond this, Turkey could not proceed. It suffered from too many limitations. Turkey was a member of NATO, Bulgaria was a member of the then Warsaw Pact. Turkey for years had been hankering to be accepted as a full member of the European Economic Community, to which are tied its future developmental prospects. Further, at a time when the Bulgaria issue peaked, Turkey was already suffering from an acute economic malaise. Because of these and other factors, it was perhaps difficult for Turkey to repeat its Cyprus performance. If Turkey was thus hamstrung, could the Muslim world in general and the *Ummah* (in this case the 45 member states of the OIC) have adopted and executed the Bush model? Preposterous though this idea may be to some, the bold initiative of the OIC and the significance of its unprecedented decision to send a delegation to Bulgaria can perhaps be acknowledged. Along with the OIC, the government of Bulgaria also demonstrated some courage as a sovereign nation state by consenting to the visit of a foreign delegation to inquire into the condition of a group of people who, after all, were nationals of the state of Bulgaria and for whom, technically speaking, the government of Bulgaria was not accountable to any outside power. The only other instance of such extra-territoriality in modern history was

perhaps that of Ottoman Turkey in the late nineteenth century, when it allowed sundry Western powers to act as protectors of non-Muslim minorities resident within the Ottoman domain.

The Islamic Foreign Minister's decision was apparently taken in 1986/87. Even if one were to note the fact that international councils (like the OIC, EEC, OAS etc.) lack the ultimate sanction of power and have to rely on consensus (and the larger the group the more difficult this is) it had taken the Muslim world more than four years to decide what to do with respect to the critical situation in Bulgaria.

The OIC Report, when it finally came, reflected the painstaking effort the Contact Group had taken to produce it. It also reflected the deep emotional stress the members had apparently been subject to. But the limitations of the Report were due not so much to these factors as to the questionable assumptions of the mandate itself, or to the absence of clarity *vis à vis* its mission, aims and objectives.

THE WORLD OF ISLAM SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The post-Second World War era had rudely thrust Muslims into a rather unfamiliar situation. In the period before the advent of colonialism they were used to wielding power and enjoying dominance; the colonial period subjected them to slavery and subservience. Thus, in the arsenal of group attitudes they knew either how to command or how to obey. They had, through most of their history, rarely learnt to live with others in equality and fraternity. When, in the period after the Second World War, they were released from their bondage, they slipped back, quite naturally, into their previous command stance. They recaptured, at least in their fancy, the glory of their previous dominance, little realising that, Rip Van Winkle-like, they had awakened into an altogether different world.

Another aspect of Muslim historical consciousness was the concept of the unity of the *Ummah*. The Muslim world was a united world. Muslims, wherever they were, were protectors of one another. Reality did not matter, the *wa'tasima* syndrome continued to condition their responses and emotional attitudes. Was it not so in the case of the Caliph *al-Mu'tasim* who, in response to the distressed cry of a *lone* Muslim woman, let loose the mighty armies of the caliphate and incorporated the offending non-Muslim territory into the Islamic domain?

Quite naturally, the OIC mandate reflected these long-cherished assumptions, held by the *Ummah* of the Muslim world. Hence, the OIC Report, in so far as the Bulgarian government was concerned, was both a charge sheet

and an ultimatum. Valiant and truly sincere efforts were made to establish guilt, and then followed ■ charter of unnegotiable demands. The document, however, was replete with the familiar Muslim *all* or *nothing* approach. Muslim world leadership courageously decided to dabble in international diplomacy but overlooked the fact that politics has always been the art of the possible.

With regard to the *Ummah* itself, the Report continued to operate within its long-held emotional assumptions: ■ refusal to see things as they are, instead of seeing them as they ought to be. How ought things to be within the Muslim World? Many had been taught to believe that Muslims were brothers and should unhesitatingly assist each other, especially in times of need. This is all well and good. But at some point there has to come ■ recognition that the *Ummah* concept, as earlier Muslims knew it, has almost expired, that if Muslims wish to retain any semblance of meaning and put it into context, their urgent priority is to redefine it. The fact of the matter is that the world we live in today is a world of nation-states. All these states are jealous of their national identity, their territorial integrity and their political sovereignty. The *Ummah* concept, on the other hand, is derived from an altogether different premise. It does not take into cognizance inviolable national boundaries or watertight political arrangements. How to make the *Ummah* concept relevant in these changing times is a major challenge facing Islamic political thinkers and social scientists.

It is possible to concede that, occasionally, there may be the need to lobby Muslims for a cause and it may perhaps even be desirable to invoke Islamic sentiments. But when Muslims are faced with hard-nosed issues, issues that have to do with life as it exists, not as it ought to exist, they need to put away sentiment and not count their chickens before they are hatched. This is particularly true when Muslims are dealing with a situation that involves non-Muslims. In such situations they have to be aware not only of their strengths, but also, and more importantly, of their limitations. The essence of leadership in our time consists not in forever playing to the galleries, but in persuading our emotionally-charged *Ummah* to act with restraint and learn to face reality, however painful.

Devices like economic boycotts, trade embargoes, withdrawal of ambassadors, even breaking-off of diplomatic relations, do not seem to mean much in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Building Bridges

If the above is in any sense a plausible analysis of the circumstances surrounding the Bulgarian case, then the only stance commensurate with the status of the OIC and the dignity of the distinguished members of the

Contact Group was to intervene as mediators rather than as partisan reinforcements.

A confirmation of sorts for this policy was witnessed, even during the Bulgarian crisis, in the case of two intensely hostile ethnic groups, neither of them Muslim, in a neighbouring East European country. Romania, as is widely known, has faced an ethnic problem similar to that of the Bulgarians. In recent times, the problem became acute, resulting in armed clashes between the ethnic Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority, in which several people died and nearly 200 were wounded in a single night. Mediation efforts by a third party 'secured a concession from each side'. The ethnic Hungarian minority won the right for its children to be taught only in Hungarian to university level. In return, local Hungarians assured Romanian nationalists, who had fought them on the elegant Square of Roses four days earlier, *'they do not want to reunite with neighbouring Hungary'* ([Emphasis added] News report, 25 March 1990).

Would it not have been possible, through prodding by the Muslim World or the OIC, for the Bulgarian Turks to come forward with a similar declaration of intent to that of the Hungarian minority in Romania? After all, one of the main points of contention between the Bulgarian Turks and their government was exactly this: the Turks wished to pursue education in their own language and the government was afraid that this might result in closer identification with a perennially hostile neighbour? (See OIC Report.)

The 'Islam in Danger' Approach

The Hungarian example could also help lay to rest another common Muslim obsession. All through the course of the Bulgarian–Turkish conflict, the bogey of the Crusades was raised again and again, more by outside Muslim agencies and less by Bulgarian Turks themselves. The argument was made, and widely endorsed, that the Bulgarian government was motivated in its measures against the Turkish minority by the hatred of Islam and the desire to eliminate Muslims altogether from Bulgaria. It was, the argument went, the Bulgarian version of the 'Final Solution' to the Muslim problem.

Such is the pervasive sense of insecurity among Muslims that no one, not even the highest representative bodies of the Muslim world, made any attempt to investigate or find documentary evidence for such an accusation. It was so much less trouble to have recourse to historical clichés. 'Islam in Danger' is such a sure and tested formula for arousing pristine passion among the simple, uninitiated Muslim masses that not only self-serving politicians but even highly responsible Muslim spokesmen and principled religious divines often succumb to the temptation.

We have already noted that the Muslim minority in Bulgaria was not the lone target of the policies of the Zhivkov government. Homogenisation or nationalisation being the objective, efforts were made among communist countries, including the former USSR, and China, to destroy the national identity of minority groups. Being a barrier in this pursuit, Islam, Catholicism, Judaism or any other ism was viewed with hostility. The target was not any particular religion, but religion as such. The danger in viewing these measures as selectively directed against Islam was one of failing to make common cause with other co-sufferers in the fight against communism. The war against communism worldwide was not and should not have been labelled as a Muslim war, but as a war against dictatorial tendencies, lack of freedom of thought and action and the free flow of ideas. Designating a dispute – local, political or national – a religious dispute is a very serious matter, since it places an awesome responsibility on the Muslims as a community and yet, at the same time, lands them in a dilemma. The Muslim *Ummah* unfortunately does not exist, except as an idea. Individual constituent states are not in a position, militarily, politically or anywise, to do much. So, to salve their conscience, they end up making wild and rhetorical statements that do not cut much ice, but simply muddy the waters and provide opportunity for others to hold up the *Ummah*, and thereby Islam, to inherent militant and terrorist tendencies.

What happened in Bulgaria, then, however cruel and callous it may sound, was neither unusual nor unique. It had been happening all over the world and, significantly, not only to Muslims but equally to non-Muslims. We have just cited the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The case of the Greek Muslims is no different, nor that of the Muslims of India or of the Philippines or of Burma, or of Spain and Portugal, and so on. One can see that the syndrome in all cases is identical. A community of Muslims, through a long-drawn historical process, was transformed from a ruling elite to a minority. It is a minority but still numerically significant: from 1.5 million in Bulgaria to 120 million in India. It also has pockets of demographic and territorial concentration, regions where it is in the majority. These regions of concentration happen to be contiguous to a sovereign Muslim state, (as in the cases of Bulgaria in East Europe or Kashmir in India, or Mindanao in the Philippines, or Sinkiang in China or the Arakan in Burma, or the Central Asian Turks in Russia). Because of several legitimate factors (ethnic, linguistic and religious, which in some cases are reinforced by kinship ties as well), Muslims in such regions are emotionally drawn toward the neighbouring Muslim states.

The problem is that non-Muslim states, without analysing the historical factors behind this natural and essentially harmless predicament, tend to

bring its repressive mechanism into play. This alienates an already confused and bewildered minority. Repression breeds alienation and alienation, on its part, breeds a longing for freedom and change; thus, setting the scene for a major conflagration. Few, if any, non-Muslim governments, nor the Muslim minority, ever ponder on the long-term consequences of its short-term measures. Each one, by the inexorable logic of events, is pushed from one crisis to another.

On how many occasions, in how many countries, has this drama been re-enacted since the beginning of the first onslaught of the West against the Muslim world? One is reminded of the noble sacrifices of a Sanusi, a Mahdi, a Shamil or an Ismail Shaheed. Saintly and totally dedicated, they dreamed noble dreams, but never quite awoke to the reality of their present. Today Muslims read about their daring exploits, and they inspire and inflame them all over again. Since, invariably, they failed in their sublime endeavours, the right approach would be not only to concentrate on what they did and draw inspiration from it, but also, and primarily, to ponder on what they did not do and draw instruction from it. Otherwise, Muslims across the globe will relive this history forever.

THE WAY AHEAD

Muslims are now entering a very grey and uncertain era. In the flux of change that is surrounding and affecting them, despite all claims in the Muslim world to the contrary, they are actually adrift, knowing not precisely where they want to go or the best way to reach there. So, above everything else, Muslims have first to acknowledge that they are lost, and then, once consciousness has sunk deep, to critically re-examine their basic postulates about life, its meaning and purpose and the role they are supposed to play in it – today's modern world of nation-states.

Until such a challenging task is undertaken they can, at least for the present, put on record things that they should not do, attitudes that they should not adopt, policies that they should not pursue and forms of action, individual and collective, that they would circumvent.

Since the focus of this discussion is the relationship between Muslim minorities and Muslim majorities, much of what follows is relevant to this subject alone.

It has thus far been argued that religion should not, as a matter of course, be dragged into every conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. The crusade syndrome in particular is now old hat, and has been for some

America and the Communists all over the world, even the Muslims among them. What do Muslims have that draws such a virulent response? It could not be Islam, as faith and ideology, for it is rarely in evidence among modern-day Muslim communities. It has to be Muslims themselves. There must be something in their past or present that scares others. Should they not try to find out? Should they not yield for ■ moment their unyielding self-righteousness and concede, even if fleetingly, the possibility that they may have it all wrong; that instead of being the ambassadors of peace and goodwill, as Islam would want them to be, they have become promoters of their own little ethnic, political and national causes and have commissioned Islam into service for this purpose.

One is reminded of ■ speech made by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in New Delhi in 1937, upon assuming the office of the President of the All India Muslim League. He warned that it was unfair to ask people to lay down their lives unless they were given ■ specific and attainable goal.

In the Muslim world today there is no commodity cheaper than human life. All through human history men have offered their lives, sometimes for an ennobling idea, at other times in an endeavour to raise the moral and spiritual consciousness of the race; in sum, to leave the world a better place than they found it. Today, and Muslims need to ponder about it, Muslims are willing to die for ■■ article of clothing, ■ language or a dialect, the name of a street or building, the right to celebrate ■ festival or give their children a certain name – just about anything. As if life were ■ locally manufactured commodity, replaceable at will. This blatant degradation of life must cease in order that Muslims can progress as a community and as productive of the international world of states. There are occasions when life has to be given and taken, but what one needs to recognise is that there are also occasions, and these are much more numerous than the former, when the sanctity of life has to be upheld, protected and preserved. And we should learn to know the difference. To manipulate the pristine passions, especially of the widely dispersed and largely uneducated and uninitiated masses of believers, is ■ crime against Islam and the *Ummah*, against God and mankind.

Till such time that Muslims are able to spell out the varied implications of the concept of the *Ummah* in modern times, the nature of the Muslim world's relationship with its minority constituents, the obligations they mutually owe each other, the responsibilities that rest with the *Ummah* in the light of this determination and the ways and means it possesses to fulfil them, Muslims should desist from raising expectations that they cannot fulfil, emphasising affiliations that no longer exist, making threats that

cannot be backed by action, making demands on the minorities that can be met only by ultimate and unavailing sacrifice.

Every age has its own ideals of success, and correspondingly its own ways of achieving it; at times a capacity for enormous physical daring and sacrifice. Our times appear to require skills of a different kind: coolness, foresight, planning, skills of the mind before which even enormous military and technological prowess is of little avail, as with the American débâcle in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, in recent history. More and more nations and peoples of the world are learning to heed this lesson. One can actually argue that they have very little choice. The proliferation of weapons of destruction among an increasing number of nations of the world, threatens the very survival of the human race on planet Earth.

What about the Muslim world in general? What would it recommend to more than one-third of its constituent members, those who live as minorities in different parts of the world? An increasing number of these communities are beginning to face all manner of problems, primarily because they are minorities, and secondarily because they are Muslims. What would stable and prosperous Muslim States advise them to do? Continue the good fight? At what price and to what end? The price of life and the total elimination of the community? While they, the *Ummah*, stand as committed bystanders, unable to move because they have their own national interests to protect, or their regional and international alliances to uphold, or simply unable or unwilling to make any effective intervention in favour of their brethren in faith, momentarily positioned to be martyred at the altar of their communal ego? Under the existing international order there is very little that the Muslim majority communities could do to rescue the Muslim minorities in their very difficult plight.

There are internal constraints as well. The Muslim *Ummah* possesses power, but it is diffused. It has enormous resources but they are not always available for the general good, or for promoting the causes of the *Ummah*. In any case, its true strength has always rested in the stunning capacity of its faith to make friends of foes, soften the hearts of the most implacable enemies and find defenders in the very heartland of unbelief, totally regardless of anything Muslim communities desired or did.

Today one can say that this is the only strength the Muslim possesses, the one that could stand up to the challenges of our times. Their strength is to genuinely practise the universalist teachings of their faith, Islam, and to practise it in such a way that it will help not only them, as a community of believers, but others. After all, in retrospect, if the Makkan community

bring its repressive mechanism into play. This alienates an already confused and bewildered minority. Repression breeds alienation and alienation, on its part, breeds a longing for freedom and change; thus, setting the scene for a major conflagration. Few, if any, non-Muslim governments, nor the Muslim minority, ever ponder on the long-term consequences of its short-term measures. Each one, by the inexorable logic of events, is pushed from one crisis to another.

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time now (the pursuit of power and dominance goes by other names now). Yet it has been employed by agencies of the Muslim world *ad nauseam*. It has, one suspects, become a cover for lack of analytical skill and diplomatic finesse on the states' many initiatives. In the case of Bulgaria, for instance, does anyone in the Muslim world truly believe that the 'man on the street' knew anything about Islam, to hate it? This is even questionable regarding the Bulgarian political leadership or the government.

What all of them knew, of course, was a group of people with whom they had a long-standing history of conflict and rivalry for power and dominance. That this group happened to be Muslim was incidental to the issue; if it had been Christian (as in the case of Romania) or Jewish it would not have made much difference to the points of contention between them, because the issues were and are primarily bread-and-butter issues, and only secondarily (if at all) religious issues. Furthermore, even if we were to assume that it was a conflict between two religious groups, would it necessarily follow that since they hated the Bulgarian Turks they would also hate Islam? The Muslims of the Middle East have had a protracted conflict with the Jews of Israel. Does this mean that Muslims hate Judaism? Or even all Jews everywhere? Nothing could be more implausible. Anyone knowing the least thing about Islamic doctrine would know of the great reverence and respect in which the Prophet Moses is held by all Muslims, and despite the breadth and intensity of the conflict with Israel, Muslims continue to harbour cordial relations with Jews who are not Zionist.

Transforming political issues into religious issues is, to be serious about it, a very dangerous game. As we noted earlier, once they claim that the Bulgarian issue, or any other issue, is 'religious', Muslims unwittingly place an almost unbearable burden on the *Ummah*. Muslims now comprise almost a quarter of the total world population. They are to be found in at least 95 countries around the globe. Naturally, this large number, living in so many different cultural and political environments and under so many different systems, is bound to face many kinds of social, economic and political problems. If Muslims chose to Islamise all these issues, Islam would be forced to be in battle harness all the time. Instead of being a blessing for mankind, a pathway to peace and harmony, it would become (if it has not already) a factor for divisiveness and instability.

Should not the Muslims, at some point, ask themselves the question: Why do many religious communities in the world harbour suspicions about Muslims? Evidence abounds on this, which occurs in communities like the Buddhists in Sri Lanka, the Catholics in the Philippines, the Hindus in India, the Confucianists in China, the Protestants in North

had failed to heed this call, in all probability there would have been no Muslim community in history to speak of. It has sometimes been argued that the Qur'an counsels against taking those who deny truth as friends or allies. However, it should also be taken into account that the Qur'an made a clear exception to this rule in situations wherein the community had to protect or guard itself (Qur'an 3:28).

Part II
Islam and Muslims in Muslim-Majority States

3 Islam in Pakistan under Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq

Mir Zohair Hussain

The role of Islam in Pakistani politics under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (December 1971–July 1977) and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (July 1977–August 1988) indicates that Bhutto used Islamic rhetoric and symbolism to bring about, paradoxically, an Islamic revival that resulted in his overthrow. Zia-ul-Haq's 'Islamisation' campaigns have been much highlighted in the international media, and, like Bhutto, were used as a legitimising agent or strategy to secure the support of the polity.

An examination of the leadership styles, ideologies and strategies adopted by these two Pakistani leaders indicates how they are similar in some respects while different in others.

THE POLITICS OF ISLAM UNDER ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was a Muslim Pragmatist *par excellence.*[1] Like Pakistan's founding father – Quaid-e-Azam[2] Muhammad Ali Jinnah – he used Islamic rhetoric and symbolism to mobilise the support of the Muslim masses for him and his policies, thus contributing to an Islamic revival.[3]

Bhutto was born into a wealthy and influential landed Sindhi family. He began his education at the Bishops High School in Karachi and continued it at the Cathedral High School (Bombay), an institution modelled on British public schools. During this time Bhutto became friendly with the children of Bombay's elite from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds.[4] As a teenager, Bhutto idolised Jinnah, who at the time was spearheading the Pakistan Movement for a separate Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, since a number of prominent Muslim leaders came periodically to meet his influential father, he was exposed to politics early.[5] After completing high school in 1947, Bhutto pursued high education in the United States and England. After obtaining a BA (Honours) in Political Science, he went on to get his MA (Honours) in Jurisprudence from Oxford University and, simultaneously, a Bar-at-Law from Lincoln's Inn in London.[6]

Rise to Power

On his return home from England in 1953, he became a legal assistant to a successful and prominent Hindu lawyer in Karachi. At weekends, Bhutto often returned to the family estates in Larkana.[7] Some of Bhutto's visits coincided with the elaborate *shikars* (game hunting) organised by his father-in-law (father of his first wife). Besides high-ranking bureaucrats and prominent landlords, senior members from foreign (including the US) embassies, well-known politicians and high-ranking members of the armed forces were also invited. Occasionally, such nationally renowned personalities as H. S. Suhrawardy, Major-General Iskander Mirza, and General Muḥammad Ayub Khan graced the *shikar*. It was on these *shikars* that Iskander Mirza came to know, and liked, young Bhutto. Since Mirza was the President of Pakistan (1956–58), he nominated the young barrister in 1958 to become Minster of Commerce and Industry.[8] When General Ayub Khan deposed Iskander Mirza that same year, in a bloodless coup d'état, he retained his predecessor's entire cabinet. Within a short space of four years the bright and dynamic Bhutto became Minster of Information and National Reconstruction, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and was asked to oversee the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.[9]

In 1963, when Bhutto became Foreign Minister, he started to decrease Pakistan's dependence on the West and to increase his country's non-aligned status. The goal of his foreign policy was to improve Pakistan's relations with communist China. This objective had been shaped by the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the popular political dictum that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. It was further encouraged by the United States' and Britain's policy of providing large quantities of arms to India, despite Ayub's vociferous protests that the military hardware being given to India would eventually be used against Pakistan.[10]

Bhutto became even more popular in Pakistan when China diplomatically supported Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and the US halted arms shipments to both subcontinental combatants. In this way, Pakistan, which was heavily dependent on American weapons, was hurt far more than India, with her diversified arms supply.[11] After the cease-fire, the Tashkent Declaration,[12] which glossed over the Kashmir issue, triggered anti-government demonstrations in a number of West Pakistan's major cities. Bhutto, perceiving the mood of the country, denounced the peace treaty as a 'virtual surrender' and a few months later claimed to have even resigned over it. A rumour that Ayub was going to dismiss him from the government at US insistence enhanced his popularity among the Pakistani

masses.[13] On his travels through Pakistan, Bhutto realised that the general conditions in the country demanded a new populist political party which reflected the aspirations of the masses. This led him and a group of intellectuals to develop and publish the Foundation documents of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in November 1967, which defined the party's platform. Besides providing his new party with an appealing populist message, by naming it the Pakistan People's Party, Bhutto formulated such slogans as 'Islam is our Faith', 'Democracy is our Polity', 'Socialism is our Economy', and 'All Power to the People'. The PPP promised '*roti, kapra, makan*' (bread, clothing and shelter) for all Pakistanis if it came to power.

The substantive portion of the Documents were devoted to alleviating poverty through secular scientific socialism. The PPP's advocacy of a kind of Fabian Socialism as the panacea for Pakistan's socio-economic problems was evident in a number of Bhutto's speeches and statements made at the end of 1967, when he had just joined the political fray, and during much of 1968. At that time he felt that 'basic anomalies' in society could be tackled only with 'scientific socialism'.[14]

On another occasion, Bhutto wrote: 'Only socialism which creates equal opportunities for all, protects from exploitation, removes barriers of class distinction, is capable of establishing economic and social justice. Socialism is the highest expression of democracy and its logical fulfilment.... Socialism is, therefore, of direct interest to Pakistan.'[15] And again, in a public address, he said: 'No power on earth can stop socialism – the symbol of justice, equality and the supremacy of man – from being introduced in Pakistan.... It is the demand of time and history.... I am a socialist.... Some ridicule me for being a socialist. I don't care.'[16]

The Islamic emphasis in Bhutto's ideology of Islamic Socialism was noticeable in 1969, but became blatantly obvious during the 1970 election year. For instance, in his address to the District Bar Association in Hyderabad on 26 June 1969, Bhutto said:

> Islam is our religion. Pakistan came into being because we were Muslims. We will sacrifice everything for Islam. Islam means the strengthening of the Muslim people.... If you want to serve Islam, Pakistan.... Make the people powerful, and in this way you will be doing a service to your God, to your prophet, to your country.... There is undoubtedly the principle of democracy in Islam... it also contains the principle of equality. Islam emphasized ... equality [more] than on anything else.... We cannot see equality in Pakistan. We want to create equality but when we talk of equality, of socialism, we are dubbed anti-Islamic.[17]

At a public speech in Liaquat Gardens, in Rawalpindi, on 17 January 1970, Bhutto said:

> We are first Muslims and then Pakistanis. Unlike 'Islam Pasands' we not only like Islam, we love Islam ... our foremost principle is 'Islam is our religion.... In Islam, socio-economic equality or 'Musawat' has been given highest priority. The Prophet (peace be upon him) emphasized the importance of Musawat. We shall, therefore, bring about Musawat.[18]

In the 1970 PPP Election Manifesto, Bhutto declared that his party's ultimate objective was the creation of a classless society, which would ensure the true equality of Pakistanis. Since this aim was deeply embedded in the socio-economic and political philosophy of Islam, Bhutto felt that the PPP was merely striving to implement the noble ideals of the Islamic faith.[19] On another occasion, he stated: 'Just as democracy is an English word for Jumhuriet, similarly socialism means nothing but Musawat. Islam is the greatest champion of Musawat, and this equality my party wants to establish.'[20] On yet another occasion, he said: 'Islam was the first religion to give a message of equality for everyone. That is why we want Islamic equality to be established. Poverty and hunger cannot be stamped out without adopting the principles of equality.'[21]

In a radio and television address to the nation just before the December 1970 elections, on 18 November 1970, he said:

> There was a time in this history of Islam when the Great Umar declared that if along the banks of the Euphrates a dog should die of starvation, the Khalifah of Islam would be answerable before Almighty Allah. Here in Pakistan – in the largest Islamic State – men and women die of starvation by the thousands. Our children sleep in the streets without shelter. Our toiling masses live an appalling life.... The struggle in Pakistan is not between Muslim and Muslim, but between the exploiters and the exploited, between the oppressors and the oppressed. If the citizens of Pakistan are provided with employment, with food and shelter, with schools and hospitals, indeed with normal facilities, we would be acting in conformity with the injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah.[22]

When the press as well as the general public began to refer to the three Islamic political parties as *Islam Pasands* (literally, those who like Islam), Bhutto claimed that members of the PPP not only *liked* Islam but *loved*

it.[23] Subsequently, when the *Islam Pasand* parties tries to instigate the masses against Bhutto's atheistic socialism by raising the slogan 'Islam in Danger', the PPP retaliated by raising the slogan 'Capitalism in Danger'. The PPP's slogan rallied the poor majority, who had witnessed the gap between the rich 'capitalists' and the masses widening during the Ayubian era of capitalism (1958–69) in Pakistan.[24]

Bhutto's effective use of a potent religious imagery is illustrated by his designating a sword ■ his party's election symbol, thereby alluding to the legendary 'Zulfiquar-e-Ali', the sword of the fourth *khalifah* (Prophet Muhammad's religion-political successor), Ali. In so doing he sought identification with Prophet Muhammad's wise and courageous cousin and son-in-law, who had defeated many an enemy of Islam with his famous sword, thus contributing to Islam's expansion and glory. Moreover, Bhutto wanted the image of the sword to inspire the masses with the ideal of a *jihad* (holy war), to be waged by the PPP regime against the evils of capitalism and feudalism in particular, and against exploitation and injustice in general. In the realm of foreign affairs he promised a *jihad* against the evils of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. He also stirred his audiences by saying that he was prepared to lead Pakistan into a one-thousand-year-long *jihad* against India and to celebrate Shaukat-e-Islam (Glory of Islam) Day in New Delhi and Srinagar (Kashmir).[25]

During his whirlwind tours of West Pakistan, Bhutto pointedly made very publicised visits to the religious shrines of a few famous *pirs* (spiritual guides). He performed public prayers at popular Islamic festivals like *Eid*, in an attempt to counteract his conservative Islamic opponents' criticism that he was a *kafir* (unbeliever).

The first fair national election based on universal adult suffrage saw the PPP win 81 out of 138 sets (59 per cent) in West Pakistan. The PPP did not campaign in East Pakistan. The other major charismatic popular leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, lead his Awami League to ■ landslide victory in East Pakistan, securing 74.9 per cent of the votes cast there.[26]

The military junta and the civilian politicians of West Pakistan found Mujib's victory unacceptable because most West Pakistanis perceived Mujib's demand for east-wing autonomy as striking at the very foundations of a united Pakistan. So the junta dishonoured the election results to prevent Mujib from assuming the leadership of Pakistan. Mujib retaliated by calling for a civil-disobedience movement in East Pakistan, which escalated into ■ nine-month-long civil war and culminated in the establishment of Bangladesh. Having suffered an ignominious military defeat, Yahya Khan relinquished power to Bhutto on 20 December 1971, because the latter had won the mandate of West Pakistan in the elections.

Bhutto's Role in Pakistan's Search for Identity

The break-up of Pakistan, and the birth of Bangladesh from the crucible of East Pakistan on 16 December 1971, bore out the prognosis of non-Pakistani analysts who had claimed all along that the slender thread of Islam would be inadequate to hold the two distant and strikingly different wings of the country together. Since patriotic Pakistanis considered that prognosis as malicious anti-Pakistani propaganda, they were traumatised when it occurred. The creation of Bangladesh led not only to a transfer of power from Yahya Khan's discredited military regime to that of the Pakistan People's Party – which had won the mandate of the West Pakistani people in the elections held a year earlier – but also resulted in a vigorous debate about the very foundations of Pakistan's nationhood.[27]

Religious Pakistanis perceived the dismemberment of Pakistan as a manifestation of Allah's displeasure with a nation that had failed to be truly Islamic. Maulana Maududi, of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, attributed the dismemberment of the country to Pakistan's un-Islamic leaders and the lack of Islamisation, which had given rise to numerous evils, including subnationalism (regionalism or provincialism), parochialism, and class-conflict. In this way, the identity crisis generated in the aftermath of Bangladesh created a powerful Islamic current which was aggressively promoted by the *Islam Pasand* groups; it was also responsible for Bhutto's giving the 1973 Constitution a far more Islamic coloration than the two previous ones, despite his personal secular convictions.

Besides conceding a Constitution that was far more Islamic in letter and spirit than the previous two, Bhutto instituted a number of Islamic measures to appease, yet undercut, the powerful Islamic interest groups in the country. These measures tended to cast an Islamic overtone onto Pakistani society. Thus, between 1973 and 1976, Bhutto endorsed an Act of Parliament declaring the Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority, despite the fact that they had overwhelmingly supported him in the December 1970 elections,[28] changed the name of the Red Cross to Red Crescent, thereby symbolically, though superficially, Islamising the humanitarian organisation in Pakistan;[29] ordered that copies of the Holy Quran be placed in all the rooms of first-class hotels throughout Pakistan; established a Ministry of Religious Affairs for the first time in Pakistan's history;[30] encouraged the national radio and television stations to increase the number of religious programmes;[31] promoted Arabic instruction in schools and on radio and television; provided increased facilities for the separate Islamic instruction of Shi'ah for Sunni children in all schools; sponsored an international conference on the life and work of Prophet

Muhammad; and removed quota restrictions imposed on those wanting to go to perform the *haj* (pilgrimage); increased the pilgrim's foreign-exchange allowance; and saw to it that more ships and planes were made available during the *hajj* season to transport the pilgrims to and from Saudi Arabia.[32]

In his desire to win over the hearts of the Sindhi and Punjabi village folk, who revere their *pirs* and saints, Bhutto ordered ornate gilded doors from Iran to be placed at the entrances of two very popular shrines in Pakistan: one at Shahbaz Qalander in Sewan (Sind) and the other at Data Ganj Bakhsh in Lahore (Punjab). In addition, he invited the *imam* (prayer leader) of the Prophet's mosque in Medina, and later the *imam* of the mosque at the Ka'aba, to Pakistan.

Bhutto's Reorientation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Given the importance of overcoming the misunderstandings of Muslim countries regarding Pakistan since the mid-1950s, when it was allied to the West and when Pakistani Prime Minister, H. Suhrawardy, angered the Muslim world by referring to it as: 'Zero plus zero is after all equal to zero', Bhutto embarked on what he called a 'journey of renaissance' or a 'journey among brothers', which took him to twenty predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa. His journey helped rebuild Pakistan's bridges of understanding and friendship with the Muslim nations.[33]

During the Arab–Israeli War of October 1973, Bhutto supported the Arabs diplomatically, politically, and even materially.[34] He instructed Pakistan's UN delegation to assist other Muslim delegations in making common cause. His regime dispatched doctors and nurses to Egypt and Syria.[35] Pakistani pilots were set to assist the Syrian air-force, and a few army battalions were kept on alert in the event of Damascus being attacked.[36]

Pakistanis saw the nomination of Pakistan as the host of the Second Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore, as a result of Pakistan's espousal of Arab and Islamic causes since the nation's inception, as well as Bhutto's astute statesmanship. In fact, because of Bhutto's careful orchestration and the propitious political climate in the Muslim world, the Lahore Summit was not only the largest gathering of its kind in the post-Second World War period, but also very successful.[37] The Lahore Summit enhanced Pakistan's stature in the world, made Bhutto one of the most popular figures in the Muslim world, facilitated Pakistan's export of manpower to, and inflow of remittances from, the Middle East, and dramatically increased the inflow of aid from the oil-rich Muslim countries.

In Bhutto's opinion, his 'greatest achievement' lay in being the major architect of Pakistan's nuclear energy programme and the father of the yet-to-be-exploded 'Islamic Bomb.[38] He considered this achievement greater than stabilising and consolidating Pakistan, his domestic socio-economic reforms, the July 1972 Simla Agreement with India, the 1973 Constitution, the strengthening of ties with the Muslim world, and hosting the 1974 Lahore Islamic Summit Conference. In a book entitled *If I am Assassinated*, published in India, Bhutto is said to have written:

> We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have the capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.[39]

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Bhutto promised the share Pakistan's nuclear technology with his Arab benefactors once his country had built the 'Islamic Bomb' with their money. Israel's past military successes and probable nuclear capability helped Bhutto convince them that the existence of an 'Islamic Bomb' would not only deter Israel from ever using its nuclear arsenal against the Arabs, but also dissuade it from ever invading and occupying more Arab land. Moreover, Bhutto firmly believed, and was able to convince his Arab brothers, that with the 'Islamic Bomb', the Islamic bloc would no longer be weak and vulnerable; rather, it could proudly reassert itself as an influential power in international affairs.[40]

Bhutto's allegation that foreign agents (especially the American CIA) and domestic opposition forces (especially the pro-Western rightists) were conspiring to overthrow him in order to prevent the completion of the 'Islamic Bomb' was intended to make him a martyr, dying in the honourable cause of Islam,[41] thus enhancing his Islamic credentials.

Pakistan's Middle East Connection: Outflow of Pakistani Migrants and Inflow of Remittances and Aid

Bhutto accurately perceived the mutuality of interest between Pakistan and the Muslim Middle East. The major common interests were the following:

(a) Pakistan was foreign-exchange poor and labour rich, while the oil-rich Muslim countries had large foreign-exchange earnings but lacked skilled labour.

(b) Pakistan had a highly developed and well-regarded military establishment, while Arab countries had an underdeveloped military establishment and poorly trained armed forces. Consequently

> Pakistani officers were well-equipped to assist the training of Middle Eastern armed forces. In fact, during and just after the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, Bhutto sent a large number of Pakistan's highly trained and experienced civilian technicians and military officers to a number of Middle Eastern countries. Besides providing advice and training, Pakistanis were especially prominent in the commercial and military operations of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and several Persian Gulf kingdoms, sheikhdoms, and emirates. Pakistani training missions were also sent to Egypt and Syria, which had the largest military establishments in the Middle East.[42]

Using the 'politics of Islam', Bhutto was able to make Pakistan's export of manpower one of the country's major export items, bringing in nearly 48.9 per cent of Pakistan's foreign-exchange earnings by the fiscal year 1977–78, compared with only 15.1 per cent in the fiscal year 1974–75.[43] In fact, by 1977, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, Pakistan topped the list of labour-exporting countries both in numbers of workers, which was estimated at over 500 000, and in volume of remittances, which was estimated at $1 billion, nearly double its 1976 figure of $590 million.[44]

Bhutto's same skilful policies generated increased Middle Eastern grants, loans, oil at concessionary prices, and investments. Statistics reveal that prior to Bhutto's assumption of power, foreign aid to Pakistan from Muslim countries was inconsequential. Starting in 1974, Pakistan became one of the prime recipients of generous aid from the oil-rich Muslim countries. By the end of 1976, foreign assistance of Pakistan, mainly from the Middle East, contributed about half of the approximately $1.7 billion Pakistani development budget.[45]

Bhutto's Use of Islam in the 1977 Elections and After

The 1977 Election Manifesto of the PPP was different in style and content from its 1970 Election Manifesto. As the Spring 1977 election campaign in Pakistan gathered momentum, the eight opposition political parties constituting the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), used Islam and Bhutto's authoritarianism to combat Bhutto's regime. Sensing the Islamic thrust of the PNA's successful election-campaign strategy, Bhutto instructed the PPP rank and file to drop references to 'Islamic Socialism', and use the much more appealing term of 'Musawat-e-Muhammadi' (Islamic Egalitarianism), instead. Moreover, Bhutto and his PPP candidates stressed the regime's service to Islam and promised to do much more for the cause of Islam if re-elected. As one perceptive editorial in a local Pakistani

newspaper pointed out: 'The major emphasis in the People's Party Programme for the future is on Islam. This is in sharp contrast to the concept of trinity propounded in the last election – socialism, Islam and democracy.[46]

The PPP's overwhelming victory at the polls, despite the PNA's success in drawing mammoth crowds during the election campaign, left the PNA disillusioned and furious. Its members accused Bhutto of election fraud, and launched a movement to remove him from office if he did not concede to new national elections under the direct supervision of the judiciary and the army. When Bhutto refused to hold new elections, the PNA launched a civil-disobedience campaign, that succeeded because Bhutto had alienated many influential groups in the country during his years in power. Numerous mosques throughout Pakistan encouraged their congregations through religio-political sermons, and even organised many of their members to engage in a *jihad* against the secular and un-Islamic political parties. Their aim was to replace the regime of the 'Whiskey party leader', under whom 'Islam was in Danger', with the pristine purity of *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (Prophet Muhammad's System) or *Nizam-i-Islam* (The Islamic System).

As the PNA-led movement drew upon the enormous reservoir of genuine Islamic sentiments among the majority of Pakistani people, Bhutto reacted by announcing a series of Islamic measures in his press conference on 17 April 1977, including the immediate prohibition of alcohol in the country; all bars and wine shops were to be closed, and Pakistani embassies abroad were forbidden to offer alcoholic drinks at receptions; he ordered a ban on all forms of gambling and the closure of night-clubs; the Islamisation of the Pakistani civil and criminal laws was to be streamlined and completed in six months instead of the four years allowed by the 1973 constitution; the Council of Islamic Ideology was to be responsible for the introduction of Islamic political parties. Though these moves did not check the erosion of his support, they only heightened the Islamic revival sweeping Pakistan.

Having attempted to appease his opponents with little or no success, Bhutto imposed martial law on 21 April 1977, placed tighter censorship on the mass media, and jailed hundreds of people who opposed his regime.[47] However, when the use of force also failed to crush the opposition movement, Bhutto requested the Saudi Arabian ambassador and the Foreign Ministers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Libya, to do all they could to bring the Pakistani political parties to the negotiating table to resolve their differences in the 'spirit of Islamic solidarity and brotherhood'. This 'Islamic Solidarity Committee' provided a face-saving device for both the PPP-led government and the PNA-led opposition to negotiate issues. Arab mediators also promised financial assistance for new elections.[48] But even as a compromise was near, the

PNA Central Council, sensing victory, rejected the deal that had been tentatively approved by the negotiators. Now that PPP-PNA negotiations had failed, an intensification of violence, inevitably leading to civil war, loomed on the Pakistani horizon. To prevent such an eventuality, the Pakistani army – increasingly restive about its task of controlling civilian unrest for ■ leadership that had lost its legitimacy – acted out its time-honoured extra-constitutional role by executing a swift and bloodless coup d'état.[49]

The secular and liberal Bhutto – whom most people would least identify ■ an Islamic Revivalist – brought about ■ Islamic revival in Pakistan through his skilful manipulation of Islamic symbolism in domestic and foreign policy. However, the 'politics of Islam', in which Bhutto so acutely engaged in order to enhance his own power and popularity, came to haunt him in the twilight months of his tenure and ultimately resulted in his overthrow.

THE POLITICS OF ISLAM UNDER MUHAMMAD ZIA-UL-HAQ

For the first time in the turbulent history of Pakistan, a Muslim 'fundamentalist', in the person of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, assumed the reins of power on 5 July 1977, ostensibly ■ a 'soldier of Islam' temporarily heading a 'caretaker regime' and dedicated to engage in 'Operation Fairplay' and hold free and fair elections within ninety days. But a number of factors affected a change in that sincere initial intention and prolonged his stay in power until he died in an air crash eleven and ■ half years later. First, there was heavy pressure on him from his colleagues in the armed forces, who enjoyed the perquisites and privileges of power and wanted to stay on as long ■ they could to enjoy it. Zia, too, was not immune from corruption by the absolute power he had assumed. Secondly, there was an incredible amount of at least circumstantial evidence incriminating former Prime Minster Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of gross misuse of his virtually absolute authority while in office. Thirdly, Zia and the generals around him feared that, if the charismatic and vindictive Bhutto came back to power, they might well be humiliated, sent to jail, or even 'terminated' for subverting the constitution. Fourthly, Zia, who had strong Islamic predilections of his own, felt that Pakistan was initially created, in 1947, not just to be ■ mere 'Muslim homeland', but to be ■ genuine 'Islamic State'. In this respect, the revival of Islam in the world at large during the 1970s, and in Pakistan in particular, culminating with the 1977 *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (Prophet

Muhammad's order) mass movement, convinced Zia that he could possibly have been chosen by Almighty *Allah* (God) to fulfil Pakistan's destiny by making his country ■■ Islamic State.

Zia-ul-Haq: Formative Years and Gradual Ascent to Power

On 12 August 1924, almost a quarter of a century before Pakistan's creation, one Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq was born into the home of a petit bourgeois Punjabi family in Jullunder, a city in the modern Indian state of Punjab. His father, Akbar Ali, belonged to the agricultural *baradari* (brotherhood) and was ■ senior clerk in the Indian Civil Service under the British Raj, dealing with military audits. A very strict disciplinarian and a *moulvi* (Islamic cleric) or Islamic studies instructor, Zia's father saw to it that his seven sons and daughters awakened at dawn to say their first of five daily prayers. Zia and his six brothers and sisters were also taught the Quran (Islamic Holy Book) from a very early age, and indoctrinated never to question God Almighty's holy words in Quran, revealed to His last Prophet Muhammad 1400 years ago.[50]

After matriculating from Saint Stephen College in 1943, Zia joined the Royal Indian Military Academy at Dehra-Dun, in the foothills of the Himalayan mountains. On graduation as a newly commissioned Lieutenant, in May 1945, he was part of the occupation–liberation forces that were sent to Burma, Malaya and Indonesia.[51]

In 1947, army Caption Zia decided to migrate with his family to the newly created Muslim state of Pakistan. In this migration to his new homeland he was the escort for the last train to leave Babina (an armoured corps training centre in Uttar Pradesh, where he was stationed) for New Delhi, and then across the Indian border into West Pakistan and on to Lahore – the largest and most important city of the Pakistani province of Punjab. A journey that should have taken 6–18 hours ended up taking a terrifying three exhausting days, and left and indelible impression of Hindu–Muslim hatred and hostility.[52] These macabre scenes burned brightly in his brain and probably reinforced his conviction of the desirability of an independent Muslim homeland where Muslims would be able to practise employment, and where they would be free from the plague of communalism.

In 1972, following Bhutto's purge of ■ number of senior army officers suspected of 'Bonapartic influences', Zia-ul-Haq, whom Bhutto regarded as ■ professional soldier, totally apolitical and not driven by any perceptible ambition, moved up the military ladder a step, to the position of Major-General, and was given the command of an armoured division.[53] In 1973, an unknown but stern and well-dressed Major-General by the name

of Zia-ul-Haq just happened to be the presiding judge at the heavily covered and discussed court-martial proceedings against two dozen junior officers of the armed forces, in a conspiracy to overthrow the Bhutto regime and eliminate some of the senior military officers responsible for the Bangladesh fiasco.

Zia dispensed severe punishments of dismissal from the armed forces without pension, and lengthy prison terms, for the conspirators, on the grounds that they were guilty of treason in attempting to subvert and overthrow a popularly-elected constitutional government. The sacred constitution, according to Zia at the time, had been grossly violated and thus, despite Bhutto's public requests of Zia to take it easy on the treasonous conspirators, Zia, knowing Bhutto better than many people thought, went ahead and meted out a harsh judgement. Bhutto, who had followed the case closely for nearly a year for which it dragged on, was secretly very pleased and impressed with Zia's exemplary loyalty to the constitution and to his Prime Minister.[54] Zia-ul-Haq was also one of the team of Pakistani generals who loyally and faithfully carried out Prime Minister Bhutto's order to quell the Baluchi uprising for greater autonomy in 1973.

Always suspicious, and afraid of politically ambitious generals in the army overthrowing him, Bhutto pursued a policy of extremely selective promotions aimed at placing absolutely 'loyal' and 'obedient' generals in the senior-most positions of the armed forces. On a thorough review of Zia's file, after keenly observing him for nearly three years, Bhutto, whose intuition had often been right in the past, felt that he had found the ideal man to head Pakistan's powerful army. Bhutto promoted Zia on 1 March 1976 to the rank of a full four-star General, and elevated him to the position of Army Chief-of-Staff, ignoring or intentionally superseding eight more senior and competent three-star generals, who were much more entitled to promotion.[55] As Army Chief-of-Staff, Zia began to lecture and exhort the Pakistani *jawans* (foot soldiers) on the necessity of religiously observing *namaz* (prayers) and *roza* (fasting). He is also said to have invited a well-known *Jamaat-i-Islami* leader to deliver lectures on Islam in the military barracks. When Bhutto learnt about this through his network of informers in the army, he upbraided Zia.

After Bhutto rigged the March 1977 elections and won a landslide victory at the poll, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which was a coalition of nine political parties, refused to accept the results and called for the resignation of the Bhutto regime and the holding of new elections. When Bhutto refused to resign, the PNA called for a general strike. In May 1977, Zia is said to have written to a number of senior army officers, urging them to be dedicated soldiers in the professional military tradition (inherited from

the British) and leave politics to the professional politicians.[56] But in early July, with the country virtually paralysed, the top brass of the army was able to convince Army Chief-of-Staff, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, to temporarily step into the power vacuum at the top in order to stop the country from sliding into another devastating civil war.[57]

Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation Campaign

In the early hours of 5 July 1977, the bloodless military takeover of Pakistan was complete. On that day, General Zia-ul-Haq delivered a national address on radio and television in which he clearly stated that his dual mission was to restore law and order and hold free and fair elections on the basis of adult franchise within ninety days. In that same speech, General Zia said that Pakistan was 'created in the name of Islam' and would 'survive only if it sticks to Islam'.[58] Five days later, General Zia imposed martial law, became Chief Martial Law Administrator, and introduced a number of *Shariah*-based Islamic punishments – such as public flogging for the commission of several crimes, including murder, rape, theft, drinking of alcohol, fornication, prostitution, adultery, bearing false witness, and destroying government property in demonstrations and riots – that were intended to intimidate the opposition and induce fear of *Allah* in the criminal and disruptive elements in society.

On 1 September 1977, Zia increased the responsibilities of the Islamic Ideology Council that had been established by General Ayub Khan and revived by Bhutto. After nominating a number of prominent 'fundamentalist' *ulama* to the Council, the latter was given the task of formulating guiding principles for the implementation of *Nizam-i-Islam* (Islamic Order), and of suggesting ways and means to bring the existing laws into conformity with the Quran and Sunnah. Within a couple of years, the Islamic Ideology Council began to function as a major policy-planning body responsible for the Islamic reformation of the country. It was given the urgent task of recommending feasible measures to introduce a comprehensive Islāmic penal code, *zakat* (a self-assessed and voluntarily contributed tax of two and one-half per cent of a Muslim's total wealth), *ushr* (a voluntary tax of ten per cent, levied on agricultural produce), and an interest-free banking system.[59] Zia also revitalised the Ministry of Religious Affairs, an *Auqaf* Department (for the administration of religious trusts and institutions), and other institutions which affected religious practice.[60]

Immediately after postponing elections for two years, General Zia increased television and film censorship, and began to introduce Islamic

measures. Women were told to dress modestly, cover their head, and wear little or no make-up on television, in government offices, and in other public places; Zia himself rejected Western dress in favour of the dress worn by South Asian Muslims, namely, the *kurta* or *kameez* (a cotton or linen shirt), *shalwar* (baggy cotton trousers), and an *achkan* (waist-coat) or *sherwani* (long baggy knee-length coat) for men,[61] most of Zia's press conferences and public speeches started with a recitation from the Holy Quran and were in fluent Urdu;[62] entertainment in all forms in the educational institutions were strictly monitored to see whether they were complying with Islamic standards of morality and ethics; the walls of offices and educational institutions, calendars and billboards were adorned with quotations from the Holy Quran, and Hadith (Sayings of Prophet Muhammad).[63] Zia officially designated Friday as the weekly holiday instead of Sunday.[64] A couple of years later even dancing and music were discouraged by the regime, because they violated the Islamic sensibilities of the 'fundamentalists'.

Zia picked up Bhutto's idea of changing the names of public places, and carried it much further. Numerous streets, parks and public buildings (including schools, colleges and universities) throughout Pakistan were named after Muslim heroes and heroines. The city of Lyallpur was renamed Faisalabad in honour of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. English road sings were removed from streets over Pakistan, and Urdu signs went up instead.[65]

In August 1978, Zia invited a number of prominent leaders and scholars in the *Islam Pasand* (Islam-oriented) parties and groups within the PNA to officially join his administration as advisors (a few with cabinet rank) in order to help the martial-law authorities 'in the prompt and effective introduction of *Nizam-i-Mustafa*.[66] Although the Islamic State that the *Jamaat-i-Islami*'s founder and former leader, Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, had envisaged did not permit a military despot as ruler, *Jamaat-i-Islami* members were prepared to cooperate with the leader of a regime that shared their Islamic ideology and was prepared to implement a series of Islamic measures. In fact, Mian Tufail Muhammad, the *Amir* (leader) of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, said that this was 'a golden opportunity for the establishment of an Islamic system which should never be allowed to go unavailed of'.[67]

While members of the *Jamaat-i-Islami* accepted positions in a federal cabinet and as official advisors for the first time in Pakistan's history, they resigned from the government only eight months later because of the Zia regime's unpopularity and their own desire to campaign actively and win the November 1979 elections. Even when the November 1979 elections were indefinitely postponed and the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, along with all political

parties, was legally outlawed, on 16 October 1979, Zia continued often to express and even sometimes to implement Maududi's long-advocated ideas and ideals regarding an Islamic State.[68] These ideas included: (1) that the sovereignty of Almighty Allah and not the sovereignty of the people (as in the West) should be a fundamental constitutional principle in an Islamic State; (2) that the Islamic State should be ruled by a devout Muslim 'whose tenure of office and power are limited only by his faithfulness to the (Islamic) ideology of the state'; (3) that a leader, called an *amir* (ruler), should be chosen in some form of election from among those who were faithful to Islam and, once elected, should be advised by a *Majlis-i-Shura* (Advisory Council) 'composed of men with the educational qualifications to make valid applications of the fundamental law of the Quran and the Sunnah' (Words and Deeds of Prophet Muhammad); (4) that there should be no political parties and no provision for an opposition because that only caused conflict and divisions within the *Ummah* (Muslim brotherhood); (5) that non-Muslims should be allowed to reside safely in an Islamic State, but not to hold any major, policy-making positions; and (6) that minorities could vote in elections but only in separate electorates.[69]

On 2 December 1978, Zia seemed committed to the Islamic transformation of Pakistan. He announced his intention to start the process of establishing a legal system based on *Nizam-i-Islam* (the Islamic system). He established a permanent law commission to simplify the legal system and to bring all the existing laws into conformity with Islamic guidelines. The ultimate goal was to make the *Shariah* the basis of all law in Pakistan. In February 1979, Zia announced the establishment of special *Shariat* Benches (courts that would decide cases on the basis of the *Shariah*), and religious courts were established as a supplement to the existing judicial court. With the addition of a *Shariat* Bench as part of the Supreme Court, cases could be brought challenging the validity of any law. The *Shariat* Bench consisted of five judges, who were to be advised by competent *ulama* in matters of classical Islamic law. The main function of these Islamic legal bodies was to exercise a form of Islamic judicial review, where any citizen could request the judiciary to declare a law either wholly or partially un-Islamic. This was a big step towards establishing the supremacy of *Shariah* (Islamic Law) over the secular Anglo-Saxon law that Pakistan had inherited from its British colonial masters.[70]

On 10 February 1979, President Zia utilised the happy occasion of *Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi* (Prophet Muhammad's Birthday) to introduce a new set of Islamic laws in Pakistan. 'I am today formally announcing the introduction of the Islamic system in the country,' he declared. 'May Allah bless our efforts.'[71] Though far from the comprehensive Islamic system that Zia

would have wanted to implement, they nevertheless constituted one additional step in a series of socio-cultural, judicial, economic and political reforms designed to incorporate Islam more fully into the nation's daily life.[72] In this Islamisation campaign, Zia set for himself the goal of introducing 'concrete steps and solid measures' designated to transform the country's socio-cultural, economic and political principles.[73] Later, in a 1983 press conference, Zia said:

> My only ambition in life is to complete the process of Islamisation so that there will be no turning back ... the Islamisation process, its aims and objectives are straight on the path of righteousness. And that is what I call Islamisation.[74]

The *Jamaat-i-Islami* initially supported Zia and his Islamic penal code, launched in 1979. But seeing the unpopularity of the Islamic punishments, reverted to Maulana Maududi's view that the introduction of the Islamic penal code prior to its socio-economic prerequisites (i.e. the establishment of an Islamic economic and socio-cultural system, which included the elimination of poverty and the attainment of the basic necessities of life by all citizens) was neither a good policy nor was it recommended by Islam.[75]

During the month of *Ramadan*, fasting from dawn to dusk was glorified and heavily promoted in the mass media; restaurants, shopkeepers, motels and hotels were forbidden to serve food to Muslims from dawn to dusk. Government offices were ordered to set aside appropriate times for daily prayers during the working day; tremendous governmental and peer-group pressure was applied on observing, especially, the mid-day prayer in governmental and private offices, factories and other organisations; civil and military officers were advised to lead, or at least attend these prayers. The government publicised the annual *Haj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, with high government officials photographed and shown on television sending off and welcoming home pilgrims at the docks and airports.[76] In fact, even General Zia was shown in the mass media personally sending off planeloads and shiploads of pilgrims going to perform the *Haj*, or shown embracing *hajis* returning from the *Hajj*.[77]

The Zia regime's Islamisation campaign significantly affected the educational system of the country. The government established numerous cells, committees, commissions, university departments and other agencies assigned to study, plan or implement the Islamic transformation of society. The government arranged many conferences on Islamic subjects, topics and themes. It ordered the mass media to cover international, regional, national and local conferences and seminars pertaining to Islam. It hosted

national conventions of the *ulama* and *mashaikh* (spiritual leaders). It undertook a thorough revision of textbooks and course curricula in order to 'prepare a new generation wedded to the ideology of Pakistan and Islam'.[78] Urdu was made the medium of instruction in all English-medium public schools. *Islamiyat* (Islamic studies) was made compulsory for all Muslims. More government money started flowing into Quranic schools (mosque schools where the Quran and Hadith were taught). A *Shariat* Faculty was set up at the *Quaid-e-Azam* University in Islamabad in 1979; a year later, it became a separate educational institution, and was called the Islamic University.[79] Radio and television productions were ordered to conform to strict Islamic standards of morality and ethics as well as to reinforce the national identity of the citizenry. A law was introduced severely punishing those who defile the names of the Prophet Muhammad and the *Khulafah-i-Rashidin* (first four rightly-guided *khalifahs* – Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman, and Ali). Furthermore, after considerable pressure from the Islamic groups, the government even tried to establish separate educational facilities for males and females, but then abandoned the idea for lack of money and opposition from women's groups.[80]

In 1980, the Government of Pakistan publicised the Report of the Committee on Islamisation. The Report cautioned against an obsession with the means of establishing *Nizam-i-Islam*. Instead, it recommended creating a just society, which was the main goal of an Islamic economic system. This could be achieved by providing universal education, the improvement in the quality of life through the availability and easy accessibility of basic consumer goods, and an increase in the level of employment so that people could lead a decent life.[81]

The Committee on Islamisation clearly stated that the adoption of *zakat* and *ushr* were *not* crucial to the introduction of an Islamic system. But the Zia regime, which was committed to creating an Islamic State, wanted to adopt two or three prominent Islamic economic concepts to give the public the feeling that the regime was ushering in an Islamic economic system. It therefore proceeded to collect *zakat* and *ushr* during the holy month of *Ramadan* with much fanfare. A central *Zakat* Fund was established to help the poor and needy (such as those who were widowed, orphaned, handicapped, and aged), and General Zia proudly inaugurated the distribution of *zakat*, with much fanfare, on the national radio and television. Despite the fact that most of the *Zakat* Fund came from the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (and not from reluctant Pakistanis), General Zia optimistically declared that, as a result of the welfare measures such as *zakat* and *ushr*, Pakistan would be transformed into an egalitarian society in which 'hunger and beggary would be eliminated' and no 'citizen would go to bed hungry'.[82]

The Pakistani Shi'ah minority, emboldened by Iran's Islamic revolution (brought about by the Shi'ah *ulama*), decided to protest at the state-organised mandatory *zakat* and *ushr* collection because it was not in keeping with their *fiqh-i-Jafariyyah* (Shiite jurisprudence).[83] On 20 June 1980, General Zia's government realised the destabilising effect of the Shi'ah anger and appointed a committee of Shi'ah and Sunni *ulama* to study the *Zakat* and *Ushr* Ordinance, with a view to making recommendations for the improvement of the collection of *zakat*. 'The government announced: (1) that there would be no interference in the religious belief of individuals; (2) that no one dogma would be imposed on any Muslim sect; (3) that the Shi'ah community would be allowed to formulate its own procedures and establish its own organisation to collect, administer, and distribute the voluntary part of Zakat.'[84] *Zakat*, as a compulsory requirement for Shi'ahs, was withdrawn in 1981.

While Zia often gave in to the influential Shi'ah minority, the much smaller and weaker Ahmadi or Qadiani minority was not as fortunate. The Ahmadis, who had been placed outside the pale of Islam by the Bhutto regime in 1974, had their religious practices further restricted in 1984 because of their belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. In response to the heavy lobbying by the *Khatm-i-Nabuwat* (Finality of Prophethood) organisations throughout Pakistan, Zia was pressured into issuing Presidential decrees, in 1984, forbidding the Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims, from preaching to Muslims, from calling their place of worship a *masjid* (mosque), or utilising such Islamic religious practices as the *azan* (call to prayer).[85]

Some of the most controversial Islamic measures introduced in the Zia era were those pertaining to the role of women in the emerging Islamic State. The *Majlis-i-Shura* (Consultative Assembly or Advisory Council) angered many women when it unanimously approved, on 3 March 1983, the *Qanun-i-Shahadat* (Law of Evidence) Ordinance, bringing the Law of Evidence into conformity with Islamic injunctions as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. 'Fundamentalist' and traditionalist *ulama* within and outside the *Majlis-i-Shura* adamantly argued that only in matters which were confined to women's activities, could there be women witnesses. In all other matters there should be ordinarily two men, and, if they were not available, there should be one man and two women witnesses (i.e. the equivalent of evidence by two male witnesses). Though no Pakistani laws were changed, Islamic controversy permeated the political environment.[86]

Many women were insulted and enraged when it was stated that in an Islamic system charges of rape had to be corroborated by as many as four witnesses (an almost impossible requirement) to find the alleged rapist guilty. Failure to convict the rapist made the woman guilty of fornication

in Islamic law. A large segment of the female population was angry with Zia and other high-level government officials for saying that women should stay at home and not work in public places, where they would be interacting with men and vulnerable to sexual harassment, adultery, and rape by men. Many women also criticised the Zia regime for forbidding female athletes from competing in Pakistan or travelling abroad for regional and international competitive sports and games. Some women were very critical of the Zia regime for stopping women from participating in drama when men might be in the audience.[87]

The overwhelming majority of Muslims believe that Islam is against *riba* ('usury', which entails charging excessive interest) and not against charging or giving 'interest', which is necessary for the very survival of banking institutions and the numerous people that work for them and sustain their families as a result of their jobs. But many 'fundamentalists' (like Zia and those in the *Jamaat-i-Islami*) and traditionalists adopted a relatively narrow interpretation of 'interest' and took initiatives to prohibit it. As a first step, the Zia regime decided that the House Building Finance Corporation, National Investment Trust, and Investment Corporation of Pakistan would begin interest-free lending and deposits. The House Building Finance Corporation, for instance, adopted the gimmick of making certain types of loans on the basis of the sharing of rental income rather than sharing interest. Zia also asked the Islamic Ideology Council to come up with some feasible recommendations for the transition to an interest-free economy. After about three years of deliberations, the Islamic Ideology Council came out with a 188-page report which, except for a change of terminology (such as referring to 'interest' charged and given by banks as 'profit and loss'), recommended no Islamic solutions to the country's serious economic problems. Instead, the Islamic Ideology Council recommended the formation of more study groups and committees to do more in-depth research on establishing an interest-free economy. However, Zia's target of introducing interest-free Islamic banking in Pakistan by June 1985 was unrealistic and has made virtually no progress since his death in an air crash on 17 August 1988.[88]

The Zia regime also tried to Islamise Pakistan's secular political system, that had been inherited from the British colonialists. In August 1979, Zia amended the 1962 Political Parties Act. The amendments allowed for the registration with the Election Commission of only those political parties that limited their party funds to the lower levels mandated, swore allegiance to the Islamic ideology of Pakistan, and held party elections annually. 'Failure to comply with any of the provisions of the new ordinance, or propagation of any opinion against the Islamic ideology of

Pakistan or against the Judiciary or the Armed Forces would serve to disqualify ■ party from participation in elections.'[89]

In order to formulate feasible recommendations concerning the structure of ■ Islamic governmental system, Zia appointed ■ twelve-member committee of 'Scholars, jurists, *ulama*, and prominent persons from other walks of life'. On the recommendations of this body, Zia decided to hold non-party elections, in which the political candidates running for office would have to be practising Muslims of established honesty, ability and competence; and the voters would have to be practising Muslims as well.[90]

Perhaps the most blatant example of Zia's exploitation of Islam was the unprecedented nationwide referendum of 19 December 1984. In the referendum, the voters were asked 'Do you support Pakistani President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's programme.... to bring Pakistani laws in line with the Islamic principles, in accordance with the injunctions of the Holy Quran and the Holy Prophet – peace be upon him – and to safeguard Pakistan's ideology; and do you support the continuance, the further strengthening of this programme and the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people in an organised an peaceful manner?'[91] The proposal in the referendum was phrased in such a way that a negative answer would cast the respondent as an 'enemy of Islam and Pakistan'. On the other hand, if the majority said 'yes', then Zia would, in his opinion, have the mandate of the people to continue as President for ■ additional five years. While opposition groups were banned from participating and threatened with punishment for even advocating ■ boycott of the referendum, Zia toured the entire county campaigning for support for the proposal. Zia dismissed the 'need for the Parliamentary opposition to challenge the government's programme, because the programme is based on the Koran ... and the Holy Koran is my manifesto, ... so what is there to oppose?'[92] There were rumours of demonstrations throughout the country in opposition to the referendum, yet, on the day following it, despite considerable scepticism from critics, the government claimed ■ 97.7 per cent approval vote, with 62 per cent of the 35 million registered voters casting ballots. Sources close to the Election Commission maintain that only 20 per cent of the eligible electorate actually cast their 'votes'. Zia interpreted the referendum results ■ a mandate to remain as President for an additional five years and to continue the Islamic socio-cultural, political, legal and economic transformation that he had initiated.[93]

After twice postponing scheduled elections (October 1977 and November 1979), non-party or 'non-partisan' elections were finally held on 25 February 1985 to choose members for the newly established National

Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. But these elections were only partially free. After all, political parties could not participate in the elections because Zia regarded them as too divisive and un-Islamic; the political campaign funds that political candidates could use were greatly limited in order to restrict their campaigning activities; public meetings and processions were tightly controlled to prevent any anti-government movement from developing; the television, radio, and written press were censored so that the Zia regime did not become a target of major criticism; and whatever the verdict, President Zia had given himself the right to appoint the Prime Minister, dissolve the National Assembly, and remain Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.[94]

The 'Movement for the Restoration of Democracy' (MRD), comprising 11 political parties, told the rank and file to boycott the elections. But many of their followers did not obey. Having the rare opportunity to cast their vote, Pakistani voters turned out in large numbers. Over 50 per cent of the eligible Pakistani voters cast their votes. A number of Zia's cabinet members were defeated by unknown politicians. The *Islam Pasand* candidates suffered an embarrassing defeat at the polls, while those identified with the PPP did well.[95] On 18 March 1985, Zia took steps to protect himself when he promulgated new amendments to the Constitution, one of which specified that 'the President's orders made since the 5th of July, 1977, shall not be altered, repealed or amended without the previous sanction of the President.'[96]

On 20 March 1985, Zia appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo, a prominent Sindhi politician, as Prime Minister, and on 30 December 1985, President Zia gave in to intense domestic and foreign (mainly American) pressure to lift martial law and allow political activity. However, political parties had to register with the Election Commission after having proved that they were sufficiently committed to Islamic ideology. In this process, Zia's loyal civil servants were in a position to determine whether a political party passed the 'ideological litmus test' or not. Needless to say, this process was instituted to prevent the PPP from qualifying and contesting the elections.[97] On 29 May 1988, Zia dismissed Junejo along with his cabinet and dissolved the National Assembly. The major excuse he gave was that the Junejo Cabinet had not been able to maintain law and order and had done little 'to make the *Shariah* the basis of Pakistani law.'[98] Less than half a month later, Zia declared the *Shariah* as the supreme law of the land. This meant that any law passed by the National Assembly or the Provincial Assemblies would be required to conform to the *Shariah*; any laws that were found to be 'repugnant' to Islam would have been discarded or revised to conform with Islamic guidelines.[99]

Islam in Zia's Foreign Policy

When Zia came to power, he inherited Bhutto's successful foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the Muslim world. Like Bhutto, Zia believed that close ties with the Muslim world constituted 'a firm pillar' of Pakistan's foreign policy.[100] While Pakistani military advisors, technicians, and even soldiers, had been serving in a number of Arab countries form 1965, their numbers increased during Bhutto's tenure in office, and further increased during Zia's tenure. The export of Pakistani civilian manpower and goods to the Middle East also substantially expanded during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 1985 estimates point to more than half a million Pakistanis living and working in the Middle East. According to a reliable estimate, the overall total funds from official and unofficial (including remittances) sources abroad came to $4 billion per year by 1983. Pakistan was able to buy the latest military hardware from the West with funds from the oil-rich Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, and even got oil from these countries at bargain prices and with soft loans (low-interest loans that are repayable over the long term). Pakistan also benefited from Middle Eastern investments. Many hotels and much real estate in Pakistan were purchased with Arab petrodollars and the cosmopolitan city of Karachi became a hot spot for Arab vacationers.[101]

Zia, with the generous help of America and the oil-rich Persian Gulf kingdoms, orchestrated the Muslim world's support for the Afghan *mojahideen* (freedom fighters). Pakistani military advisors trained the Afghan *mojahideen* on weapons supplied by America, and organised them into an effective fighting force that prevailed in their *jihad* against the army and air-force of a Communist and atheist superpower. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hezb-i-Islami* (Islamic Party) – an Islamic 'fundamentalist' group committed to an Islamic State in Afghanistan – got more assistance from Zia than any of the other seven different guerrilla groups.

Zia was one of the Muslim leaders who called for the readmission of both Egypt and Iran to the OIC, despite the opposition of some Arab states. While coming closer to the pro-American Muslim countries, Zia also kept good relations with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary Islamic government in Iran, which was hostile to the West and to the conservative Arab monarchies. Zia sent Pakistan's Shi'ah foreign minister, Agha Shai, a number of times to visit high-level Iranian government officials (including Khomeini). In fact, Pakistan earned Iran's goodwill by withdrawing from the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in March 1979 (after Iran did so), selling Iran wheat and rice, and maintaining neutrality in the Iran–Iraq War despite heavy pressure from the West and the conservative Arab kingdoms to take Iraq's side.

Zia continued Bhutto's project of building the 'Islamic bomb'. Zia's commitment to building Pakistan's atom bomb was so strong that when US President Jimmy Carter offered ■ $400 million aid package to Pakistan, on the condition that Zia discontinue the atomic bomb programme, Zia rejected the aid by calling it 'peanuts' (an insult to Carter, who was ■ wealthy peanut farmer from Georgia). The newly inaugurated Reagan administration promised to increase the Carter offer dramatically and concluded a six-year aid package with Pakistan worth $3.6 billion (approximately $600 million ■ year) and nine times the size of the Carter offer. Unlike Carter, Reagan decided to ignore Pakistan's nuclear development programme and the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, that made it incumbent on the US government to discontinue giving aid to any county building ■ nuclear bomb. In 1981, the Reagan administration got Pakistan a six-year waiver of the Symington Amendment; this was extended for two and ■ half years in 1987, an ■ further extension was given in early 1990.[102]

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan ■■ important member of OIC and Zia a major spokesman for the 45-nation Islamic bloc. No wonder the plenary session of the 11th Annual Meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference unanimously elected Zia to address the 35th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1980. As spokesman for the OIC, Zia made several successes, and his government played a principal role in the UN – sponsored talks in Geneva that finally got the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Furthermore, Zia told all Pakistani diplomats in international bodies to complain about the persecution of Muslims around the world. In this connection, Pakistani diplomats complained bitterly about the killings of Muslims in Kashmir, Bombay and Bhiwandi in India.[103]

Factors Responsible for Zia's Islamisation Campaign and Longevity

Looking in retrospect, there were ■ number of reasons for General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation campaign: first, there was Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's own religious upbringing, profoundly Islamic socialisation, and sincere devotion to and practice of Islam; secondly, Bhutto had already done much to use Islamic symbolism and rhetoric to create ■■ Islamic revival in the country; thirdly, Zia was impressed by the success of the *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (Prophet Muhammad's System) movement which had swept the secular Bhutto regime from the pinnacle of power; fourthly, the failure of capitalism during the Ayub Era (1958–69)and socialism during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Era (1972–77) resulted in the Pakistani people (especially the

mass media and politicians) talking about the Islamic Alternative as a way of addressing the country's problems (such as poverty, corruption, and socio-economic injustice); fifthly, Zia was acutely aware of the fact that his military government lacked legitimacy, and so Islam, which had always been his security blanket and anchor in life, became a useful weapon with which to fight his enemies, as well as the key with which to consolidate, expand, and remain in power longer than any other political leader before him; sixthly, there was pressure on Zia to establish an Islamic system, from the *Islam Pasand* parties and pressure-groups, who claimed that Bhutto's removal through an Islamic mass movement was eloquent testimony to the yearning for an Islamic system in the country; seventhly, Zia's regime benefited from the generous aid from, and remittances earned by, the Pakistani manpower in the oil-rich Muslim countries during the 1970s and 1980s; eighthly, the success of the first Islamic Revolution in modern times, in Iran, reinforced the Islamic revival in Pakistan and all over the world and helped the Zia regime remain in power and continued promoting its Islamic message; and ninthly, the Zia regime effectively used its well-established Islamic credentials at home and abroad (especially in the help it gave to the Afghan *mojahideen* and Afghan refugees in Pakistan) to get more aid from the oil-rich Arab Persian Gulf countries and the West (especially the US) than most other countries.

The Post-Zia Period

Military rule came to an abrupt end on 17 August 1988, when President Zia and 28 others were killed (including nine senior generals and the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphael) in the mysterious air crash of a C-130 near Bahawalpur (Pakistan). The Chairman of the Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a former defence minister and a protege of Zia, took over as the Acting/Interim President and assured Pakistanis that the elections would be held as scheduled in accordance with the constitution.

The Western-educated and secular Benazir Bhutto campaigned throughout Pakistan, and her speeches emphasised the urgent need to grant real economic and political rights rather than the vague Islamic 'doses', which were 'a hoax played by the General Zia to fool the poor and the downtrodden'.[104] The *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (the Islamic Democratic Alliance, IJI for short, comprising seven political parties) was opposed to Benazir, campaigned on the continuation of Zia's domestic and foreign policies, and lambasted Benazir as a 'socialist' and an 'enemy of Islam'.

On 30 November 1988, the Pakistani electorate went to the polls and gave the PPP a majority of seats in the National Assembly. Benazir

Bhutto, daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became the first woman to govern the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In fact, the first woman in modern times to govern ■ predominantly Muslim nation. It is obvious that a significantly large segment of the Pakistani electorate seemed to pay no heed to the *Islam Pasand* parties, who claimed that in the Islamic world view it was improper for ■ Islamic Republic to be ruled by a woman. While the IJI lost the national election to the PPP, it was able to deprive the PPP of getting a majority of seats in the National Assembly, and was able to win ■ narrow majority in the Punjab Provincial Assembly. The IJI showing in the polls showed that a significantly large number of voters were alienated from Zia's legacy (the creation of an Islamic State).[105]

Benazir Bhutto failed to meet the unrealistic expectations people placed in her democratic civilian regime, and was dismissed on 6 August 1990 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

CONCLUSION

In many ways, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq were totally dissimilar: Bhutto was born into ■ wealthy Sindhi landowning family and came from the elite strata of society; Zia, on the other hand, was the son of a relatively low-level, middle-class, Punjabi–Indian civil servant, and remained part of the middle class for much of his life. Bhutto was born into an aristocratic political family, nourished on politics from ■ early age, studied politics both formally at university and informally as a voracious reader, and was a politician before he came to power. Zia, on the other hand, was born into ■ apolitical family, was himself relatively apolitical for much of his life, and was proud to be a professional soldier before he became the President of Pakistan.

Bhutto was brilliant, highly educated, well-read, widely travelled, and cosmopolitan. Zia, on the other hand, was of average intellect (but with keen intuition), with modest educational qualifications, relatively poorly read, relatively provincial and parochial in his worldview. Bhutto was ■ well-known national and international figure when he came to power, as he had served in a number of capacities in Ayub Khan's cabinet (including the highly visible position of Foreign Minister of Pakistan from 1963 to 1966). Zia, on the other hand, was ■ relatively unknown military officer with an undistinguished military record, when he came to power.

Bhutto was ■ charismatic and egotistical leader with ■ superiority complex, who thought he knew it all and wanted to monopolise power,

and reluctantly delegated or shared power. Zia, on the other hand, was a lack-lustre and humble administrator–bureaucrat, who attentively listened to people and took the advice of wise men and intellectuals. Zia was also disarmingly humble and much more willing to delegate and share power with his colleagues. Bhutto had a flamboyant and temperamental personality. Zia, on the other hand, was reserved, low keyed, and even-tempered.

Bhutto was more socialist-oriented and believed in the redistribution of wealth. When in power, he nationalised industries, banks and insurance companies and introduced land reforms that took land away from a number of *zamindars* (very large landlords) and gave it to landless peasants. Zia, on the other hand, was capitalist-oriented. Like all good capitalists, he believed in the free-enterprise system and privatisation. He went on to privatise the industries that Bhutto had nationalised.

Bhutto's use of Islam was intended to appease and undermine his enemies, win over a predominantly illiterate, religious, and gullible population, and get money from oil-rich Muslim countries. On the other hand, Zia's Islamisation campaign was taken seriously and caused much concern in some segments of the population, that did not like the Islamic 'fundamentalist' (especially *Hanafi*) direction in which the country was headed. Bhutto's use of Islamic rhetoric and symbolism were seen as hypocritical and fraudulent. After all, Bhutto was a secular and non-practising Muslim pragmatist, who, the *Islam Pasand* parties alleged, was a drunkard and womaniser, unfit to rule in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Zia, on the other hand, was a Muslim 'fundamentalist', who considered alcohol and womanising un-Islamic and sinful.

Bhutto's exploitation of Islam may well have contributed to the Islamic revival that ultimately destroyed him. Zia's Islamisation campaign probably contributed to his political longevity at the pinnacle of power. Bhutto believed that the founding fathers were mostly secular men, who wanted Pakistan to be a 'Muslim homeland' where Muslims would be free from Hindu *Raj* (Rule). Zia, on the other hand, believed that the founding fathers had clearly stated that 'Islam was in Danger' and wanted to create an 'Islamic State' in the Indian subcontinent.

In short, Bhutto and Zia not only had different backgrounds, personalities, and worldviews, but wanted to shape the destiny of Pakistan in two totally different ways. Both left an indelible imprint on Pakistani politics. Only time will tell which of the two left a more enduring legacy, and whose vision of Pakistan will come to prevail!

NOTES

1. Muslim Pragmatists are generally non-religious Muslims who cherish Islamic ideals and values, identify with the Muslim community and culture, and are perceived as Muslims by non-Muslims. Frequently, the Muslim Pragmatists do not practise the obligatory duties expected of all Muslims. Many in this group have been exposed to secular Western education. Despite their predominantly secular worldview and desire to promote secularisation and secularism, some of these Muslim Pragmatists engage in the politics of Islam to enhance their legitimacy.
2. An Urdu term that means Great Leader.
3. An Islamic revival can be defined as the renewal of heightened interest in Islamic symbols, ideas and ideals subsequent to a period of relative dormancy of interest.
4. Salman Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (London: Ithaca Press, 1979) pp. 25–7; Dilip Mukerjee, *Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972) p. 27
5. Taseer, op. cit., pp. 25–7.
6. Taseer, op. cit., p. 31; Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 30
7. Larkana is the interior of Sind, 200 miles north-east of Karachi.
8. Taseer, op. cit., pp. 31, 40.
9. Ibid., pp. 41–2.
10. Mukerjee, op. cit., pp. 44–5; S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 275–9; Taseer, op. cit., pp. 49, 53–5; William Barnds, *Indian, Pakistan and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972) pp. 185–92.
11. Mukerjee, op. cit., pp. 44–5, 48; S. M. Burke, op. cit., pp. 275–9, 341–57; Taseer, op. cit., pp. 49, 53–7; Barnds, op. cit., pp. 185–92; Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981) pp. 19–24.
12. The Tashkent Declaration was a peace treaty that was signed by the leaders of India and Pakistan at Tashkent (USSR) in 1966, with active Soviet mediation.
13. Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan and Bangladesh: Quest for Identity', in *An Introduction to Asian Politics*, edited by C. I. Eugene Kim and Lawrence Ziring (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977) pp. 202–3.
14. Bhutto's address to the Muzzaffargarh Bar Association on 17 January 1968, quoted in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Awakening the People: A Collection of Articles Statements and Speeches, 1966–69*, in Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan (eds), *Politics of the People*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications) p. 45. (Henceforth referred to as: Bhutto, *Awakening the People*).
15. Ibid, pp. 94–5.
16. Bhutto's address to the Sind convention in Hyderabad on 21 September 1968, quoted in Bhutto, *Awakening the People*, p. 32
17. Bhutto, *Awakening the People*, p. 240.
18. Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy*, pp. 10–11.
19. Pakistan People's Party, *The Election Manifesto* (Lahore, 1970), p. 1.
20. Bhutto's public meeting in Jhelum on 21 January 1970, quoted in Meenakshi Gopinath, *Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and*

Rise to power of the Pakistan People's Party (New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975) p. 67.

21. Bhutto's speech to a public gathering in Abbottabad on 19 April 1970, quoted in Bhutto, *Marching Towards Democracy*, p. 63.
22. Ibid, pp. 153–4.
23. Gopinath, op. cit., p. 80.
24. Ibid, p. 80.
25. Gopinath, op. cit., pp. 53, 47, 66, 75–6.
26. Craig Baxter, 'Pakistan Votes, 1970', *Asian Survey*, vol. XI, March 1971, pp. 197–218.
27. See Waheed-uz-Zaman, 'Editor's Note', in *The Quest for Identity*, Proceedings of the First Congress on the History and Culture of Pakistan held at the University of Islamabad, April 1973 (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1974) p. i; Lawrence Ziring, 'Introduction', in *Pakistan: The Long View*, edited by Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Hoard Wriggins (Durham: Duke University Press 1977) p. 6.
28. The anti-Ahmadi demonstrations in May–June 1974, resulting in widespread rioting, destruction of Ahmadi property and the loss of innocent lives, were responsible for his decision. But despite the same sort of happenings in 1953, Khwaja Nazimuddin, known to be one of the most devout Muslim leaders (save Zia-ul-Haq) Pakistan has had, refused to concede to any of the demands made by the Islamic groups.
29. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *My Execution* (London: Musawat Weekly International, January 1980) p. 1.
30. A. H. Syed, *Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity* (New York: Praeger Publishers 1982) p. 126.
31. Within a very short space of time numerous privately-owned Arabic tutorial centres sprang up throughout the country and Arabic began to be taught in the Open University that came on public radio and television once a week.
32. Syed, op. cit., p. 126.
33. See Z. A. Bhutto, *A Journey of Renaissance* (published by the Ministry of Information, Government of Pakistan, November 1972) p. 7.
34. See Bhutto's press statement made in Karachi on 20 October 1973, and quoted in *Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Speeches and Statements*, 14 August 1973–31 December 1973 (produced by the Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1973) pp. 126–7.
35. *Pakistan Times*, 13 October 1973, p. 1.
36. M. G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, 'Pakistan Enters the Middle East', *Orbis*, vol. 22, no. 3, Fall 1978, p. 600.
37. Rafiq Akhtar (ed) *Pakistan Year Book* (Karachi: East–West Publishing Company, 1974) pp. 122–5.
38. Rafiq Akhtar, op. cit., p. 299.
39. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979) p. 137.
40. Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East* (New York: Times Books, 1981) pp. 53, 62–4.
41. On 28 April 1977, Bhutto made a dramatic and impassioned speech to Pakistan's National Assembly, in which he disclosed the fact that when

Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, visited Pakistan on ▮ August 1976, he personally threatened him (Bhutto) to drop Pakistan's plans to build the atomic bomb, or else 'Carter, if he comes to power will make a horrible example of your country' (Dawn, 29 April 1977, p. 1; Salamat Ali, 'The Options Finally Run Out', *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 July 1977, p. 8.

42. Weinbaum and Sen, op. cit., p. 599.
43. Jamil Rashid, 'The Political Economy of Manpower Export', in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds), *Pakistan, The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State* (London: Zed Press, 1983) p. 222.
44. *Dawn Overseas Weekly*, 6 January 1979, p. 3.
45. Weinbaum and Sen, op cit., p. 603.
46. 'A Great Manifesto', Editorial, *Baluchistan Times*, 26 January, 1977; Also quoted in Richter, 'The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan', *Asian Survey*, vol. XIX, no. 6, June 1979.
47. William Border, 'Bhutto in Crackdown on Critics Orders Martial Law For Three Cities', *New York Times*, 22 April 1977, p. 1.
48. Surendra Nath Kaushik, 'Aftermath of the March 1977 General Elections in Pakistan', *South Asian Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1, January–July 1978, p. 75.
49. *Dawn* (Karachi), 6 July 1977, p. 1; *New York Times*, 6 July 1977, p. 1.
50. Mary Anne Weaver, 'Pakistan's General Zia – From Soldier to Politician', *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 May 1983, p. 7.
51. *Washington Post*, 6 July 1977, pp. A-16.
52. Weaver, op. cit., p. 7.
53. *Pakistan Times*, 9 July 1977, p. 4; 'Pakistani President Announces Shakeup of Military Leadership', *Washington Post*, 4 March 1972.
54. Hussain, *Elite Politics in an Ideological State* (Kent, Dawson and Sons Ltd, 1979) pp. 142–3.
55. Ian Mather, 'The Soldier who Hanged Bhutto', *The Observer*, 8 April 1979, p. 8.
56. Ibid., p. 8.
57. The first civil war in Pakistani history occurred in East Pakistan (March–December 1971). At that time East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan and a new nation called Bangladesh was established in December 1971.
58. *Pakistan Times*, 7 July 1977, p. 1.
59. Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Islamic Revival in Pakistan', in Cyriac K. Pullapillay (eds.), *Islam in the Contemporary World* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Cross Roads Books) p. 266; Also, see Shahid Javed Burki, 'Economic Management within an Islamic Context', in Anita M. Weiss (ed.), *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986) pp. 49–57.
60. William L. Richter, 'Pakistan', in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1981) p. 144.
61. This dress was strongly recommended for government employees and popularised in the mass media from 1981 onwards.
62. Urdu is the national language of Pakistan. It is ▪ hybrid of Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit. It is written from right to left like Arabic and Persian. Spoken Urdu is similar to Hindi (the national language of India, that is written from left to right in the Devnagri script). Urdu was initiated in the army barracks

during the Muslim-dominated Mughul Rule that lasted from 1526–1857. Ironically, most of Pakistan's Presidents before Zia were fluent in English, but not in Urdu.

63. Kemal A. Faruki 'Islami Government and Society', in John Esposito (ed.), *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) p. 59.
64. It was Bhutto who first started the practice of making Friday to holiday instead of Sunday, because Muslims have been enjoined by Prophet Muhammad to go to the mosque on Friday at noon to pray with the congregation. Zia just made the Friday holiday and Sunday work-day official and permanent.
65. William L. Richter, op. cit., p. 150.
66. Quoted in Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Islamic Revival in Pakistan', in Pullapillay (ed.), *Islam in the Contemporary world*, p. 265.
67. Quoted in Barbara D. Metcalf, 'Islamic Argument in Contemporary Pakistan', in William R. Roff (ed.), *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning: Contemporary Studies of Muslim Discourse* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) p. 136.
68. Ibid., p. 136.
69. Richter, op. cit., p. 151; Also, see Charles J. Adams, 'The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi' in Donald Eugene Smith (ed.), *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) pp. 371–97; Zohair Hussain, 'Maulana Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi: An Appraisal of His Thought and Political Influence', *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol. IX, no. 1, June 1986, pp. 61–82.
70. Craig Baxter, 'Restructuring the Pakistan Political System', in Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) p. 36.
71. Richter, op. cit., pp. 143–4.
72. Ibid., pp. 143–4.
73. Mumtaz Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 265–6.
74. Richard Reeves, 'Journey to Pakistan', *New Yorker*, vol. LX, no. 33, 1 October 1984, pp. 97–8.
75. Mamtaz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 268.
76. Faruki, 'Pakistan: Islamic Government and Society', in Esposito, *Islam in Asia*, p. 59.
77. Richter, op. cit., pp. 150–1.
78. Ibid., p. 150, 155.
79. Weiss, 'The Historical Debate on Islam', p. 15; Lucy Carrol, 'Nizam-i-Islam: Process and Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamisation, with Special Reference to the Position of Women', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, no. 20, 1982, p. 74.
80. Richter, op. cit., p. 150.
81. Shahid Javed Burki, 'Economic Management within An Islamic Context', pp. 50–1.
82. Mumtaz Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 267–9.
83. The Twelve Shi'ah school of Jurisprudence is based on the legal works of their sixth Imam, Jafar-i-Sadiq (d. 765).

84. *Dawn*, 7 July 1980, p. 1; *Pakistan Affairs*, 16 July 1980, no. 14, vol. XXXIII.
85. Richter, 'The Political Meaning of Islamisation in Pakistan', in Weiss (ed.), *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, p. 134.
86. 'Majlis-i-Shoora Approved Law of Evidence Draft', *Dawn*, 10–16 March 1983, vol. VII, no. 11, p. 3; Barbara Metcalf, 'Islamic Arguments in Contemporary Pakistan', in William R. Roff, *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) pp.132–3.
87. Baxter, 'Restructuring the Pakistan Political System', in Burki and Baxter (eds), *Pakistan under the Military*, p. 37; Michael Hamlyn, 'Pakistan's Prisoners of Purdah', *The Times* (London), 8 September 1983, p. 4.
88. Baxter, 'Restructuring the Pakistan Political System', in Burki and Baxter, *Pakistan under the Military*, pp. 37–8; Mumtaz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 269.
89. Richter 'Pakistan' in Ayoob, p. 147.
90. Ibid., p. 148.
91. Richter, 'The Political Meaning of Islamisation', p. 132.
92. Ibid., p. 132; *The Economist*, 19 January 1985, p. 33.
93. Ibid., p. 132.
94. Anita Weiss, 'Islam and the State in South Asia', in Weiss (ed.), *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, pp. 16–17.
95. Ibid.; Burki, 'Zia's Eleven Years: A Chronology of Important Events', in Burki and Baxter, *Pakistan Under the Military*, p. 172.
96. Shahid Javed Burki, 'Zia's Eleven Years: A Chronology of Important Events', pp. 172–3; William L. Richter, 'Pakistan: Out of the Praetorian Labyrinth', *Current History*, vol. 85, no. 509, March 1986, p. 114.
97. Weiss, 'Islam and the State in South Asia', in Weiss (ed.), *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, pp. 16–17.
98. Baxter, in Burki and Baxter, p. 38.
99. While the Pakistani Constitution does give the President the right to legislate on presidential ordinances when Parliament is not in session, it is widely understood that such ordinances are only to be issued during emergencies or periods of utmost urgency. This was clearly not the case with the *Shariah* (Law). Ordinances must also be confirmed by Parliament within four months and, further, are not to be renewed. The ordinance expired before the 1988 election, but a modified version was promulgated by the acting president, Ghulam Ishq Khan, when the four months expired, violating the spirit if not the letter of the constitution. The Benazir Bhutto parliament permitted the ordinance to expire.
100. Quoted in Shirin Tahir-Kheli, 'In Search of an Identity: Islam and Pakistan's Foreign Policy', in Adeed Dawisha (ed.), *Islam in Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) pp. 75–6.
101. Craig Baxter, 'Pakistan Becomes Prominent in the International Arena', in Burki and Baxter, *Pakistan under Military Rule*, pp. 142–5.
102. Baxter, 'Pakistan Becomes Prominent in the International Arena', in Burki and Baxter, *Pakistan under Military Rule*, pp. 145–6.
103. *The Economist*, 1 September 1984, p. 28.
104. Quoted in Rafiq Zakaria, *The Struggle within Islam: The Conflict Between Religion and Politics* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1988) p. 238.

105. Baxter, 'Restructuring the Pakistan Political System', in Burki and Baxter, *Pakistan under the Military*, p. 45.

4 Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh: Challenges and Prospects

U. A. B. Razia Akter Banu

There are different aspects or perspectives in analysing Islamic politics in Bangladesh. One useful way is to study Islamic groups and organisations. A well-organised and controversial Islamic party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, shares some similarities, but more dissimilarities with other political parties in the country.

It is instructive to see how the *Jamaat*, which has the stigma of collaboration with the Pakistani occupation armed forces in 1971, re-emerged as a political force with growing influence among different sections of society. Why this has become so can be discerned if one explains the ideology and programmes of the *Jamaat*, its social bases of support, the quality and demographic characteristics of its leaders, followers and supporters, its sources of finance and party organisation and the methods it employs in membership recruitment. With all these will the *Jamaat* have any prospect of capturing political power in the future?

As has been emphasised by many scholars on nation-building, the way that a nation is born affects much of her later political developments.[1] The politics of Bangladesh provides a clear example of the above statement. Even after twenty years of independence, the cleavage between 'the patriots and freedom fighters' and the 'collaborators of Pakistan's army', generated by the liberation war of 1971, is still wide open. This came into sharp focus recently when Professor Ghulam Azam, who 'collaborated' with Pakistan's army in 1971, was elected *Ameer* (President) of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh. Ghulam Azam's elevation to the position of *Ameer* provoked freedom fighters and kith and kin of martyrs to resort to the unconventional politics of *Gana Adalat* (People's Court), which 'tried' him in absentia for his alleged 'war crimes' committed against Bangladesh in 1971.[2]

Professor Ghulam Azam (b. 1920), an MA in Political Science from Dhaka University, has had a long political career. Like many of the

politicians in Bangladesh, Ghulam Azam began his political career as a student of Dhaka University. He was the General Secretary of the Dhaka University Central Students' Union for two consecutive years, 1947–8 and 1948–9. He was one of the early leaders of the movement for recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan. In this connection, he presented, in 1949, a memorandum to Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, demanding Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan along with Urdu. In 1952, while he was professor of a government college, he was arrested for his association with the state language movement, and the government removed him from his job in the college. During his days of college teaching he came to know about the writings of Syed Abul Ala Maududi and developed an interest in Islamic politics. He became a full member of Jamaat-i-Islami in 1955 while in jail. He was elected General Secretary and *Ameer* of Jamaat-i-Islami, East Pakistan, in 1956 and in 1969 respectively.

During the liberation war of 1971, the Jamaat-i-Islami (Jamaat), under the leadership of Ghulam Azam, supported the Pakistan armed forces which perpetuated one of the largest genocides in this century in erstwhile East Pakistan.

Ghulam Azam went to West Pakistan on 19 November 1971 to attend a meeting of the Central Committee of Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan. He could not come back to Dhaka, as war broke out between India and Pakistan, disrupting the air link between the eastern and western wings of the country. He, however, managed to go to London and stayed there until July 1978. In the meantime, the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Sheikh Mujib), under a Presidential Order, cancelled the citizenship of 39 persons, including Ghulam Azam, on 18 April 1973, for 'collaboration' with the Pakistan armed forces in 1971. After the fall of the Sheikh Mujib regime, the Bangladesh government of General Ziaur Rahman restored the citizenship of many of these 39 persons. On 11 July, 1978, Ghulam Azam came back to Bangladesh holding a Pakistani passport and applied for Bangladeshi citizenship. The military governments of Ziaur Rahman and H. M. Ershad did not grant him citizenship but allowed him to stay in Bangladesh.

Since 1979, members of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh, have been electing him as their *Ameer* every five years. As Ghulam Azam did not have the citizenship of Bangladesh, he could not formally work as the *Ameer*. The Senior Deputy *Ameer*, Abbas Ali Khan, worked as the acting *Ameer*, although Ghulam Azam guided much of the activities of the Jamaat from behind the scenes. After the election of Ghulam Azam as the *Ameer* in December 1991, the Jamaat formally declared him as the *Ameer*,

arguing that he had been a citizen of Bangladesh by birth. Ghulam Azam took the oath as the *Ameer*.[3]

Some left-wing intellectuals, lawyers and members of other professions, and two retired military officers – all of whom had participated in the liberation struggle in some way – were enraged by the election of Ghulam Azam as the *Ameer* of the Jamaat. They argued that Ghulam Azam had been a foreign national (Pakistani) and a former ally of the Pakistani forces in 1971. This disaffected group formed a National Coordination Committee for the Elimination of the Killers and Collaborators of 1971 and the Implementation of the Spirit of the Liberation War (Elimination Committee).[4]

The Elimination Committee called for a rally on 26 March 1992 (Independence Day) to try Ghulam Azam in a 'People's Court'. The Awami League (the largest opposition party in the country) used their organisation in the city to ensure a large attendance on 26 March in Suhrawardy Park. In this mass gathering, the self-elected judges of the 'People's Court' found Ghulam Azam guilty of war crimes in the 1971 war, and suggested the death penalty for him. The 'People's Court' urged the government to implement the judgement. The government arrested Ghulam Azam on 24 March 1992 'for violating the article 38 of the Constitution by becoming *Ameer* of Jamaat-i-Islami despite being not a citizen of Bangladesh'. The government then requested the members of the Elimination Committee not to proceed further with the 'People's Court' as Ghulam Azam had been arrested and would be prosecuted. The Elimination Committee defied the government and held the 'People's Court'. The government then charged the members of the Elimination Committee with sedition for challenging the normal process of law.

Meanwhile, a writ petition was filed in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court, challenging the arrest of Ghulam Azam. The validity of the Presidential Order of 1973, which deprived Ghulam Azam and others of their citizenship, was also challenged in the same Court.

The *Jatiya Sangsad* (Parliament) discussed the Ghulam Azam issue for three days. The House resolved that the issues of Ghulam Azam, as well as the Elimination Committee, were *sub judice* and the government would accept the decision of the normal judicial process.[5]

The political importance of the Ghulam Azam issue stems from the fact that the Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh, patiently built by Ghulam Azam and his associates, is a political force of significant strength. In the 1991 elections, held under a caretaker, neutral government, the Jamaat captured 18 seats and 12.13 per cent of cast votes.[6] The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a party with Islamic orientation,[7] which secured 139 seats in the elections, could form the government only with the support of the 18 members of Jamaat, as the BNP did not have absolute majority in the

Parliament. Jamaat also supported BNP in electing 30 women members of the *Jatiya Sangsad*, elected by the members of the *Jatiya Sangsad*. According to the deal, BNP secured 28 and Jamaat took 2 seats. These 28 women members of the BNP gave BNP an absolute majority in the *Jatiya Sangsad*. Besides this crucial support for BNP, grudged by all the opposition parties, the leftist and secularist forces find Jamaat as their arch ideological enemy.

What type of political party is Jamaat-i-Islami? What is its ideology? What are the social bases of its support? What type of leadership does it have? What are its sources of finance? How is this party organised? What methods of recruitment does it follow? Does the Jamaat represent the wave of the future in Bangladesh, the third largest Muslim country in the world? This chapter aims at resolving the above questions.

JAMAAT'S IDEOLOGY AND PROGRAMME

In contrast with the orthodox *ulama* (theologians) in Bangladesh, who explain Islam in traditional and ritualistic terms, the Jamaat takes a fundamentalist position on Islam. It wants to implement Islam in its spirit as well as in the letter. According to Jamaat leaders, the most important, recent and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam was provided by Syed Abul Ala Maududi – the ideologue and founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami in 1941. According to Jamaat's literature, Jamaat is not a religious or political party in the ordinary sense of the term but an ideological movement for transforming society on Islamic principles. As stated by its principal leader:

> The Jamaat is neither simply a political party nor merely a religious organisation. It has embraced Islam without any reservation and it considers Islam to be a complete and balanced code of conduct. So the Jamaat is both political and religious. It is political to the extent Islam is political, it is neither more nor less political than what Islam wanted to be.[8]

The Jamaat's purpose is stated to be two-fold – to give a clear exposition of the Islamic system, and to organise a party whose indoctrinated leadership and cadres would work to bring about an 'Islamic' revolution.

Jamaat's idea of an Islamic state can be summarised in the following way: Islam's political philosophy is an antithesis of secular Western democracy. The philosophical foundation of Western democracy is the sovereignty of the people. Islam repudiates the theory of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of

God. God is sovereign and the Koran and Sunnah are the only sources of the law of an Islamic state. The Muslim community as a whole enjoys political power as a trust from God, under the limitation imposed by the Koran and Sunnah (traditions of the prophet). Islam, thus, provides 'theo-democracy'; the Muslim community can elect a legislature consisting of pious, God-fearing men who would enact new legislation in the spirit of the Koran and Sunnah only in the fields which are not already covered by the Holy Book and Prophet's traditions. The whole purpose of the Islamic polity is to enforce Islamic principles of morality and ethics, political, social and economic policies and penal laws.[9] From this perspective, the Islamic state bears a kind of resemblance to fascist and communist states. Based on a particular ideology, the Islamic state can therefore be run only by an Islamic community. The non-Muslim minority in such a state cannot hold any policy-making position. However, in the Islamic state, the Zimmis' (non-Muslim citizens') life, honour, property, religion and culture are supposed to be fully protected by the state.

How can such an Islamic state be established? According to the Jamaat, the methods for bringing about the Islamic revolution were delineated by Prophet Mohammad himself. The Prophet preached the message revealed to him by Allah, organised those who believed in his message, trained the believers in their responsibilities for establishing the divinely prescribed order of human society, and ultimately placed them at the position of leadership for the fulfilment of his mission. The Jamaat, therefore, has adopted a three-point programme to bring about the Islamic revolution. First, Islam is to be preached as a revolutionary ideology, and then those who are ready to accept that ideology are to be organised and trained according to the principles of the ideology. The people thus trained are to strive to capture power in order to replace the existing 'un-Islamic' leadership by an Islamic one capable of establishing an Islamic State.[10]

Jamaat's Techniques of Operation

The Jamaat was built upon the pattern of revolutionary totalitarian parties working through concentric circles of cells spreading out their influence. The members of the party were recruited by a selective process and a member had to remain as an associate for some time and take lessons in the ideology of the party before he was entitled to full membership.

Jamaat leaders often quote the Koranic verse which tells that the best work that a Muslim can do is to create really faithful men dedicated to Allah's way. Jamaat's current efforts were directed towards the creation of true faithfuls. Carrying the message of God to other people is one of the primary work of every member and associate member of Jamaat. Jamaat's

men perform this duty by individual contacts, distributing Jamaat's literature, establishing libraries in every branch of the party, organising lectures and seminars on various aspects of Islamic ideology.

Jamaat leaders believe that Bangladesh can be transformed into a truly Islamic polity, where the 'soldiers of Islam' created by Jamaat would occupy key positions in the strategic sectors of the state, like the army, civil service, modern professions, and the like. Hence Jamaat's emphasis is on the student front. As a matter of fact, Professor Ghulam Azam, the informal but real leader of the Jamaat, is concentrating his main attention on the Islamic Chatra Shibir (ICS) or the student front of the Jamaat. The ICS follows methods similar to the Jamaat in extending its influence and organisational network, and has been able to attract many of the bright students of Bangladesh universities and colleges.[11]

Although Jamaat is organisationally modelled on totalitarian political parties, it seeks to achieve power through constitutional means. It had been consistently opposing the military regime of General H. M. Ershad (who seized power in March 1982 from the constitutionally elected president) through public meetings, protest demonstrations and strikes, either alone or in cooperation with other opposition parties. As Abbas Ali Khan, the acting *Ameer* (President) of the Jamaat-i-Islami stated:

> It is the absence of laws of Allah (the God almighty) and rule by honest men which has resulted in the subjugation of our people by well-organized, selfish exploiters. The Jamaat-i-Islami wants to free the people from the grip of the exploiters by organising honest men under selfless leadership. The greatest impediment to this aim is the present undemocratic government. The goal to transform the country into a welfare state cannot succeed until people are given the opportunity to exercise their franchise. Whatever else could be accomplished without the help of the people, the country cannot be built without the active involvement of the people. If the people do not have the power to elect their own government, how could they help in building up the country? Thus, it is for the very interest of the Islamic movement that the Jamaat-i-Islami is ardent about the democratic movement and it is for this very reason that the Jamaat wants to continue the struggle to establish the rights of the people in cooperation with other democratic forces despite Jamaat's ideological differences with these opposition political parties.[12]

Social Bases of the Jamaat

In the early fifties, Syed Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami in undivided India and Pakistan, sent some full members of Jamaat

to former East Pakistan to build up the party there. By the end of the sixties the Jamaat had become a fairly large organisation. In 1968–9 Jamaat had about 425 full members and 40 000 associate members in East Pakistan. About 40 full members in East Pakistan were full-time workers of the party and were paid from the party's funds.[13] In the elections of 1970, dominated by secularist and nationalist ideas, the Jamaat secured about 10 per cent of the votes cast (about 1 400 000 ballots) and emerged as the second largest party after the Awami League, which, of course, secured a much higher percentage of the votes cast (75.57 per cent). The extent of Jamaat's success could be measured from the fact that all other Islamic parties, including the various factions of the Muslim League, together secured 7.85 per cent of the ballot.[14]

As the most zealous of Islamic nationalist parties in former East Pakistan, the Jamaat leaders and cadres suffered most after the independence of Bangladesh. Some of the Jamaat leaders and workers suffered humiliation and imprisonment after Bangladesh emerged as an independent state. Some of them died earlier than expected. Thus only 50 per cent of the pre-1971 full members could join the Bangladesh Jamaat-i-Islami in late 1979. Still, in March 1981, the full members of the Jamaat were 650 and associate members numbered over 100 000.[15] By 1987, the number of full members rose to as high as 2000 (including 73 women) and associate members totalled over 2 000 000.[16] What are the social bases of the Jamaat? From which classes are the leaders of the Jamaat drawn? To which age-groups do they belong? Do they have modern education or are they educated in *madrassahs* (orthodox religious educational institutions)? What are their professions? The demographic characteristics of the party-elite (members of the Central Council) of the Jamaat, collected first in March 1981 and later in September 1987, are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, which can provide us some clues for answers to the questions raised above.

Table 4.1 shows that 33 per cent of the top leaders of the Jamaat are aged below 40. Leaders in their 40s and below constitute 71 per cent of the party elite of the Jamaat. The age structure of the Jamaat leaders shows that the party has been able to recruit its leaders from the younger generations of Bangladesh. The data on education show that, despite its fundamentalist ideology, the Jamaat could attract Western-educated people; 67 per cent of its top leadership has college or university education. The professional background of the Jamaat leaders shows that they are primarily drawn from the lower middle classes. Jamaat leaders claimed, in 1981, that approximately 90 per cent of their members and associate members belonged to the lower middle classes.

TABLE 4.1 Demographic characteristics of the party-elite (Members of the Central Council) of Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh (March 1981)[17]

Demographic Characteristics	*Number*	*Percentage*
Age		
60 and above	4	8
50s	10	21
40s	18	38
30s	13	27
20s	3	6
TOTAL:	48	100
Education		
Matriculant	3	6
Higher Secondary	1	2
Graduate	15	32
MA	16	33
Orthodox Religious Education	10	21
Doctors, Engineers and others	3	6
TOTAL:	48	100
Profession		
Small Business	20	42
College Professors	3	6
School Teachers	5	11
Lawyers	4	[illegible]
Agriculture	8	17
Lower-Grade Govt Servants	4	8
Others	4	[illegible]
TOTAL:	48	100

TABLE 4.2 Demographic characteristics of the party-elite (Members of the Central Council) of Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh (September 1987)[14]

Demographic Characteristics	*Number*	*Percentage*
Age		
70 and above	2	2
60s	9	10
50s	19	20
40s	40	43
30s	23	24
20s	1	1
TOTAL:	94	100
Education		
Non-Matriculant	3	3
Matriculant	3	3
Higher Secondary	4	4
Graduate	29	31
MA	34	36
Madrassah Education	17	18
Doctors, Engineers and others	5	5
TOTAL:	94	100
Profession		
Small Business	20	21
College Professors	20	21
School Teachers	13	14
Lawyers	5	6
Agriculture	11	12
Lower-Grade Govt or Private Firm Officers	14	15
Journalists, Doctors and others	11	12
TOTAL:	94	100

Table 4.2 suggests that a significant change in the demographic characteristics of the party-elite took place between 1981 and 1987. While in 1981 leaders in their 40s and below constituted 71 per cent of the party-elite, in 1987, 68 per cent of the party-elite belonged to this age group. This is all the

more striking as the membership of the party elite in 1987 is almost double (94) the membership (48) in 1981. Interestingly enough, only 21 per cent of the party-elite in 1981, and 18 per cent of the party-elite in 1987, had orthodox religious education. This clearly indicates that the Jamaat has been continualy recruiting Western-educated people to its top leadership. In 1987, 71 per cent of the top leaders had college or university education, as against 67 per cent in 1981. However, the party-elites of both 1981 and 1987 came from ■ common social background – the lower middle classes.

The main channel of recruitment of Jamaat is provided by its student wing, the ICS. The ICS is built on the model of the parent organisation. Its members are recruited through ■ selective process. In September 1980, the full members of the ICS totalled about 226, associate members about 2000, and workers about 15 000. The ICS leaders also claimed the support of over 100 000 students in various universities, colleges, *madrassahs* and some high schools all over Bangladesh.[19] In December 1986, the ICS had about 300 full members, about 6000 associate members and 40 000 workers.[20] The nature of the social forces behind the fundamentalist movement in Bangladesh can also be learned from the demographic background of the leaders of the ICS given in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.

A comparison of the date in Table 4.4 with those in Table 4.3 shows much similarity in the demographic characteristics of the central leaders of the ICS of 1981 and 1987. Like the leaders of 1981, the leaders of 1987 are studying modern subjects. As to the professions of the fathers of the leaders, while, in 1981, 76 per cent of them came from the rural lower middle class, the percentage in 1987 was 55. But the other professions mentioned in 1987 – lower-grade government service, school teaching, professional preacher and homoeopathic doctor – are all lower middle classes in Bangladesh. Again, with regards to their fathers' education, although there was some increase in the number of graduates in 1987, matriculants and non-matriculants still constituted 83.5 per cent of the fathers of the ICS leaders.

Of particular interest is the study of the women's branch of the Jamaat. Although two major political parties of Bangladesh, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, are led by women, systematic women's participation in the politics of Bangladesh is not much visible. The Jamaat's women leaders (79 full members in September 1987) are quite active in making door-to-door contacts with the women sympathisers of the Jamaat to extend the influence of the party and to recruit members from them. Who are those women working zealously for, preaching the Jamaat's message among the women? The demographic characteristics of women full members of the Jamaat in Table 4.5 may help us to understand their background.

TABLE 4.3 Demographic characteristics of the central leaders of ICS (March 1981)[21]

Demographic Characteristics	*Number*	*Percentage*
Subject studying		
Political Science	6	35
English	4	23
Economics	2	12
History, Journalism, Medicine, Law	5	30
TOTAL:	17	100
Father's profession		
Agriculture	8	47
Agriculture-cum-Small Business	5	29
Small Business	1	6
School Teaching	2	12
Lower-Grade Govt Servant	1	6
TOTAL:	17	100
Father's education		
Primary	12	70
Non-Matriculant	2	12
Matriculant	1	6
Graduate	1	6
Education in *Madrassah*	1	6
TOTAL:	17	100

TABLE 4.4 Demographic characteristics of the central leaders of the ICS (September 1987)[22]

Demographic Characteristics	*Number*	*Percentage of Total*
Subject studying		
Political Science	5	28.00
Sociology	1	5.50
Economics	2	11.00
Public Administration	1	5.50
Islamic History and Culture	1	5.50
Medicine	3	16.50
Agriculture, Management, Law	5	28.00
TOTAL:	18	100.00
Father's profession		
Agriculture	2	11.00
Agriculture-cum-Small Business	[illegible]	44.00
School Teaching	1	6.00
Professional Religious Research	1	6.00
Lower-Grade Government Officers	4	22.00
Homoeopathic Doctor and others	2	11.00
TOTAL:	18	100.00
Father's education		
Primary	3	16.50
Non-Matriculant	5	28.00
Education in *Madrassah*	2	11.00
Homoeopathic Doctor	1	6.00
Matriculant	4	22.00
Graduate	3	16.50
TOTAL:	18	100.00

TABLE 4.5 Demographic characteristics of the full women members of the Jamaat, 1987[23]

Demographic Characteristics	*Number*	*Percentage of Total*
Age		
60 and above	6	8.00
50s	8	10.00
40s	26	33.00
30s	26	33.00
20s	13	16.00
TOTAL:	79	100.00
Education		
Primary	15	19.00
Non-Matriculant	11	14.00
Matriculant	13	16.00
Intermediate	14	18.00
Graduate	12	15.00
MA	14	18.00
TOTAL:	79	100.00
Housewife	56	71.00
Government and Private Service	6	7.5
Teaching	15	19.00
Others	2	2.5
TOTAL:	79	100.00
Husband's profession		
Small Business	12	15.00
School Teachers	9	11.50
Agriculture	4	5.00
College Professors	7	9.00
Lower-Level Government and Private Officials	31	39.00
Doctor	5	6.50
Lawyer	4	5.00
Others	7	9.00
TOTAL:	79	100.00

The striking feature of Table 4.5 is that in 1987 women in their 40s and below constituted 82 per cent of women members of the Jamaat, as against 68 per cent of the male party-elite. The appeal of Jamaat to a younger generation of women seems stronger than to elderly women in Bangladesh. The younger women are fairly educated. While 79 per cent of the party-elite in 1987 were at least matriculants, the figure for women members for the same year was 67 per cent. In view of the fact that, in 1986, female literacy in Bangladesh was 18.8 per cent as against 39.7 per cent among men,[24] Table 4.5 indicates that the proportion of educated women in the Jamaat was higher than that of educated men.

The professions of the women members are also striking: 71 per cent of them are housewives; the rest are lower-level government officers and teachers. The profession of the husbands of the women members of Jamaat indicate that they belong to lower-middle-class families. Thus the portrait of a Jamaat woman member is that of a fairly educated woman working as a housewife or holding a lower-level job, spending her spare time in organising the womenfolk of Bangladesh as Jamaat supporters.

The above discussion on Tables 4.1 to 4.5 makes it clear that the Jamaat-i-Islami movement is a movement of a section of the recently-educated lower middle-classes. It is generally argued by modern scholars on social change that the process of modernisation has its own logic and dynamics and that wherever and whenever the process takes place, certain developments go together.[25] One such common development in present-day Muslim countries is that the religious 'fundamentalist' movements in these countries derive support and sustenance from the recently-educated lower middle classes who, under the stresses of their competition with the model established by the middle and upper classes, find their psychological anchor in the programme of the 'fundamentalist' movements with their uncompromising emphasis on the revival of Islamic ideology.[26] The Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh is no exception to this general process of development in the Third-World Muslim States.

Recent Changes in the Class-Character of the Jamaat Leadership

In the late 1960s the Jamaat was one of the few political parties in former East Pakistan which had a steady party fund, having an annual budget of around Rs 450 000.[27] According to Jamaat sources, the party fund came from: (i) a regular contribution from the full and associate members of the party (as high as 5 per cent of their personal monthly income); (ii) *zakat* (a religious tax) and other duties paid by all members and associate members; (iii) donations from Jamaat's sympathisers; (iv) profits from the sale of party literature.[28]

In the 1980s Jamaat leaders, through their organisational, entrepreneurial and innovative skills, developed new sources of finance. The Jamaatees have established about a dozen trusts in Dhaka and about 50 trusts in up-country towns 'to promote welfare activities in the light of the teaching in Islam and assist other organisations working for the same objectives'.[29] The incomes of most of these trusts have been the envy of public and private welfare organisations in Bangladesh. The Jamaat has established 200 private schools in Dhaka and outlying towns. The schools have also grown as profitable organisations.[30] These trusts and schools are almost wholly manned by Jamaat members and associate members. The high salaries that the Jamaatees receive in these trusts and schools have elevated them from the lower middle classes to the upper and middle classes of Bangladesh.

A question of theoretical import is raised by this increasing change of class-character of the Jamaat leadership. Will the new 'social being' of the Jamaatees bring about a change in their 'consciousness'? Could upper-class people lead a lower-class movement? Our observations of the 'new upper class/middle class' Jamaat leaders and members indicate that the transformation in the economic position of the Jamaatees has not detracted at all from their ideological purity. On the other hand, this change seems to have increased their sense of efficacy and to have inspired them further to excel in their duties as 'vice regents' of God on earth. As the Jamaat is a reformist rather than a social-revolutionary movement, the upper-class connections of its leadership are not likely to affect its pursuit to capture political power through mass indoctrination.

Jamaat's economic solvency has, of course, brought charges of its being an agent of the 'imperialists and their petro-dollar-rich lakeys, particularly, Saudi Arabia'.[31] The leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami agree that the party gets some help from non-governmental institutions like Rabat-i-Alam al Islam of Saudi Arabia. But this help is mostly indirect. For example, the Rabat-i-Alam help Jamaat in Bangladesh by employing Jamaat workers and sympathisers working in the Middle East.[32] However, we do not have any means to substantiate or contradict the assertion.

THE FUTURE OF THE JAMAAT

Is 'fundamentalism' going to mould Bangladesh politics in the near future? There are several factors favourable for the growing strength of the Jamaat movement in Bangladesh. First, the change in the geo-political situation in South Asia, caused by the emergence of Bangladesh, is likely to help the

Islamic forces in Bangladesh. After the 1971 war, India emerged as the hegemonic power in South Asia. The sheer size of the giant neighbour creates a sense of insecurity among the Bangladeshis and leads some of them to seek security in 'fundamentalist' Islamic ideology.

Secondly, people belonging to the educated lower middle classes are likely to multiply rapidly in the near future. These classes will develop ■ severe sense of insecurity as a result of their fierce competition with the educated upper classes for jobs and other scarce resources. These educated lower-middle-class people are likely to seek ■ psychological anchor in total movements like the Jamaat or communist movements. With numerous divisions and the ineffectiveness of communism in Bangladesh,[33] Jamaat's strength in the burgeoning educated lower middle classes is likely to increase in the future.

However, the factors preventing the massive forward surge by the Jamaat are also very formidable. One major political handicap that the Jamaat faces is the fierce attack on it by all the secular and leftist groups (including a section of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party) for Jamaat's collaboration with the occupation army in the genocide in 1971. Besides, as we have shown in another study, the vast majority of the Muslims in Bangladesh prefer leaders who have ■ modern education but are to some extent religious minded. They do not like political parties based on religion.[34]

The more important impediment to Jamaat's massive spread of influence is the fact that Jamaat's 'fundamentalist' ideology is incongruent with the broad political culture that has developed in Bangladesh during the three-decade-long struggle with the power-elite of Pakistan. Talukder Maniruzzaman describes this political culture of Bangladesh in the following way:

> In asserting separate nationhood vis-a-vis Pakistan, the students and political leaders of East Bengal had to choose a secular symbol. The policy of the power-elite of Pakistan forced them to choose a primordial one – language. This did not mean that Bengali Muslims became less Islamic and would merge their identity with others. Neither did it imply that an obscurantist Islamic ideology would emerge as ■ major factor in Bangladesh. In the secularised politics of Bangladesh, religion would not have the degrees of salience it had in former United Pakistan.[35]

The organisational and financial strength of the 'soldiers of Islam' working zealously for the Jamaat ideology might help them to play more than ■ peripheral role in Bangladesh polity. But, barring ■ political develop-

ment in Bangladesh paralleling that which developed in Iran under the Shah – a brutal authoritarian system stamping out all middle-class leadership and threatening to eliminate the religious leadership too – and given the secularised political and cultural milieu of Bangladesh, Jamaat's politics is not likely to be the mainstream of Bangladesh's political system.

The standard of success of the Jamaatees, however, is not the same as that of the politicians in general. They seek political power as a religious duty. Their source of strength is the Koran itself. The Koran promises that Islam will be victorious over all other religions (S.LXI.9) and the believers in Islam will inherit the world (S.XXIV.55). The Koran urges the believers repeatedly to fight for God's cause (S.II.1990–3; S.IV.74, 76, 84; S.IX.29). The Koran repeatedly promises the believer who fights in God's cause that he will have 'the highest rank in the sight of God' and will be greatly rewarded 'whether he is slain or gets victory' (S.IX.20; S.IX.III; S.IV.74). The Jamaat leaders thus argue that, by working for their organisation, each of the members of the Jamaat is striving for personal salvation in the world-after. Given this religious conviction of the Jamaatees to become God's elects, the Jamaat is not likely to die of atrophy because of its failure to become the mainstream of Bangladesh politics. The Jamaat ideological stream in Bangladesh's political system will continue to be narrow but it will remain deep and perennial.

NOTES

1. S. M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (London: Heineman Educational Books 1969) pp. 31–63.
2. The leaders and workers of Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh, worked against the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. The Jamaat-i-Islami, however, accepts the sovereignty and independence of Bangladesh and does not want the restoration of the old United Pakistan. The Jamaat leaders advocate greater volume of trade with Pakistan than now exists and argue that larger trade between Bangladesh and Pakistan would benefit both countries. (Interviews with the leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami.)
3. For a short but critical life-sketch of Ghulam Azam, see 'Ghulam Azam's Profile', *The Dhaka Courier* (Dhaka), 7–13 February 1922, p. 9.
4. Of the 24 members of the Elimination Committee, four were litterateurs, four were professors of Dhaka University, six were lawyers, two were from the entertainment field, three were journalists and two were retired army officers. The Committee also included one engineer; one doctor and one Maulana (religious leader). The convenor of the Committee was Jahanara Imam. Jahanara Imam, who wrote a moving diary of the days of 1971, lost

her son in the Liberation War. Her husband could not bear the loss of his son and also died in 1971. Bio-data of each member of the Elimination Committee was published in the *Dainik Rupali*, a Bengali daily, on 8 April, 1992.

5. The whole opposition in the House was absent when this resolution was passed.
6. The results of the elections held 27 February, 1991 were as follows:

Name of the Party	*Number of Candidates Elected*	*Percentage of Total Votes Cast*
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	139	30.81
Bangladesh Awami League (AL)	88	30.08
Jatiya Party (JP)	35	11.92
Jamaat-i-Islami (Jamaat)	18	12.13
Pro-Moscow Leftists	11	3.50
Pro-Chinese Leftist	1	1.23
Orthodox Islamic Parties	1	2.28
Independent and others	6	8.05
TOTAL:	299*	100

*The election in one constituency was postponed because of the death of one of the candidates. The seat was won later by a BNP candidate.

7. We have defined Islamic political organisations as only those which explicitly advocate the Koran and Sunnah as their political ideology and aim at building an Islamic state on Islamic ideological principles in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) proclaims vague Islamic goals but falls short of promising an Islamic State. The BNP does not satisfy our definition of Islamic political parties. For a discussion of the peripheral nature of Islam in the party platforms of BNP, see Talukder Maniruzzaman, 'Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends', in S. R. Chakravarty and Virendra Narain (eds), *Bangladesh: History and Culture*, Volume I (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986) pp. 64–5.
8. Professor Ghulam Azam, *A Guide to the Islamic Movement* (Dhaka: Azam Publications, 1968) pp. 62–3.
9. This Islamic political ideology, propagated by the Jamaat, closely follows Maududi's interpretation of Islam. For Maududi's interpretation of Islam, see Syed Abul Ala Maududi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (English translation from Urdu) (Karachi: Jamaat-i-Islami Publications, 1965); *The Political Theory of Islam* (English translation from Urdu) (Lahore: Markazi Maktaba Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan, n.d.). See also, Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961) pp. 70–108.

10. This mechanism for bringing about Islamic revolution is outlined in Syed Abul Ala Maududi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution* (Bengali translation from Urdu) (Dacca: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1962).
11. In 1978 the Jamaat started its front organisation – *Islami Chattri Sangstha* (Islamic Girls Student Organisation) – among the girl students of universities and colleges. By 1986, the *Islami Chattri Sangstha* had built up considerable influence among the female student community in Bangladesh.
12. See the *Inaugural Address of Abbas Ali Khan at the Second All Bangladesh Convention of Rokons (Full Members) of Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh*, held on 25–28 December 1986 (published by Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh) p. 7. The speech is in Bengali and the English translation of the excerpts is by the author. Jamaat men worked zealously for the success of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in the presidential election of 1978, parliamentary election of 1979, and again, in the presidential election of 1981. The Jamaat contested the parliamentary election held on 7 May, 1986 and won 10 out of 300 seats. By all reliable accounts, only about 4–5 per cent of the voters cast their ballots in the May 1986 election and the seats were distributed by the military government among the political parties participating in the election, without any reference to actual votes received by the parties. The Jamaat, along with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Bangladesh Awami League, boycotted the presidential election held on 19 October 1986, on the ground that a fair election could not take place in Bangladesh with General Ershad in power. Casting of ballots in the October election was as poor as it was in the May election.
13. See Talukder Maniruzzaman, *The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath* (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, Second Edition 1988) p. 32.
14. Ibid, p. 74.
15. Interview with a prominent leader of the Jamaat in March 1981.
16. See the special report on the Second All-Bangladesh Convention of *Rokons* (Full Members) of Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh, held on 25–28 December 1986, in the *Sonar Bangla*, 26 December, 1986.
17. The data on the party-elite of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Bangladesh were supplied to the writer by a prominent leader of the party in March 1981.
18. The data on the party-elite was supplied to the writer by a prominent Jamaat leader in September 1987.
19. Interview with a prominent leader of ICS in March 1981.
20. Interview with a top leader of ICS in September 1987.
21. The demographic characteristic of the central leaders of ICS 1981 were supplied to the author by a central leader of the organisation in March 1981.
22. The demographic characteristics of the central leaders of the ICS were supplied to the author by the central office of ICS in Dhaka in September 1987.
23. The demographic characteristics of the Jamaat women full members were supplied to the author by the central office of the Women 's Branch of the Jamaat in September 1987.
24. For figures of literacy in Bangladesh, see, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, *1986 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh*, p. 842.
25. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).

26. For the lower-middle-class base of Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan, see Khalid Bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1967) pp. 218–19. For similar movements in Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Morocco, Iran, Libya, see, G. H. Hansen, *Militant Islam* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979) pp. 147–160.
27. Maniruzzaman, op. cit., p. 33.
28. Professor Ghulam Azam, op. cit., pp. 46–7
29. See, the brochure, *The Ibn Sina Trust* (published by the Ibn Sina Trust, House No. 242A, Road No. 22 (Old), Dhanmandi Residential Area, Dhaka, n.d.).
30. The figures about the trusts and schools run by the Jamaat members were supplied to the author by the general manager of one of these trusts.
31. In October 1983, Maulana Abdul Jabbar, a member of the Jamaat's *Majlis-e-Shoora* (Consultative Committee) accused Professor Ghulam Azam of having handled the organisational problems in the ICS in an autocratic and un-Islamic manner. He also made allegations about Ghulam Azam's special connection with the Monarchical authorities of Saudi Arabia. He argued further that it was because of Ghulam Azam's special connection with the Saudi Arabian authorities that the Jamaat took a lukewarm attitude toward the great Iranian Revolution. The attempt by Maulana Abdul Jabbar to bring about a split in the Jamaat, however, failed. For details of this incident, see B. M. Monoar Kabir, 'The Politics of Religion: The Case of Jamaat-et-Islami', Mimeographed Paper, 1986.
32. Interview with a prominent leader of the Jamaat in September 1987.
33. For an account of numerous communist groups in Bangladesh, see Chapter VII, Maniruzzaman, op. cit., pp. 162–75.
34. See U. A. B. Razia Akter Banu, *Islam in Bangladesh* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992) pp. 163–9.
35. See Maniruzzaman op. cit., p. 239.

5 Islam in Bangladesh Politics

Taj ul-Islam Hashmi

With the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, which adopted the four-pronged state policy of nationalism, democracy, secularism and socialism, replacing the 'Islamic ideology' as practised in neighbouring Pakistan, many scholars believed that secular Bengali nationalism was firmly entrenched in the country. The rise of Islam as a political force in the country was not considered even as a remote possibility by the founders of the new nation. But not long after the emergence of the nation, Islam emerged as a political force which soon challenged the incompetent and corruption-ridden government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the 'father of the nation'.

His government's alleged pro-Indian ('pro-Hindu', hence 'anti-Islam') alignment had somewhat alarmed a section of Bangladeshi Muslims. Former pro-Pakistani politicians incited the masses by arousing them against the government by raising the 'Islam-in-danger' slogan. The generally poverty-stricken petty-bourgeoisie, peasants and lumpen-proletariats, were easily swayed to accept Islam as an alternative to Bengali nationalism. Henceforth, all the governments, following the overthrow of the Mujib regime in 1975, have identified with Islamic values and symbols to legitimise their rule. Meanwhile, the growth of the Jamaat-i-Islami and other Islam-oriented political parties has resulted in a sharp polarisation between Islamic and secular forces. Given the fluidity of the current situation, it is too early to draw conclusions about the future of Islamic politics in the country.

I

Bangladesh is the third largest Muslim country in the world (after Indonesia and Pakistan). It is only natural to assume that since about 90 per cent of the population are Muslims, Islam will play an important role in moulding its politics and the socio-cultural norms and political culture of the bulk of the population. If mass poverty, illiteracy, backwardness, unequal distribution of wealth and mass unemployment or under-employment have any positive correlation with Islamic resurgence and militancy, then Bangladesh is one of the most fertile breeding grounds of the syndrome, often wrongly defined as 'Islamic fundamentalism'. But

Bangladesh is not just another Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon or Malaysia. There may be striking similarities between the Islamic movements of different countries, their dissimilarities are none the less striking.

It is essential to bear in mind that the country is predominantly agrarian, more than 80 per cent of the population being rural, mostly impoverished peasants, primarily depending on almost primitive modes of cultivation. What is more, the bulk of the peasantry, about 60 per cent (with sub-regional variations), are in the landless or semi-landless categories, lacking power, security of tenure or viable means of employment.

Despite the availability of a plethora of primary and secondary sources on the socio-political and economic aspects of Bangladesh society, there is a paucity of sources on the peasant and folk-culture of the region. It is not enough to pass sweeping comments on the nature of the Bengali Muslims, as some British colonial administrators have done out of malice, and more out of ignorance. There is no point in simply agreeing or disagreeing with such comments as that the Bengali Muslims were by nature 'the most quarrelsome, litigious, vindictive race in India',[1] or that harmony was the exception rather than the rule,[2] in the village community of East Bengal. But what one gets from the above 'malicious' and 'contemptuous' assertions is a tinge of truth as well, that traditionally the people in this region have been known for their unpredictability, their vacillating and non-committal nature, and their propensity for violence, anarchy and factiousness – typical of most peasant societies.

The 'peasant factor' has been an important ingredient and catalyst in all the major political movements in the region – from the so-called Wahhabi and the Faraizi movements of the nineteenth century to the nationalist and separatist movements of the twentieth century, including the movements for Pakistan and Bangladesh. The 'Politics of Islam' is no exception in this regard. Militant as well as non-militant Islamic groups and political parties have been mobilising peasant support since the emergence of Bangladesh. The peasant support and participation in the various Islamic movements need not necessarily project only the violent, anarchical and non-committal aspects of the peasant mentality; they also suggest how the genuinely sincere Islamic dogmatists and reformists, as well as the insincere, pseudo-Islamist elites, manipulate and hegemonise peasant consciousness, mainly for the benefit of the non-peasant elements in the society.

Besides the 'peasant factor', there are two other important ingredients, often catalytic, who play important roles in the 'politics of Islam'. They are the petty-bourgeois and the lumpen-proletariat categories, equally if not more vacillating, non-committal and unpredictable than the peasantry. They, in addition, are very opportunistic by nature.

Two examples will highlight the unpredictability and ambivalence of the people: On 25 March 1992, thousands of urban, educated Bangladeshis held wild celebrations of the Pakistani victory in the World Cup Cricket final. The same people would miss no opportunity to remind everybody how Pakistanis massacred 'three million' Bangladeshis in 1971. The Pakistani military crackdown, leading to the killing of so many Bangladeshis in 1971, ironically, started on 25 March, exactly 21 years before the cricket match. A second example of their ambivalence is the way they organised the 'public trial' of Ghulam Azam, a former collaborator of the Pakistani occupation forces in 1971, in a 'people's court' in Dhaka on the following day, 26 March 1992, the National Day of Bangladesh. Thousands of Bangladeshis from all walks of life went to witness the 'trial'.

II

With the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, which soon adopted 'secularism' and 'socialism', along with 'democracy' and 'nationalism', as its ideologies and goals, scholars and laymen within the country and elsewhere were unanimous about one thing – Islam as a political factor had no future in Bangladesh – although there was scepticism among the intelligentsia of Bangladesh about the implementation of the four-pronged ideology (also known as 'Mujibism') by the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Sheikh Mujib). In short, for many scholars, the emergence of Bangladesh amounted to the hammering of the last nail into the coffin of the 'two-nation theory' of Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. Some even raised 'doubts about the credibility of any comprehensive interpretation of Muslim separatist ideology'.[3] One may aptly cite Basant Chatterjee, who witnessed the presence of all the elements of the Muslim exclusive mentality towards Hindus and India among Bangladeshi Muslims in 1973. He does not believe that the creation of Bangladesh has demolished the 'two-nation theory' of Jinnah. One finds his arguments in this regard irrevocable:

> Somebody should ask these hypocrites if they could give one good reason for the separate existence of Bangladesh after the destruction of the two-nation theory. If the theory has been demolished, as they claim, then the only logical consequence should be the reunion of Bangladesh with India, as seems to be the positive stand of the Bangladeshi Hindus. ... Perhaps these people do not know, or perhaps they know it only too

well, that no person in Bangladesh today can dare to assert from the public platform that what was done in 1947 was wrong, for the people know that had Pakistan not been created then, Bangladesh too would not have come into existence now.[4]

Scholars argued on the basis of the history, tradition and culture of the Bangladeshi Muslims that, although God-fearing, they had been nourishing a culture of tolerance and peaceful coexistence with non-Muslim neighbours. Asim Roy has rightly assessed that, although the puritanist and revivalist forces succeeded in drawing Bengali Muslims 'towards the heterogenetic model of classical Islam' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this did not signal the total break with the traditional syncretistic culture of the Bengali Muslim masses. We may agree with him that: 'A culture, is no less a determinant in recasting and reformulating a religion than is a religion in modifying a culture'.[5] One may mention, in this regard, how north-western Indian Muslims in general, and Pakistanis in particular, also consider their Muslim counterparts in the lower Gangetic plains of Bengal as 'Hinduised Bengali Muslims' or 'Semi-Hindus'. This further substantiates the hypothesis that Bangladeshi Muslims are not as dogmatic and fanatic as their north Indian, Pakistani or Iranian/Middle-Eastern counterparts, hence their 'immunity' from getting involved in 'political Islam', let alone turning radical, militant or 'fundamentalist', as broadly understood in the West. For further embellishment of the above theory, the proponents may even cite the period between 1947 and 1971, when East Pakistani Bengali Muslims, being gradually disenchanted with and alienated from West Pakistan for economic reasons, were losing faith in Muslim solidarity, the cornerstone of Pakistani nationhood. Bangladeshi political leaders, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the main architect of Bangladesh, quite complacently nourished this view without realising the thinness of the ice they were trampling on. They simply ignored the fact that East Bengali Muslims had been aroused again and again in the name of Islam throughout the British colonial period,[6] and how Bengali Muslim peasant and petty-bourgeois support had been instrumental and decisive in the creation of Pakistan in 1947.[7]

However, as we know, secularism, along with socialism, became the cornerstone of Bangladesh only after the emergence of the nation in December 1971.[8] The implications of the 'secularisation' of the polity and the reasons why Islam has emerged as a powerful political factor in the country are very important for our understanding of the problem. First, the overnight introduction of the ill-defined concept of secularism was simply a superimposition on the predominantly agrarian, backward and pre-

modern society of Bangladesh, still nourishing feudal values with religion as the main source of law and ethics; and secondly, the failure of the Mujib government to fulfil the expectations of the bulk of the people, who did not get their 'Golden Bengal', free from exploitation and poverty, brought Islam – political, fatalist and escapist – to the forefront. The military, and the quasi-military regimes, following the assassination of Mujib, found Islam a convenient tool to legitimise their rule by championing the cause of Islam, having popular support in all sections of the Bangladeshi Muslim population.

The champions of Islam are not necessarily avowedly communal or anti-Hindu, as is often wrongly assumed by many Bangladeshi scholars and politicians.[9] For our convenience, we may categorise the different groups of people championing the cause of Islam into four broad categories: (a) the militant reformist ('fundamentalist'); (b) the fatalist; (c) the 'Anglo-Mohamedan' ('opportunist' and 'pragmatist'); and (d) the orthodox (including *pirs* and *sufis*, often escapist). The first two categories, which generally represent the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tabligh Jamaat respectively, are non-communal by nature. The former believes in the total transformation of society in accordance with the tenets of Islam, as understood and interpreted by its founder, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi.[10] The Tabligh Jamaat, on the other hand, is an extremely puritanical movement organising Muslims throughout the world with a view to guiding them to the 'right path'.[11] Unlike the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Tabligh movement is not a militant political movement to capture state power. It can be classified as a fatalist/escapist, non-violent movement.

The 'Anglo-Mohamedans' are the anglicised or Westernised Muslims aiming at synthesising Islamic and Western values for temporal benefits. They can be believers as well as agnostics or atheists, but for the sake of expediency, legitimacy and power, they are often vacillating. Sometimes they are with the nationalists and sometimes with the orthodox *ulama*, *pirs* and *sufis*. They can be very communal or anti-Hindu (not anti-Christian or anti-West). They draw inspiration from the Aligarh Movement (of the nineteenth century) of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.[12]

The *pirs* and *sufis*, in short, represent mystic Islam, but they are not an amorphous, homogeneous group. The *pirs* in general belong to one or more mystic orders or *tariqas*, having *muridan* or disciples among all sections of the population, especially among peasants.[13] They exert tremendous influence on their followers. At times they are non-political, but can be politically active and influential as well, having close ties with the 'Anglo-Mohamedans' and other members of the ruling classes, including the armed forces. Though exponents of orthodoxy, *pirs* in Bangladesh are generally opposed to the Jamaat-i-Islami and Tabligh movements. But

there are instances of Jamaatis and Tablighis paying respect to certain renowned *pirs* of the region. One should point out the contradictions between the philosophies of the groups and the practices of the respective followers in this regard. The followers of a group often shift allegiance. A Tablighi might join the Jamaat-i-Islami and an 'Anglo-Mohamedan' might turn Tablighi one day.

Despite their mutual differences and enmity, especially between the orthodox *ulama* or *pirs* and the Jamaat-i-Islami,[14] these groups have certain commonalities. Excepting the 'Anglo-Mohamedans', the other three groups oppose women's liberation; Western codes of conduct, law and ethics; even dress and culture; and are in favour of establishing *shariah* or Islamic law, emanating from the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet of Islam. Apparently, they are committed to the notion of an Islamic state. This notion is, however, more vague and utopian than anything concrete and explainable in terms of modern social sciences. Only the Jamaat-i-Islami offers some sort of substance in their arguments in favour of an Islamic state as an alternative to the existing system of government in Bangladesh. The most important aspect, which is common to all the four categories, is their stand *vis-à-vis* India and Pakistan. They are invariably anti-Indian (if not anti-Hindu), nourishing a soft corner for Pakistan and other Muslim countries. This attitude is not only a reflection of their political conviction but also a reflection of their psyche, which has to be explained for a proper comprehension of Islam as a political factor in Bangladesh.

The 'India-factor' is the key element in the whole discourse on Islam in Bangladeshi politics, along with the 'peasant', 'petty-bourgeois' and 'lumpen-proletariat' factors, mentioned earlier. Besides the geo-political and other factors associated with the Indophobia of the average Bangladeshis, the Indian government's over-friendly attitude towards the Mujib government, which lost its credibility as a sensible, sincere, competent and honest one among the bulk of the Bangladeshis not long after their independence, was also responsible for this hostility towards India. One wonders how Bangladeshis, who regarded India as the 'greatest friend and ally' during the War of Liberation in 1971, turned anti-Indian and 'pro-Islamic' within a year or so of the Liberation.

III

What the above discussion requires is an analysis of what went wrong with 'Mujibism' and the government-cum-party machinery soon after the creation of the new nation. We might also look into the phenomenon called

Islamic resurgence and Islamic 'fundamentalism' in Bangladesh not only as a reaction to Mujibism but also as a factor explainable in other terms. But as most scholars draw a positive correlation between 'Mujibism' and its failure to deliver anything but misery to the luckless millions of Bangladesh, one must examine what really went wrong with the 'new system' evolved by Sheikh Mujib and his party.

The Mujib government's first major step towards introducing secularism — a formal state-principle, along with nationalism, democracy and socialism, was its incorporation into the preamble to the Bangladesh Constitution of 1972. The Constitution stressed that secularism would be guaranteed only after the elimination of all kinds of communalism; political recognition by the state; political use of religion; and any discrimination against anybody on religious grounds.[15] It also imposed a ban on any organisation 'which in the name or on the basis of any religion' would indulge in political activities.[16] Consequently a number of political parties, including the Jamaat-i-Islami, Muslim League and Nizam-i-Islam Party, many of whose leaders and workers had collaborated with the Pakistani occupation army in 1971, were deregistered with immediate effect.

Meanwhile, the government had also taken measures to 'secularise' the polity by changing Islamic names, logos, motifs etc. of various institutions. The Islamic Intermediate College of Dhaka, for example, was renamed as Nazrul Islam College, and the Quranic inscription, 'Read in the name of your Lord', was replaced with 'Knowledge is Light' on the logo of the University of Dhaka. This infuriated a section of the Bangladeshi Muslims, who, by 1973, started open criticism of the Mujib government for its 'anti-Islamic' and 'pro-Hindu-pro-India' stands. It might be mentioned here that not a single Hindu, Christian, or Buddhist organisation, having religious identity or name, was affected by the Mujib government's 'secularisation' programme. The government also made religious instruction at schools optional. Some other innovations of the Government: introducing the recital of Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian religious texts along with the Quran, on government-controlled radio and television networks; the replacement of the hitherto prevalent 'Khuda Hafiz' (May God protect us all) with 'Jai Bangla' (Victory to Bengal) as a mode of ending radio and television programmes, also angered many Bangladeshi Muslims. Some became apprehensive of further 'Hinduisation' of Bengali Muslim culture under the Mujib regime.

Relations with India, and its role during and immediately after the Liberation War, became very controversial. Maulana Bhashani, the octogenarian pro-Chinese politician, who also championed the cause of 'Islamic socialism', became the chief spokesman and leader of the anti-Mujib, anti-

Awami League campaign during this period. He was extremely critical of the Indian 'Marwari' traders (originally from Rajasthan) and their Bangladeshi business associates for their alleged calculative plunder of Bangladesh. Maulana Bhashani is said to have told Basant Chatterjee in 1973: 'Let there be no mistake about it: the Marwaris are leeches; they are sucking the blood out of both Bengals.'[17] There is every reason to believe that the clandestine workers of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Muslim League, Nizam-i-Islam Party, and other Islamic groups, joined hands with Bhashani. His Bengali weekly, the *Haq Katha*, played an important role in vilifying India and the Mujib government as enemies of Islam and of the people of Bangladesh. The Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty, signed by Sheikh Mujib and Indira Ghandi on 19 March 1972, soon became a liability for the Mujib government despite the apparently innocuous terms and conditions of the treaty to promote mutual friendship, cooperation and peace in the region for a period of 25 years, with a provision for renewal. Some of the clauses of the treaty, especially articles 9 and 10, were regarded by many Bangladeshis as attempts to circumscribe the sovereignty of their country.[18]

Meanwhile, the presence of Indian troops in Bangladesh, who had been living there after the surrender of the Pakistani troops in December 1971, had aroused suspicion and resentment among a cross-section of the Bangladeshi population. India's controversial role in promoting the pro-Awami League freedom fighters, called Mujib Bahini, during the Liberation War, created a lot of resentment amongst Bangladeshi army officers and freedom fighters not affiliated to the Awami League.[19] These people later turned anti-Indian or anti-Awami League, which became synonymous not long after the Liberation. Soon anti-Indian sentiments of the people turned into anti-Hindu. The incipient capitalist class of Bangladesh, who could not compete with the well-established Indian one, might have been the main *agents provocateurs* in arousing anti-Hindu feeling among the Bangladeshi masses,[20] but there were other factors as well. Many Bangladeshis apprehended that Hindu professionals, landlords, businessmen and others who had emigrated to India under the prevailing hostile conditions during the Pakistan period would come back to reclaim their property and would be competing with them for jobs and business opportunities.

Owing to the misrule, abuse of power and rampant nepotism of the Awami regime, as early as in 1973, many Bangladeshis were totally crestfallen at the state of affairs in the country. According to Basant Chatterjee, a poor rickshaw-puller of Tangail (about 60 miles from Dhaka) told him that the *azadi* or freedom had only benefited the Awami League leaders and 'their friend India'. He also told Chatterjee: 'For us poor people

Pakistan was all right. At least, we had enough "bhat" [rice] then to eat to our fill.' He also believed that India was taking away food grains from Bangladesh, wondering 'where is all the rice then?'[21] Chatterjee has also portrayed Sheikh Mujib as an indulgent, weak person, suffering from indecisiveness. On top of that, he was surrounded by opportunist and avowedly communal (anti-Hindu) Awami Leaguers. Chatterjee has even cited Maulana Bhashani, who is said to have told him:

> Mujib himself would use every trick of communalism to keep himself in power. In fact, he is the worst communalist this country has ever produced...he was not even prepared to drop the prefix 'Muslim' from the name of Awami League.[22]

Chatterjee has rightly pointed out that although Sheikh Mujib himself was possibly not communal in the 1970s, he was surrounded by 'all kinds of Pakistani agents, communal fanatics and plain ruffians'. Some Bangladeshi Hindus told him: 'Most of the Awami League's membership is composed of thugs, dacoits, and cut-throats, and the poor Hindus are entirely at their mercy.'[23] His interview with Manoranjan Dhar, a senior Hindu minister in Mujib's cabinet, is quite revealing. Dhar is said to have registered his apprehension that if, through a 'combination of internal and external forces inimical to India–Bangladesh friendship' secularism was not achieved, and the Hindus in Bangladesh 'continued to have the feeling of being second-class citizens', then they would be forced to shift gradually to India. 'And, in that case, Bangladesh would by itself become "Muslim Bengal".'[24] Chatterjee was not very pleased with the state of affairs in Bangladesh under Sheikh Mujib, especially with regard to the Hindu minority in the country. He felt that Hindu Bangladeshis were already living as second-class citizens and were hardly visible or distinguishable, in the urban areas, from Muslims, as they dressed up as Muslims in *lungi* and *kurta-pajama*, discarding *dhoti*; and *namaskar* as a mode of greeting people (as Hindu Bengalis in India would do) was replaced by the Muslim mode, *salam* or *adab* by them, so that they could not be 'identified' as Hindus. In general, Hindus would not compete for jobs with Muslims. They would rather be self-employed as professionals or businessmen. Chatterjee has pointed out how the anti-Indian/anti-Hindu feeling prevalent among the bulk of the Bangladeshis prevented Sheikh Mujib from restoring the famous Kali Temple of Ramna Race Course, demolished by the Pakistani occupation army in 1971. He has given a list of other temples and Hindu monuments not restored by the Government owing to the fact that many Awami League leaders were communal and anti-Hindu by

temperament. According to him, some top Awami League leaders occupied Hindu property. Chatterjee, in this regard, has quite cynically portrayed the Mujib government as 'diabolical', having a double standard as well. He thinks: 'When this government wants to deprive the Hindus of their properties, it assumes the role of a successor to Pakistan, but when it faces the prospect of having to share a part of Bhutto's headache, it unfurls the banner of revolution.'[25]

Some other eye-witness accounts of Bangladesh polity during the Mujib regime also lead us to the same conclusions, that: the Awami League government was not sure about (a) its stand *vis-à-vis* Islam and secularism, and (b) whether it should be aligned to the Indo-Soviet bloc by alienating the USA, China and the pro-Western Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This vacillation was reflected in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's attending the Islamic summit in Lahore in 1974, with a view to getting Saudi Arabian recognition and financial support, while maintaining secularism as part of the state ideology. Meanwhile, most of the former collaborators of the Pakistani regime of 1971 had been released from detention or relieved of collaboration charges under the provisions of the General Amnesty of Sheikh Mujib. Some scholars and pro-Chinese politicians believe that the collaborators were released to neutralise the growing influence of the radical left and to improve ties with the oil-rich Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. Professor Ghulam Azam of the Jamaat-i-Islami, living in exile during the Mujib regime, is said to have had close links with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. It is alleged that Ghulam Azam described Bangladesh as a 'Godless socialist country' and that he even asked King Faisal to impose political pressure on Mujib's government to remove 'constitutional obstacles' imposed against Islam in the country. According to some scholars, Mujib had to compromise with the Islamic groups both within and outside Bangladesh. Thus more funds for *madrassah* education (Islamic education) and the Islamic Foundation were released by the Awami League government – in 1971 the allocation of Islamic education was Taka 2.5 million, which went up to Taka 7.2 million in 1973.[26] With a view to getting petro-dollars and legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim bloc, Sheikh Mujib is said to have started attending Islamic gatherings in the country. Consequently Bangladesh received $200 million as charity from Saudi Arabia in 1973–74,[27] although there was no diplomatic relationship between the two countries; it was only established after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in a military take over in August 1975.

Meanwhile, the clandestine Jamaat-i-Islami, Muslim League and other Islamic groups were also busy throughout the country organising themselves by observing Islamic functions and publishing Islamic literature,

and often laying emphasis on 'research activities', through the Islamic Foundation (formerly Islamic Academy), Bangladesh Masjid Mission, Masjid Samaj and a number of other organisations, affiliated to mosques or other socio-cultural organisations. The famine of 1974 also gave these Islamic organisations opportunities to come closer to the people in the name of relief and rehabilitation works.[28] The ban on Islamic politics turned Islamic groups into determined, underground opposition to the Mujib government, many of them, especially the Jamaat-i-Islami, 'forming working relations' with certain left-wing organisations. Thus Islam became a 'powerful rallying cry' against the Indo-Soviet axis, a common enemy of the Islamic and pro-Chinese leftist groups. As mentioned earlier, Mujib's dependence on the Indo-Soviet bloc became a political liability for him and his party.[29]

By early 1975, despite several desperate attempts to compromise with the Islamic groups by a kind of face-lift, giving Islam some prominence, the Mujib government was thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the average Bangladeshi Muslim.[30] Sheikh Mujib was in the most pathetic situation, facing a dilemma over whether to reconcile the Muslims and thus antagonise the Hindu lobby represented by India, who had helped create Bangladesh![31]

Meanwhile, because of a sharp polarisation between the Awami League and the opposition, belonging to the moderate liberal, leftist and Islamic groups, Sheik Mujib had gone for authoritarian rule by installing himself as the President of the country, holding the absolute power of an autocrat. In the name of the 'second revolution', existing political parties and 20 daily newspapers were banned (the remaining four being under government control), and the ruling party, renamed as the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL) or the Peasants' and Workers' Awami League, emerged as the only party. The government forced a cross-section of people, including officers of the armed forces, high government officials and university teachers, to become members of the BKSAL, in the fascist/communist style. The pro-Soviet Communist Party of Bangladesh and the National Awami Party were close allies of the BKSAL regimes.[32] The 'second revolution' was the last straw to break the back of the regime, which had already lost its credibility among all sections of the population. Consequently the August coup d'état of 1975, by a group of young army officers, which resulted in the brutal killing of Sheikh Mujib and most members of his family, was not resisted or condemned publicly by anybody in the country but was, rather, celebrated by many as a step towards shaking off Indian hegemony, socialism and secularism, along with corruption, misrule and autocracy.[33]

IV

It is very significant that although the handful of soldiers and army officers who staged the coup belonged to the 'freedom fighters' or the privileged section of the army, they raised Islamic slogans on the roads of Dhaka city, in tanks and lorries, on the morning of 15 August, after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib and his family members. Another 'freedom fighter' and a close associate of Mujib, Khondkar Mushtaque Ahmed, who took over ■ the new President of the country after the coup, also used Islamic rhetoric in his speeches throughout his short tenure, which lasted until early November 1975. In his first speech to the nation he declared that he had taken over the full powers of the government of Bangladesh 'with the help and mercy of the Almighty Allah'.[34] Another interesting aspect of the coup was an announcement made over the Dhaka radio on 15 August, declaring Bangladesh as an 'Islamic Republic'.[35] It would be too trite to ascribe this to the Jamaat influence in the army. This sudden 'Islamic orientation' of the new rulers of Bangladesh smacked of their fear of India (as a possible intervening force) and lack of confidence in running the show. Their use of Islam was typical of the 'Anglo-Mohamedans' throughout the subcontinent in modern times. It not only gave them legitimacy, but also assured them of the support of Jamaat-i-Islami, the Muslim League and other groups with vague commitments to the cause of Islam. The successive military regimes under Generals Ziaur Rahman (1975–81) and H. M. Ershad (1982–90) paid full attention to refurbishing their images by becoming 'champions' of Islam, if not as exponents of orthodox Islam.

Ziaur Rahman not only withdrew the ban imposed on Islamic political parties, such as Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim League, by Sheikh Mujib; he also included several former collaborators of the Pakistani military junta of 1971 in his cabinet, including Shah Azizur Rahman as his Prime Minister, who had been to the UN, representing the military junta of Pakistan, during the War of Liberation for Bangladesh in 1971. He also amended the Constitution of Bangladesh in 1977. After the amendment, the Constitution had *Bismillah-ir Rahman-ir Rahim* in Arabic (In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) inserted at the beginning, along with 'Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions', in place of 'secularism' in the preamble of the same. Zia assured the business community that there would not be any nationalisation of property in the name of socialism.[36]

Sheikh Mujib's tragic death and the overthrow of the one-party, BKSAL government might have been a very important lesson for Ziaur Rahman, who went further than his predecessors in showing his solidarity with

Islam and the Muslim world. He introduced more Islamic studies as a compulsory subject at school form levels I to VIII.[37] He started celebrating Islamic festivals under state patronage. He also adopted measures such as introducing *azan* (prayer call) through public media (radio and TV); hanging banners on busy intersections of Dhaka city with quotations from the Quran and Hadith (traditions of the Prophet); uttering *Bismillah-ir Rahman-ir Rahim* before his public speeches, which greatly helped in transforming his image from a military ruler into a God-fearing, Islam-loving and above all, anti-Indian, patriotic and honest ruler.

Zia took full advantage of the prevalent political situation in the country to strengthen his position by forging ties with diverse elements – leftists, liberal capitalists and extreme rightists – who had one thing in common with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) of Zia, formed in 1978. They were all arch anti-Awami Leaguers. Zia, being a Freedom Fighter, had the advantage of getting the whole-hearted support of the Bangladesh Mukti Joddha Sangsad (Bangladesh Freedom Fighters' Association) in the 1977 referendum to legitimise his rule. On the other hand, Shah Azizur Rahman and a few other prominent Muslim League leaders, along with Maulana Abdul Mannan, chief of the Jamiat-i-Mudarresin (Association of the *Madrassah* teachers), the *pirs* of Sarsina, Jaunpur and others with a pathological hatred for the Awami League and India, joined hands with the BNP. Even the Jamaat-i-Islami, politically more organised and commited to the establishment of an Islamic state based on *shariah*, found the BNP more acceptable than the Awami League. Some scholars believe that the Islam-oriented political parties 'who were instrumental in organizing Zia's BNP, had demanded Islamic symbolism in national life'. They even wanted to change the national anthem and flag of Bangladesh.[38] The concept of Bangladeshi nationalism, as developed by Zia, was his trump card as well. It was distinct from the 'Bengali nationalism' of Sheikh Mujib in the sense that it not only drew a line between the Bengali-speaking people of Bangladesh and those of West Bengal (India) but, at least theoretically, it also embraced the ethnically non-Bengalis, including the tribals, within the fold of the nation. For the Islamic groups, it had a distinct Muslim identity as it excluded the Indian West Bengalis, predominantly Hindu.[39]

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia had already recognised Bangladesh on 16 August 1975, the day after Mujib's assassination,[40] almost implying that it had been waiting for his removal from power. Zia further enhanced the Saudi–Bangladeshi relationship by making Bangladesh an important member of the OIC. He also took measures to make Jamaat-i-Islami happy. This Islamic group had direct links with the Saudi Arabian government and with some non-governmental institutions like the Rabat-i-Alam

al Islam of Saudi Arabia.[41] The Zia government's willingness to appease the Jamaat is reflected in Air Vice-Marshal M. G. Tawab's (one of the Deputy Martial Law Administrators) attending and addressing a big rally of the Jamaat in Dhaka in March 1976, where slogans were raised for converting Bangladesh into an Islamic Republic.[42] Not long afterwards, the government acquiesced in the Jamaat campaign for the removal of the statue, Aparajeyo Bangla (Unconquerable Bengal), depicting the Liberation Struggle, in front of the Arts Building of Dhaka University, in early 1978. Some time in 1978, the statue of a javelin-throwing athlete, in front of the National Stadium in Dhaka, was literally uprooted by some armed people who came in a lorry (popularly believed to be an act to 'purify' society of the influence of 'un-Islamic idolatry' by some members of the 9th Division of the Bangladesh Army, headed by a pro-Jamaat general).

Another major move towards Islamisation under Ziaur Rahman was the foundation of the Islamic University at Shantidanga-Dulalpur in Kustia, in western Bangladesh, in 1979. This move must have been appreciated by the Jamaat-i-Islami and other 'Islam-loving' parties. His forming a new Ministry of Religious Affairs might have a swathing effect on the irritation of these groups caused by the adoption of a secular policy by the Mujib government.

The sudden assassination of Zia by a small group of soldiers in May 1981 was followed by a short-lived civilian government under Justice Abdus Sattar, of BNP, as the elected President of the country. The army chief, General Hossain Muhammad Ershad, unceremoniously removed Sattar on 24 March 1982. Ershad had neither the charisma nor the image of Zia. He lacked legitimacy as well as integrity and honesty. But, like his predecessor, he also thought Islam would legitimise his usurpation of power. It is, however, another matter if he failed to legitimise his power among the bulk of the population, despite his so many gimmickries and innovative measures *vis-à-vis* Islamisation. He declared, in late 1982, the introduction of the principles of Islam as part of the Constitution of Bangladesh. He established the *Zakat* Fund to raise poor-tax in accordance with Islam. His introduction of Islamic studies in school levels; visiting mosques and shrines, including the *pir* of Atrashi in Faridpur district; beautifying and building mosques with government funds; going on the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina; declaring Friday as the weekly holiday and maintaining cordial relationships with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, were some of the measures and salient features of Ershad's Islamisation programme.[43] As the Jamaat-i-Islami and some other Islamic groups had been demanding the shifting of the Islamic University from Kustia to Dhaka, Ershad ordered its shifting to Ghazipur, near Dhaka, in 1982; it

seemed to appease the Islamic groups. The Islamic University started functioning at Ghazipur in 1985.

Despite all these measures, because of rampant corruption and Ershad's own involvements in many controversial matters, he was somehow extremely unpopular among most Islamic groups, intellectuals, professionals and students. Unlike Zia's BNP, his Jatiya Party failed miserably in organising a student front in Dhaka and other universities. He also failed to win over the Jamaat-i-Islami and some other Islamic groups. He did manage to get the support of the *pirs* of Atrashi and Sarsina, along with a few 'Anglo-Mohamedan' groups.[44] Maulana Abdul Mannan of the Jamiat-ul-Mudarresin, a minister in Ershad's cabinet, was another prominent supporter of Ershad among the 'Islam-loving' people. He shared Ershad's anti-Jamaat feelings as well. Ershad used to attend rallies organised by Mannan as head of the Jamiat-ul-Mudarresin. In one such rally, on 20 January 1983, Ershad promised to introduce 'Islamic principles' into the 'cultural life' of Bangladeshi Muslims.[45]

It is interesting that not only educated Bangladeshis with secular orientation opposed Ershad's so-called Islamisation process, but many orthodox *ulama* [Muslim theologians] also bitterly criticised his *modus operandi*, raising questions about his legitimacy as well. Maulana Mohammadullah (Hafizjee Huzur), who had close links with Iran, issued a *fatwa* (religious decree) in February 1984 condemning Ershad's government as un-Islamic, as it did not rule according to the Quran and Sunnah, and as illegitimate for seizing power without the consent of the people.[46]

However, this sort of vitriol did not deter Ershad from projecting himself and his rule as Islamic. He attended several *ijtamas*, or annual gatherings of the Tabligh Jamaat, at Tungi, near Dhaka, where about a million Muslims, including some foreigners, assemble every year for mass prayers. To buy the support of the God-fearing ordinary Muslim masses of Bangladesh, he went to the extent of exempting mosques from paying electricity and water bills.[47] His most important measure towards the 'Islamisation' of Bangladesh was his declaration making Islam the State Religion, in June 1988. What he thought would be a gambit, forcing the Islamic opposition groups to a defensive game, and neutralising them as a political force, simply backfired.

The background of this legislation, making Islam as the State Religion, is very significant. While the pro-Saudi, Jamaat-i-Islami, and the pro-Khomeini, Hafizjee Huzur, along with other rightist, liberal and even leftist groups, were busy in a relentless anti-Ershad campaign, using Islamic symbols and devices to draw mass support for their groups, Ershad was utilising the pro-Saddam, Abdul Mannan's Jamiat-ul-Mudarresin, and the

pir of Sarsina, Maulana Abu Zafar Saleh, to promote him as a champion of Islam. Addressing a huge congregation of Muslims, who assembled at Sarsina, in southern Bangladesh, in connection with the annual *urus* (commemoration of a dead *pir*) of the *pir* of Sarsina, on 13 March 1988, General Ershad declared that the Parliament would consider a bill in the following session declaring Islam as the State Religion of Bangladesh, to provide a 'religious identity to the nation'. He argued, that since 90 per cent people in the country were 'guided by Islam from birth to death', Islam should be accepted as the State Religion of the country. He stressed that his motive was to establish the tenets of Islam in accordance with the ideals of the Prophet Muhammad, where non-Muslims would enjoy full freedom to practise their faiths. He criticised both the secular and Islamic political groups of Bangladesh. With oblique reference to the Jamaat-i-Islami, he said that their politics was 'suffering from utter contradiction'. He observed that: 'While they want to portray themselves as the champions of Islam, they have joined hands with those who preach secularism.' The most interesting part of his speech was his assertion that as 'in Islam, the head of state is considered the Imam', he was ready to act as one, being fully aware of his responsibility in this regard. He also highlighted the steps taken by his government for 'the advancement of Islam' in Bangladesh.[48]

Maulana Mannan, Ershad's minister in charge of Religious Affairs, who was also present in the *urus* gathering, praised the General as a champion of Islam and of the poor masses. The *pir* of Sarsina, Maulana Aba Zafar Saleh, said that President Ershad was 'the first President and leader' he had seen in his life who was dedicated to the path of Islam, upholding the interest of the common man. The Iraqi ambassador to Bangladesh, Zohair Mohammad al-Omar, who also attended the rally, described Ershad as 'a bridge between Bangladesh and the Muslim Arab countries' and as a 'highly respected personality' in the Muslim world.[49]

Despite Ershad's desperate attempt to salvage his image among the 'Islam-loving' masses and political parties, his move to introduce Islam as the state religion became very unpopular among almost all the political groups, socio-cultural organisations, teachers, students, lawyers, feminist groups and others. They bitterly criticised the move as an attempt to exploit the religious sentiment of the people for narrow political gains. Abbas Ali Khan, the acting Ameer of Jamaat-i-Islami felt that this move was designed to perpetuate the Ershad government. The Bangladesh Khilafat Movement held that this was aimed at by-passing the national demand for establishing a truly Islamic rule in the country. It urged the people to guard against such designs. The Seven-Party Alliance, under BNP's Khalida Zia, and the Eight-Party Alliance, under Awami League's

Sheikh Hasina, also condemned the move as a political ploy to strengthen the Ershad regime. The Freedom Fighters' Organisation and other political groups condemned the move as well, urging the people to forge unity to restore democracy and fundamental rights.[50]

The Ershad government, turning a deaf ear to the anti-state-religion criticisms of the vast majority of socio-political organisations, tabled the State Religion Amendment Bill (also known as the 8th Amendment of the Constitution) in the Parliament on 11 May 1988. After the placement of the bill in the Parliament, the BNP, Awami League, Jamaat-i-Islami and other organisations became more critical of the government. The Jamaat chief, Abbas Ali Khan, held that the people wanted an Islamic state, not a mere declaration of Islam as a State Religion.[51] Khalida Zia, the BNP chief, declared that it was unnecessary to have Islam as the State Religion. She held that the BNP government preceding the Ershad regime had given the right status to Islam in the body politic of Bangladesh.[52]

The State Religion Bill was enacted on 7 June 1988, and this was followed by violent protest rallies, general strikes and mass meetings of the opposition parties throughout the country.[53] But some pro-Ershad groups and organisations without mass support welcomed the move, congratulating Ershad for 'fulfilling the expectation of the 90 per cent of the population'. Politically unimportant and insignificant organisations, such as the Bangladesh Teachers' Federation; Bangladesh Jamiat-i-Hizbullah; Jamiat-i-Ulama; Jamiat-ul-Mudarresin; Bangladesh Students' Hizbullah; the Tapsil Jati Federation (the Scheduled Caste Federation of Hindus); National Peasants' League; Muslim Kafela; Islami Chhatra (Student) Parishad; Sirat Mission, and personalities like the *pir* of Sarsina Maulana Abu Zafar Saleh, congratulated the government for the enactment of the bill.[54] Among the opponents there were militant Islamic groups as well as the leftists, liberal democrats, secular organisations and even 'Anglo-Mohamedan' organisations like the Bangladesh Muslim League. Kazi Abdul Qader, the chief of the Muslim League, demanded the immediate declaration of Bangladesh as an Islamic Republic. He felt that the move to make Islam the State Religion was aimed at suppressing the movement of the God-fearing Bangladeshi Muslims to establish the principles of the Quran and Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet) as the cardinal principles of the state.[55]

Soon the government tried to justify the move. Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Deputy Prime Minister of Ershad, told the Parliament on 6 June 1988 that the aim of the State Religion Act was not to establish 'Islamic fundamentalism' in the country but to stop the Islamic 'fundamentalists' from coming to power, so that Bangladesh would not become a 'Khomeini State'.[56] Consequently the Jamaat-i-Islami became more vocal against

Ershad and his State Religion Act. Some of its leaders condemned Ershad as an Indo-Soviet agent, determined to crush Islamic 'fundamentalism',[57] while Maulana Delwar Hossain Saidi, a demagogue of the party, openly admitted that he and his party were 'fundamentalists' – commited to the establishment of the fundamentals of Islam – while Ershad was a hypocrite, using Islam to resist the 'genuine' Islamic movement of the Jamaat.[58] The Jamaat also started a week-long Depose Ershad campaign on 10 June 1988. While the Eight-Party, Seven-Party and Five-Party alliances and other opposition groups observed a *hartal* (general strike) in protest against the State Religion Act, on 12 June, the Jamaat did not take part in the *hartal*. On 11 June the chief of the Dhaka city Jamaat addressed a rally in the city, asserting that the Jamaat believed in toppling the government by ballot, implying its reluctance to adopt violence. He also warned the 'enemies of freedom' not to go against the will of the people.[59]

Two women's organisations, Naripakhyo and Oikyobadhyo Nari Samaj, also came forward to protest against the move to establish Islam as the State Religion of Bangladesh. In doing so, they brought the issues of 'sovereignty of the country' and 'the spirit of the Freedom Struggle', which were presumed to be in danger as a result of the proposed State Religion legislation. They held rallies at the Shaheed Minar (Martyrs' Memorial) and in front of the Press Club in Dhaka on 16 April 1988. These were very thinly attended, and, according to the organisers of the rallies (mostly educated women), there was a sort of inertia and indifference among men towards these rallies. Many men were even happy about an Islamic State of Bangladesh where women would not compete with them in the job market. Naripakhyo leaders even complained about rude remarks by some men, who often asked them to observe proper *purdah* (seclusion of women from public view).[60]

Some leading male intellectuals and political workers also attended the rallies organised by Bangladeshi feminists. Professor Ahmed Sharif, a retired professor of Dhaka University, who openly advocates the virtues of secularism and atheism, and Colonel Nuruzzaman (Freedom Fighter) of the Muktijuddho Chetona Bikash Kendro (Centre for the Development of the Spirit of the Liberation War), spoke at some of the women's rallies. They stressed how vital democracy, socialism, secularism and the ideals of the Liberation Struggle were for the sustenance of Bangladesh. Ahmed Sharif felt that 'food in stomach is Islam' and urged that 'the right to be fed be incorporated in the Constitution' instead of Islam as the State Religion.[61] After the enactment of the State Religion Bill, on 7 June 1988, the feminist Naripakhyo organised several protest rallies in Dhaka. In a Bengali leaflet, '*Jar dharmo tar kachhey, rashtrer ki balar achhey*' (Religion is a personal

matter the state has nothing to do with it), this organisation condemned the Act of 7 June. Holding that the Act negated the basis of Bangladesh, creativity, free thinking and women's liberation, the Naripakhyo asserted that the concept of a 'new identity', as espoused by General Ershad, would raise questions about the existence of Bangladesh and would dishonour the non-Muslims and women in the country. It also lodged a writ petition with the Supreme Court of Bangladesh on 18 July 1988, challenging the validity of the 8th Amendment of the Constitution by Ershad, making Islam the State Religion of the country.[62]

With a view to neutralising the impact of the Jamaat on the politics of the metropolis, Dhaka, Ershad decided to shift the Islamic University, assumed to be a base of the Jamaat's student front, from Ghazipur (near Dhaka) to Shantidanga-Dulalpur in Kustia. Despite protests from the Jamaat, in January 1989 the University was again shifted from Dhaka to Kustia. This move, however, did not serve the purpose. The Jamaat became more aggressive in its anti-Ershad campaign. Maulana Delwar Hossain Saidi, the fire-eating pro-Jamaat demagogue, started a country-wide campaign against Ershad. He challenged Ershad in front of a mammoth crowd at the Chittagong Parade Ground in early 1989:

> General Ershad, you should never forget that yours is an illegitimate government. Don't you ever try to shift the Islamic University from Dhaka to Kustia. If you do so, there will be divine retribution (*ghazab*) on you.... You cannot forestall Islamic resurgence in Bangladesh by declaring Islam as the State Religion.[63]

V

What follows from the above discussion on the Zia and Ershad regimes' reliance on and manipulation of Islam for their continuation is the question: Did Zia and Ershad cling to the wrong idealogy and symbols (Islam and anti-Indian stand, respectively), contrary to the will of the people? Most certainly, the answer ought to be in the negative. What was once unthinkable, that the 'freedom-loving' Bangladeshis would ever tolerate military regimes, and that after so much sacrifice, suffering and humiliation at the hands of Pakistanis, they would ever forgive (let alone accept as leaders) the former 'collaborators' of the Pakistani regime of 1971, emerged as realities not long after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. Why people 'changed mood' has partially been discussed earlier. And the question has been partially answered by Rounaq Jahan, who holds that:

The masses were no longer as enthusiastic about political struggle as they were before independence, when they believed that a political change would necessarily bring about the betterment of their socio-economic conditions. Ziaur Rahman's survival in power, in part, reflects this changed mood of the masses, who are now more cautious about bringing in political change. Unless a change is definitely proven to be a better alternative, the masses in Bangladesh prefer, for the time being at least, to maintain the *status quo*.[64]

Zillur Rahman Khan's empirical study also indicates how Bangladeshi elites changed their attitude towards freedom and prosperity in the wake of independence in 1971. Prior to independence, they are said to have preferred 'freedom to prosperity'; while after independence they 'went for prosperity one hundred per cent'.[65] This 'prosperity', as perceived by Western-educated elites, does not necessarily connote prosperity in the economic sense. It also indicates the crest-fallen, persecuted intellectuals' and elites' longing for a civil society with rule of law, which was never established in the country in the true sense of the term. The masses (mostly peasants or depeasantised proletariats) also expected 'prosperity' with their limited perceptions of 'good life', which did not go beyond the level of attaining bare subsistence or *dal-bhat* (literally, rice and lentil soup), in common parlance of the Bangladeshis. They also expected the rule of law and social justice, measured in the scale of their 'moral economy', or a peasant state of mind which assumes that a pre-capitalist society protects the masses from the total destruction of their economy, and that not only is their subsistence assured, but their patrons also show paternal concern for their welfare, and they in return show filial loyalty to their patrons.[66]

If we agree with Ernest Gellner that 'no secularisation has taken place in the world of Islam', and that 'the hold of Islam over its believes is...stronger now stronger than it was 100 year ago'; then we must also agree with the proposition that the longing for civil society among Muslims in general is not as strong as their longing for traditional values.[67] Further agreement with Gellner would strengthen our argument that, by idealising local folk tradition and values and by their rejection of Western values (a humiliating option)[68], the Muslim masses in Bangladesh, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, have eventually surrendered to the 'High Islam' of the urban-based, strict, puritan, scripturalist religion of scholars. Consequently, the adherents of 'High Islam' and their allies, as well as rivals from among the dominant classes, hegemonise or try to hegemonise the mass culture, depicting 'Low Islam' and folk culture as having elements of ecstatic, ritualistic, unpuritanical faith and practices. The adherents of 'Low Islam'

are also addicted to the cult of personality. Most of the time these personalities, 'mediators with the divine', to paraphrase Gellner, are adherents of 'High Islam'.[69]

It has been discussed above how the Jamaat-i-Islami, the main champion of 'High Islam', behaved *vis-à-vis* the successive governments of Bangladesh. There has been further elaboration of the Jamaat's ideology, brief history, the socio-economic backgrounds of its supporters and its prospect in the future as a political force, in some other works.[70] What we need is further elaboration of Jamaat-i-Islami's nature and extent of influence among different sections of Bangladeshis, with special reference to its relationships with other Islamic and secular political parties.

It is interesting that, despite the Jamaat's anti-Bangladeshi role during the Liberation War of 1971 as Pakistani collaborators, and afterwards, up to the fall of Mujib's regime in 1975, as a co-organiser of the clandestine 'Muslim Bengal' movement;[71] it re-emerged as a full-fledged political party in 1979, accepting Bangladesh as a *fait accompli*. Not long after its formal emergence in the arena of Bangladeshi politics, the Jamaat not only gained strength, it also became very controversial for its pre-independence role and post-independence activities. It has grown fast as a very well-organised political party, having a powerful student organisation and support among petty-bourgeois classes and the peasantry.[72] By the early 1980s Jamaat's student wing became so powerful in Chittagong that, for the first time in the history of student politics in the region, it captured the Central Students' Union of Chittagong University, which it continued to hold until 1990 despite the combined opposition of the pro-Awami League, pro-BNP and pro-leftist student organisations of the country. In the 1991 parliamentary elections the party captured 18 seats and more than 12 per cent of the votes.[73]

Jamaat's growing popularity and the controversial statements by some of its leaders, such as 'we did no wrong in 1971', not only alarmed the pro-Awami League and pro-Bangladesh elements, they also annoyed the BNP and General Ziaur Raḥman.[74] Its growing popularity, especially among the lower middle classes and in rural areas and small towns in north-western and south-eastern Bangladesh, who had earlier been the bases of the left-oriented organisations, must have alarmed the secular and socialist forces in the country. Meanwhile, the Jamaat's student front, the Islamic Chhatra-Shibir, had earned a bad name for its alleged violent acts against students, teachers and other opponents of the group at Chittagong, Rajshahi and in the interior of Bangladesh. There have been claims and counter-claims of killing, torture and arson from both the Jamaat and its opponents since the late 1980s.

According to the pro-Awami League and pro-Eight-Party Alliance newspapers, the Jamaat had been killing off its rivals and, in many cases, amputating limbs and severing ligaments and vital veins of anti-Jamaat elements, crippling them for life.[75] While the Jamaat had a free hand in Chittagong, Rajshahi, Pabna, Khulna, Rangpur and some other districts, the secular-socialist students of Dhaka city did not allow any Jamaat meeting or rally in the three universities and scores of colleges in Dhaka city. In the University of Engineering and Technology in Dhaka, for example, the pro-Awami League and pro-socialist students imposed a total ban on Jamaat-Shibir activities in the campus with effect from 26 December 1990.[76]

At times, the Jamaat-non-Jamaat conflict overshadowed the other political conflicts and rivalries in the country. Despite Jamaat's anti-Ershad stand, excepting the BNP and some other 'Islam-loving' groups, other anti-Ershad groups, especially the Awami League, did not extend their support to the Jamaat, an enemy of their common enemy, Ershad. It seems the Ershad government was quite successful in alienating the Jamaat from the main-stream opposition parties to divide the opposition with the help of its allies among a section of the 'Anglo-Mohamedans', *pirs*, *sufis* and the *ulama* (Muslim theologians). Consequently, the Jamaat faced a three-pronged attack, from the government, secular/socialist/liberal groups and the *ulama*.

It is, however, interesting that the Jamaat did not categorically identify all these groups as its enemies. One rather finds a compromising attitude of the Jamaat towards the Islamic and secular political parties of the country. This is reflected in Jamaat's literature, especially in the writings of Professor Ghulam Azam.[77] Ghulam Azam asserts that in accordance with the tenets of Islam, all human beings are related to each other; and as fellow citizens of Bangladesh the non-Muslims should be especially loved and protected by Muslims. He thinks that, since the non-Muslims are 'potential Muslims', they should be treated well by all Muslims.[78]

Despite its showing of the olive-branch, the Jamaat could not reconcile the opposition of the left, liberal democrats, Bengali nationalists and others. One may agree with Badruddin Umar, a renowned leftist intellectual of Bangladesh, that the Jamaat is not a communal organisation. He has rightly pointed out that there are communal (anti-Hindu) elements in the Awami League as well as in some 'leftist' organisations, who did not oppose the Jamaat consistently. He has cited examples of how the Mujib regime rehabilitated the Jamaat and other pro-Pakistani collaborators 'with a view to neutralising the growing leftist opposition', and how the Awami League and other 'leftist-secular' politicians cooperated with the Jamaat in

the 1980s. Umar discovers a common 'class interest' between the 'bourgeois' and 'pro-USA–pro-Saudi' Jamaat and other 'bourgeois', anti-leftist organisations, including the Awami League and BNP, as the main reason behind their mutual love–hate relationship.[79]

So what emerges out of the above analysis is that there is hardly any fundamental contradiction between the Jamaat and the liberal democratic 'Anglo-Mohamedan', and even the so-called secular political groups, as they have 'common class interests.' But the myth of 'common class interests' is shattered in the light of more objective studies on the Jamaat and other orthodox Islamic groups such as the Tabligh Jamaat and the Khilafat Andolon of Hafizjee Huzur.[80] One may argue, in accordance with Badruddin Umar, Anu Mohammad and scores of other leftist, liberal democrat scholars of Bangladesh, that since the Jamaat-i-Islami has close links with Saudi Arabia, it has to be, out and out, a 'pro-Western, lackey of imperialism'; that the growth of Islamic 'fundamentalism' in Bangladesh is the direct result of 'the crises of imperialism and bourgeois politics and capitalism'.[81]

There is no point in the assertions that the Jamaat and 'Islamic fundamentalism' in Bangladesh grew because the so-called progressive forces failed 'to come out of the vicious circle of the politics of compromise and vacillation' by trying to exploit the progressive aspects of religion.[82] This hypothesis only highlights the negative aspects of Islamic politics in Bangladesh, implying that but for the wrong strategy of the leftist and 'progressive' groups, Islamic forces became powerful. There is another type of oversimplified generalisation so far as the 'progressive' and leftist writings of the region are concerned. They at times lump different categories of people together as an amorphous group, who 'benefitted mostly by gradually centralising power'. They include 'the businessmen who have emerged through corruption, the military and non-military bureaucracy, *imperialist and fundamentalist communalist* and other reactionary forces'.[83] It is simply preposterous to assume that the so-called Islamic fundamentalists of Bangladesh, including the supporters of the Jamaat, Khilafat Andolon or the Tabligh movement, and the corrupt businessmen and bureaucrats, are the same people. On the contrary, there is a plethora of evidence to contradict the above assertion, establishing the anti-corruption, anti-capitalist (hence anti-Western) and anti-bureaucratic nature of the so-called fundamentalist forces of Bangladesh.

In support of the assertion that the orthodox Islamic groups of Bangladesh are not part of the corrupt ruling classes and their allies, one may simply point out that, since the creation of Bangladesh, these groups have never shared power with the civil or military governments, unlike what the Jamaat-i-Islami did in Pakistan under Zia-ul-Haq. One may, in

this regard, point to the inner contradictions within the Jamaat between the pro-Saudi and pro-Iranian factions,[84] and to the rural, peasant and petty-bourgeois group as the main supporters of the party.

There might be some substance in the argument that, since the Jamaat-i-Islami has been close to pro-USA Saudi Arabia, indirectly the party has links with the West as well. But the equation is not that simple. One must not forget that many anti-Western Islamic militant groups in the Middle East, including the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, have been influenced by the writings of Maulana Maududi, who founded the Jamaat in the early 1940s. Had Jamaat been that friendly to the USA or the West it would not have opposed General Ershad and other pro-Western groups in Bangladesh. However, the Jamaat's main targets of attack have been the socialist–secular forces and those who have vilified Islam and the Holy Prophet, such as Daud Haider, a Bangladeshi poet, who made aspersions on Prophet Muhammad in a poem in 1974, and Salman Rushdie for his *Satanic Verses*, and the Ahmadiyas or Qadiyanis.

It is, however, too early to assume that the Jamaat is going to exploit the cheap religious sentiments of the Muslims in the region with 'non-issues' like the Qadiyani community in Bangladesh, because there are scores of other issues having socio-economic and political significance in the country, which the Jamaat has been successfully exploiting for quite some time. It hardly needs any red herrings to attract mass attention towards its political programmes. The failure of the Awami League government and the subsequent government to deliver anything substantial to the masses and the lower middle classes since 1972, along with the absence of any viable alternative party to ameliorate the conditions of the people, have already strengthened the position of the Jamaat and other Islamic or quasi-Islamic groups. The Jamaat seems to be fully aware of the situation. Hence its vitriols against the Awami League and the socialist, communist and secular forces. Despite its claim that the Jamaat is not inimical to the secular–socialist political parties, its projection of the Awami League regime between 1972 and 1975 as the darkest period in the history of the region, and the overthrow of the regime on 15 August 1975 as a revolutionary change signalling the beginning of a new era of hope and freedom,[85] must have antagonised the Awami League towards the Jamaat-i-Islami and its leaders.

The Salman Rushdie episode in early 1989 signalled a new shift in the politics of Islam in Bangladesh. The Jamaat-i-Islami, along with most of the political parties, including those professing socialism and secularism, condemned Rushdie, and many supported the stand of Iran *vis-à-vis* Rushdie, condemning him to death for blasphemy. However, several

Bangladeshi poets and writers condemned Iran in this regard, issuing a press statement in support of 'freedom of expression'. The Jamaat and its student wing lost no time in condemning these litterateurs for their support and sympathy for the 'Zionist conspirator,' Rushdie, demanding the death penalty for the 'Rushdies of Bangladesh'.[86] The Jamaat reaction frightened some of the signatories so much that one even issued a counter-statement refuting his links with the signatories.

Meanwhile, there had been numerous clashes between supporters and opponents of the Jamaat throughout the country, resulting in several deaths on both sides. According to the Jamaat, its workers killed in August 1988 were victims of the 'pro-Indian and pro-Ershad' political groups.[87] By December 1987, the ten Jamaat members of the Bangladesh parliament had resigned to come closer to the BNP-led Seven-Party Alliance, which was opposed to the Ershad regime and the Awami-League-led Eight-Party Alliance. Meanwhile, Maulana Delwar Hossain Saidi, the charismatic Jamaat leader, had emerged as a political factor. He was critical not only of the Ershad regime but also of the Awami League and the leftist/secular groups.

It is interesting that the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam of Bangladesh, while condemning Rushdie at a big public meeting in Dhaka on 28 February 1989, also demanded that the Qadiyani or the Ahmadiya community of Bangladesh should be declared a non-Muslim minority.[88] It seems that the raising of the Qadiyani issue by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama was motivated by its desire to gain political support from those who had already heard about the Qadiyanis as 'enemies of Islam' from Jamaat leaders. However, the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam and other minor Islamic groups representing different *pir* families of Bangladesh, and often associated with mosques and *madrassahs*, who had been trying to prove the Jamaat-i-Islami as a heresy and its founder, Maulana Maududi, as a heretic,[89] failed to make much headway in the arena of Bangladesh politics.

The humiliating defeat of the Zaker Party (organised by the *pir* of Atrashi and his son, Amir Fayṣal, in 1989) in the 1991 parliamentary elections also indicates that, other than the Jamaat, other 'Islam-loving' parties lack political support in Bangladesh. Despite the Zaker Party organisers' claim of having more than 30 million supporters, mostly the disciples of the *pir*, it failed to get a single seat in the parliament. It is, however, quite interesting that although the *pir* of Atrashi had earlier supported General Ershad and his State Religion Act of 1988, in the wake of the 1991 elections, Amir Faysal, the chief of the Zaker Party (son of the *pir*), condemned Ershad as corrupt and autocratic; expressing his satisfaction at the success of the BNP and the failure of the Awami League to get the majority of seats in the elections.[90]

This is indicative of the opportunist nature of some of the influential *pirs* of Bangladesh, who always 'bless' the party in power, especially the ones having 'Anglo-Mohamedan' connections.

While a section of the liberal, secular and socialist forces were busy fighting the Jamaat, mainly with a view to 'restoring the ideals of the Freedom Struggle'; students and intellectuals, lawyers and teachers were mobilising public opinion for the overthrow of the Ershad regime. By late 1990, the anti-Ershad movement had gained enough momentum to topple the regime. Meanwhile, across the border, there had been an attempt by Hindu revivalists to demolish the Babri Mosque in northern India in October 1990. This led to Hindu–Muslim antagonism in India. Ershad's government tried to take advantage of the communal disturbances in India by inciting Bangladesh Muslims against their Hindu compatriots. A pro-Ershad Bengali daily, *Inqilab*, of Maulana Abdul Mannan, published provocative articles urging Muslims to wage *jihad* or holy war against Hindus. The paper also published a fictitious news that the Babri Mosque had been demolished on 30 October 1990. The pro-government mayor of Dhaka city is believed to have been the ring-leader of the armed hooligans who terrorised Hindus in the city. But, through the concerted efforts of all opposition parties, including the Jamaat-i-Islami, all attempts to start communal rioting to divert public attention was foiled.[91]

It is noteworthy that Islam became so important politically that during the parliamentary elections of 1991 almost all the candidates, including those belonging to the communist parties, had to show their commitment to Islam through their speeches, banners, manifestos and slogans. The Awami League's most popular slogan, 'Jai Bangla' (victory to Bengal), frequently raised by its supporters and others from 1969 to 1975, was hardly audible during the election campaigns in 1991. As a result of the anti-Awami League campaigns of different groups, many Bangladeshis believe that 'Jai Bangla' had its origin in the Indian slogan, 'Jai Hind' (victory to India). The slogan got such negative publicity that even some Dhaka University teachers attacked their political rivals in the Senate election of the University in 1991 as adherents of 'Jai Bangla' and Hinduism, opposed to Islam and 'Bismillah'.[92]

According to Mohiuddin Ahmed, a senior leader of the pro-Awami-League Alliance, who was elected as a member of parliament in 1991, he had to show his commitment to Islam during the election campaign by saying his prayers in public and by displaying 'Allahu Akbar' (God is Great) at the beginning of his election banners and manifestos, against his will, as this was done by all other candidates contesting the elections. He has cited the following 'Islamic' slogans, chanted regularly by supporters

of different political parties during the election campaigning for the success of their respective candidates:

> '*Vote dile pallay, Khushi hobe Allay.*'
> (God will be pleased with you if you vote for the scale [Jamaat's symbol])
> '*La ilaha illallah, Dhaner shishe Allah.*'
> (There is no god but Allah, Allah is visible on the paddy-sheaf [BNP's symbol]).
> '*La ilaha illallah, naukar malik tui Allah*'.
> (There is no god but Allah, the boat [Awami League's symbol] belongs to Allah.)[93]

The issue of retaining 'Bismillah in the Constitution' became so important that even Sheikh Hasina, the Awami League chief, had to declare in public that she had 'no quarrel with Bismillah'.[94] Despite her assertions that the Awami League was not against Islam, Sheikh Hasina and her allies in the Eight-Party Alliance did not get the majority in the elections. The Islam-oriented parties, the BNP, Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jatiya Party of General Ershad, got 54.13 per cent of votes, as against 34.81 per cent by the Eight-Party Alliance.[95]

Some candidates also resorted to anti-Hindu, communal activities to intimidate Hindu voters in some constituencies in Barisal and other southern districts with substantial Hindu population. Hindus were verbally threatened not to cast votes. In some places ugly posters conveyed the ominous message to the would-be voters among the Hindus:

> Beware! Beware! No Hindu should cast his vote on the 27th. If you want to go to the polling centres, prepare all arrangements for your funeral pyre in advance. This time we don't need your votes.[96]

Presumably this was done by candidates belonging to the 'Islam-loving' groups, who apprehended that uninterrupted voting by Hindus would lead to Awami League victory.[97] It is generally believed by many Bangladeshi Muslims that the under-privileged Bangladeshi Hindus are loyal to India and the Awami League.[98] It is, however, interesting that some left-oriented and 'pro-Peking' politicians also resorted to anti-Hindu, communal propaganda for their success in the 1991 parliamentary elections.[99]

As discussed above, the 1991 elections signalled the victory of Islam-oriented forces. The Jamaat-i-Islami emerged as the third largest party in terms of its share in the total votes cast in the election – it captured 12.13

per cent of votes.[100] According to Maulana Abbas Ali Khan, the acting-chief of the Jamaat, the Jamaat would have polled more votes had the Indophobia of the Muslim masses not alarmed them, which led to the success of the BNP and failure of the 'pro-Indian' Awami League.[101] Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami, another leader of the Jamaat, believes that some BNP and Awami League candidates won by clever use of the Gulf War between Iraq and the US-led coalition. They published Saddam's photos beside those of their candidates on the election posters and banners, while the Jamaat was critical of Saddam Hussein for invading Kuwait. Nizami has also pointed out how some local newspapers (implying the 'pro-Libyan' Freedom Party's Bengali daily *Millat* and 'pro-Iraqi' Bengali daily *Inqilab*) moulded Muslim public opinion in favour of Saddam. He thinks the Jamaat lost popularity through its vehement protest against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when most Bangladeshis were staunch supporters of Iraq and bitter critics of the USA and Israel.[102]

There might be some truth in the assertion that the 'Saddam factor' played some role in moulding the election results, but the impact could be marginal. The main factor behind BNP victory must have been the 'resist India' sentiment of the people, who found the BNP as more viable than the Jamaat as a counterpoise to the Awami League. The Jamaat support was vital for BNP, which had 140 out of 300 seats in the parliament, not enough to form the majority. It may be pointed out that 16 out of the total 18 seats captured by the Jamaat were from districts close to the Indo-Bangladesh border.[103] The prevalent anti-Indian feelings of the people, which has been stronger in the border-districts, might have also gone to the advantage of the Jamaat candidates professing anti-Indian ideology. The 1991 elections also signalled a substantial rise in the popularity of the Jamaat in comparison with the 1979 and 1986 elections. In 1979, it fielded only 62 candidates, capturing 6 seats in the parliament and securing 750 000 votes. The corresponding figures for 1986 and 1991 are 75 and 218 candidates, 10 and 18 seats and 1 314 057 and 4 124 868 votes respectively.[104]

VI

The post-election Bangladesh witnessed further polarisation and rivalries between the secular–socialist–Bengali nationalists, led by Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League and the 'Islam-loving', anti-Indian groups. The Awami League, which did not expect defeat in the elections, became more

hostile towards the Jamaat than to the ruling party. Soon the rivals engaged themselves in the politics of violence and vitriol which resulted in several deaths and injuries on both sides in Chittagong, Pabna, Kustia and elsewhere.[105] The Jamaat-Awami League rivalry reached its climax when Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami, the Secretary-General of the Jamaat, was severely beaten up by some students of Dhaka University in the Vice-Chancellor's office in the presence of the Vice-Chancellor and several leaders of the parliament on 27 May 1991. The pretext for the attack on Nizami, an elected member of the parliament and leader of the Jamaat Parliamentary Party, was that he had collaborated with Pakistan in 1971.[106]

The assault on Nizami, a premeditated action by politically organised student groups,[107] instead of demoralising the Jamaat gave more ammunition to its activists against the Awami League and the government, which came into being with Jamaat's support. The Jamaat chief, Abbas Ali Khan, even mildly threatened the government with the Jamaat's withdrawal of support for it if it failed to ensure the safety to the Jamaat leaders and workers.[108] This threat was, however, ineffective as by then the BNP had an absolute majority in the parliament with an additional 28 female MPs, elected by members of the parliament (including those belonging to the Jamaat) in accordance with the constitutional provision. Thus, within three months of the elections, the Jamaat lost its political leverage to influence government policy. It was soon realised by the crest-fallen Jamaat leaders that the BNP government 'failed to reciprocate' their 'gesture of good will'.[109] But it would be too trite to assume that by then the Jamaat was a spent force in the arena of parliamentary politics.

The presidential election of Bangladesh now became important. More importantly, it exposed the anti-Jamaat forces' vacillating, non-committal nature. Not long after the attack on Nizami, which intensely embittered the Jamaat–Awami League relationship, the top brasses of the two organisations had a meeting behind closed doors on 3 October 1991, where they agreed 'to forget the past and look forward to the future'. Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury, the presidential candidate from the pro-Awami League opposition group, also met up top Jamaat leaders, especially Ghulam Azam for his 'blessings'. Ghulam Azam is said to have been impressed by Justice Chowdhury's background and 'maturity' and remarked: 'It is good for the country that a person like him is coming forward to serve the nation'.[110] From the behaviour of the Awami League and other anti-Jamaat (especially anti-Ghulam Azam) groups *vis-à-vis* Ghulam Azam on the eve of the presidential election, it appears that neither was there anything ideological about their opposition to the Jamaat nor had they any qualms about Ghulam Azam. Their main concern was to get Jamaat support

for their presidential candidate, whose success partially depended on the 20 Jamaat MPs, who, along with other members of the parliament, would elect the president of the country.

However, the opposition candidate, Justice Chowdhury, lost to BNP's Abdur Rahman Biswas. Not long after this defeat, some of the opposition parties, along with some intellectuals, organised the so-called public trial of Ghulam Azam after his election as the new Ameer of the Jamaat in Bangladesh, for collaboration with Pakistan in 1971. The Awami League lost no opportunity to support the 'public trial' in the 'people's court' (*gano adalat*) at Suhrawardy Park in Dhaka on 26 March 1991.

The whole episode of the so-called trial of Ghulam Azam was full of contradictions, and at times it looked as if the trial would achieve secularism and revive the 'spirit of 1971' or 'the mass consciousness' about the significance of the Liberation War. It is noteworthy that, initially, the demand for Ghulam Azam's trial for alleged 'war-crimes' committed by him in 1971 against Bangladesh was raised by a group of intellectuals, with Mrs Jahanara Imam (mother of a martyred freedom fighter) as the convenor of the Killer-Collaborator Elimination Committee (*Ghatak-Dalal Nirmul Committee*), after Ghulam Azam's election as the Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami in December 1991. One may partially agree with Badrudin Umar, a leading political analyst and activist of Bangladesh, that the Awami League, which was responsible for the rehabilitation of the collaborators of Pakistan, came forward to support the 'Elimination Committee' only after the movement for Ghulam Azam's trial had 'spread throughout with the grassroots support' and that the movement was a mass-based 'class movement'.[111] It is interesting that the Awami League, which had earlier cooperated with the Jamaat both within and outside the parliament, acknowledging that 'the Jamaat's reality has to be admitted',[112] suddenly became vocal against Ghulam Azam. It seems the Awami League's main motive behind this was to embarrass the BNP government.

It is equally interesting that the BNP also found that the Jamaat was no longer indispensable for its existence as the ruling party, especially after the Jamaat had opposed the BNP candidates in some by-elections held in late 1991. One Jamaat leader is alleged to have portrayed the BNP as the 'little devil or satan',[113] which might have infuriated the anti-Jamaat group within the BNP. Consequently, the government arrested Ghulam Azam on 24 March 1991, two days before the 'mass trial', for becoming the Ameer of the Jamaat being a 'foreign national'. The government also served a 'Show Cause Notice' to 24 organisers of the 'mass trial' for taking the law into their own hands.[114] Despite the government measures, arresting Ghulam Azam and serving legal notice to the organisers of the trial, the

'public trial' took place, on 26 March 1991, which suggested the death panalty for Ghulam Azam and its immediate implementation by the government.[115]

Soon the country was dragged into a bitter and divisive conflict between the anti-Jamaat and pro-Jamaat elements, represented by the 'Elimination Committee' and the Indian Agent Resistance Committee respectively. The Jamaat got the support of the Freedom Party of Colonel Faruq and others, who were held responsible for the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Freedom Party held public meeting and rallies in Dhaka condemning the alleged threats made by the 'Elimination Committee' of 'closing down of mosques'. Some leaders of the 'Elimination Committee' alleged the pro-Jamaat students had attacked mosques and other Muslim institutions to vilify the 'People's Court'.[116] The 'Elimination Committee' organised general strikes throughout the country, demanding the implementation of the 'verdict' by the 'People's Court', between May and December 1992. In certain districts, especially in northern Bangladesh and Chittagong (in Jamaat strongholds), people were killed in clashes between the supporters and opponents of the Jamaat.[117] When the Awami League became too vocal against the BNP government, accusing it of being pro-Jamaat and anti-Bangladesh, the government agreed to try Ghulam Azam in accordance with the law of the country and to withdraw cases filed against the 24 organisers of the 'People's Court', on 29 June 1992. The government, however, did not agree to ban the Jamaat or the Freedom Party.[118] The two-judge High Court Division Bench of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh handed down a split decision on 12 August 1992 on the writ petition by Ghulam Azam challenging the Bangladesh government's order of 1973 disqualifying his Bangladeshi citizenship with effect from 1971. While one of the judges rejected his writ petition, the other judge found flaws in the government order of 1973. Considering Ghulam Azam ■ a Bangladesh citizen by birth, he held that since Ghulan Azam was a citizen of Bangladesh on 26 March 1971, when Bangladesh officially became independent, the government decision to disqualify him as ■ citizen in 1973 could not be operative retrospectively.[119]

VII

What emerged as the sequel to the 'public trial' of Ghulam Azam was an erratic movement, usurped by the Awami League, who turned it into an anti-government movement or the 'trial of the BNP leaders' with a view to

gaining political benefits. Consequently the group of intellectuals and relatives of some of the victims of Pakistani brutality in 1971, who initiated the movement to try Ghulam Azam for his alleged war crimes, soon receded to the background when the Ghulam Azam issue turned out to be 'essentially a political issue'.[120] But contrary to the expectations of the 'Elimination Committee', many intellectuals, having anti-Jamaat propensity, did not support the so-called trial. Some even felt that the formation of the 'People's Court' amounted to the destruction of the judicial system of the country.[121] Fifty-five Dhaka University teachers, in a statement, condemned the so-called trial as a move towards a civil war in the country. Some opponents of the 'Elimination Committee' formed the Bangladeshi Chetona Bikash Kendro (Centre for the Development of Bangladeshi Consciousness), urging its supporters to form 'suicide squads' to punish the 'agents of India', implying the organisers of the 'Elimination Committee'.[122] In the Jamaat strongholds, Jamaat supporters terrorised anti-Jamaat groups, especially in parts of Jessore, Khulna and Kustia. Sixty teachers of Chittagong University, on the other hand, demanded the immediate release of Ghulam Azam from detention.[123]

By December 1992, the 'Elimination Committee' had come across an awkward situation. After the demolition of the Babri Mosque in India, by Hindu revivalists, on 6 December, agitated Bangladeshi Muslims were hardly in a mood to be concerned about Ghulam Azam's trial. In some places, Muslim fanatics attacked Hindu temples and property. Various Islamic groups exploited the Babri Mosque issue to their advantage, vilifying the Awami League and other organisers of the 'Elimination Committee' as 'enemies of Islam' and 'agents of India'. Prior to the demolition of the Babri Mosque, the 'Elimination Committee' had organised a general strike, to be observed in Dhaka on 8 December in support of their demand for the trial of Ghulam Azam. But the situation compelled them to tack the Babri Mosque issue to their programme to observe the general strike on the 8th. Soon, the Mosque issue overshadowed all other issues, for the time being, throughout Bangladesh.[124]

The Babri Mosque issue overcharged the Bangladeshi polity with such combustible emotions that Sheikh Hasina, the Awami League chief, tried to gain political leverage by identifying herself with the 'Islam-loving', anti-Indian lobby in Bangladesh. But instead of criticising the Indian government for its failure to protect the lives and properties of Indian Muslims in the wake of the demolition of the Mosque, she targeted Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Khalida Zia, and the Jamaat-i-Islami of Bangladesh, holding them responsible for their 'collusions' with Indian leaders, which, she alleged, had led to the destruction of the mosque. As

'evidence', she cited Mrs Zia's signing an agreement with the Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, and some Jamaat leaders' previous meetings with L. K. Advani (BJP leader), held responsible for the destruction of the mosque. Soon the 'Elimination Committee' demanded the execution of both Ghulam Azam and Advani for abusing religion for political gains. The Jamaat, on the other hand, portrayed the Awami League and 'Elimination Committee' as the 'local agents of the BJP'.[125] Soon the ultra-anti-Indian Freedom Party, along with a few 'Anglo-Mohamedan' groups and communal fanatics, organised a Long March, ostensibly to cross the Indo-Bangladesh border, by thousands of Bangladeshi Muslims in support of their demand for the reconstruction of the mosque. The Babri Mosque and the deaths of more than a thousand Muslims in India in the wake of the demolition of the mosque emerged as the most important issues in Bangladeshi politics.

Despite the presence of so many Islam-oriented political parties and groups, Jamaat-i-Islami seems to be the focal point of any discussion on the Islamic movement in Bangladesh. There are differences of opinion as to why the Jamaat emerged as a political force and about its future prospects in the arena of Bangladeshi politics. Some leading Bangladeshi intellectuals think that the Awami League government's lack of moral sense or standard, along with its emphasis on Bengali nationalism and 'Mujibism', which were neither positive nor original, largely contributed to the growth of Islamic revivalism in the country.[126] While Razia Akter Banu and some other scholars find no future prospect for the Jamaat in Bangladeshi politics,[127] some analysts, including some leftist politicians, on the other hand, do not totally rule out any prospects for the Jamaat.[128] In view of the above, it is difficult to come to a definite conclusion about the prospect of the Jamaat's or any other militant Islamic group's capturing political power in the country. As mentioned earlier, the unpredictable and vacillating, non-committal nature of the bulk of the Bangladeshi population – peasants, petty-buorgeoisie and lumpen-proletariats – should be always kept in mind before saying anything conclusive about Bangladeshi politics. However, it may be pointed out that despite the Jamaat's declared policy of adhering to constitutional politics, with respect to democratic means and the will of the majority, the party has not ruled out the possibility of resorting to 'other means' to come to power. This was categorically stated by the acting Ameer, Abbas Ali Khan, in the course of [illegible] interview with the author in 1991.[129]

If we take the 'other means' of the Jamaat as a viable option for democratic ways of capturing power, the theory that the Jamaat is unlikely to succeed in establishing an Islamic government in Bangladesh, [illegible] the party

is unlikely to get a two-thirds majority in the parliament to amend the Constitution, does not carry much weight.[130] One may, in this regard, point out how the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran transformed the whole socio-political structures and systems without having a formal mandate from the people. One simply cannot rule out the possibility of some extremist group's forging ties with a section of the armed forces with a view to waging an armed insurrection in the name of Islam. Some observers believe that there have already been some clandestine armed groups in parts of Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, having close links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who are alleged to have armed Islamic insurgents under cover of giving aid to the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar.[131]

What seems to be the most likely scenario in the near future, is a continuation of the rule by 'Anglo-Mohamedan' groups, who will try their best to project themselves as 'Islam loving' liberals, with pro-Western and pro-Saudi proclivities. The history of the gradual ascendancy of the 'Anglo-Mohamedans' in the region since the second-half of the nineteenth century strengthens our hypothesis that the 'Anglo-Mohamedans' will always find handy a section of the *ulama*, including *pirs* and *sufis*, as collaborators to perpetuate their hegemony over the God-fearing masses, who also nourish some sort of contempt and suspicion, if not hatred, towards India and their Hindu compatriots. Razia Akter Banu's recent work on Islam in Bangladesh has strengthened the view that rural as well as urban Bangladeshi Muslims are, in general, Islam-oriented, not fanatics, anti-Indian by temperament; and though respectful to *pirs* and *sufis*, they prefer the 'Islam-loving' Western-educated to the *mullas* as their favourite candidates in elections.[132] This was further proven in the 1991 parliamentary elections, when most voters rejected all the candidates fielded by the Zaker Party, sponsored by the very influential *pir* of Atrashi, said to have millions of disciples throughout the country. The greater popularity of the popular, often vulgarly communal, Islam rather than the dogmatic, militant version of the faith, is further reflected in the larger circulation of the daily *Inqilab* of the 'pro-Saddam' Maulana Mannan than the daily *Sangram* of the Jamaat-i-Islami.

In the light of the above discussion it emerges that poverty and inequality, along with the inferiority complex of the peasants and petty bourgeoisie *vis-à-vis* the urban, rich, Western-educated superordinates, have drawn the former towards Islam. Many of them have adopted fatalist and escapist Islam. But for some, who nourish a sense of deprivation and exploitation at the hands of the rich, dominant classes (that have now emerged in the wake of independence in 1971), militant Islam or even communal, anti-Indian and anti-Awami League, 'Anglo-Mohamedan' versions of Islam,

are better alternatives than the doctrines of secularism and socialism for the redress of their grievances. As discussed earlier, the moral economy of the peasants accepts poverty and inequality as natural, hence acceptable, but rejects misrule and corruption ■ unnatural phenomena. Islam provides the peasants with an alternative philosophy conforming to their moral code of conduct, or inversely, their moral code of conduct, to a great extent, is ■ by-product of Islam. Islam in Bangladesh is playing the same role which once was played by the myth of 'Golden Bengal'. This means, Bengali chauvinism and Islamic revivalism, or Muslim Bengali nationalism, are the two facets of the same syndrome, which has pushed people backwards to their imagined past or utopias.

In sum, what appears from the foregoing pages is that since both the leaders and the bulk of the followers of most political parties in Bangladesh change sides and allegiance in quick succession, only the unpredictability of the future course of Islamic politics in Bangladesh seems to be ■ safe prediction. From the unpredictable nature of the peasant–petty-bourgeois–lumpen-proletariat triumvirate one may, however, assume that, even if Islamic radicals take over political power, for the bulk of the population it will be just another means of reviving their imagined past. If Islam does not deliver the goods, in a country with too many people with too little resources, the people will most certainly go for another ideology. And if that has to be Islam, neither the Jamaat-i-Islami nor any other Islamic group has the monopoly over it.

NOTES

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4. Basant Chatterjee, *Inside Bangladesh Today: An Eye-Witness Account* (New Delhi, 1973) p. 155.
5. Asim Roy, *The Islamic Syncretic Tradition in Bengal* (Dhaka, 1983) pp. 249–53.
6. See A. R. Mallick, *British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal, 1975–1856* (Dhaka, 1961) passim; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (Lahore, 1969) passim.
7. Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, *Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920–1947* (Boulder, 1992) passim.
8. See *The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh* (Dhaka, 1972 article 8.

9. See for details Badruddin Umar, *Sanskritik Shampradayikata* (Bengali) (Dhaka, 1969) passim; Badruddin Umar, *Bangladeshe Dharmer Rajnoitik Baebohar* (Bengali) (Dhaka, 1989) passim.
10. See M. S. Agwani's essay in this volume, and Zohair Hussain, 'Maulana Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi: An Appraisal of His Thought and Political Influence', *South Asia*, vol. IX, no. 1, June 1986, pp. 61–81.
11. K. M. Mohsin, 'Trends of Islam in Bangladesh', in S. R. Chakravarty and Virendra Narain (eds), *Bangladesh: History and Culture*, vol. I (New Delhi, 1986) p. 33.
12. W. C. Smith, op. cit., pp. 7–44.
13. See Asim Roy, op. cit.; R. Ahmed, op. cit., passim.
14. See Maulana Mansurul Haq (ed.), *Islam Versus Mr Maududi's New Islam* (Bengali) (Dhaka, 1985) passim.
15. *Bangladesh Constitution*, Article 12.
16. Ibid., Article 38.
17. B. Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 84.
18. Moudud Ahmed, *Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman* (Dhaka, 1991) appendix D, pp. 331–3.
19. Ibid., pp. 217–19.
20. B. Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 43.
21. Ibid., pp. 69–71.
22. Ibid., pp. 33–4, 86.
23. Ibid., pp. 140–1.
24. Ibid., p. 143.
25. Ibid., pp. 118, 127–9, 135–40.
26. B. M. Monoar Kabir, 'The Politics of Religion: The Jamaat-Islami in Bangladesh', Rafiuddin Ahmed (ed.), *Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1990) pp. 124–5.
27. Syed Anwar Husain, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh: Internal Variables and External Inputs', in R. Ahmed (ed.), op. cit., pp. 142–4.
28. K. M. Mohsin, op. cit., pp. 31–3; Ahmed Shafiqul Haque and M. Y. Akhter, 'The Ubiquity of Islam: Religion and Society in Bangladesh', *Pacific Affair*, vol. 60, no. 2, Summer 1987, pp. 204–5.
29. S. A. Husain, op. cit., pp. 141–2.
30. Ibid., p. 142.
31. A. K. M. Aminul Islam, *Victorious Victims: Political Transformation in a Traditional Society* (Boston, 1978) pp. 71–8, 86–96.
32. Moudud Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 274–312; Talukder Maniruzzaman, *The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath* (Dhaka, 1988) pp. 178–81.
33. I personally came across people in jubilant mood after hearing the news about the fall of the Mujib regime [illegible] 15 August 1975 in Dhaka. Some of them even screamed: 'Now we will get rid of the Hindu domination'.
34. A. S. Haque and M. Y. Akhter, op. cit., p. 205.
35. Zillur Rahman Khan, 'From Mujib to Zia: Elite Politics in Bangladesh', in R. Ahmed (ed.), op. cit., p. 58.
36. 'The Proclamation (Amendment) Order, 1977', *Bangladesh Observer*, 23 April 1977; Golam Hossain, *General Ziaur Rahman and the BNP: Political Transformation of a Military Regime* (Dhaka, 1988) p. 18.
37. T. Maniruzzaman, 'Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends', in Chakravarty and Narain (eds), op. cit., vol. 1, p. 54.

38. G. Hossain, op. cit., pp. 44–6; Chandrika Gulati, *Bangladesh: Liberation to Fundamentalism* (New Delhi, 1988) p. 78.
39. G. Hossain, op. cit., pp. 60–64.
40. A. S. Haque and M. Y. Akhter, op. cit., p. 205.
41. See *Bichitra* (Bengali weekly) of 1 June 1984, which published a news item with a photocopy of a cheque for $327 000 to 'Prince' Ghulam Azam from Saudi Arabia.
42. S. A. Hussain, op. cit., p. 144.
43. A. S. Haque and M. Y. Akhter, op. cit., p. 207; K. M. Mohsin, op. cit., pp. 38–9; Emajuddin Ahmed and D. R. J. A. Nazneen, 'Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics', *Asian Survey*, vol. XXX, no. 8, August 1990, p. 797.
44. See Syed Abdul Maksud (ed.), *Gano Andolon, 1982–90* (Bengali) (Dhaka, 1991); Sirajul Islam Chowdhury and Abul Hasnat (eds), *Nobboier Abhbhuthan* (Bengali) (Dhaka, 1991) passim.
45. E. Ahmed and D. R. V. A. Nazneen, op. cit., p. 797.
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47. A. S. Haque and M. Y. Akhter, op. cit., p. 224.
48. *Bangladesh Observer*, 14 March 1988.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 16 and 17 March 1988.
51. *Sangbad* (Bengali daily), 12 May 1988.
52. Ibid., 13 May 1988.
53. Ibid., 8 June 1988.
54. *Inqilab* (Bengali daily), 9 June 1988.
55. *Sangram*, (Bengali daily), 14 June 1988.
56. Ibid., 7 June 1988.
57. Ibid., 15 June 1988.
58. Maulana Delwar Hossain Saidi's speech at Chittagong Parade Ground, January 1989, Video Tape no. 1.
59. *Sangbad* (Bengali daily), 13 June 1988.
60. *Holiday* (weekly), 22 April 1988; *Sangbad* (Bengali daily), 17 April 1988.
61. Ibid.
62. Bengali leaflet, 'Jar Dharma Tar Kachhey, Rashtrer Ki Balar Achhey?' (Dhaka, 18 July 1988).
63. Saidi's speech, Video Tape no. 1.
64. Rounaq Jahan, *Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues* (Dhaka, 1987) p. 223.
65. Z. R. Khan, op. cit., p. 60.
66. See for details, James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, 1976); Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, 'Moral, Rational or Political Economy? An Appraisal of Peasant Behaviour in Colonial Bengal and Vietnam', *Journal of Social Studies*, no. 57, July 1992, p. 2.
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68. Gellner, op. cit., p. 5.

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70. See B. M. M. Kabir, op. cit.; T. Maniruzzaman, 'Bangladesh Politics', and R. A. Banu's essay in this volume.
71. B. M. M. Kabir, op. cit., p. 128.
72. Ibid., pp. 131–2.
73. Bangladesh Election Commission, 1991.
74. B. M. M. Kabir, op. cit., p. 129.
75. *Sangbad* (Bengali daily), 25 and 26 December 1990; *Swandeep* (Bengali weekly), 6–12 January 1992, p. 15.
76. *Sangbad* (Bengali daily), 27 December 1990.
77. Ghulam Azam, *Bangladesh and Jamaat-i-Islami* (Bengali) (Dhaka, 1988) pp. 8–13, 22, 30–31.
78. Ibid., p. 6.
79. B. Umar, *Bangladeshe Dharmer*, pp. 8–17, 45–56.
80. See R. A. Banu's essay in this volume; T. Maniruzzaman, 'Bangladesh Politics'.
81. B. Umar, *Bangladeshe Dharmer*, passim; Anu Mohammed, 'The Political and Economic Bases of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh', in B. Umar and Anu Mohammed (eds), *Bangladeshe Dharmio Moulobad O Shamprodayikata* (Bengali) (Dhaka, 1987) pp. 19–31.
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83. Anu Mohammed, 'Class Structure, Corruption and the Hidden Roots of Autocracy', *Inqilab: South Asia Solidarity Group's Quarterly Magazine*, London, Spring 1992, vol. 2, p. 28.
84. See B. M. M. Kabir, op. cit., pp. 130–31.
85. Ghulam Azam, op. cit., pp. 7–11.
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92. Sushil Ranjan Hawladar, 'Shamprodayik Uththan: Kicchu Prashno, Kuchu Prastab', *Ajker Kagaj* (Bengali daily), 14 May 1991.
93. Interview with BKSAL President and MP Mohiuddin Ahmed, Dhaka, 17 May 1991.
94. *Sangbad* (Bengali daily), 16 February 1991.
95. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, 'The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian Rule in Bangladesh', *Pacific Affiars*, vol. 65, no. 2, Summer 1992, p. 212.
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98. See B. Chatterjee, op. cit., passim.
99. S. R. Hawladar, op. cit.
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101. Interview with Maulana Abbas Ali Khan, Chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Dhaka, 21 May 1991.

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103. *Bangladesh Times*, 2 March 1991.
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108. *Sangbad* (Bengali daily), 30 May 1991.
109. *Telegraph*, Dhaka, 12 January 1992.
110. *Bichitra* (Bengali weekly), Annual No., January 1992, p. 39.
111. Badruddin Umar, 'Why has Ghulam Azam's Trial Emerged as an Issue?', *Ajker Kagaj* (Bengali daily), 1 April 1992; leaflets by the 'Elimination Committee', 31 March 1991; 'Circular No. 1', April 1992.
112. *Dhaka Courier*, January 10–16 1992, p. 23.
113. *Surjoday* (Bengali weekly), 20–26 January 1992, p. 20.
114. *Bangladesh Observer*, 25 March 1992.
115. Ibid., 27 March 1992.
116. *Inqilab* (Bengali daily), 25 March 1992.
117. *Bangladesh Observer*, 9 December 1992.
118. *Jay Jay Din* (Bengali weekly), 7 July 1992, pp. 4–5.
119. *Morning Sun*, 13 August 1992.
120. See *Holiday*, 17 April 1992.
121. Ibid., 'From the Arm Chair', 3 April 1992.
122. *Inqilab* (Bengali daily), 25 March 1992.
123. *Ajker Kagaj* (Bengali daily), 1 April 1992.
124. *Sangbad* and *Inqilab* (Bengali dailies), 8–16 December 1992.
125. *Bichitra* (Bengali weekly), Victory Day No., December 1992, pp. 13–25.
126. Interviews with Dhaka University Professors, A. K. Fazlul Haq and Musa Ansari, 20 May 1991.
127. Interviews with Barrister Ishtiaq Ahmed, Dhaka, 25 May 1991; Professors Sirajul Islam Chowdhury and Musa Ansari, Dhaka University, 20 May 1991.
128. Interviews with Professor A. K. Fazlul Haq; Ajay Ray and Saifuddin Manik of the Communist Party of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 26 May 1991.
129. Interview with Abbas Ali Khan of Jamaat-i-Islami, Dhaka, 21 May 1991.
130. Interview with Barrister Ishtiaq Ahmed.
131. 'Elimination Committee's' leaflet, Dhaka, 6 June 1992.
132. See Razia Akter Banu, *Islam in Bangladesh* (Leiden, 1992) chs. IX and X.

6 Islam in South-east Asia: Varying Impact and Images of the Middle East

Mona Abaza

The impact of 'Middle Eastern Islam' on its South-east Asian counterpart is both symbolic and real. South-east Asian Muslims borrow abstract ideas as well as concrete examples from the Middle East to strengthen their faith and Islamise their often pragmatic and Westernised cultural bearings. There has been, however, a dialectical and ambivalent imagery of the Middle East in the Muslim landscape of South-east Asia. The latter at times regards the former as the home of the high culture and knowledge, in so far as Islam is concerned. Yet one also detects some contempt for the Middle East for its feudal traditions and a somewhat violent, contradictory way of life.

It is often argued that Islamic fundamentalism is foreign to South-east Asia. But when one examines, as an example, the Malay version of the phenomenon, one finds Malay identity *vis-à-vis* non-Malay (often dominant) outsiders as the main steering force behind the Islamic movement in Malaysia. In short, there is a love–hate relationship: South-east Asian Muslims use Arabic and Islam against Western and other hegemonies, but at the same time resort to Western ideologies as a bulwark against Middle Eastern cultural hegemony. The Arabs are perceived as respectable but, at the same time, their image in the minds of Muslims in the region has not been all that positive.

This chapter attempts to look into some perceptions of the Middle East in the imagination of the Muslim communities of South-east Asia. It also hopes to shed some light on the utilisation of some Middle Eastern representations of South-east Asia in the world and the role it plays in the construction of a modern South-east Asian discourse on Islamic resurgence.

AN AMBIVALENT IMAGERY

The 'imagery' of the Middle East in South-east Asia entails an ambivalent and dialectical relationship: great appreciation as a centre of 'high culture',

knowledge and religion; and yet, dissatisfaction towards the current social and economic reality of the Middle Eastern countries; compassion towards the holy lands and yet aversion to the feudal traditions and the violence of contemporary politics. While Mecca is the holy land which all believers would aspire to visit to perform the *Haj*,[1] the image that many contemporary Saudi citizens exhibit, of disdain and unfavourable treatment of the foreign working Asian and non-Asian population, works to the detriment of Arabs in general.[2]

Quite often Islamic fundamentalism in South-east Asia is interpreted as imported, and imposed upon a syncretic local context. The Middle East is thus portrayed as the harsh, arid, hermetic culture versus the tolerant, fertile Asia.[3] The controversy of the discourse about Islam in South-east Asia implies that there is a Malay version and a Malay identity, closely intertwined with Islam, which is quite often left behind at the expense of the 'so-called' imported Arab habits, a phenomenon quite distinct from the universalism of Islam, as many Muslim intellectuals in that region would maintain. One good example is the neo-modernist Islam in Indonesia, promoted by the intellectual Nurcholish Madjid, who obtained his doctoral degree from the United States under the supervision of the late scholar Fazlur Rahman. Madjid, although influenced by early Egyptian reformists and equally by Western and Muslim international trends, represents an interesting case of indigenous Islam with little connection to the Middle East. It is also interesting to note that another Muslim intellectual, Abdurahman Wahid, the leader of the Indonesian *Nahdatul Ulama*, and a religious-trained scholar from Baghdad and Al-Azhar University in Cairo, has suggested replacing the Muslim greeting in Arabic with Indonesian words, to the point of offending the traditionalist wing of his party (see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 June 1990). Although Wahid spent long years in the Middle East and acquired a deep knowledge of Islam there, his advocation of 'contextualizing Indonesian Islam', while bringing extensive examples of variations in the application of Islam from the Middle East, reflects the symbolic desire of Indonesia to construct its own version of Islam at a distance from the religious centre.[4]

On the other hand, imported Arab habits are quite often accepted and venerated, since the Arabian desert is the cradle of Islam and this gives great credibility to physically and psychologically 'transformed' returning scholars and wanderers. Here the adoption of Arab habits in dressing, eating, and sitting on the floor, or the natural borrowing of an Egyptian or Saudi dialect, become a political target area. But also, the rejection of blind imitation of appearances such as dress or eating habits, which often discard the content of the message, finds an audience in those who want to

emancipate themselves from the Middle East and yet feel that they are equal to, (if not better than) the Middle Eastern Muslims.

The returning students and scholars from the Middle East become the *Kulturtraeger* of Arabic–Islamic culture and form the channel for borrowing debates,[5] ideas, books, films, and video tapes from the centres of the Middle East. For example, in Kuala Lumpur, the Islamic Centre (*Pusat Islam*) boasts of a wide collection of Islamic literature which might be only available in specialised Islamic bookshops in Cairo. The Kuala Lumpur-based Pustaka Antara bookshop also sells a large collection of Egyptian, Lebanese and Saudi Arabian Islamic books; a selection which demands, from its owner, an excursion once a year to the Cairo International Book Fair. The late Chinese convert Masagung's bookshop in Jakarta displayed an interesting collection of various translations by Arabic-trained scholars in the Middle East.

The experience of having lived in centres of learning such as Cairo, or Baghdad is most significant for many South-east Asian Muslims in that, in conjunction with the religious readings, it is a means to get acquainted with Arabic translations of French, English and Russian literature.[6]

Likewise, there is often the fear that fundamentalists in South-east Asia, such as the *Parti Islam*-led government in Kelantan (Malaysia), might copy the Islamic administration of Iran, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan (the *Straits Times*, 9 February 1991). One should not here neglect the significant impact the Iranian revolution had upon the Islamic resurgence in South-east Asia and, in particular, upon Malaysia's political life. Quite often the Malays are portrayed as the passive recipients of Middle Eastern Islam, as if no internal dynamic and variation in terms of everyday spheres of religious life could exist. If Islam is the principal thread linking them with the Middle East, many Malays strongly identify themselves with the Palestinian cause as a form of anti-colonial sentiment. The Malays, who form a minority in Singapore (although enjoying far greater privileges as citizens and much less discrimination), are quite often compared to the Arabs of Israel. The smallness of the Chinese-majority-dominated island of Singapore, surrounded by one of the largest communities of Muslims in the entire world, automatically brings the analogy with Israel and the Arab World.[7]

The Middle East Influence in Malaysian Politics

It is plausible to see how the reference to Middle Eastern symbols plays a significant role in cultural elevation and political ascendency for Muslims, particularly in Malaysia, more so perhaps than in Indonesia. For many

Muslims in the South-east Asian World, the experience of having 'lived' and studied in Cairo or Mecca[8] has been the passport for religious and political credibility and activism. The biography (among some many other Muslim politicians) of Haji Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the Head of *Parti Islam* in Malaysia, bears testimony to this. Born in 1931 in Pulau Melaka, Kelantan, he was, during 1952–62, a student at Deoband University (India) and Al-Azhar University in Cairo, to obtain his BA and MA degrees. In 1967, he was elected as Member of Parliament in Kelantan. In 1968, he became head of the *Ulamak*, or *Ulama's* (religious scholars') wing of the *PAS* National Party, *Parti Islam SeMalaysia*, and in 1990, he was appointed *Mentri Besar* (Chief Minister) in Kelantan state. Another case is Abdul Hadi Awang, the leader of the PAS in Trengganu, Malaysia, who also studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and in Medina. We are told that his political success has to do with both his oratory skills and his good knowledge of the Arabic language, which he uses extensively in his weekly Friday lectures (Jomo and Cheek 1992, p. 96). It seems that the borrowing of Arabic terminology in the Malaysian context is a card for political authenticity.[9] Indeed, it became fashionable for Muslim leaders to fill speeches with Arabic terminology. For example, in the mid-eighties, and under the influence of Ali Shariati's writings, PAS started borrowing terms such as defending the cause of the *musthahafin* (the meek) against the *mustakbirin* (the arrogant). In 1985, PAS fought a campaign against *assabiyyah*, which means, in the Malaysian context, ethnic chauvinism, against Indians, and Chinese ethnic groups (Jomo and Cheek 1992, p. 98). Observers have previously pointed to the fact that the Arabic language in the South-east Asian context enjoys a magical and mystical status of exalted veneration as the sacred language of the Qur'an. Hence to master it is a sign of knowledge and power, a skill which the Middle Eastern graduates command. The reverse side of the story is that among the circles of the Western-trained scholars, holders of European and American degrees, one hears doubts expressed about the quality of subjects the Middle Eastern graduates understand.[10]

Yet there is, today, a prevalent view that Middle Eastern returnees are hardliners in matters concerning local traditions and on the question of gender segregation and women's participation in the workforce.[11] The rigidity of the PAS in advocating the punitive aspects of Islamic law is quite often attributed to the Middle Eastern-educated '*Ulama* versus the local and Western-trained Muslim technocrats such as in ABIM (the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement) circles, and to Anwar Ibrahim, the current Minister of Finance. The revivalism in the students' campuses in Malaysia is ascribed to two overseas youth movements, the *Suara al-Islam*

(Voice of Islam) and the Islamic Representative Council (IRC), which is strongly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 January 1987).

The popular view is that the Middle East graduates only pick the harshest form of Islam and seem to discard the content of the message for inward self-constructions. It is thus interesting to note that in contrast to Malaysia, where the Middle Eastern graduates seem to have a growing role in the religious state bureaucracy, the secular-oriented government of Indonesia, in order to manoeuvre the educational programme of the religious teachers who have been influenced by Middle Eastern fundamentalism, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, decided to send the students to European and American universities instead of letting them studying in the Middle East[12] (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 June 1990).

The Middle East is here utilised as an imaginary field, as a counterpoint in internal politics. For instance, fundamentalism has always entailed negative connotations due to the violence some of the groups have exercised all over the Muslim World. The tactics of governments, be they in South-east Asia or the Middle East, have been to promote the idea that when puritanical religious attitudes swing excessively in one or another direction, they are prosecuted as being an alien phenomenon imposed upon local traditions. A similar argument is also promoted by most of the Arab governments, which state that fundamentalism has gained ground only as a result of external financing and international Muslim linkages – a partially true interpretation because it discards the internal and class/ethnic cultural competition between the official religious version of Islam and the dominant secular state ideology. Therefore, in South-east Asia, borrowing the Arab dress, dyeing rice green, wearing the white or green *jubah*, the turban and leather sandals, are perceived as signs of approaching the Arab pattern (Nagata 1984, p. 83). In Egypt, on the other hand, the fundamentalists are seen by a significant section of intellectuals as imitating and importing the dress of Pakistani and Indian Islamic sects. Nevertheless, this is quite often confused with the fact that there has always been a genuine religious ethos, which existed long before fundamentalism and the importation of dress and habits, and that the channels of orthodoxy have always perpetuated a class of religious learned men.

I have previously argued (Abaza 1991) that the so-called imagined Arab traditions such as the manner of dressing and eating and reshaping space have also been recreated and re-invented among urban middle classes in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, to fit with the constraints and pressures of modernity, which emerging middle classes are undergoing. I have also pointed out that the same religious symbols can imply a

contradictory significance and be appropriated by different social classes within the same society. A fact which does not invalidate the idea that cross-cultural borrowing of religious symbols entails its own dynamic of self-constitution in the changing local context.

By focusing on some aspects of borrowing symbols on the cross-cultural level, one's argument would be incomplete if one were to ignore the long-established relationship between South-east Asia and the Middle East, which dates since early Islam. For, after all, the Middle East, and in particular the classical centres of Muslim scholarship, have been regarded for centuries in the world of South-east Asia as holy places. The Middle East is the birth-place of the Islamic faith. It has always instigated the *Wanderlust* feeling of the 'far away' visions in the scholars' pursuit of knowledge.

The Arab Image in South-east Asia

The image of the Arab in South-east Asia symbolises the *Kulturtraeger* of Arabic/Islamic knowledge. The Arab community in the South-east Asian Archipelago seems to have controlled, to a great extent, the *Haj* industry (see Roff 1967, pp. 39–41). By keeping ties with the centres of the Middle East, Hadhramis from Yemen often sent their children to study under the patronage of famous scholars in Mecca and Hadhramaut. The students brought back with them not only Arab habits but also books and religious ideas. They also imported '*Ulama* to teach in their schools, and created organisations and schools which kept close links with the Orient. Hadhramis played an important role in feeding a 'constant stream of revivified "orthodox" Muslim thought from the Hegaz into the peninsula and Archipelago' (Roff 1964, p. 83)[13]. Reid, furthermore, argues that the returning *hajis* and Hadhrami *Syeds* tended to emphasise their superior knowledge of pure Islam as against the established *Adat* system. During the nineteenth century the Hadhramis had gained a natural respect in the world of South-east Asia. The Hadhrami Arab was perceived as the attractive looking trader and religious scholar who offered to marry the local princesses. Indeed, C. Snouck Hurgronje's thesis on the Islamisation of the Archipelago by peaceful means had extensively to do with the Muslim traders settling and marrying native women, thus intermingling with the local population. It was through the strategy of marriage that the Muslim foreigners acquired land and obtained prominent posts (Drewes 1985, p. 9).[14]

Yet the Arab Hadhrami was also perceived as having taken advantage of his position and enforced particular feudal traditions. The Hadhrami *Syeds*

discarded the egalitarianism of Islam and emphasised manners such as kissing hands and perpetuating elitist traditions concerning the exchange of *sharifa* women through marriage (Bujra 1971). The controversial accounts about the Arabs in the Archipelago, shifting between their being regarded as highly venerated scholars and Saints, and being portrayed as 'rascals and swindlers', as well as landing in the debtors' jail, was ■ point highlighted by Talib (Talib 1990, p. 32), who compared the contradictory biographies (Dutch and local accounts) of the teachers of Munshi Abdullah,[15] the writer of *Hikayat Abdullah*.

The symbolic capital which was attributed to these forms of representation of Middle Eastern habits and origin was also a source of discontent. The Arab is also portrayed as the ruthless trader and middleman, who abused the Malays and accumulated wealth from pilgrimage. During the conquest of Sumatra in the late nineteenth century, the Arabs seemed to have played a double role as mediators. They were portrayed as being used as secret service agents, who gathered information against the Acehnese and their friends, who were anti-Dutch (Reid 1969, p. 135), but also as the intermediary messengers to the Middle East, and in particular to Constantinople, to gain material support for the Acehnese cause against Dutch authorities (Reid 1969, pp. 128, 150).

Yet when Middle Eastern reformist ideas started to gain ground in Indonesia, the debate of *taqlid/ijtihad* (imitation/innovation) sparked the sensitive issue of the privileged position of the Arabs who monopolised the religious knowledge:

> The status of the Arabs among the Indonesian Muslims, was a special point of argument between the Kaum Muda and traditionalist Arab 'ulama' residing in Indonesia. While this last point was actually a revolt by Malay Muslims against the status and prerogatives of Arab Muslims in the Malay world, the dispute took place within the framework of taqlid/ijtihad dispute. (Federspiel 1970, p. 57)

What interests us in this controversy is the fact that the two opposing parties did embrace the 'Middle East' as ■ religious and cultural battlefield. The Arabs, on the one hand, claiming the 'natural' superiority and enforcing it through particular gestures and body language, while the modernist Muslims adopted an 'inward' attitude of rejection of false sainthood and of elevating themselves within the local context by returning to the original sources through interpretation. As Federspiel argued, Indonesian modernists were indeed competent in contextualising the Middle Eastern reformist ideas for Indonesian needs.

The Middle Eastern Influence: Islamic Reformism

The debate about what the Malayo-Muslim world has borrowed from the Middle East, and later reinterpreted according to the countervailing political context, dates from the beginning of the twentieth century. Here, we can refer to the Islamic reformist movement ■ a crucial transforming element in awakening nationalism among Muslims in South-east Asia. Much has been written about this. The impact of the reformist ideas of al-Afghani and 'Abduh – the Kaum Muda/Kaum Tua controversy between the modernists and traditionalists – and its implication in the construction of the Malay nationalist movement, have been well elucidated in Roff's *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (1967). The first reformist journal in the Archipelago was call *al-Imam* and launched by Shaikh Muhammed Tahir b. Jalal al-Din al Azhari (1869–1957), who was a student of 'Abduh. The connection and resemblance between the Egyptian magazine, *al-Manar*, which was published by Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida, and the Singaporean *al-Imam* has been previously analysed by Roff (1967).[16] For an analysis of the contents of *al-Imam*, see Hamzah (1991), and for the reformist import in Malaysian Islam, see Mutalib (1990).

Bluhm has published the correspondence between the South-east Asian world and *al-Manar* magazine, which was edited by 'Abduh and Rida. This correspondence consisted of around 134 requests for legal opinions and 26 articles in the form of letters, comments, and letters requesting advice. Influenced by the form and content of *al-Manar*, there appeared two magazines, *al-Imam*, which has been mentioned above and was published in Singapore between 1906 and 1907, and *al-Munir*, published in Padang from 1911 to 1916 (Bluhm 1983, p. 35; see also, Benda 1970, p. 189). We shall, in the following lines, refer to some of the articles that will demonstrate the nature of the relationship that existed between Egypt and the Archipelago. More important though is how there is ■ dialectical liaison vacillating between a great appreciation of Egypt as a centre of knowledge and religion, and an acknowledgement of its 'deceit' in grasping that culture and thus turning inward. It is the disappointment expressed *vis-à-vis* the Asian students who did not 'learn' the right knowledge, disappointment at the unfulfilled expectations and the corrupt, 'secular' ideas they might encounter in Egypt that is of interest to us here.

In *al-Manar*, vol. 15, no. 9, year AH 1330, Abdel Wahid bin Abdullah, ■ student from the *riwaq* of *Jawis* (the students' Lodges in al-Azhar, which included students from all over South-east Asia), wrote an article describing the retarded state of *Jawi*, in both religious and secular subjects. The only instruction given was through the Dutch, who were colonialists and

bent in spreading missionary Christian thinking. Nevertheless, he emphasised how delighted he was that there were three Malayo-Indonesian pupils who were studying in Rida's School, *Dar al-Da'wa wal-Irshad*. He also expressed great hope for the thirty *Jawi* students who were then studying in al-Azhar (*al-Manar*, AH 1330, vol. 15, no. 9, pp. 695–7). Many letters, questions, and other articles centre around education, and whether Western schools are better than the ones in Egypt (Shaykh Muhammed Basyuni Imran, Imam of Sambas; *al-Manar*, vol. 31, no. 5, p. 348). In another article, a strong critique is directed against the students who study in the Middle East and who return with very little knowledge about Islam and modern times. The article points to the fact that students spend long years studying useless books. They moreover spend a long time in Cairo or Mecca and know very little of its institutions (*al-Manar*, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 347–353). An answer to this article stressed the fact that the students did not learn in the Middle Eastern centres because their Shayks in Mecca practised an attitude of exaggerated abstentions from worldly desires (*zuhd*). The students spent long years studying useless heritage books, according to the author. The blame was placed on the archaic methods of teaching, which emphasised learning by heart rather than any understanding. After many years in Mecca, students ended up with a very poor knowledge of Arabic. These shaykhs, the author insisted, taught *Jawi* pilgrims false, charlatanistic practices (*al-Manar*, vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 537–539).

The emphasis upon educating, elevating and awakening the Muslim masses was a general claim in many periodicals. In the second issue, in October 1933, of *al-Irshad*, a Hadrami Arabic periodical published in Pekalongan, Java, the opening article stressed that the aim of the *Irshadis* was to revive Islam, through Salafite teaching, by founding an Arabic school for teacher graduates (*al-Irshad*, October 1933, pp. 2–3). What is interesting in the various other articles (published anonymously, but probably written by its Chief Editor, Sd. Umar Sulaiman bin Nagui) was the constant reference to Egyptian publications. In another article, also written by an anonymous author, a strong critique was made about a 'certain' Egyptian philosophical publication which has followers in Indonesia, entailing notions such as freedom of thought and encouraging Indonesians to despise Islamic customs, which aimed merely at a blind imitation of the West (*al-Irshad*, October 1933, p. 4). The great evil was caused by the spread of European education. Egypt, for the Irshadis, seemed at that time to be turning into a secular and Westernised land; Egypt the centre of Arabic culture was no more able, in its private schools, to teach religious subjects properly, according to this Irshadi writer (*al-Irshad*, October 1933, p. 10).

The issue of the Arab community in Indonesia, together with the question of its integration in the South-east Asian world, was a main topic in reviving the correspondence about the conflict between the Middle East and South-east Asia. The *Alawi/Irshadi*[17] conflict led to the involvement of the Shaykh of al-Azhar, in sending his advice. It also seems that Rashid Rida was involved in this conflict. The *Irshadis*, however, did not seem to accept his propositions.[18]

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in this chapter to show the dialectical relationship of attraction/antipathy in perceiving the Middle East in South-east Asia. It has revealed how the Middle Eastern frame of reference, be it imaginary or real, plays an important role in contemporary politics in South-east Asia, in particular with the growing Islamisation policies which have swept many parts of the Muslim world. Perhaps, to reverse the argument concerning the 'Good Muslims' of the Middle East versus the 'bad and lax Muslims' in the periphery of South-east Asia, it can be argued that it is because the Muslims in the Archipelago have always been perceived as 'lax', with the advent of modernity and mass culture as a global phenomenon,[19] and the constant need of self-definition *vis-à-vis* Western culture as well as towards the other ethnic and religious groups in the region, that Muslims feel themselves cornered, in portraying the reverse picture. Secondly, because of the historical prejudices and taxations of Islam[20] in that region, the Muslim communities and, in particular, the literate middle classes, might find themselves being challenged to prove that, as Muslims of the periphery, they are better than any Middle Eastern Muslim. Thirdly, there is the problem of interpreting history and 'authentication' of the past. One sees al-Attas's notion of history in the sense that Islamisation is equally an ideologically-loaded concept. He constructs his interpretation of the history of the spread of Islam in South-east Asia essentially on depaganisation, de-secularisation and de-Westernisation. In his *Islam, Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future* (1985) al-Attas argued that 'Islam did not bring about the proper disenchantment of nature, and the proper desacralization of politics, and the proper deconsecration of values, and hence without bringing about the secularization.'[21] A pioneer in promoting the concept of 'Islamization of knowledge', he has recurrently advocated the concept of 'de-westernization of knowledge' (1985) and Islamising scientific thought.[22] The Islamic path in social sciences centred

all sociological knowledge upon faith. Knowledge, according to al-Attas, 'must be scrutinized so that there is nothing that contains the germs of secularization'.

One could find the equivalent advocations of Islamising knowledge among Middle Eastern intellectuals, such as the Egyptian former Marxist, 'Adel Hussein, who advocates the Islamic path in social sciences. However, what interests us is that, the Middle East is not solely used as a source of cultural reconstruction in the framework of Islamic resurgence, but also that the history of the spread of Islam in the region is equally a source of such speculation.[23] The specific interpretation of the history of Islam and 'secularism' in the Archipelago being embraced for modern cultural-identity construction might also be a factor affecting the understanding of oneself in relation to religion in everyday spheres and habits.

NOTES

1. With regard to the significance of historical *haj* accounts for various South-east Asian scholars and travellers, see Matheson and Milner (1985). For the most recent soujourn and pilgrimage descriptions by an Indonesian, see Haji Danarto, *A Javanese Pilgrim in Mecca* (1989).
2. Several Indonesians who worked as immigrant labourers in Saudi Arabia, whom I met in Cairo during my field-study on al-Azhar Indonesian students (Abaza 1991a) mentioned that Saudis call all South-east Asians '*Jawi*' as a manner of debasing them. According to the *New Straits Times* of 6 Jan. 1982, there were 42 000 Indonesians employed in the Middle East and among them 22 000 in Saudi Arabia. It was also reported that the number had been increasing by between 10 and 15 per cent annually. For an understanding of the historical significance of the *Jawa* community in Mecca, see C. S. Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century: Daily Life, Customs and Learning. The Moslims of the East-Indian Archipelago* (1970).
3. See, for instance, Geertz's *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (1968) and his comparison of Islam in Morocco and Indonesia. The idea of borrowing purer or so-called Middle Eastern orthodox traits as against the local *adat* in South-east Asia has to do with the fact that Islam in the periphery was historically taxed by South-east Asianists for being more lax, syncretic and deviant, in contrast to the harsh Islam of the centre.
4. Here a comparison between Muslim Indonesian intellectuals, who would advocate [illegible] more 'Indonesianized' type of Islam, with less emphasis on dress, and Arabic habits, but rather [illegible] debates and contextualisation, versus the Malaysian scene, which seems to be strongly influenced by the Middle Eastern graduates, needs still to be researched. One could interpret such a

move as Wahid's, however, ■ ■ powerful politically motivated attempt to reduce sectarianism in Indonesia, which could be triggered by minor controversial details.

5. Regarding this point, in Malaysia a controversy took place concerning the advocation of teaching Shi'ah theology at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur by Ustaz Abu Bakar, ■ Darul 'Ulum (Cairo) and Kent University (England) trained scholar. Ustaz Abu Bakar's frame of reference and examples in advancing shi'a teachings were derived from the debates which have been taking place among the al-Azhar scholars in Cairo (see *New Straits Times*, Malaysia, 27 February 1987).
6. This point was stressed by Abdurahman Wahid, the Leader of the *Nahdatul Ulama*, when asked about his experience in studying in Cairo: Interview with Abdurahman Wahid, Nahdatul Ulama Headquarters in Jakarta, JL. Kramat Raya, Jakarta, 23 Feb. 1989.
7. In 1988, the population of Singapore numbered 2 647 100. The Chinese constituted 76 per cent of the population, Malays 15.1 per cent, Indians 6.5 per cent and persons of other ethnic groups, 2.4 per cent: *Singapore, Facts and Pictures 1989*, published by The Information Division, Ministry of Communication and Information. Islam is the religion of the majority of the Malays; there are also Indian Muslims.
8. See Snouck Hurgronje's *Mekka* (1970).
9. In fact the Middle Eastern visitor to Malaysia would notice quickly how Muslim Malaysians put stress upon using recurrently Arabic terminology in public ceremonies.
10. Here again, the returning Middle Eastern '*Ulama* are still viewed with either veneration or fear that their religious-education preaching is the result of their failure in entering the secular system as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir, expressed in 1992 in his political campaign against the PAS '*Ulama*.
11. Susan Ackerman has analysed the moral state discourse in Malaysia about Islam in attempting to control the working class and in particular the female factory workers' culture. She has pointed to the cultural debate which centred around portraying working-class women in the work place as sexual unrestrained (Ackerman 1991, p. 193).
12. It was not possible to check empirically whether the Indonesian government offers scholarships to study overseas. Once in Cairo they can, nevertheless, obtain scholarships from al-Azhar University. The majority of the students who study in Cairo at al-Azhar University obtain a scholarship from al-Azhar besides receiving financial help from their own families.
13. Roff (1967) also emphasises the crucial role of Singapore as ■ centre of religious teaching and a cross-road point for '*Ulama*, travellers and *hajis*.
14. Nevertheless, the Arab traders' theory of Islamisation would be incomplete without mentioning the influence both of the Moghul and Turkish rule and from towns like Gujerat and Cambay, which supplemented the Malay world with sufi and wandering sheikhs. For a discussion about the various positions concerning the impact of the Indian subcontinent upon the Malay world, see Fatimi (1963, p. 35).
15. Munshi Abdullah bin Abdul Qadir (1797-1854) is considered as the founder of modern Malay literature. He wrote *Hikayat Abdullah* and travel books. He originated from Arab and Tamil parentage and worked as a teacher and

clerk in a Western milieu. His accounts describe vividly the changes which occurred in Singapore under Sir Stamford Raffles (Zaki 1965, Appendix I). Interestingly enough, Zaki (1965) compared his accounts with the Egyptian intellectual, al-Tawtahi, who wrote of his encounter with French civilisation and his vision of Europe, in describing the impact of European culture in confronting ■ different civilisation.

16. See William Roff (1967, p. 59).
17. Concerning the *Alawi/Irshadi* conflict in the Archipelago, the Arab community seem to have been divided into two groups. The *Syeds* (*Syed* is a title revealing that one belongs to the family of the Prophet) seem to have enjoyed ■ higher social position and enhanced their status through hand-kissing and holiness. The Alawites seem to have insisted upon their social rank in not letting their women marry men of non-*Syed* origin. The conflict reached a crucial point with the famous incident of a woman of *Syed* descent, belonging to the Hadrami migrant community in Singapore, who, in 1905, married ■ Indian Muslim. The validity of the marriage was brought into question and ■ great controversy occurred, leading to the *Irshadi/Alawi* Conflict in Indonesia (see, Bujra 1971, p. 94). This incident symbolised a clearly growing social conflict between the stratum of *Syeds*, who tried vehemently to defend their status and wealth, against the non-*Syed* migrants. The conservative position was defended by the '*Alawi* Sayyeds who showed great ideological prejudice from the Khatiri dynasty' (Serjeant 1962, p. 249). Here it is important to note that the twentieth century political history of Hadramawt is mainly characterised by the never-ending struggle between the Khatiri Sultanate and the two Yafi'i tribal factions which rule the Ku'aty Sultanate (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Hadramawt, 1971, p. 338).
18. Shakib Arslan, too, corresponded with some Hadramis, but could not find ■ definite solution to the fight between these two camps (al-Jafri, *Majallat al-Azhar*, 1961, p. 731).
19. We have to add here the impact of recent state Islamisation policies, which has occurred in various Muslim countries both in the Middle East and in South-east Asia. For a comparative perspective, see Abaza (1991).
20. One can argue that the major negative contribution of Islamic fundamentalism was to depict Islam (as a totality) in the Western world as fanatical and intolerant, thus enlarging the dichotomy among Muslims of differing opinions, but also creating ■ constant self defensive attitude.
21. There are, however, many Middle Eastern scholars who nevertheless argue that the idea that Islam did not bring secularisation is ■ Orientalist creation of the despotic East. Concerning the critique of such ■ position, see the entire issue of the *Review of the Middle East* (1988).
22. Concerning the critique of the promoters of 'Islamisation of Knowledge' see my 'Globalization of Social Sciences and the "Islamization of Science Debate"', 1991, unpublished paper.
23. A separate study is indeed needed to analyse the changing different ideological positions concerning the theories of the Islamisation in the Archipelago. See, for instance, the article of S. Farid al-Attas (1985), where he attempts to express ■ Malay point of view about the issue.

7 Islamisation in Malaysia: Between Ideals and Realities

Hussin Mutalib

Ever since the 1980s, Malaysia, like many other Muslim-dominated states, has been experiencing the reassertiveness of Islam. This process continues in the 1990s, with the government officially supporting the calls and pressures from segments of the population for a more visible Islamic orientation for Malaysia. Of late, suggestions have also been publicly broached by Islamic groups, notably the Islamic Party, PAS, for the realisation of the Islamic State in Malaysia.

The revitalisation of the Islamic ethos in Malaysia can be expected to continue in the years ahead, more so if Anwar Ibrahim, presently Finance Minister and a former leader of [illegible] Islamic movement in the country, should become Prime Minister. However, the structural or systemic constraints confronting Malaysia are so [illegible] that any adventurous and zealous move, in speeding up the Islamisation process there, will be fraught with nation-building problems. Of the many constraints and impediments, four deserve special mention: the country's plural ethnic complexion; the Malay–Islam dialectic and Malay disunity; the peculiarities of Sabah and Sarawak within the federation; and the secular, capitalist ethos and institutions.

In 1991, Muslim civil servants wishing to apply for government jobs were expected to have a reasonable knowledge of Islam, including the ability to recite the Qur'an.[1] In the same year, the government for the first time imposed a ban on a much-awaited Malay film, 'Fantasia', because of certain scenes considered to be un-Islamic.[2] Prime Minister Dr Mahathir himself, in launching the 'Wawasan 2020' (Vision of 2020), which aimed at turning Malaysia into a developed country by the year 2020, reiterated, also in 1991, that Malaysia's economic development and material progress must not be at the expense of moral values and the 'hereafter'.[3] In November 1992, he justified the government's big increases in tax on cigarettes and liquor as attempts at implementing the Islamic value-system in the country.[4] In January 1993, one of the major reasons used by Dr Mahathir

in the government's desire to strip the legal immunity of Sultans from court prosecution was that such immunity was un-Islamic. Such is the situation with the Islamisation process in Malaysia, a process which has intensified since the 1980s.

It was, however, the electoral victory of the Islamic Party, PAS, in regaining the state of Kelantan from UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) in 1990, that heightened the interest, if not concern, among many Malaysians in the future course of Islam in the country. PAS's statement that it would pursue its intention of establishing an 'Islamic State' in Kelantan accorded the Islamisation process higher prominence in the politics of Malaysia. In line with this goal, the party wanted to introduce the Islamic penal (*hudud*) code, which, among its consequences, would also deny the Sultans the legal immunity they occupy under Article 32 of the Federal Constitution.[5] As if that were not adequate, the party declared, as recently as 1992, that it was still determined to see the establishment of the Islamic State for the whole of Malaysia.[6] Soon after winning the 1990 state election, PAS and its partner, *Semangat '46* (Spirit of '46 party), decreed a dress code for Muslims and non-Muslims, and since then, in Kelantan, all Muslim women must cover everything except their faces and hands. Traditional games and cultural performances deemed indecent from the Islamic standpoint have been banned, and so too were gambling outlets.[7] In November 1992, 50 Muslim women were actually fined for not heeding the Islamic dress code.[8] PAS also announced that even the State Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) would be required to carry out its business dealings according to Islamic laws, which include prohibition from indulging in interest and usury.[9]

With all these developments, is it a foregone conclusion that the country is on the path towards greater Islamisation and perhaps even becoming an Islamic State?[10] This poser has begun to be an issue for serious discussion by many scholars, particularly since that electoral victory of PAS in Kelantan and its concomittant declaration that the state will be governed as an Islamic State.

Prior to a substantive discussion and analysis of this issue, however, it may be instructive to first delineate, briefly, the sources and causes of Islamic revivalism in the country.

SOURCES AND CAUSES OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM

The rise of Islam as a factor to be reckoned with in Malaysian society, other than being precipitated by international or external sources, was also

due, in no small measure, to the dynamics of local or domestic circumstances. Amongst these circumstances and events, four deserve some attention, given their impact upon the Islamisation process in the country. First was the 1969 racial riots; second, the coming onto the political scene of Dr Mahathir Mohamed as the Prime Minister; third, the *dakwah* (Islamic propagation) phenomenon; and finally, the wresting of control of Kelantan state by PAS in the 1990 General Election.

The 1969 Ethnic Riots

In a way, the ethnic riots were a paradox. On the one hand, the riots were ethnic-inspired or oriented, and the numerous policies and programmes, tilted towards a pro-*bumiputra* emphasis,[11] had a similar ethnic intent: to assist the Malays as an ethnic community *vis-à-vis* non-Malays. However, against the backdrop of the crystallisation of the Malay identity crisis, as well as their demands for some structural changes in the way things were organised in the country, arose a more 'Islamised' and educated Malay elite. The New Economic Policy (NEP), launched in 1970, and especially its major offshoot, the New Education Policy (NEDP), led to sizeable numbers of Malay youths and students being accorded opportunities to further their education up to the tertiary level, in both national and overseas institutions of higher learning.

The role of these educated Malay youths is especially significant to our discussion here because studying at these universities also led to an increase in their commitment to Islam. Being transported from their rural settings in the villages (*kampung*), to one completely different and alien, namely the overseas universities in the West, these youths felt a sense of alienation and 'anomie'. Over-awed and ill-equipped to face the cultural shock of Western society, with its attendant liberal values and norms, these Malay youths tended to develop a sense of disillusionment, and at times, revulsion, against things associated with Western values and lifestyle.

The conflict of this change of environment, and new and difficult educational standards, resulted, for some of them, in a 'return' to Islam. In the case of poor Malay students from the rural areas, their stint overseas saw a strengthening and better articulation of Islamic sentiments, as they also decried the secularising and 'un-Islamic' trends they saw developing within Malay society. This Islamic orientation developed because of their exposure to the wide array of literature on the Muslim world in the overseas university campuses where they were studying, as well as their involvement with the Muslim Students Associations (MSA) and the Islamic Representative Councils (IRC). In this latter case, they were often guided by active Muslim students in the Indian subcontinent, Iran and the Middle East.

The riots of 1969 and the subsequent launching of policies aimed at redressing the socio-economic imbalance of ethnic communities have also, gradually, speeded up the modernisation of Malaysian society. Some 30 per cent of Malays, who, by historical accounts, have always been a rural people, had moved towards the inner cities by 1979, a movement inevitably affecting the lifestyle and ethos of the Malay population in general.[12] Studies of global Islamic revivalism have also concluded that the challenge posed by the metropolis setting in urban centres has led to spiritual emptiness and, as a consequence, the tendency for people, in this case the new urban Muslims, to become active participants in politics in the defence of Islam and the Muslims.[13]

The Government's Islamisation Policies

The development of Malaysian Islam in the 1970s could be associated, to some extent, with the return of Dr Mahathir Mohamed to the forefront of Malaysian politics. Previously sacked by the then Prime Minister for his communalistic leanings, Mahathir's comeback saw the government becoming more supportive of Islam.

In the first year of his Prime Ministership, in 1981, his government announced a big seminar entitled 'The Concept of Development in Islam', the recommendations of which were adopted by the government.[14] Although the declaration to implement more Islamic laws was not intended to include non-Muslims, Mahathir's government actually stepped up many Islamic-related programmes and policy directives.[15] These ranged from the revision of the national legal system to make it more in line with Islamic law; to making Religious Knowledge an examination subject; to the establishment of Islamic economic institutions such as the Islamic Bank and Islamic Economic Foundation; to the co-option of the leading Islamic youth leader of the time, Anwar Ibrahim, into UMNO and the Cabinet, and the upgrading of the *Pusat Islam* (Islamic Centre); to the declaration of intent to 'Islamise government machinery' in 1984. In 1988, the government, in responding to calls by non-Muslims that other religions be given the opportunity to broadcast over radio and television, did not hesitate to reply through its statement that only Islam would be accorded such air time 'since Islam is the national and official religion and every citizen should learn its values'.[16]

This point was reiterated in 1990 when the government rebutted the charges by the Opposition that the RTM (Radio and Television Malaysia) had given a disproportionately high profile to Islamic programmes at the expense of other religions. These charges were not totally surprising, since by 1987, all male Muslim RTM newsreaders were already required to put

on the *songkok* (Muslim headgear) on Fridays and to begin the News by mentioning the Muslim greeting, *Assalaamu'alaikum*. This was followed by the government's declaration, in November of that year, that although under the 'National Culture Policy' other non-Malay cultures are accepted, such cultures cannot be against the teachings of Islam.[17]

By April 1988, other policy emphases in favour of Islam were announced: Mahathir's promise that the legal sanctity of Islamic laws would be safeguarded from incursions by secular, civil laws, and the status of Islamic courts be put on a par with civil courts;[18] the stepping up of actions against Muslims caught eating or drinking during the fasting month;[19] the upgrading of Islamic programmes on television by *Pusat Islam*;[20] the setting up of the Dakwah Foundation (YADIM) to co-ordinate all *dakwah* activities throughout the country;[21] the declaration that UMNO was the 'biggest Islamic party in Malaysia';[22] and the announcement of a big plan to develop 'Islamic villages' in the cities, starting with Kuala Lumpur in August 1988.[23] By 1992, when, in his New Year Message to Malaysians Mahathir emphasised that his government is bent in ensuring a balance between material and spiritual growth, such a statement no longer surprises them as something new.[24]

In the area of foreign policy, the most significant statement made by the Mahathir administration was the declaration in 1983 that the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth were no longer as important as the Muslim bloc. Hence, for the first time, both the Non-Aligned and the Commonwealth countries were demoted from the top two positions they had occupied in Malaysia's foreign policy since Independence. In line with this new position, Malaysia has been seen to be clearly wanting to identify itself with the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC).[25] In 1992, after chairing the UMNO Supreme Council meeting, Dr Mahathir said that UMNO members' views about the oppression of Muslims in Myanmar would have to be conveyed to the Myanmar regime.[26] Mahathir, in response to the growing anger of Malaysian Muslims about the plight of Bosnian Muslims, also made the decision to sever diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in protest against the Serbian attacks on Bosnian Muslims. A Cabinet statement from Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi said that the Yugoslav embassy had to close and all Yugoslavs staying in Malaysia 'will probably have to leave as well'. In addition, no new business contracts were to be given to Yugoslavia.[27]

Upon analysis, this increasing emphasis on Islam by the Malaysian ruling elite is the more understandable because, in recent years, other than the pressures exerted by the Islamic Party, PAS, indications of a closer identification with Islam have been taking root amongst the general Muslim populace, and are discernible even to a casual observer of Malaysia and

her people.[28] This development of Islam, in its most organised form, is best illustrated by the emergence of what came to be popularly known as the *dakwah* phenomenon. Through *dakwah* activities, Muslim popular consciousness was mobilised on a scale seldom witnessed in the country in recent memory.

The Dakwah Phenomenon

Much has been written of the *dakwah* phenomenon and movement in Malaysia.[29] The phenomenon manifests itself in the activities of Muslim organisations throughout the country. The more organised and bigger organisations include ABIM (the Islamic Youth Movement), DARUL ARQAM (the 'House of Arqam' Movement), PERKIM (the Muslim Welfare Association) and Jama'at Tabligh (the Muslim Missionary Group).

The significance of *dakwah* to Malaysian society and politics is wide-ranging. Although almost all the *dakwah* organisations have denied that they are acting as pressure groups, invariably their activities and public statements about Islam and Malaysian society have considerable political ramifications. Of equal significance is the fact that in recent years, some *dakwah* groups have begun to make pointed references to the need for Malaysia to move towards some form of an Islamic State. Given the sensitivity of the issue of such a State in Malaysia, very few Islamic groups and organisations have come out publicly to call for such a State, but it is obvious that in many small group discussions involving members of these organisations there is little doubt that they would prefer an Islamic State for Malaysia.

ABIM's leadership, for instance, has argued that an Islamic State, contrary to popular belief by non-Muslims, would actually strengthen, rather than weaken, democratic principles in Malaysia.[30] The 'Islamic Republic' group has, on occasion, made known its view that not only must Muslim masses be Islamised according to the right teachings of Islam, but that the government must also be similarly brought into the Islamic system. It has called for the banning of Western liberal rock culture in the country. In 1983, its supporters and sympathisers took over the leadership of the Malaysian National Students' Association.[31]

PAS and the 'Islamic State' of Kelantan

The Islamic Party, PAS, in a major way, has also played its part in the pressures for greater Islamisation in the country. To start with, integral to the Party Manifesto is the aim to see the eventual emergence of an Islamic State in Malaysia. With the coming onto the scene of a new leadership for

the party since its General Assembly in April 1989, the party has became more keen than ever before to 'Islamise' the country in all its aspects. The party's success in regaining all the seats in Kelantan State in the General Elections of 1990, with the co-operation of the *Semangat '46* group, and the determination of its *ulama* leadership to transform Kelantan into an Islamic State, has again raised questions about the future course of Islam in the country. Under these new leaders, the party became even more adamant in wanting to rekindle the whole issue of the 'Islamic State' as [illegible] alternative to what the leaders argued to be UMNO's secular, ethnic–nationalistic one. In the 1990 Election, PAS joined the opposition alliance of *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah* (Peoples' Solidarity Movement), led by Tengku Razaleigh, which also included the Opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP).

Although the results of both the 1986 and 1990 General Elections, particularly at the Federal level, indicate that PAS has still a long way to go in securing non-Malay support (in 1990, it secured only [illegible] seats as compared to 71 for UMNO), its aggressiveness, in offering a non-ethnic style of politics, further politicised Islam in Malaysia and deepened the already prevalent fissures within the Muslim community. A major tactic employed by the party in its attempt to cut ground from UMNO was its questioning of UMNO's right to govern, given its confinement of Islam to a limited sphere of life, and its separating politics from religion.[32] That was why, in a setting such as Kelantan, which had had a long Islamic tradition, UMNO failed to gain a single seat of the 13 parliamentary and 39 state seats it contested in the October 1990 Election.

After winning the Kelantan state, PAS declared its intention to invite foreign Islamic experts to help it introduce the Islamic penal (*hudud*) code or system.[33] Deputy President, Ustadz Abdul Hadi Awang, was put in charge of the Committee to see the implementation of Islamic laws in the state, including *hudud* laws. The recommendations of this Committee have been submitted to the Kelantan State Legislature for endorsement. Meanwhile, in an interview, Ustadz Nik Abdul Aziz, the Chief Minister in the state, has also expressed his commitment and determination to see that Islamic laws govern the policies of his government, and that while the rights of the 7 per cent of non-Muslims in Kelantan will be honoured, they will also be made subject to the *hudud* laws.[34] He has made it clear that even if non-Muslims object to the Islamic State idea, his party will go ahead with implementing Islamic laws.[35] The Sultans or Rulers who are currently considered above the law under Article 32 of the Federal Constitution, will no longer be excluded from the *hudud* laws, declared Ustadz Abdul Hadi Awang.[36]

FUTURE COURSE OF ISLAM IN MALAYSIA

All the above developments bring us to the vexing question as to the future course of Islam in Malaysian society and politics. Given the salience of Islamic revivalist tendencies in Malaysia today, the official status of the faith in the Constitution, and the increasing attention given by all competing Malay political parties and societal forces to Islam, it is only natural for many to pose the question, 'Whither Islam in Malaysia?' Understandably, the ruling regime, under UMNO's leadership, has never directly called for an Islamic State for Malaysia, although Mahathir, in 1988, did actually refer to 'Malaysia's Islamic Government' when he was defending his government's Islamisation policies,[37] and in January 1993, in a parliamentary speech, Mahathir said that Malaysia would adopt the *hudud* laws when the time had come. One is now made to ask whether the proponents of the Islamic State are genuine and serious in making such demands or whether the issue is more of an emotional myth harped on by PAS and other Islamic-oriented groups within Malay society for their own political objectives and ends?

More importantly, are the conditions and circumstances in the country congenial towards seeing a greater progression of Islam in the direction of an Islamic State? Is such a State a feasible alternative to the present secular-oriented system of governing plural Malaysia?

It is unrealistic to expect Islam and the Muslims to retreat to the bygone period of the 1960s when, under the administration of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the faith was practised more in its ritualistic and symbolic aspects. Mosques and *madrasah* were built, and Muslim children were sent to recite the Qur'an but mostly by rote, especially in the village religious institutions such as the *surau, madrasah* and *pondok*. The government played its part in fostering the development of such a style of Islam by its treatment of the faith in a ceremonial way; hence the Tunku's launching of the National (later, International) Qur'an Reading Competition, and annual mass rallies marking the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, where Muslim Cabinet Ministers joined the processions in pomp and splendour. Malaysia, before the 1980s, to all intents and purposes, was a secular country in a manner quite similar to many other Muslim states in that period, with the Tunku viewing Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as the models for an Islamic State.[38] Tunku's well-known remark that non-Muslims would be drowned if ever Malaysia were to become an Islamic State, in a nutshell, sums up the regime's definition of the status and role of Islam during that time. Tunku's successors, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein

Onn, did not, in a fundamental way, change such a role of the faith in Malaysia.

Then came Dr Mahathir Mohamed, who, since assuming power, despite using Islam as a legitimating instrument, seems quite genuine in wanting to practise the universalistic Islamic values and principles in his governance of the country. Obviously though, a primary motivating factor for the breadth of Islamic programmes under his administration must be the pressures coming from the collective force of the *dakwah* movements, Islamic intellectuals, and most understandably, the Islamic Party, PAS. With the official patronage of Islam, the cues for an Islamic State by PAS, and the general vibrancy of Islamic activities in the country, it is difficult to conclude that Islam in Malaysia has reached its peak. Whatever the UMNO government's charges against PAS's Islamic assertiveness, some UMNO leaders conceded that PAS's hold on Kelantan would be hard to beat in the next Election in 1995.[39] Does this then suggest the impending establishment of the Islamic State in Malaysia?

REALITIES OF MALAYSIAN SOCIETY

It will be argued here that, in the particular context and circumstances of Malaysia, and for reasons to be elaborated below, the Islamisation process in Malaysia may continue to be a strong force or factor in the country in the years ahead, and, in all probability, will ascend even further if Anwar Ibrahim should assume a greater leadership role in the country. However, if by an 'Islamic State', Malaysians and others are referring to the doctrinal form of Islamic State, and one which existed during the reign of Prophet Muhammad, then such a State will have little chance to emerge in Malaysia within the next decade or so. The reasons for such a conclusion are as compelling as they are numerous, and we shall delve into these in the pages to follow.

Plural and Bi-modal Society

Central to an understanding of Malaysia is the plural or heterogeneous nature of its society, brought about by colonialism: peoples of different ethnic and religious backgrounds as well as political affiliations. Since the notorious ethnic riots in May 1969, relations between the ethnic communities, especially the two principal communities, the Malays and Chinese, have not been good. This observation has been well documented in many

writings, such as those by Bedlington, Enloe, Fletcher, MacDougall, Ratnam, Snyder and Vasil.[40] The arrests of 106 people from different ethnic backgrounds in October 1987 under the 'Internal Security Act', for activities considered dangerous to communal harmony, was a clear demonstration of the persistence of ethnic communalism in the country. So too, with the recent 10-page Memorandum sent by MCA Youth to the Prime Minister in their meeting in March 1992, which highlighted the anxieties and concerns of Malaysian Chinese over issues such as Chinese language, culture and economic interests.[41] Recently too, the Malay-dominated government had to appease the ethnic demands of Malays and UMNO Youth, and decided not to support the establishment of a Chinese Cultural Centre in Kuala Lumpur.[42]

A related reality not often realised is that not only are Malaysians ethnically divided, but the division, in numbers, is almost equal between Malays and non-Malays.[43] Statistically, despite constituting approximately 7 million in numbers, the Muslims in peninsular Malaysia (according to the Population Census of 1980) make up only 53 per cent of the population.[44] Malaysia is not a Muslim State, if we include Sabah and Sarawak. The country is still less a Malay state, because, nation-wide, Malays, despite their indigenous status and political predominance, constitute barely half of the total population of about 17 million, despite a 4 per cent increase in annual birth rate from 1970 to 1990, as compared to a corresponding drop of 5 per cent and 1 per cent for ethnic Chinese and Indians respectively.[45] This Malay–non-Malay ratio has remained about the same ever since Independence in 1957, though with a slight percentage increase of the Malay population in peninsular Malaysia.[46] This demographic reality has to be noted when one discusses attempts to turn the country into an Islamic State.

In Malaysia, religion is also very closely identified with ethnic background. According to the 1970 Census, 98.7 per cent of Malays were Muslims, 100 per cent of Chinese were adherents of the Chinese religions, and 99.0 per cent of Indians were Hindus.[47] While there has been some change in the figures for Chinese and Indians, by and large, Islam, the faith of the Malays, has not been well understood by the non-Malays (most of whom are non-Muslims), This point has been exacerbated by many recent incidents and events in the country, which cast Islam and the Muslims in ■ negative light. To them, the faith has always been identified as a Malay religion in that the two are quite synonymous with each other, although, doctrinally, race, still more racism, is anathema to Islam.[48] Hence, the programmes and policies launched by the government with regard to Islam have always been perceived ■ benefiting only one group of Malaysian society, namely Malays.

The fact of the matter is that the more the advancement charted by the *bumiputra* (literally, sons-of-the-soil), the less the probability for non-*bumiputra* to achieve the gains they secured previously. The changing professional make-up of Malaysian society consequent to the NEP is a case in point. In 1970, the *bumiputra's* share of the major professions (such as doctors, architects, engineers and accountants) was a mere 4.9 per cent, as compared to 61.0 per cent for Chinese and 23.3 per cent for Indians. In 1990, the figures were 29.0 per cent, 55.9 per cent and 13.2 per cent respectively for the three ethnic communities.[49] The many initiatives either officially undertaken or patronised by the government, such as the Islamic Bank, Islamic University, Islamic Pawnshop and Islamic Economic Foundations, imply that non-Malays, Chinese in particular, need to double up and become more competitive. Their task is made more demanding given the traditional Malay distrust of Chinese-run businesses, which they regard as motivated by greed and generally exploitative.[50] The result of this economic frustration could be an intensification of tension in Malay–Chinese relations,[51] especially amongst businessmen, given the growing assertiveness of a new *bumiputra* entrepreneurial class amongst the Malays.

For various reasons, the government's many assurances that, with Islamisation, the constitutional rights of non-Malays will not change, have not been found convincing by many non-Malays. Their anxiety has to do with the lack of clear and open discussions about the issue in general, and especially the zeal with which many states in the federation go about their Islamisation programmes and activities, including the widely-publicised intentions to practise the *shar'iah* and *khalwat* (close proximity between sexes) laws.[52] If the demands for such laws to be made obligatory for Muslims have shaken many Muslim Malays, the fears of non-Muslims must surely be greater, especially after the declaration by some states, for instance in 1989, that *khalwat* laws and morality issues in general are to include non-Muslims too.[53]

News of fanatical and extremist deviant Muslim actions, such as the desecration of a Hindu temple in 1979, the attack on a police post in Batu Pahat in 1980, and the declaration of intent by PAS to introduce laws which will advocate cutting off the limbs of thieves, and the stoning of adulterers, at a time when there has been very little public education to enable people to understand these laws, certainly does not improve the non-Muslims' image of Islam, the Malays and Muslims as a whole.

The Sabah and Sarawak Dimension

The proposal to establish an Islamic State in the country assumes a greater challenge if one brings into the discussion the Sabah and Sarawak

dimension, two of the biggest states; states which have also tended to be isolated from mainstream peninsular developments, given their history, location and politics. It is well to remember that both these states only joined the Federation in 1963, after a series of acrimonious debates amongst their peoples and political parties at that time. This was especially so of Sabah.

Neither state has a Malay majority nor Malay political hegemony, and in fact their entry into the Federation in 1963 brought about a drop of the total Malay population in Malaysia to only 46 per cent.[54] Subjected to different historical experiences, they were more ethnically diverse and generally comprised peoples of non-Muslim stock. The main groups originated from more 'tribal' settings, and, while increasing numbers of the present generation have made considerable strides in improved education and other achievements, many still retain most of their traditional cultures and preferences, including their loyalty to their tribal leaders and customary practices. The major groups are not Malays but Kadazan, Murut and Kelabit in Sabah, and the Iban, Bidayuh and Melanau in Sarawak.[55]

In Sabah, as an illustration, although the Bajaus and Sulus – loosely grouped as 'Malays' – collectively form about 37 per cent of the population, ever since the General Election of 1985, a Kadazan Christian, Pairin Kitingan, and his party, 'Parti Bersatu Sabah' (PBS) have been in firm control of the state. In the context of Malay/Muslim-dominated Malaysia, Sabah, the richest state, and led by a Christian, has had some difficulty in its relations with the Federal government. This was actually accentuated in 1990 when, in the run up to the Elections – obviously to the dismay of the UMNO-led *Barisan* government – Pairin suddenly decided to withdraw his party from the government coalition, which it had joined earlier, and joined the opposition alliance. Despite the regular signals for mediation, from Sabah's government, Mahathir and UMNO still remain bitter about that episode, with Mahathir viewing PBS as a party that 'could no longer be trusted' by the coalition government.[56]

The Chinese form a sizeable group in Sabah, with about 23 per cent of the population, second after the Kadazans with 28 per cent. However, in the political dynamics of the state, a bloc Chinese vote could decide the party which would eventually form the government. Since 1991, UMNO has tried to penetrate politics in the state by opening up more of its branches there, particularly via Labuan[57] which was handed over by the previous government, as a federal territory, in 1984. It has been reported that the vigorous campaign led by UMNO's former Deputy President, Ghaffar Baba, to recruit members for UMNO in Sabah, is paying off: by May 1992, with USNO (United Sabah National Organization)'s unexpected support, the membership figures had reached such a high figure, of more than 240 000, that it ranked only second to Johore in the whole of Malaysia.[58]

A similarly uneasy situation, though arguably less strained, occurs in Sarawak–Federal relations. Although the ruling party, the PPBBS ('Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu Sarawak') is Muslim-led, the state also has a non-Muslim majority, and it was Chinese collaboration with Malay political parties there that actually enabled the latter to secure the leadership of the state. After all, it was the Chinese who formed the first political party there (SUPP, or Sarawak United People's Party) in 1959. Hence, as early as 1965, a Chinese, Peter Lo, was elected Chief Minister in the electoral pact forged between USNO and SCA (Sabah Chinese Association). A clear manifestation of the different ethnic composition and temperament of the Sarawak people *vis-à-vis.* Malays and Muslims in Malaysia was the decision of the Federal government to go ahead with approving the 4-D Lottery in Sarawak, despite strong objections by Malay and Muslim groups in Sarawak.[59] The pressure by the largest youth organisation, Saberkas (Sarawak United Youth Organisation), to ban the lottery on the grounds that it was 'morally wrong to encourage gambling',[60] was insufficient to change the Federal government's appreciation of the ethno-religious make-up of Sarawak.

Malay–Islam Dialectic and Malay Disunity

Islam has, to an extent, integrated the Malays, but the faith has also tended to divide them in at least two aspects. One, the differing perception and attitude that different categories and groups of Malays – politicians, literary figures, *ulama*, Sultans, masses – have of their faith,[61] particularly its position and role in the affairs of the state; and the other, the strength of the ethnic idiom in the Malay ethos, which has somewhat inhibited the Malay practise of the more universalistic content and approach of the faith.[62]

To start with, top Malay leaders in government have very little knowledge of the meaning of an 'Islamic State'. As early as 1964, many Malay leaders in the Alliance government, in criticising Lee Kuan Yew's proposal for a 'Malaysian Malaysia', charged that the proposal was aimed at 'destroying Islam and the Islamic State in Malaysia'.[63]

An obvious illustration of the differing perceptions, and resort to Islam, amongst the Malays is the traditional UMNO–PAS ideological divide. Both parties have accused each other of not following the 'right Islam'. Today, nothing substantive has changed in the relationship between leaders of these two main competing Malay political parties. In November 1985, a bloody clash occurred between PAS supporters and the police, in the much-publicised 'Memali affair', which led to 18 dead and 29 injured.

The UMNO-led government, then under Musa Hitam as the Acting Prime Minister, sent in military troops to attack the barricade put up by Ibrahim Mahmud's religious group. Although this group was not directly linked to PAS as such, PAS leaders declared the deaths as *shahid* (martyrdom) or 'death in the cause of Islam' and gave them an Islamic warrior's burial, whereas UMNO and the government charged the group with being extremists. Throughout 1987, both parties openly attacked each other as 'infidels' – a most serious, blasphemous charge indeed in Muslim eyes – in the much reported 'kafir–mengkafir' débâcle.[64] As recently as 1992, the PAS government in Kelantan openly charged the UMNO-led coalition in Kuala Lumpur with 'victimising Kelantanese' who voted for PAS, and for delaying development grants, which PAS saw as an attempt to weaken its Islamic rule of Kelantan state.[65]

There has also been, since 1984, an intensification of intra-UMNO infighting among its top leadership, pitting the Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh camps against each other for support of the Malay ground. Razaleigh had disregarded the general UMNO tradition of not openly contesting the top posts in the party when he stood to challenge the incumbents in both the 1984 and 1987 UMNO elections. After his failure to wrest political leadership from Mahathir in 1987, Razaleigh spearheaded the formation of the 'Spirit of '46' UMNO team (later to become popularly known as 'Team B') and the *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah* (Muslim United Movement), to offer an alternative team to Mahathir's. In separate public rallies organised by both Mahathir and Razaleigh, each openly criticised the other.[66] After collaborating with the Opposition parties in the 1990 General Election, on 28 April 1992, Razaleigh initiated the official establishment of a combined united front, consisting of Opposition political parties in the country, including PAS and the DAP, called the *Gagasan Rakyat* or Peoples' Might. The seven-party coalition chose him as their chairman.[67]

The disintegrative function of the faith, to the Malays, is not only confined to their leaders or elites. The general public, or Malay masses as a whole, have also been dragged into the quagmire. This was evident in the breaking up of the UMNO party in 1988 when, after the High Court declared UMNO an illegal party, two splinter UMNO groups were formed, the *UMNO Baru* (New UMNO) led by Dr Mahathir, and *Semangat '46* ('Spirit of 46', or the Old UMN0 of 1946) led by Tengku Razaleigh. During the UMNO General Assembly in 1989, the party's rank-and-file members were split right in half when it came to voting in the new UMNO President. The incumbent, Dr Mahathir, barely scraped through against his arch rival, Tengku Razaleigh.

Like all religious affiliations everywhere, there is also the strength of the ethno-cultural component in the religious adherence of Malays in Malaysia, and it is obviously not easy for Malaysian Muslims to subscribe to ■ pristine, unadulterated Islamic practice. Hence, in this Islam–Malayness dialectic, the former, in ■ somewhat unconscious manner, has always been subjected to the force of the latter, namely, Malay ethnic, innate parochial sentiments ■■ compared to the more universalistic, humanistic and philosophical dimensions and principles propounded by the faith.

Secular, Capitalist Ethos and Institutions

A final factor, which may pose added difficulty for Islam in assuming a much greater role in Malaysia than what it is playing now, is the prevalence and influence of numerous Western secular systems, values,[68] and other powerful institutional or structural forces in Malaysian society and politics. These include the Constitution, Royalty, 'democracy', and ■ capitalist economic system, a system which not only dictates the framework of economic life there but has gradually won new supporters amongst the burgeoning Malay middle class. If ever Malaysia were to become an Islamic State, many of these institutionalised systems, structures and values would have to be reviewed, if not abandoned.

Take, for instance, the provision for Islam in the Constitution. Although Article III(1) states that 'Islam is the religion of the Federation', it is instructive to note that the framers of the Constitution, led by British colonial judges and appointees, actually had not wanted Islam to perform more than a symbolic function. This was in sharp contrast to the original proposal from the majority members of the Reid Commission,[69] which actually recommended that Islam be accepted as the religion of the country. It was also quite telling that the Council of Rulers concurred with the view of British officials:

> It is Their Highness' (Sultans/Rulers) considered view that it would not be desirable to insert some declaration of the Faith such as has been suggested (by the Working Committee) that the Muslim Faith or Islamic Faith be the established religion of the Federation.[70]

Such ■ provision was finally incorporated only after some vigorous lobbying on the part of the Working Committee headed by UMNO leaders.

Secondly, secular/civil laws take precedence over Islamic laws at the Federal level, since, as in the opinion of an expert in Malaysian and Islamic law, Tan Sri Prof. Ahmad Ibrahim, 'all laws in conflict with Federal laws are automatically null and void'.[71] Finally, the provisions

granting special rights and privileges, indefinitely, to Malays (after the formation of Malaysia in 1963, *bumiputra* was included) are very difficult to defend under Islamic law, the *shar'iah*, which deplores both the notion of a 'special people' and their 'special treatment'; more so if such notions have no time-limitation for their observance.

Yet another systemic inadequacy, which will serve as an obstacle to any development towards an Islamic State in Malaysia, is the political system itself. The coalition government, the *Barisan Nasional* (National Front) and all political parties, almost without exception, are communal-based, and draw upon the support of communal, ethnic–religious groups for their sustenance and influence. Race or ethnic considerations loom large in many aspects of the political process, from the delineation of seats for component members of the coalition government, to the choice of Cabinet appointments, to allotments of places to students in tertiary institutions and positions in the bureaucracy. UMNO was formed principally to defend and safeguard Malay interests, while the DAP's greatest strength is its image as the propounder of Chinese aspirations. For their own legitimacy in the eyes of their ethnic constituencies, all political parties have to succumb to communalism, and power politics, in some way or another. In an Islamic State this institutionalised political framework, and political parameters that are based on ethnic and power considerations, would have to be radically changed.

A further power-point which will face tremendous pressure for change in an Islamic Republic of Malaysia, is the Royalty. Constitutionally, the Sultans or Rulers have tremendous powers in determining the status and role of Islam in their respective states. Sultans, because of their sponsored status even before the colonial occupation of the country, were not only granted the final decision in matters of pardons, reprieves and respites for all offences, but also could not, as a general rule, be prosecuted in the courts.[72] Hence, the Sultan of Kelantan, in March 1992, could simply drive off in his new Lamborghini sports car after it arrived at the airport, without finding it necessary to pay the M$2.1 million in taxes for the car.[73] In the same year, the Johore Sultan beat up a hockey coach in a much-publicised event which triggered off the Constitutional crisis between the government and Royalty. After all, in such matters as affect Royalty, it is not the Cabinet or government which has the upperhand, but the Council of Rulers. In December 1992, only after assurances by the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, did the coach file a police report.[74]

Given the declining role of the Sultans at the Federal level of politics, following the 1983–84 and 1992–93 constitutional crises and the 'Memorandum from UMNO' to the Sultans about the misdeeds of the latter,[75] royalty's traditional image of awe and mystique, and the respect that Sultans usually receive from Malays, are waning.

Finally, despite the recent innovations in the Malaysian economic system, with the introduction of Islamic banks and other Islamic financial institutions, the whole economic infrastructure and framework upon which the Malaysian economy operates is almost wholly dependent upon ■ global, secular and capitalist international system, and, in Malaysia's case, exacerbated by a growing Malay business class supportive of such ■ capitalist culture. The element of 'class consciousness' has also begun to creep into Malay politics consequent to the burgeoning Malay middle class since the 1980s. 'Money politics' have ■ part to play, too, in the way Malay leaders solicit political support from the ground, as is evident in the dynamics of UMNO politics. As indicated by Mahathir himself, in his book, *The Challenge*: 'Each candidate and each party has to spend millions of dollars to take part in the elections. Once it was not necessary to spend so much ... but today, a poor person cannot stand for elections unless he is nominated by a rich party'.[76] An Opposition leader, Fan Yew Teng, in his book, *The UMNO Drama,* even maintained that 51 per cent of Malay company directors held political titles.[77]

If Malaysia is to assume the status of an Islamic State, the crucial issue of usury (*riba*'), and other matters, such as an interest-free and collective system of profit-sharing (such ■ the *mudharabah* concept),[78] have to be addressed and an alternative, workable system, found. One can in fact argue that recent trends towards the emergence of a Malay business or entrepreneurial class, which adopts such a capitalist culture in its work ethos, may actually strengthen, not lessen, the secular–capitalist framework of economic life in the country. The government's launching, in January 1991, of a massive multi-million-dollar scheme to help produce more *bumiputra* entrepreneurs in the next ten to fifteen years,[79] may give greater credence to such an assertion. In an Islamic State of Malaysia, the country will have to be prepared for some initial difficulties in its dealings with Western capitalist states.

CONCLUSION

What the above discussion and illustrations imply is this: if ever Malaysia were to become 'more Islamic' on the path towards ■ Islamic State, a radical change would be required in the way the whole society and political system functions and operates. It is primarily because of such bold transformations and changes that have to be undertaken, and the exacting moralistic standards that have to be observed, that most Muslim-majority states today come nowhere close to what could be described ■ Islamic

States, whatever their pious declarations. In many so-called 'Islamic States', as in the Middle East, ruling Islamic regimes have even been found to deal harshly with Islamic pressure groups and political parties.

In Malaysia too, limitations have been imposed upon PAS, and religious groups and movements like the *Darul Arqam*, as well as on what have come to be known as *dakwah songsang*, or deviant Muslim activities. In 1991, 70 groups were declared by the government to be 'deviating from Islamic teachings'.[80] In 1992, it was reported that other states were studying the decision by Malacca to ban the *Tabligh* group, a group that has operated in the country since independence and that has a following of at least 5 000 civil servants and students.[81]

Hence, given the above observations, it is plausible to argue that there is not in existence a single model of a fully functioning Islamic State, although the Iranian case has been accepted as the closest to such a model by many Islamic scholars. In any examination of the Islamisation process in Malaysia, one cannot help but conclude that, while the trend towards greater Islamisation may continue, such a development will, in all probability, be constrained, if not checked, by the realities which shape the Malaysian societal and political landscape. It is unrealistic to expect a tapering off of the progression of Islam in the country, given the strength of pro-Islam forces and the necessity for the UMNO Malay-dominated leadership to be seen to support Islam, and it is not in the faith of Muslim adherents, including those in Malaysia, to doubt the efficacy of their religion in resolving problems and challenges, however great they are.

The above sentiment aside, it is really the stark constituent realities of Malaysian society – a heterogeneous ethnic matrix, intra-ethnic disunity within all major ethnic groups, the different socio-political culture of Sabah and Sarawak *vis-à-vis* peninsular Malaysia, and the secular–capitalist orientation of the whole country – which must suggest that the road ahead would indeed be arduous if pressures to see a much greater role for Islam in Malaysia were to escalate.

NOTES

This article is more substantially treated in Chapter 4 of the present writer's forthcoming book to be published by Singapore University Press, to which acknowledgement is hereby recorded.

1. *Straits Times*, 21 March 1991.
2. *Straits Times*, 29 July 1991.

3. *Berita Minggu*, 1 Sep. 1991. The same sentiment was repeated a few months later: *Straits Times*, 24 Mar 1992.
4. *Berita Harian*, 27 Nov. 1992.
5. *Straits Times* (Singapore: Overseas Weekly Edition), 9 May 1992, p. 10, and 23 May 1992, p. 10. (Islamic penal laws are different from the existing Muslim civil laws practised in all states in Malaysia, since the former prescribe the maximum penalties for certain crimes, including cutting off the limbs of thieves.)
6. *Straits Times*, 10 Aug. 1992.
7. *Asiaweek*, 5 June 1992, esp. pp. 27–31. Compare an earlier report dated 17 Oct. 1991 in the *Straits Times*.
8. *Sunday Times*, 29 Nov. 1992.
9. *Straits Times*, 9 Dec. 1991.
10. This issue is more substantively analysed by the present writer in Chapter 4 of his forthcoming book on the issue of the Islamic State in Malaysia (see above).
11. *Bumiputra* is a legal concept which refers primarily to Malays and other smaller indigeneous groups in East Malaysia. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), launched soon after the riots, this category of people were accorded special privileges in many fields, such as education, the economy and the bureaucracy.
12. *The Star*, 20 March 1979.
13. See the article by Vatikiotis, in A. Cudsi and Ali Dessouki (eds), *Islam and Power* (London: Croom Helm, 1982).
14. See Dr Othman Ishak, 'Pentadbiran Kerajaan Malaysia dalam pandangan Islam' (Islamic Academy, University of Malaya).
15. For a chronological list of some of these major policy initiatives throughout the whole decade of the 1980s, see this present writer's book on *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990).
16. *Straits Times*, 6 Feb. 1988, p. 12.
17. Ibid., 16 Nov. 1987, p. 12.
18. *RTM News*, 17 March 1988. This may be seen as an extension to the government statement in December 1987 that civil and Islamic laws could be merged into one law: *Straits Times*, 24 Dec. 1987, p. 10.
19. *Straits Times*, 7 and 9 Sep. 1987; *Berita Harian*, 22 April 1988.
20. *RTM* interview with Dr Yusoff Noor, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, 15 April 1988.
21. *RTM News*, 14 April 1988.
22. *ASEAN Forecast* (a monthly analysis of developments in ASEAN), June 1983, p. 70.
23. *Berita Harian*, 24 April 1988.
24. *Straits Times*, 1 Jan. 1992.
25. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), however, has continued to be Malaysia's number one foreign-policy priority ever since its formation in 1967.
26. *Straits Times*, 18 March 1992.
27. *Straits Times*, 13 Aug. 1992, p. 3.
28. Some of these points have been noted in this writer's book entitled *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics* (1990).

29. See a sampling of writings by scholars: in 1980, von der Mehden; 1981, Mohamed Abu Bakar, and Hussin Mutalib's MA thesis; 1984, Judith Nagata; 1987, Chandra Muzaffar and Zainah Anwar.
30. Fred von der Mehden, in 'Esposito' (1987); *Islam in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press) p. 186.
31. Zainah Anwar, *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia* ... (Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1987).
32. Sundram and Cheek (1988), 'The Politics of Malaysia's Islamic Revivalism', *Third World Quarterly*, p. 845.
33. *Straits Times* (Singapore, Overseas Edition), 23 May 1992, p. 10.
34. *Asiaweek*, 5 June 1992, pp. 27–31.
35. *Straits Times*, 29 Oct. 1991.
36. *Straits Times*, 10 Aug. 1992.
37. *Straits Times*, 25 April 1988.
38. Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Challenging Times* (Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1986) p. 115.
39. *Asiaweek*, 4 Dec. 1992, p. 45.
40. For ▪ sample, see Enloe's Ph.D thesis (1967), MacDougall (1968), Ratnam (1969), Snyder (1972), Vasil (1971).
41. *Straits Times*, 23 March 1992.
42. *Straits Times*, 23 Oct. 1991.
43. See, for instance, 'Esposito' (1987) p. 262, where it was stated that Muslims make up only 49 per cent.
44. *Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 1980* (Report of the Population Census, Volume 2, Dept. of Statistics, 1983) p. 10.
45. *Straits Times*, ▮ Feb. 1991.
46. Sidhu, Manjit and Jones, *Population Dynamics ... Peninsular Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: UMCB Publications, 1981) p. 234. According to this study, Malay fertility rates had been higher than those of the other communities ever since the 1970s.
47. Ibid., p. 236. Non-Malay converts to Islam tend to be regarded by Malays as 'Malays'.
48. Other than Qur'anic injunctions, much of this aspect of Islam has been emphasised in the writings of Muslim scholars: Abdul Rahman Doi (1981 and 1983), Abdul Aziz Kamil (1970), Ajijola (1977), Ezzati (1976), Muhammad al-Madani (1967), Muhammad Hamidullah (1973), S. Qutb (1974).
49. *Asiaweek*, 28 June 1991, p. 33.
50. Mohamed Aris Othman, *The Dynamics of Malay Identity* (Univ. Kebangsaan Malaysia,1983) p. 55.
51. Chandra Muzaffar, *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1987) p. 100; Tan Chee Khoon, whom we had interviewed, had raised this as early as 1983. See his 'Islamisation and ethnic relations', in *The Star* (newspaper), 27 April 1983.
52. Simon Barraclough (1983), 'Managing the Challenges of the Islamic Revival in Malaysia', *Asian Survey*, 23 (8) p. 966.
53. *New Straits Times*, 13 and 15, Dec. 1982; *Straits Times*, 23–25 April 1989.
54. See von der Mehden, *Islam, Development and Politics in Malaysia* (Texas: W. Rice University, 1987) p. 24.
55. Ongkili (1972), Margaret Roff (1974), Searle (1983), Sidhu and Jones (1981).

56. *Straits Times,* 6 Jan. 1992 and *Business Times,* 7 Jan. 1992.
57. The recent PBS–Gerakan alliance could be a reaction to such incursions by UMNO.
58. *Straits Times*, 1 May 1992.
59. *Straits Times*, 11 Jan. 1992.
60. *Straits Times*, 11 Jan. 1992.
61. The image of the Sultans is, today, mixed in the minds of many Malaysians. Increasingly, the un-Islamic exploits of some members of the Royal family (horse-racing; cheques that bounced; abuse of power; etc.) have caught public attention. News has been reported of how a Sultan battered his caddie with a golf club, or fired at a driver who overtook his royal car, or was secretly keeping another wife, or of a Sultan's son beating up a hockey player after his team lost to the latter's team, and other cases. See two such reports in *Straits Times*, 27 Nov. 1988, and *Straits Times*, 30 July 1992. Throughout the first four months of 1992, there have been extensive media reports of how UMNO members have pressured the Sultans not to abuse their privileges. More news and revelations of the Royalty's excesses were published in all Malaysian newspapers throughout Dec. 1992–Jan. 1993.
62. This latter point was a major argument in the present writer's book on *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics* (1990).
63. *Malaysian Mirror,* 31 July 1965.
64. For these two episodes, see for instance, *New Straits Times,* 5 Jan. 1986; *Utusan Malaysia*, Feb 20 1986; and *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 22 Jan. 1987.
65. *Straits Times*, 15 Aug. 1992, p. 21.
66. *Straits Times,* 12 May 1992, pp. 12–13 and 20.
67. *Straits Times,* 29 July 1992, p. 13.
68. The word 'secularism' generally has two principal meanings. To be secular means to be 'this-worldly' and to be concerned only with matters of this life. Consequently, secular societies have a general tendency to be preoccupied with pursuits which focus on the individualistic and materialistic concerns and yearnings of the people. Secularism also has been used to refer to the development since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1646, which gave birth to the notion of sovereignty and the classic separation of the state and the church (religion).
69. The dissenting voice came from the Muslim Pakistani member.
70. Raj Vasil, *Tan Chee Khoon: An Elder Statesman* (Selangor: Pelanduk,1987) p. 48.
71. Ahmad Ibrahim (1982), in Zuraina Majid, *Masyarakat Malaysia* (Penang, USM).
72. Federal Constitution, Article 159(5).
73. *Straits Times* (Singapore, Overseas Edition), 23 May 1992, p. 11.
74. *Sunday Times*, 6 Dec. 1992 and *Berita Harian*, 7 Dec. 1992.
75. *Straits Times,* 9 and 10 Nov. , 1991 and 25 Feb. 1992.
76. Mahathir Mohamed, *The Challenge* (Selangor: Pelanduk 1986), p. 152.
77. Fan Yew Teng (1989) p. 194.
78. See, for instance, Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari (1979) pp. 223–41; S. Qutb (1974); Rodinson (1974), Mohamed Ariff (1990). In recent years,

more writings and solutions have been offered by Muslim scholars on the issue of Islamic economics.

79. *Straits Times,* 11 Jan. 1992.
80. *Straits Times,* 17 Oct. 1991, p. 18.
81. *Straits Times,* 17 March 1992.

8 Muslims and the State in Indonesia

C. W. Watson

With the simultaneous destruction of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in 1965 and the subsequent removal of Soekarno from the helm of affairs of Indonesia by General Suharto, the Masyumi, an active Islamic group banned under Soekarno, expected the release of its leaders, who were imprisoned during the former regime, along with its revival as a legitimate political force. The Masyumi had also expected that the 'Seven Words' adopted in Jakarta in the deliberations towards a new Indonesian Constitution would be re-incorporated in the Final Constitution. However, the military government under Suharto neither restored the old Masyumi party nor acceded to the demands for a more Islamic framework for the Indonesian Constitution.

The military rulers have since then resorted to Islamic symbols to legitimise their rule, but since they had to fight militant Islamic groups in the 1950s, they were apprehensive, if not suspicious, of activist Islam. This, however, does not mean that the military has antagonised all Islamic groups in the country; rather, they have bridged the gap between activist Islamic groups and the State, through innovative policies and the cooperation of the modern, Western-educated *ulama*.

In the euphoria following the destruction of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and the ousting of President Sukarno by General Suharto in 1966, reformist Muslims who had worked closely with the ruling military elite fully expected that after years in the political wilderness they were at last to see their aspirations fulfilled. In the first place this meant the release from detention of their leaders, secondly the rehabilitation of the modernist Masyumi party banned under Sukarno, and finally the insertion into the Constitution of the State of the famous seven words of the Jakarta Charter requiring Muslims to abide by Islamic law.[1] Except in relation to the release of their leaders, however, these expectations were to prove short-lived.

The military leaders soon made it apparent that they would not rehabilitate the old Masyumi leadership. Having had to deal with regional Islamic revolts in the 1950s, the Army, particularly those elements within Java whose cultural traditions alienated them from the reformist ideals which Masyumi embodied, felt that the restoration of the party might well

endanger the unity of the State. Although the Masyumi had been strongly opposed to the Islamic revolts, there could be no denying that a number of their most respected leaders had taken a major part in PRRI rebellion in Sumatra,[2] and this, in the eyes of the Army, was more than sufficient reason for not taking the risk that they might again, if given the opportunity, jeopardise the country's stability. Since the political situation in the country was still in a state of flux, after widespread massacres and disorder, the Army were anxious to keep a tight rein on the Government and to do this it was necessary to suppress any political movements which might seek or might be appearing to seek political supremacy within the State. This toughness on the part of the New Order, a term used to distinguish President Suharto's Government from the previous regime, under Sukarno, was quickly brought home to the Muslim community when, in 1966, it attempted to bring up for debate in the MPR, the highest legislative body in the country, the thorny issue of the seven words. In no uncertain terms Muslims were told that this matter had already been decided upon once and for all, and that there was no question of the debate being revived. This firm resolution on the Government's part to adopt a carrot-and-stick approach to Muslim demands, vigorously suppressing any political initiatives which in the Government's eyes threatened national stability, while at the same time encouraging developments in the fields of education and the practice of religious ritual, is what has characterised relations between Muslims and the State in Indonesia since the mid-1960s.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Throughout the twentieth century devout Muslims in Indonesia, faced with governments which they have regarded as hostile to the interests of the Muslim community, have responded in three ways. They have attempted to increase their political leverage in the State by means of *realpolitik*; they have turned inwards to their own community in order to raise the level of Muslim self-consciousness; and they have, when the opportunities have arisen, engaged in extra-parliamentary protest in order to wage a defensive campaign in relation to specific issues. During the Dutch colonial period, for example, the founding of the Sarekat Islam and the other political parties can be considered as attempts to bring pressure on the Dutch through formal political channels. At the same time the activities of the Muhammadiyah, a non-political social organisation, were directed to a regeneration of the Islamic community both through the promotion of religious education and

through direct involvement in welfare organisations. On particular occasions, however, primarily when formal channels were blocked, Muslims also engaged in *ad hoc* demonstrations, of which the most well-documented was resistance to Dutch proposals for Marriage-Law reform in the 1930s.

The degree to which one or other type of response becomes the dominant reaction of the whole community varies according to the level of tolerance of the Government in power. Because of the general perception that political power determines the range of permissible activity in all spheres, the immediate preference of committed Muslims is for political campaigning with the aim of obtaining that power, but the success of that campaigning is seen to be determined by the ability to mobilise the Muslim community within an Islamic party, through an appeal to them on religious grounds. The consequence of this has been that in electoral campaigns political and economic issues have been relegated to a minor position, and the emphasis has been on religious and local loyalties, appealing to what has been termed primordialism. Realising that this is the strategy of Islamic parties, the aim of other parties has always been to question that automatic link between a profession of Muslim faith and a vote for an Islamic party, and at times, when particular Governments have felt most threatened, they have actively interfered in religious politics either by direct suppression or by tactical manipulation. At such times one finds that there is often a change of emphasis in the attitudes of the Muslim leaders, and the amount of effort allocated to the three responses is redistributed, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes as part of a consciously devised strategy.

In looking at the development of relations between Islam and the State from 1965 to the present, we shall see that what begins with a concerted effort to win political power through parliamentary channels is thwarted at every stage, and how, consequently, a general awareness develops that, since party-political campaigning is disappointingly futile, the most appropriate action is to concentrate on the spiritual regeneration of the Muslim community, temporarily abandoning the political struggle. And, finally, in the most recent period there develops a further perception which, for the first time within the community of devout Muslims themselves, calls into question the value of a party organised on the basis of religious affiliation.

THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

The strategy which the New Order evolved to deal with Muslim opposition was identical to that advocated by the Dutch adviser, Snouck Hurgronje: to

insist on ■ separation between Islam ■■ ■ religion and Islam as ■ political way of life.[3] Although, clearly, in the seventy years which separated Snouck's recommendations from the establishment of the New Order, much had happened and circumstances had changed, both shared ■ perception of Islam as being a potential threat to the political order they were trying to create. But, whereas Snouck was trying to preempt the creation of an Islamic political leadership, the New Order were having to devise means, first, to cripple the leadership which had arisen in the intervening years, and secondly, to turn Muslim commitment away from politics. In tackling these issues by stages the New Order adopted four inter-linked strategies: the destruction of the influence of the old Masyumi leadership; the reorganisation of the party-political structure; the support of religious institutions; the encouragement of the Muslim community to think of political participation in terms of development programmes rather than religious affiliation.

The first aim, of destroying the influence of the Masyumi politicians of the 1950s, had been successfully accomplished by the time of the 1971 elections. Though many old Masyumi members might have looked nostalgically back to former times, it was clear – at least so it may have seemed superficially – that the former Masyumi leaders were men of the past, whose influence on Muslim politics had declined steadily over the years in proportion to their growing distance from a new younger generation of educated Muslims. The elections of 1977 and 1982, and the campaigns leading up to them, indicated that it was a different set of preoccupations that concerned the electorate from the old questions of the fight for an Islamic state, which had been so much a preoccupation of the older leaders. This change of direction, away from the guidance of the old Masyumi, was to ■ large degree facilitated by the achievement of the second objective in the long-term strategy: the reorganisation of the structure of the political parties. In the 1971 elections there had been ten parties. In 1973, after restructuring, there were three; Golkar (the State Party), the PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, comprising the old secular nationalist parties and the Christian parties, and the PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, which brought together all the Islamic parties.

Under other circumstances this combining of the Islamic parties might have been welcomed by devout Muslims since it brought together, for the first time since 1952, both the reformist stream, represented by the new party, Parmusi,[4] and the conservative NU.[5] However, it was clearly perceived by Muslims that, far from being designed to aid Muslim unity and create ■ more solid opposition, this simplification of the party structure was intended to facilitate easier Government control and manipulation of Muslim representatives, although, as we shall see, this ploy occasionally backfired.

The third objective, of being seen to encourage the development of religious institutions, was pursued primarily through the reorganisation of the Ministry of Religion.[6] Under the Old Order the Ministry had always been under the control of the NU, as a reward, it is often said, for its continuing support of the Government, which desperately required the legitimacy which the backing of a Muslim party could give it. And under the direction of the NU, gains for the Muslim community had been made in terms of the support which the Ministry gave to the establishment of educational institutions and the training of religious teachers. There had, however, been numerous problems in relation to the administration of the Ministry and it had acquired notoriety for mismanagement, corruption and nepotism. It was often said that the principal reason underlying the Ministry's bureaucratic problems was the lack of properly trained civil servants within the Ministry, which appeared to recruit its staff more on the basis of connections within the informal Islamic establishment than on the basis of professional competence. Well aware of the nature of these problems, the New Order Government which placed a great emphasis on modern professional skills, moved quickly in the 1970s to reorganise the Ministry and to demonstrate its support for formal religious institutions.

A first step in this direction was taken in 1970, when the Government took over as a state monopoly the organisation of the *haj* pilgrimage. An even more significant declaration of intent, however, was the appointment in 1971 of Dr Mukti Ali as Minister of Religion. Most of the previous Ministers of Religion had come, as we have seen, from the ranks of the NU and, *ipso facto*, they were men who had achieved prominence in religious circles as men of religious learning, *kiyai*, spiritual leaders of the community. They were not in any sense modern intellectuals, and came from a background of traditional Islamic scholarship. Widely revered, with strong local and personal links to the important NU networks in central and eastern Java, they often lacked that skill in the day-to-day management of affairs which the running of the Ministry required. Dr Mukti Ali, on the other hand, was one of the new brand of technocrats with which the New Order intended to refurbish the State apparatus. He had a further degree in Islamic studies from McGill, and, although he had none of the personal religious charisma of the NU leaders, he did have the necessary skills to sweep the Ministry clean with a new broom. An indication of the faith which the Government placed in him is his relatively long period in office as Minister, from 1971–8, a period which was not without its difficulties in the Government's relations with Muslim communities.

A second major innovation of the New Order Government was the setting up of an official Council of *Ulama* Religious Scholars, *Majelis*

Ulama, in 1975. During the 1950s and early 1960s, in an effort to win round Muslims to the notion of Guided Democracy, in addition to 'buying off' the NU, Sukarno had tried to establish a body of Islamic scholars who would act as an official mouthpiece to communicate directly with the Muslim faithful. This policy was successful so long as the scholars on the official body continued to maintain their ties with the grass-roots, and for ■ long ■ there was no direct friction between the PKI and the NU. When, in the early 1960s, trouble in the rural hinterland of Java over the issue of land reform led to clashes between NU and PKI supporters, the mediating role of the official *Ulama* was undermined. Those who continued to support Sukarno became alienated from the local organisations and consequently their ability to dictate Muslim response was eroded.

In continuity with the policy of its predecessor, whose perceptions it shared on the importance of creating an official, State-affiliated, body of *Ulama*, the New Order Government convened a meeting of *Ulama* in 1970, taking care to include representatives from both the traditionalist and reformist mainstreams. Although the immediate outcome of this meeting was inconclusive, with opinions divided on what the proper constitution of such ■ state body should be, eventually it was decided to set up, in 1975, a *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI), headed by the modernist ulama, Hamka. By 1975, however, much of the residual goodwill which devout Muslims had felt for the strong anti-communist stance of the New Order had disappeared in the face of the apparent irreligiousness of many New Order policies, and there was thus a reluctance to endorse the new *Majelis*. Deputations had in fact gone to Hamka to request him not to accept the new appointment because his presence would appear to give legitimacy to the New Order and, secondly, because it was feared that the *Majelis* would be open to Government manipulation. In the event, Hamka did accept his appointment, but contrary to expectations the *Majelis* has not been so quick to endorse Government proposals as the latter would like. As an instrument of State policy, then, the *Majelis* has not, up till now, been conspicuously successful. Its lack of success does not, however, appear to have worried the Government unduly, since the overall strategy of domestication has never depended on any single initiative and the indifferent performance of the *Majelis* has been more than compensated for by the success of other tactical manoeuvres.

The fourth of the strands of the Government's neo-association policy has been to win endorsement for its political programme by persuading the electorate around to the idea that in exercising its judgement at the polls it should be guided by its assessment of performance rather than by simple religious sentiment. The novelty of this idea might not immediately be

apparent to those who are accustomed to democratic traditions where policy proposals and past achievements have always been the acid test of electoral success, but in Indonesia, where elections have been determined by the notion of party loyalty rather than a vote for a specific platform, the idea is revolutionary in its implications. Persuading devout Muslim voters, traditionally loyal supporters of Muslim parties, to reconsider the nature of their political allegiance was, then, clearly a daunting task, which the New Order seems to have embarked upon in 1970 and which it can be said to have finally achieved only in the recent election of 1992. How far the tactics that it has adopted have been responses to individual issues and how far they have been conceived as part of a long term strategy is sometimes difficult to determine, but underlying the gradual shifts in the direction of political manoeuvring over the past fifteen years one can discern two types of operation, the first overt, direct and intermittent, the second disguised, indirect and continuous.

The direct appeal has taken the form of saying loudly and frequently that being a good Muslim does not require a person automatically to vote for a Muslim party. The first time this was said in any significant forum, in fact by M. S. Mintareja in the 1971 election campaign, when he was the Government-appointed Chairman of Parmusi, it caused consternation among members of Parmusi, since, in effect, what Mintareja had said was that Muslims could vote for Golkar. Although this did not mean that they would therefore vote Golkar, the State party, with a clear conscience. There was understandably great bitterness at what was regarded as a betrayal of the new party, but none the less there were, even at that date, significant numbers of Muslim intellectuals who, however much they might have despised Mintareja's toadying to the Government, felt that in principle there might be some justification for what he said. At the same time, the Government was making it easy for those within the civil service with wavering consciences, by requiring them to join Golkar in an election. Although this did not mean that they would therefore vote Golkar, campaign pressures were such, certainly at the provincial level outside Jakarta, that the vast majority did so. As the pressures increased after 1973, when a new, simplified party-system was introduced, under which there was only one Muslim party, the PPP, there were many who found that, whereas in the past they had been drawn into Golkar, at first by expediency, now, their personal careers were inextricably linked to Golkar's political success.

The second, and more indirect, method of creating a new political climate again employed strategies borrowed from the Old Order, in this case the invention of a political rhetoric. By first bringing that rhetoric into currency and then identifying itself as the vehicle of the promise of that

rhetoric, while political parties were, by implication, seen as the opponents of that promise, the New Order both undermined the credibility of the other parties and put itself forward, in the guise of Golkar, as the only political faction which possessed a natural mandate to govern.

The key term in the New Order's ideological manipulation was Development, *Pembangunan.* After the economic chaos of the last years of Guided Democracy, the New Order's promise to restore economic stability and develop the natural resources of the country to create a just and equitable society won support throughout the country. The first Five Year Plan, trumpeted with great fanfare in 1969, included *Pembangunan* in its title. It was the New Order's plan; they would carry it through to success, and a *fortiori* anyone who was against the New Order was against Development. It was a logic that appeared difficult to resist, and those Muslims who did try to resist it, by simply refusing to acknowledge the argument, were singled out as sullen, disappointed and insignificant men. By about the mid-1970s, however, this particular rhetoric, like the tactic of constant labelling of the Communists as the cause of all the failures in its previous programme, was beginning to sound a little hollow. Besides, the Muslim party was also ostensibly the party of *Pembangunan.* The term had clearly reached the limit of its ideological usefulness, and it was therefore imperative to create a more sophisticated political rhetoric. One was ready to hand in the notion of Pancasila,[7] the state of philosophy, closely associated with Sukarno, and therefore not much emphasised in the first few years of New Order rule.

In the debates in the Constituent Assembly in the 1950s concerning the formulation of a new Constitution, the disagreement on which the proceedings eventually foundered arose from the question of whether Indonesia was to be a Pancasila State or an Islamic State. After an initial unsuccessful attempt on the part of Muslims to persuade the New Order Government to opt for an Islamic State, the issue had lain dormant for a number of years, but in 1978 the Government disclosed its plans to make the nation more aware of Pancasila. The first stage of this plan required the holding of in-service instruction, known as P4 (the Promotion of Understanding of Pancasila), for civil servants throughout the country. This was followed by the introduction into schools of a new syllabus, complete with text-books, for education in Pancasila, known as PMP in Indonesia. Vast resources were put at the disposal of the bodies concerned with this instruction, and the Government made very clear how seriously it regarded this initiative, emphasising that its aim was both to remind people of the centrality of the State philosophy in the political life of the nation and to educate the younger generation in the political history of the Republic.

The older generation of Muslim politicians, remembering the way in which Sukarno had tried to mount ■ similar indoctrination campaign, were quick to see in this new initiative ■ attempt to demote the importance of religion, in the life of the nation. Although the first of the five principles was ■ belief in one God, it was clear that the overall stress of the P4 programme and the PMP in schools was to suggest that it was ■ fundamentally secular morality which was being advocated. Furthermore, certain passages in the text-books seemed almost to deny the importance of religion, with the implication that Pancasila was a sufficient guide for right conduct. There was therefore considerable opposition to the campaign, although, because of the Government's attitude of immediately labelling any challenge to P4 as subversive, much of this opposition was muted. Occasionally, however, Muslim criticism was publicised, for example in the reporting of M. Natsir's criticism of the PMP text-books.

Having staked so much on the resurrection of the State philosophy, however, the Government, beyond making minor concessions, was not prepared to halt its campaign. Indeed the opposition that emerged seemed to strengthen its resolve. After requiring that all political parties include support for Pancasila as the sole fundamental principle (*asas tunggal*) of their organisation, the Government proceeded, in 1984, to demand that all mass organisations do the same, and introduced legislation to that effect.

Having briefly surveyed the various strategies of containment that have been employed by the Government to contain and domesticate Muslim opposition, we must now take a closer look at the way in which Muslim groups have responded to these developments, bearing in mind the three types of response described earlier which have historically shaped Muslim reaction to a hostile state: political campaigning, a retreat into the restructuring of the community of the faithful, and occasional violent demonstration.

MUSLIM REACTION

Commenting on Muslim reaction to the New Order Government, Western scholars have recently suggested that the most significant opposition to the Government has come not as might have been expected from the reformist Masyumi–Parmusi supporters but from the NU, the traditionalist party. There are several reasons for questioning this assessment, not least the over-reliance on information about the NU, and the failure to acknowledge, or at least investigate further, the nature of opposition within the

reformist stream. None the less, some consideration needs to be given to this apparent paradox. The paradox has several facets: in the first place, the NU has always been the party most prepared to bend with the prevailing wind, and recognising this the New Order has always given it support. Secondly, the strength of the NU has always lain in the rural hinterland of central and eastern Java, where the traditional Islamic teachers, the *kiyai*, have exerted a major influence over their rural supporters, who have relied on them for spiritual and political guidance. The *kiyai* and their community of the faithful, the *ummat*, inhabit the same socio-cultural world, and the bonds linking them derive more from affective emotional ties than from any thought-through intellectual commitment. Outside their community, most religious leaders are out of their cultural depth. Very few have had exposure to modern secular education, hence they find it difficult to engage in modern political debate either with secular nationalists or with western-educated reformists. For that reason, with the exception of one or two able leaders, who have usually been pointed in the direction of the Ministry of Religion, when NU representatives have reached the political centre in Jakarta, they have tended to be passive spectators. The emergence of a new, vociferous and occasionally hostile group of NU radicals requires some explanation.

Some of the first signs of the new militancy were to be observed in the election campaigns in East Java in 1971. It quickly became clear that the NU was not prepared to acquiesce in the Government's desire that the campaign should be a low-key affair, and consequently there were clashes between NU and Golkar supporters. Subsequently, when the election results were known, and NU was seen to have fared considerably better than Parmusi, a new confidence surfaced in the ranks of the NU leadership. This was particularly evident among the younger, partly western-educated leaders, who began to engage much more readily in political debate. Furthermore, deprived at this time of their traditional channel for self-expression, the Ministry of Religion, and at the same time observing the reticence of the Government-sponsored Parmusi leadership to speak out for Islam, the NU gradually began to take on in the urban centres of Java the mantle of defender of the faith. This partial transformation of the NU was greeted enthusiastically by younger Muslim intellectuals, who, under different circumstances, would have been drawn to the reformist views of Parmusi. The NU, therefore, began to gather political momentum at a rate which should perhaps have alarmed the Government. The latter's perception of Islamic opposition had not, however, encompassed the possibility of a hostile NU, or, if it had, it had calculated that the young Turks within NU were no match for the solid, traditional, older rural leadership of the

party, which the Government could always win round through reaching some accommodation with one or two of the senior NU figures in Parliament.

The first indication to the Government that its tactics of buying off the opposition had not been entirely successful, was the walk-out of the PPP, now numerically dominated by the NU, from the Parliamentary debates on the proposed Marriage Laws, in 1974. Over this issue the Government had badly miscalculated. The demonstrations which followed showed that the Marriage Laws had become a focal point for general Muslim dissatisfaction with the Government. Already annoyed by the high-handed way in which the elections had been rigged, and by the Government's rejection of several individuals from the Muslim candidates' lists, Muslim opinion had also recently been offended by the Government's recognition of *kebatinan* (a form of Javanese mysticism) as an official religion. The Marriage-Law demonstrations provided an opportunity for demonstrating both to the Government and to Muslims themselves that, however weak, ineffective and numerically inferior the Muslim parliamentary opposition might be, Muslim opinion was still a strong political force which the Government could ignore only at its peril.

Further evidence of the NU's unwillingness to toe the Government's line followed in another walk-out in 1978, this time over the issue of PMP (Pancasila education in schools), and, more seriously, in its refusal to endorse President Suharto's candidature for a third period of office. In response to this recalcitrance the Government decided that it would have to work within the PPP and to split the new unity that was developing, and it chose to do so by giving its support to the two leaders whom it had in the past regarded as the most pliable, Idham Chalid of the NU and Jaelani (Joni) Naro of Parmusi. The particular tactics which were adopted need not concern us here, but their outcome was a success for the Government: the NU was seriously riven into two factions, and internal dissension broke out within Parmusi.

With the coming elections in 1987, then, the Government, surveying the party political scene in mid-1985, could rest reasonably content. The only political party which could have proved a thorn in its flesh had been effectively destroyed. In comparison with the measures taken in earlier elections under the New Order, which could be interpreted as exercises in containing Muslim political aspirations by stitching and patching, the more recent strategy had succeeded in maintaining the semblance of democracy while at the same time severing Muslim opposition from its one remaining channel of political expression. Furthermore, it had succeeded in doing this by creating such internal divisions within the

Muslim community that there had been no possibility of concerted opposition to its actions. The removal of the NU from the political stage appeared to be an added bonus. Disappointed by Idham Chalid's failure to bring the NU to heel over the years, and afraid that the NU was taking up the role of opposition formerly undertaken by Masyumi–Parmusi figures, the Government had needed to ensure that the voice of Muslim opposition within the DPR, at least, was effectively muzzled. In his railroading of the PPP, Naro had done this job for them, and the final outcome of his manoeuvres, the withdrawal of the NU from the PPP, ■ withdrawal in no way asserted as a challenge to the Government or as ■ protest against the inherently undemocratic manipulation of party politics, but as an internally generated restructuring of the organisation's aims, was a crowning accomplishment.

A word of caution, however, needs to be expressed about seeing recent developments solely in terms of the successful outcome of Government manoeuvring within party organisation. It is certainly true that ■ number of the principal actors in these political scenes have been working in close cooperation with leading Government figures, and at the same time many others have been using political careers to further their own ambitions and have thus been happy simply to follow Government direction as links in a chain of patron-clientage. On the other hand, it is also true that there is a growing body of feeling among the younger generation of sincere and committed Muslims that Islamic principles can best be inserted into the political culture of the State not through the discussions and debates of the present parliamentary system, but through the realisation of their religious imperatives in the determination and implementation of policy-making, and in the field of economic development in particular. Although these urban-based university graduates have never commanded, nor ever sought to command, much electoral support, either among the constituency of potential Muslim voters, who are suspicious of their intellectual orientations, or among the older generation of Masyumi supporters, who regard the call to abandon politics almost ■ a betrayal, none the less, their ideas appear to have exerted some influence on the thinking of politicians, civil servants and university lecturers. Clearly, however, they still have a long way to go in persuading their fellow-Muslims in these groups to accept the notion that the best way forward for Islam is at this juncture through introspection and retreat into the community.

The effect of the Government's overt hostility to the PPP and its intolerance of any opposition from that quarter was to exacerbate the siege mentality of committed Muslims, and this in turn led to their withdrawal into the community. This withdrawal both stimulated, and was accentuated by, ■ keener interest taken in international Muslim events. In terms

of what might be seen as a historical pattern of response, the closing off of opportunity in the political sphere within the country leads to greater introspection in relation to the spiritual life of the individual, and at the same time to a greater awareness of the wider Muslim world. Not that there had been no attempts at spiritual renewal within the country before this. As early as 1969, young Muslim intellectuals had formed study groups centred on the major universities in Jakarta and Bandung, and from the ranks of the HMI[8] there had emerged a vigorous debate about the nature of Islam as a religion and the question of secularisation. Although this debate was largely confined to a small group of intellectuals it received much coverage in the press. Thus, although the revival of religious enthusiasm was in large measure a response to national and international events after 1974, it is important to recognise that new religious ideas had been the subject of discussion in intellectual circles long before this.

There were various dimensions to the spiritual renewal of the mid-1970s which it is not always easy to disentangle when observing the various social phenomena which emerged at that period. At one level there was a kind of moral rearmament, which arose as a response to a strong feeling of malaise throughout the country, which can be construed as a reaction both to blatant corruption in official circles and to the grosser forms of materialism. This conspicuous consumption was most evident in the capital but was also observable in the regions, in the form of lavish expenditure, on the part of a few wealthy families, which was often coupled with a flagrant violation of traditional codes of morality.

Another significant dimension of spiritual regeneration was the growth of the *dakwah* (Islamic renewal) movement. This led to a proliferation of discussion groups, that regularly held prayer meetings of different levels of sophistication, ranging from the sometimes heterodox groups that formed around a local religious figure in the urban *kampungs* to university groups discussing controversial Koranic interpretations. Whatever the specific religious and political colouring of these groups, one common element that they shared was a strong sense of personal conviction and a distrust of the wider society, which was considered to have been corrupted by Western values.

At an international level the post-revolutionary situation in Iran evoked considerable public interest, although it needs to be pointed out that even among devout Muslims the extremes to which Khomeini went were ridiculed and criticised. More recently, the Salman Rushdie affair and the Gulf War have been the subjects of debate within the Muslim press.

All these developments on the international stage have had immediate, although not direct, repercussions for Muslim communities in Indonesia.

There seems, for example, to have been a renewed emphasis on personal piety. At another level, one response has been the emergence of new popular forms of religious expression, for example through the kind of music known as *dangdut*, performed by the singer Rhoma Irama, who used his music to criticise contemporary trends in Indonesia. But however much figures like Rhoma Irama irritated the Government, the principal concern of the latter, at the time, was not people like him, but the more serious threat to law and order by maverick Muslim leaders who were beginning to mount a campaign of violence, a last desperate throw after what appeared to them to be the suppression of democracy.

THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION

In September and October 1985, the columns of the press were filled with accounts of trials of people accused of subversion up and down the country. The nature of the charges brought perhaps illustrate both the mood and temper of Muslim critics of the Government and the latter's determination to use the full force of law to deal with them. They were charged with subversion, causing animosity towards the Government and questioning Pancasila as the basis of the State, and bringing them to trial represented the culmination of the Government's efforts to root out, once and for all, Muslim opposition at a local level throughout the country. That the Government was well aware that individuals and local groups were engaged in frequent, persistent and vocal criticism of the Government's actions is attested by the evidence collected prior to the trials. The accumulation of this evidence indicates very clearly that police spies had been observing the activities of these groups over a long period. Ever since the sensational affair of what the Government labelled the Komando Jihad, when a plane had been hijacked and a police station bombed in 1978, the police and military authorities had exercised especial vigilance in relation to the possibility of other Muslim terrorist groups emerging. But if the facts were known to the authorities, why did they wait until October 1984 before they began this widespread series of arrests? In order to answer this we need to look at the background leading up to the events of the Tanjung Priok affair of September 1984, which was mentioned in several of the trials. One of the conclusions which emerges from an analysis of these events is that one reason for the Government's apparent delayed reaction was a manoeuvre to discredit the movement of growing opposition to the

Government among senior intellectual, religious, political and military figures by linking them with the activities of violent terrorist groups. To see these issues in context it is necessary to describe briefly the intellectual opposition which was building up at the time.

On 17 August 1984, on the same day as President Suharto was making his annual speech to the nation in which, *inter alia*, he stressed that the new law establishing Pancasila as the basis of all organisations was not intended to prohibit the expression of religious faith, a group known as the Institute for the Awareness of the Constitution Foundation, or YLKB (*Yayasan Lembaga Kesadaran Berkonstitusi*) was publishing a pamphlet entitled, 'Save Democracy. Based on the Spirit of the Proclamation [of Independence] and the 1945 Constitution.' The pamphlet was written by three senior figures in Indonesian political life, each representing a different group within the polity: Mōhd Sanusi Hardjadinata, a former minister in New Order Cabinets from 1966 to 1968 and a former head of the PDI; M. Natsir, the former Masyumi Prime Minister and an internationally respected Muslim figure; and General (retired) A. H. Nasution, former head of the Armed Forces. Each of the three launched an outright attack on the Government's record, accusing it of subverting the 1945 Constitution to its own ends and suppressing democracy, the latest example of its moves in this direction being the five new proposed bills.

The publication of the pamphlet represented a strong, ucompromising attack on the Government by some of the most respected men in the country. There was, however, no mention of the pamphlet in the Indonesian press, and it was not for sale in public. It had to be circulated in a clandestine fashion to sympathetic persons throughout the country, since there was no possibility of the Government permitting its distribution. The YLKB itself had been set up in difficult circumstances. It had come into being in 1980 when, as a consequence of their alarm at the progressively authoritarian steps which the Government was taking, a group of 50 leading figures presented a petition, known as the Petisi 50, to the Head of the DPR, asking the DPR to give serious consideration to this worrying state of affairs. The Government had, on that occasion, quickly suppressed news of the Petition, and had taken action against some of the signatories. It was, however, unable to move against the senior figures, who were still men of great influence and popularity despite their retirement from active political life. The Yayasan that was set up centred on the figure of Ali Sadikin, the former Governor of Jakarta, an extremely popular man whose name had been mentioned in the past as a candidate for the Presidency. Members of the Yayasan met regularly in his house and discussed political developments.

As a group they were a focus of opposition and, although they appeared to have no base to support them, they could not be ignored despite the

suggestion put abroad in Government circles that they were simply a group of disgruntled has-beens. All of them had, in one way or another, been associated with, and had supported, the *Orde Baru* in the early post-coup years, and all of them felt a profound sense of betrayal at the way in which the New Order had moved towards that very totalitarianism which it had been set up to destroy. By 1984, with the new legislation before Parliament, the sense of betrayal had prompted the writing of 'Selamatkan Demokrasi.' In his contribution to the pamphlet, Natsir documents the stages by which, after coming to power, the New Order Government gradually subverted the Constitution. He points out how the Supreme Representative Assembly (MPR) was packed with appointed members and how, subsequently, its sessions were suspended. He goes on to describe the interference with political parties and the suppression of freedom of speech as well as the banning of newspapers. In the graphic narrative which he gives of one disturbing event following another, the impression is given of the inexorable progress of a Government growing increasingly more powerful and arrogant and wholly indifferent to public opinion. On the other hand, no concessions are made to the progress achieved in those years in terms of relative political stability and qualified economic development. In Natsir's description the consciously planned subversion of democracy reaches an almost inevitable climax in the new laws, which he proceeds to excoriate. He is particularly scathing about the new law on a referendum, which lays down that any change to the 1945 Constitution must be voted on in a referendum, reversing the earlier constitutional position under which any such change had to have a two-thirds majority in the MPR. Referendums, points out Natsir, giving the example near to home of the Philippines, have always been the means by which dictators have imposed their views under the semblance of democracy.

In discussing the question of the sole principle, he again uses a chronological narrative to demonstrate how the *Orde Baru* has tried, since 1966, to curtail political freedom through attempting to control political parties, and then goes on to show that the present legislation goes even further than earlier proposals in imposing restrictions on religious organisations. That such organisations should be asked to substitute Pancasila for their basic faiths is intolerable. Yet this is precisely what is being required, and not only that, but the legislation states that the Government will give guidance to the organisations. The description ends ominously with the statement: 'what we have feared has come to pass.'

Perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of Natsir's contribution, however, is not so much the explicit attack on the Government, but the absence of much specific reference to the role of Islam in the State. This can to some extent be explained in terms of the context of the publication:

it is intended as a general criticism of the authoritarianism of the Government with the aim of uniting opposition, and therefore overt mention of Islam, which might alienate some potential readers, was best avoided. On the other hand it is tempting to see it as evidence of political mellowing on Natsir's part. Although he is clearly unable to share the sentiments of the younger generation, whom he criticises, by implication, in the conclusion to his article, where he calls on men of principle to speak out rather than withdraw from politics, one might speculate that his apparent emphasis on the need for democracy as the foundation for public expression of opinion indicates a responsiveness to those who criticised the Masyumi leadership for being premature in its insistence on an Islamic state.

Moreover, another significant point to be drawn from the relative absence of the mention of Islam is that these opinions set Natsir and, by association, other members of the Petisi 50 very clearly apart from the terrorist groups of fanatical Muslims with which the Government Prosecutor tried to link them. The actions of senior Muslim political figures, in giving their name to the Petisi 50 and in their support for Yayasan LKB are, then, of a very different nature from the actions of the militant Muslim preachers who were involved in the incidents at Tanjung Priok.

The Tanjung Priok Incident and its Aftermath

On the evening of 20 September 1984, the head of the Armed Forces, Lt Gen. Benny Murdani, came on national television to give an account of an incident that had occurred in Tanjung Priok, the dock area of Jakarta. According to this account, a mob led by a fanatical Muslim preacher named Amir Biki had led an attack on a police station, where they had tried to force the release of some men who were being held there. When the mob had refused to retire the armed forces had been compelled to fire on them and in the firing several people were killed, including Amir Biki. This account was greeted with some scepticism and it was generally felt that there was a great deal which had not been disclosed. Why was the mob so incensed? Were Amir Biki and the others really fanatics? How many people had really been killed? Why had it not been possible to use other measures to control the crowd?

In the aftermath of the incident, in which different versions of what had occurred were current, some blaming the Armed Forces for deliberately provoking the incident, the YLKB group put out a 'White Paper', in which they cast doubt on Benny Murdani's account and called for a proper independent investigation of what had occurred. There was of course little chance of such an investigation being set up, but the signatories of 'The

White Paper' clearly felt that the occasion demanded some form of public protest. The dust of the incident was still thick in the air when the country was rocked by a series of bomb explosions in the premises of the Bank of Central Asia, owned by a business associate, Chinese by origin, of the President.

The authorities were very quick to arrest those directly responsible for the bombing, and subsequently, after pursuing their investigations, they arrested two of the more important members of the Petisi 50, who were charged with complicity in the bombings. One of them, M. Sanusi, a former Masyumi member, and a Cabinet Minister in the early *Orde Baru* Government, was put on trial and accused of supplying funds to the man responsible for the bombing, with whom he had had a business association. The evidence which was presented at the trial was highly suspect, and there is some suggestion that, with the help of *agents provocateurs*, intelligence agents deliberately entrapped Sanusi, who did in fact give money to a certain Rachmat Basuki, not for bombing but to investigate the Tanjung Priok incident. Sanusi was, none the less, found guilty and sentenced to 19 years' imprisonment. As the Government must have hoped, Sanusi's acquaintance with the bomber caused ripples of alarm among those who had only official accounts on which to rely.

Even more disturbing was the arrest and trial of General (retired) H. Dharsono, which followed. Dharsono had been one of the leading military figures in the New Order just after the coup and had won considerable popularity for his strong anti-communist stance. He had, however, subsequently fallen out of favour with the Government, and had been shunted away from the political centre, being first appointed as an Ambassador to Thailand and subsequently appointed as Secretary-General of the ASEAN organisation. His trial and conviction set the seal on any effective extra-parliamentary opposition to the Government.

EPILOGUE: THE SITUATION AFTER 1985

Having resolved the political tensions of the mid-1980s, at least to its own satisfaction, and having achieved a landslide victory for Golkar in the 1987 elections, the Government has been able to adopt a more benign attitude towards Muslim organisations since 1987. Consequently, carrots rather than sticks have been much in evidence. This new mood of openness and generosity towards Muslim organisations and institutions was, on the whole, welcomed. However, there was a suspicion on the part of

some that this courting of Muslim sympathies represented an astute personal political manoeuvre on the part of President Suharto, who had found himself increasingly subject to criticism from his erstwhile supporters in the armed forces, and was looking for new allies among the political groupings. There may have been some truth in this speculation, but the more likely explanation is that *Orde Baru* support for Muslim non-political institutions had always been part of a long-term strategy, and had indeed been consistently pursued since the mid-1970s. Because of the greater visibility of political confrontation, however, it had never previously been much noted.

The architect of the Government's strategy in recent years has been the present Minister of Religion, Munawir Sjadzali, a career diplomat with a degree in political science from Georgetown University, who comes from the central Javanese town of Solo, well-known for its community of pious (*santri*) Muslim traders. Munawir was appointed to his post in 1983, and since that time, although he has occasionally been involved in minor controversy, he has successfully managed to bring a number of Government policies to fruition. Simultaneously, he has persuasively but firmly guided influential Muslim figures in the direction of taking a more positive attitude towards cooperation with the Government. As a consequence, there is now a much greater receptiveness towards Government initiatives than there has ever been in the past. Two examples are perhaps sufficient to illustrate this change in relations between Muslims and the State, the first concerns legislation dealing with the administration of Muslim legal institutions, the second, the foundation of a new association of intellectuals.

On 14 December 1989, the Religious Justice Bill was passed in the Legislative Assembly, which gave new powers to Islamic courts and raised their status within the structure of the judiciary. Henceforward, the decisions of religious courts, in the field of family law in particular, were to be more binding and more immediately enforceable than was the case in the past. Among non-Muslim communities this step was greeted with some dismay, since it appeared to bring in by another route the spirit of the missing seven words of the Jakarta Charter, which, after protest, had been excluded from the 1945 Constitution. Muslims, however, welcomed the Bill, which they regarded as encouraging members of their community to take a new pride and confidence in their religion. How the legislation will operate in practice, and whether there will be any noticeable changes in what occurs at the local levels at which the courts function, it is still too early to tell.

The New Order Government has always argued, however, that the efficacy of all Islamic institutions, not simply courts but educational

institutes, and departments within the Ministry of Religion, depends on the provision of well-qualified staff to manage these institutions. The task of creating an educated cadre of Muslim intellectuals to take on these roles within the religious bureaucracy has been carried out by Munawir with great enthusiasm. In particular, large amounts of funding have gone into the State Institutions of Higher Islamic Education (IAIN), and graduates have been sent on scholarships abroad, not only to pursue their studies in various part of the world, but also to acquire new perspectives and an experience of other academic cultures, which they can employ in the Muslim organisations and institutions to which they will be attached on their return from abroad.

It is, however, not only academics who have been encouraged by the Government to broaden their outlook. The encouragement of Muslim intellectuals and entrepreneurs in general over the past few years has been remarkable, culminating in the founding of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990, under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Technology and Research, Habibie. Perhaps even more remarkable, however, than the Government sponsoring of this organisation, has been the very positive welcome it has been given, even by those who not long before had been expressing hostility to the Government. As one might have expected, not all critics have been appeased, and, in particular, some of those who were young Masyumi Turks in the 1950s still refuse to cooperate with the Government. Nevertheless, ICMI has captured the imagination of most of those committed intellectuals who clearly recognise an important role for the implementation of Muslim ideas in social and economic arenas outside the narrow range of party politics. In this area, then, as in others, the response of the Muslim community, or at least of the educated elite within it, has indicated a desire to move away from a policy of confrontation towards one of responsible cooperation with the Government.

There is much more which could be said about developing trends in the relationship between the Muslim community and the State in Indonesia. One might, for example, discuss the debates in Muslim apologetics between those who take opposing views about the application of Muslim doctrine to issues such as the State lottery, the issue of mixed marriages, the wearing of head-scarves (*jilbab*) by women, or debates about inter-religious dialogue. A description of these on-going controversies would not, however, contribute much more to an understanding of the way in which the Government and Muslim organisations continue to manoeuvre in relation to each other. The political framework in which religious debate is allowed to take place is well understood by both sides. The present generation of Muslim politicians and their young followers in the Universities[9]

are sophisticated, realistic and broadly familiar with ■ number of intellectual traditions, Islamic and Western. They are also strongly committed Muslims, and from the positions which they hold, both within the structures of the State and in Muslim associations, they are able to exercise ■ powerful influence on the policy-makers within the Government ■ well as on the Muslim faithful who look to them for leadership. On reflection, the failure of Muslim political parties to win the struggle for power in the long period between 1950 and 1985 rather than having hindered, may, paradoxically, have accelerated the introduction of Islamic ideals in the Indonesian polity today.

NOTES

I am grateful to the British Academy and to the University of Kent at Canterbury for travel grants which enabled me to visit Indonesia and collect materials on which this chapter is based.

1. In 1945, after the proclamation of Indonesian Independence, there was considerable discussion about the preamble to the proposed State Constitution. Originally it had been proposed that the full text of the so-called Jakarta Charter should be incorporated into the preamble. However, there were objections that seven words in the Charter (*dengan kewajiban menjalanken syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya* – with the obligation of adherents of Islam to follow Islamic law) could be construed as giving a pre-eminent position to Muslims and discriminating against non-Muslims. Because of the objections, the seven words were eventually dropped from the Constitution, and a demand that they should be replaced remained ■ important item on the political agenda of Muslim political parties in the two decades that followed. A detailed discussion of the issue and the debates can be found in: B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde, no. 59, The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff, 1971; Saifuddin Anshari, *The Jakarta Charter 1945. The Struggle for an Islamic Constitution in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1979); Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan* (Islam and the Issue of the State).
2. PRRI (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*), the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, was ■ rebellion set up in West Sumatra against Sukarno and the central Government in 1958. A number of prominent Muslim politicians from the Masyumi party were involved in the leadership of the rebellion which had some CIA support. There is still no authoritative account of the PRRI but ■ useful source is U. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power. Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982) pp. 107–9.
3. C. Snouck Hurgronje was ■ Dutch Islamologist who became an influential Adviser on Native and Islamic Affairs to the Colonial Government. He is

particularly renowned for advocating the so-called *association policy*, which argued that it was necessary to encourage influential leaders of the various ethnic groups in Indonesia to identify their interests with the Dutch and to adopt a Western life-style and outlook. This pro-Western view would, then, percolate down to the mass of the population, thus preempting the rise of Muslim fanaticism. Detailed information about Snouck Hurgronje and Dutch colonial policy can be found in H. J. Benda, 'Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia', pp. 338–47. This article is also to be found in the useful collection, *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, compiled by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).

4. On the origins and history of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia CPMI/Parmusi, see Kenneth E. Ward, *The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970); and the authoritative articles of Allan A. Samson, including 'Conceptions of Politics, Power and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam', in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds), *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1978) pp. 196–226.

5. There has been relatively little written about the *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU), the Association of the *Ulama*, set up in 1926, in part to represent the response of 'traditional' scholars to 'modernist' attacks. After combining forces with the modernists during the Japanese occupation it split from them in the early 1950s to form its own political party. For a time, after the Islamic parties were forced to combine under the *Orde Baru* Government, it again worked with the modernists. In the mid-1980s, however, it withdrew from the PPP and renounced party politics, proclaiming the need to return to the commitment of 1926. Since that time, under the dynamic leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, grandson of the original founder, the NU has been very positive towards the Government's initiatives in relation to Islam. See Sidney Jones, 'The Contraction and Expansion of the "Umat" and the Role of the Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia', *Indonesia* (Cornell), no. 38, pp. 1–20; Abdurrahman Wahid, 'NU dan Islam di Indonesia, Dewasa Ini', *Prisma* (Jakarta), April 1984; and M. Irsyam, *Ulama dan Parai Politik* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984).

6. The structure of the Ministry of Religion is well described in Deliar Noer, *The Administration of Islam in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1978).

7. There is now a considerable literature about Pancasila and about its implications for Muslim politics. For a general account, see Eka Darmaputera, *Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985). See also, C. W. Watson, 'P4. The Resurrection of a State Ideology in Indonesia', in C. W. Watson, *State and Society in Indonesia*, University of Kent at Canterbury: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, Occasional Paper no. 8, 1987, pp. 17–49. For a positive Muslim response to Pancasila, see Nurcholish Madjid, 'An Islamic Appraisal of the Political Future of Indonesia', *Prisma* (Jakarta), no. 35, 1985, pp. 11–26. For a negative response see Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatran).

8. HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) has been an influential Muslim student organisation in Indonesia for several decades. Many of the most influential

modernist Muslim figures in Indonesia today cut their political teeth in positions of leadership within the HMI. In recent years, in particular after angry internal debates about whether to accept Pancasila as its basic principle (*asas tunggal*) – which it eventually did – it has lost much of its political vigour. For a somewhat controversial account of its origins and history, see Victor Tanja, *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1982). See also, Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982), for an account which is somewhat hostile to what is regarded as the young intellectuals' compromises with modernisation.

9. There has recently been a spate of books written by young Muslim intellectuals expressing their views on current developments affecting the Muslim community in Indonesia. Among the most well-known writers are M. Dawam Rahardjo, Amien Rais, Fachry Ali, Nurcholish Madjid, Jalaluddin Rahmat and the historian, Dr Kuntowijoyo. The publisher, Mizan, in Bandung, has a very active programme of publishing the writings of this generation, sometimes called the generation of the 60s. A recent collection has brought together the reflections of the youngest, so-called 80s, generation, Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and Haidar Bagir, *Mencari Islam Kumpulan Otobiografi Intelektual* (Bandung: Mizan, 1990).

9 Ayatollah Khomeini's Concept of Rightful Government: The *Velayat-e-Faqih*

Hossein Seifzadeh

The political philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeini developed as a doctrine to implement Islamic laws, with the *faqih* or Muslim jurist being elevated and granted absolute political power. The jurist would not only interpret the religious codes, he would be the supreme political leader as well, in the cherished Islamic State of Ayatollah Khomeini, called the *Velayat-e-Faqih*.

Khomeini's *Velayat-e-Faqih* was a reaction to the secularisation of the Shahs. Mohamed Reza Shah was obviously bent in curtailing the power of the *ulama* as part of his grand strategy to consolidate his power. Khomeini's conception of political leadership evolved, through time, while his concern with the implementation of Islamic laws in all aspects of Iranian life remained constant. He seemed set in his mind that, in the *Velayat-e-Faqih*, the *Faqih* would never abuse power, because of his expected dedication and commitment to Islam. The potential for people with such an absolute and all-embracing power to transgress that power, however, is always there.

In considering Ayatollah Khomeini's ultimate conception of political leadership of the Islamic state (*Velayat-e-Faqih*), one is led to realise the significant impact that such a conception has both on the Muslim world and on developments within Iran. Throughout the long historical process of his political activism, Khomeini's assumption of the supreme political leadership of Iran and the conception of the absolute power of the *faqih* in that role have been based on his insistence on the implementation of Islamic laws and ordinances. However, the role and power of the *ulama* in this regard has been very much expanded by him. As such, though his motive remains unchanged, he has gradually come to argue for expanding the role, and ultimately the absolute power, of the *faqih* as the supreme political leader of the Islamic state of Iran. He deems the Iranian political

scene to be the first stage in achieving the solidarity of Muslims and of the oppressed in the world in general. For him, *Velayat-e-Faqih* has a crucial role in achieving this objective.

PHASES OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL PROCESS

From the Ayatollah's assertions, one can hypothesise that *Velayat-e-Faqih* itself, and its expanding political power, are the products of the Ayatollah's perception of how Islam and Muslims in Iran could map out their future strategies consequent to what could be described as the 'third phase' of the Iranian political process.

The first phase was the policy of moderate secularisation of both Pahlavis (Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah) before 1963.[1] The wholesale package of the 'White Revolution' of 1963–79[2] came next, and was followed by the fall of the dynastic rule and the consolidation of the Islamic Republic, in 1979.[3]

Throughout the first phase, by using a moderate approach in his within-system political activism, Ayatollah Khomeini expressed his opposition to the increasing secularisation of both Pahlavi Shahs, who attempted to modernise Iran according to the Western paradigm. He responded to this development by demanding the reinstitution of the supervision of the *fuqaha* (Islamic religious scholars) in Majlis (Parliament), according to the Second Article of the 1906–1909 Constitution, or recognition of the *fuqahas'* control over the cultural institutions of Iran.

The second phase emerged during the time of the introduction of the 'White Revolution' by Mohammad Reza Shah, in 1963, who aimed at consolidating his power through curtailing the already dispersed power of the religious leaders. Subsequently, the Ayatollah furiously compaigned against this wholesale package of social change in Iran. He was arrested, and the riots in his support were ruthlessly crushed in major cities[4]. Under the pressure of other *ulama*, he was briefly released, but, his sharp criticism against the granting of legal immunity to US citizens in Iran led to his second arrest in October 1964. He was promptly sent into exile in Turkey, and, after a short interval, to Iraq.

The relative success of the Shah in crushing and silencing the riots, as well as sending the Ayatollah into exile without any restraint, was a turning point in the latter's conception of political leadership of the Islamic states. Observing the increasing power of the Shah and the influence of the Executive over the political process in Iran, from abroad, he became

increasingly concerned with the hegemonic role of the Executive in controlling the Islamic state. In a series of lectures, later published under the title of *Velayat-e-Faqih*[5], after January 1970, he made the claim that the 'more important' executive branch of government is also a prerogative of the *fuqaha*, delegated to them by Allah through the Impeccable Imam. Hence, he adopted and justified the claim of the nineteenth-century Ayatollah Ahmad Naraqi[6] regarding the supreme authority of the *faqih* in the political process of the Islamic state, and then applied it to his own newly designed frame for Islamic government, specified at the time of the Greater Occultation. Thus, he explicitly started the campaign to replace dynastic rule with the *Velayat-e-Faqih*. Since then, he has became a radical, uncompromising revolutionary, who has opted for the establishment of Islamic government. Political leadership, in this context, was, in fact, a kind of constitutional religious leadership, directed by *Velayat-e-Faqih's* Islamic knowledge, supported by the people because of its reputation for Justice, and constrained by other *fuqahas'* discretion and a popular vote of confidence through a referendum.

The third phase, reflected in his conception of the absolute power of *Velayat-e-Faqih*, unfettered by the Constitution, came after a period of nine years in the position of supreme leadership in Iran. Confronted with various internal conflicts and external war with Iraq, he argued for and insisted upon the expansion and centralisation of the power of the *Velayat-e-Faqih*, which, to him, was not to be subjected to the popular vote, *fuqahas'* discretion and/or other constitutional constraints[7].

In this phase, *Velayat-e-Faqih* became a supra-constitutional institution and Khomeini emphasised the supremacy of protecting the Islamic state even over *Forus* – the Islamic rituals. A corollary of this change is the precedence of the political factor in the governance of the Islamic state. Hence, he proposed that a 'Council of Determining System's Expediency' be established, while, at the same time, dropping the requirement of *marjayat* (authoritative source of following by followers) in the leadership of the state. Following upon this change in thought, he assigned 20 out of the 25 members of the second 'Constitutional Assembly' to ratify his ideas. During this time, he was an authoritative, charismatic leader, who single-handedly envisioned and set the ground-rules for public and even private behaviour.

At this juncture, it is opportune to elaborate on Ayatollah Khomeini's conception of political leadership of the Islamic state in the context of the historical development of Iran. In this study of the *Velayat-e-Faqih* we can adopt an ideological stance, or a conceptional framework, and so characterise the 'phenomenon' of *Velayat-e-Faqih* by detaching it from

the impact of historical evolution in the perception of the agent who devised it.

Secondly, we can derive our characterisation of the concept, from the reasoning of Ayatollah Khomeini in the context of historical contingencies. This second approach, it can be argued, shows his rationale in devising *Velayat-e-Faqih*, the supreme political leader of the Islamic state.

THE EVOLUTION OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S THOUGHT ON POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Ayatollah Khomeini's first public statement of a political nature came in *Kashf-al-Asrar*, published in 1941,[8] where he overtly criticised Reza Shah and his attempts at secularisation. There, he firmly demanded that Islamic laws and ordinances be applied to all aspects of Iranian lives, while explicitly disclaiming any direct role for the *fuqaha* in the political leadership of Iran. Instead, he demanded the reactivisation of Article II of the 1906–1909 Constitution, to ensure the Islamicity of the laws passed by the legislature:

> We do not say that government must be in the hands of the Faqih; rather we say that government must be run in accordance with God's laws for the welfare of the country and the people demands this; and it is not feasible except with the supervision of the religious leaders.[9]

Beyond this, Ayatollah Khomeini had not demanded or done much during the period of the 1940s. But, with the unfolding of the 'White Revolution' of 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini once again appeared on the Iranian political scene. He gave a series of addresses and wrote various letters regarding issues such as: the change in the practice of using the Quran as the only means of taking an oath in assuming role in the legislature or judiciary (6 October 1962); the 1963 referendum to ratify the Articles of the 'White Revolution'; the attack on the Feyzieh seminary (23 March 1963); the abolition of the requirement for candidates for the legislature and judiciary to be Muslim (3 April 1963); the establishment of religious corps; (12 October 1971); the drafting of clerical students (11 July 1972), and the change of the origin of the Iranian calendar from Islamic to monarchical (1977).

On each and every one of these occasions, Ayatollah Khomeini has specific comments to make and proposals to adopt. For instance, with respect to the decision to use the Quran as the sole source for oath-taking,

he emphasises that 'We don't discuss this issue because of constitution. Whatever is compatible with Quran we earnestly comply with. Whatever is in contradiction with religion and Quran, whether they are from the constitution or international obligations, we oppose it'.[10] And following the police ambush at Feyzieh seminary ■ 22 March 1963, he emphasised that 'the government has evil intentions and is opposed to the ordinances of Islam'.[11] At this stage, he became disappointed of the personal authority with the Shah, but did not propose any alternative political system to replace it. 'As long as this usurpatory and rebellious government is in power, the Muslims can have no hope for any good'.[12]

This peaceful means of opposition to the personal authority of the Shah was preserved in his other public addresses. In most instances he deemed the 'anti-Islamic' policies of the Shah to be imposed by greater powers, *inter alia*, Israel. In one of the more memorable addresses of his life, given in Feyzieh seminary on 3 June 1963, he accused Israel of being responsible for the inimical policies applied to the Iranian economy, and also against the *ulama*. Whence he continued:

> Let me give you some advice, Mr Shah! Dear Mr Shah; I advise you to desist in this policy [of the White Revolution] ... I do not want the people to offer up thanks if your masters should decide one day you must leave.... Listen to the ulama of Islam, welfare of the country.[13]

It was because of this speech that he was arrested, but, because of the pressure of public opinion and other leading *ulama*, he was set free a few months later. In response to the government declaration, which said that Ayatollah Khomeini had promised to stop agitating the masses against the Shah's policies, he responded that:

> Khomeini is not to agree to what opposes Islam. How can Khomeini agrees with injustice? The ulama have done so much, can Khomeini or the like say something against Islam? If so, Khomeini will be expelled from the Islamic community.[14]

Nevertheless, at this stage he was still hopeful that, through advice and the ulamas' pressures, the government might stop its secularising policies. Significantly too, at this point, he again disclaimed any political role for the *ulama*.

> If you are faithful to Islam then act accordingly; otherwise if you assume Islam is reactionary then act according to the constitution.[15] Then you will see we do not protest any longer.[16]

The above quotation explicitly manifests the stages of priority in Ayatollah Khomeini's thought. He was primarily committed to the Islamic laws, but, under the then existing circumstances, grudgingly complied with the Constitution.

When legal immunity was granted to American citizens in Iran (October 1964), he furiously denounced this violation of Iranian sovereignty and independence.[17] Consequently, he was arrested again on 4 November 1964, and was promptly sent into exile in Turkey. After a brief stay in Ankara, and later in Basra, Ayatollah Khomeini left Turkey for Najaf, Iraq. There was a break in his political activism, which later led to his conception of *Velayat-e-Faqih*, the subject of the following section.

THE RADICAL APPROACH TO SUBSTITUTING *VELAYAT-E-FAQIH* FOR MONARCHY

This period of political activism of Ayatollah Khomeini generated the idea of the constitutional leadership of the *Velayat-e-Faqih*. The period had started with his exile and lasted through the ratification of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Roughly six years after his departure from Iran, in a series of lectures given during January and February 1970 (later published under the title of *Velayat-e-Faqih*), he broke radically with the past, and for the first time, called the monarchy illegitimate, and therefore proposed the alternative of the Islamic government: 'Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession-wrong and invalid ... monarchy and succession represents the same sinister, evil system of government'.[18]

Since then, he has seriously insisted on establishing an Islamic government within which the rulership of the *faqih* is assumed to be supreme.

> The true rulers are *fuqaha* ... the ruler supervises the executive power and has the duty of implementing God's laws. [The *faqih* in authority] possesses the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger ... in the administration of the society, and it will be the duty of all people to obey him.[19]

As it appears, then, the leadership of the Islamic society and the compliance of the people are a 'must' for both the leader and the people respectively. Accordingly, the custodianship of the nation is relative, and is held only by assignment, thus it is no different from the custodianship of minors.[20] However, it is the responsibility of the Vali-Amr (leader) himself to keep within the Islamic limits: 'A guardianship per se is [not] a gift, or an exalted state ... it is a heavy and grave duty'.[21]

Along with this self-control, he emphasises two important safeguards against the *faqih*'s probable abuse of power once he attains political office: one, his own moral integrity, which, in addition to his religious knowledge, constitutes one of the two prerequisites of the leadership of the Islamic state; the other, emanating from the autonomy of other *fuqaha*, outside of power. The Vali-Amr has the proviso, in accordance with the legitimacy of many beliefs in shiism, that 'no *faqih* can have absolute custodianship over other *fuqaha*.... There is no hierarchy [among the *fuqaha*] so that one may be higher than the other ones'.[22]

Regarding the qualifications essential for the supreme rulership of the state, Ayatollah Khomeini suggests that, beyond intelligence and administrative ability, knowledge of Islamic laws and justice are also necessary, since the 'ruler should be foremost in knowledge of the laws and ordinances of Islam and just in their implementation ... [and by justice he meant] excellence in belief and morals'.[23]

Notwithstanding the *faqihs*' knowledge and sense of justice, Ayatollah Khomeini devised an ultimate source for confronting the *faqih* who misinterprets Islamic law and attempts to enforce it:[24]

> It will then be the duty of the Muslims to engage in an armed jihad against that ruling group in order to make the policies and the norms of government subject to the principles and ordinances of Islam.[25]

Ayatollah Khomeini was also concerned with the justification of the political leadership of the *faqih*. In this respect, he justified the rulership of the *faqih* by arguing that the *faqih* has learned, through his comprehensive training, what is necessary for the supreme control and administration of the country and for promoting justice among the people. Science and techniques are required only for executive and administrative affairs, and the *faqih* can always call on the services of those who are well-versed in them.[26] This particular aspect of his thought must suggest that Ayatollah Khomeini is basically pushing for a supervisory role for the *fuqaha* and that beyond that he is not interested in the technicalities of the statesmanship.

From a jurisprudential point of view, he argues that leadership in Islam is existential (*takwini*) or relative (*itibari*). The former is a spiritual eminence exclusive to the prophets and the Imams; the latter is the social and political duty of the *faqih* to 'administer and rule the state and the laws of the sacred path'.[27]

Velayat, he says, 'consists of government and administration of the state and implementation of the laws of the sacred path'. This seems to him to be a heavy and important duty. Nevertheless, he emphasises that this responsibility does not create supernatural status for its holder, elevating

him to a position higher than that of an ordinary citizen. 'Contrary to what many people think it is not a privilege but a grave responsibility.'[28]

In support of his ideas about *Velayat-e-Faqih*, Ayatollah Khomeini quotes a number of *hadiths*, or sayings from the prophet Muhamad and the Imams, in which the role of the *ulama* has been described alternatively: 'as the heirs of the prophet's', 'the fortresses of Islam', and 'the trustees' or the emissaries [of God]. He also refers to the famous Quranic verse enjoining the Muslims to 'obey God and the Prophet and the holders of authority' (4:54), and to two *hadiths* known as the 'narratives' of Umar Ibn Hanzala and Khadija, attributed to the sixth Shi'i Imam, al-Sadiq, prohibiting the Shi'is from seeking redress from 'the unjust rulers of the age'.[29]

The conclusion he draws from all these and other quotations is that, with the obvious exception of the privilege of receiving the divine revelation, all the other responsibilities and powers of the Prophet have been relegated to the '*ulama* after the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam'.[30]

With these details, *Velayat-e-Faqih* became the mandate upon which the new political system of the Islamic Republic was established. Despite the fact that he emphasised in his book that the position of the *Velayat* is not elective, and 'its reality is not substantiated except by appointment',[31] he deems a confirmatory role for the people. On the eve of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, on 11 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini expressed the ground-rules for the operation of the emerging Islamic Republic.

> The destiny of each generation must be in its own hand.... [32] With the support of people, and by virtue of the acceptance the people have granted me, I will appoint a government.... The power of the government that I intend to appoint emanates from people and is a government based on the divine ordinance.[33]

After the victory of the Revolution, various questions were raised regarding the role of the *fuqaha* in government. In practice, the 'Revolutionary Council', composed of various religious leaders, was devised to supervise the proceedings of the provisional government. In theory, Ayatollah Khomeini assumed a supervisory role for the *ulama* in the newly-created Islamic Republic. In an exponential interview about the role of the *ulama* in the Islamic government, he emphasised that:

> The religious scholar does not wish to be president himself, he wishes instead to have ... a supervisory role. He exercises this role on behalf of the people. If the Government begins to misbehave, the religious scholar will stand in his way.[34]

In short, Ayatollah Khomeini assumed a veto-role for the *faqih* in the political system of Iran, and even one on behalf of the people. The government formed in this way, in Ayatollah Khomeini's words, 'no longer can suppress the nation, the Islamic government is, and must be at the service of the people and in case a Prime Minister encroaches people's right he should be arraigned and sentenced in the court'.[35]

Ayatollah Khomeini's idea of the *Velayat-e-Faqih* is enshrined in Principles 5, 57, 107 and 110 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 1979. Accordingly, a tremendous amount of power is bestowed upon the *Velayat-e-Faqih* as the supreme leader and guardian of the people, who is 'a courageous, just and knowledgeable *faqih*' enjoying 'the overwhelming support of the people'. Among the prerogatives of the *faqih* are:

1. appointment of half (6) of the members of the *Council of Guardians* of the Constitution;
2. appointment of both the highest authority and the Attorney General in the judiciary, after consultation with the Supreme Court;
3. commandership of the Joint Chief of Staff;
4. endorsing the presidency of the Presidents-elect after a popular vote;
5. dismissal of the President after a vote of Majlis regarding the incapability of the President, or his conviction by the Supreme Court for violation of his legal duty;
6. amnesty for criminals within the limits of Islamic ordinances and based upon the recommendations of the Supreme Court.[36]

Despite the tremendous amount of power accorded to the *faqih* by Ayatollah Khomeini and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the Ayatollah was optimistic that this power would never be abused. In this respect he denies the allegations that the government of the *faqih* could actually turn into despotism. As he puts it:

> Those who opposed the constitution said that it instituted a form of tyranny, but how can that be? ... [*Faqih*, who is the supreme leader] is just, not in the limited sense of social justice, but in the more rigorous and comprehensive sense that his quality of being just would be annulled if he were to utter a single lie.[37]

On the basis of this optimism and confidence in the institution of the *faqih*, he was even dissatisfied with the 'limited' scope of power recognised for the *Vali-e-Faqih* in the Constitution. In the following section, we shall elaborate on this.

THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF *VELAYAT-E-FAQIH*

The third phase in Ayatollah Khomeini's conception of *Velayat-e-Faqih*, as the absolute power, virtually started with the referendum which was held to establish the Islamic Republic, on 1 April, 1979. However, its theoretical and legal aspects were only completed afterwards, in proposals to grant absolute power for the *Velayat-e-Faqih*, and in the revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

During the first months following the institution of Islamic government in Iran, scattered riots took place across the country in defiance of the Islamic government. Segments of the polity boycotted the referendum regarding the institution of the Islamic Republic, and that held on the occasion of the ratification of the Constitution. Ayatollah Khomeini, in an address on 1 April 1979, announced that 'those who did not participate in this movement have no right to claim'.[38] Then he maintained that 'We must cure them ... otherwise, we will destroy the agents of foreign powers'.[39] He also expressed his dissatisfaction regarding the powers given to the *fuqaha* under the Constitution: 'now the Constitution makes some provisions for the principle of the governance of the *faqih*. In my opinion, it is deficient in this regard. The religious scholars have more prerogatives in Islam.'[40]

In response to this observed deficiency, eight years later, in a letter to Ayatollah Khamanei, the then-president and present supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, he elaborated on the concept of the absolute power of the *Velayat-e-Faqih*. Accordingly, he argued for the logical precedence of Islamic government and the supreme power of the *Velayat-e-Faqih* over all other minor principles – and rituals – of Islam:

> If the authority of the government is limited to the framework of minor religious principles, then the breadth of God's government and the absolute Velaya, given to prophet Mohammad, is nonsensical ... government is one of the primary principles of Islam and ... it is entitled even to unilaterally annul the canonical contracts reached with others. Whatever was/is said by now emanates from the lack of knowledge of absolute Velayat of Allah.[41]

In accordance with this expansion of *Velayat-e-Faqih*'s power, a 25-member committee of experts was designated by him (20 members) and by Majlis (5 members) to revise the Constitution. The committee then revised the Constitution, making the *Velayat-e-Faqih* a supra-constitutional leader. He became responsible for devising the general framework of policies. Moreover, in cases where the Guardian Council and the Majlis

differed on any issue, the Council for Determining System's Expediency, whose members were appointed by the supreme leader, would intervene, and its rule would be final. In line with this thinking, the Judiciary Council, the highest rank in that branch of government, was dissolved. Instead, the highest authority of the judiciary branch would simply be appointed by the leader. In turn, he was to appoint and dismiss the Supreme Judge, the Attorney General and other important figures of the Judiciary.

The most dramatic of these changes appeared in 1989, affecting Articles 57, 110, 112, 157 and 177 of the Constitution. According to the revised version of Article 57 of the Constitution, the power of supreme leader was expanded to become absolute. To operate this absolute power, he was armed with the authority to delineate the general policy of the system, after consulting with the Council for Determining System's Expediency. This Council was to resolve whatever differences lay between the Legislature and Council of Guardians. Members of this Council were to be appointed by the Supreme Leader.

Revision of the Constitution was also to be proposed by the leader. Besides the members mentioned in Article 177 of the revised Constitution, the leader had a leverage to set the limits of revisions and to expand the number of members by expanding the membership of the Council for Determining System's Expediency, who were, *inter alia*, members of the Committee for revision of the Constitution.[42]

According to one of the devoted interpreters of Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of *Velayat-e-Faqih*, who was also a member of the Committee which revised the Islamic Republic's Constitution, the absoluteness of power of *Velayat-e-Faqih* is such that the three branches of government are not independent of him; rather, he is the source of their authority[43] in distributing values, in Eastonian terms.

CONCLUSION

As the preceding arguments illustrate, Ayatollah Khomeini's conception of the various forms of political leadership of the Islamic State is at odds with his constant insistence on the implementation of Islamic laws and ordinances. While his conception of political leadership has evolved considerably through time, his concern with the implementation of Islamic laws remains constant. None the less, it is impossible to discuss the former without also considering the latter, if we are to explain Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas about the Islamic State in Iran.

The juxtaposition of the two has the advantage of showing us how the *Velayat-e-Faqih* finally assumes the supreme political leadership, giving it absolute and unfettered power in the Islamic state. One could deduce that this mixture manifests the conviction of Ayatollah Khomeini that the rising power of *Velayat-e-Faqih* will never be abused, because of his own commitment to the Islamic laws. In this, we notice how Ayatollah Khomeini's optimism is contrary to the pessimism of the Realist school, which suggests that power induces corruption in its possessors.

Examining the historical contingencies in the study of the evolution of Khomeini's thought helps us to reify both the temporal and the spatial contexts of his conception of political leadership of the Islamic state.

None the less, the above mixture has its ambiguities in two respects. First, the relation between the fixed nature of Islamic ordinances and the variant nature of political leadership, according to historical contingencies, is vague. This confusion, however, might be eased should we distinguish his strategic concern for the implementation of Islamic laws, according to his interpretation of Islam, and the tactical political arguments he propounded to deal with the historical objectives that are contingent in nature.[44]

Secondly, and equally important, is the fact that the inclusion of historical contingencies in the evolution of his thought implies that there is an element of pragmatism in Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation of ideology. Though this implication is partly true, it is not utilitarian pragmatism *per se*. On the contrary, one could explicitly observe that, in the final analysis, the Ayatollah made Islam his pivotal reference point in his attempt to identify certain forms of political leadership or ordinance and their attendant conditions and courses of action.

In sum, the pragmatism derived from his evolution of thought is apparently directed by his interpretation of Islam. That is explicable by the fact that, throughout his long and active political life, he remained emphatically faithful to Islam as his sole frame of reference, and the *fuqaha* as the sole interpreter of Islamic ordinances, though with various forms of participation and different degrees of power in enforcing their implementation in the affairs of the state.

NOTES

1. Guita-shenasiye, *Keshvarha* (Tehran: Guita shenasi, AH 1362/AD 1983) pp. 70–1.
2. Ibid.

3. Ayatollah Khomeini, *Velayat-e-Faqih* (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publishers, 1982).
4. Guita-Shenasiye, op. cit.
5. Ayatollah Ahmad Naraqi, *Avae'd al-Ayyam* (np, nd) pp. 185–205.
6. Ibid.
7. Sahifeye Noor, *Complete Addresses of Imam Khomeini*, 'A Letter to President Khamanei', dated 6 January 1988 (Tehran: Centre for Cultural Documents of Islamic Revolution, 1361/1982) pp. 173–4.
8. Ayatollah Khomeini, *Kashf-al-Asrar* (Tehran: Intesharat Muhammad, 1941) passim.
9. Ayatollah Khomeini, *Kashf-al-Asrar*, p. 22.
10. Sahifeye Noor, vol. I, p. 17.
11. Ibid., p. 47.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 55.
14. Ibid., p. 70.
15. Ibid., p.72.
16. Ibid. p. 69.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., pp. 102–8.
19. Ibid., pp. 60–3.
20. Ibid., p. 65.
21. *Imam Khomeini's Last Will and Testament*, trans. by M. Karbasi (Tehran: Kayhan International, 1989) p. 30.
22. Ayatollah Khomeini, *Velayat-e-Faqih*, p. 66.
23. Ibid. pp. 59–61.
24. Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981).
25. Ibid., p. 115.
26. Ayatollah Khomeini, *Velayat-e-Faqih*, pp. 58–68.
27. Ibid., pp. 64–8.
28. Ibid.
29. Ayatollah Khomeini, *Velayat-e-Faqih*, pp. 118–120. The narrative reads as: Imam Jafar Sadiq said: 'They [shiis' when have conflicts] must seek one of you who narrates our traditions, who is versed in what is permissible and what is forbidden, who is well acquainted with our laws and ordinances, and accept him as judge and arbiter, for I appoint him as Judge over you.'
30. Ibid. pp. 64–5.
31. Ibid., p. 65.
32. Sahifeye Noor, vol. VII, p. 74.
33. Ibid., p. 7.
34. Hamid Algar, 'Interview with Imam Khomeini', op. cit., p. 342.
35. Sahifeye Noor, vol. V, p. 238.
36. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic, 1980.
37. Interview with Algar, op. cit., p. 342.
38. Ibid., p. 269.
39. Ibid., p. 271.
40. Ibid., p. 342.
41. Sahifeye Noor, vol. XX, pp. 173–4.

42. Revised Constitution of Islamic Republic (1989).
43. Hojat al-Islam Amid-e-Zanjani, *Resalat*, N:1850 (Tehran, daily, 10 June 1992).
44. To replace the dyadic conception of the strategic–tactical, Dr Ali Ghaderi, Director of IP IS, and one of the devoted interpreters of the Ayatollah Khomeini, suggests 'consummatory goals–intermediate goals to replace the strategy–tactic used here.

10 Islam and Development in Egypt: Civil Society and the State

Denis Sullivan

Proponents of the 'Islamic alternative in Egypt' claim that it is the only solution to the ills besetting the political and economic structures in the country. The network of Islamic charitable associations, the *jamiyyaat khayriyya*, have taken a lead in promoting economic and social development in local communities throughout Egypt. Islamic private voluntary organisations (PVOs) and other groups are attempting to fill the void left by a government that is increasingly unable to devote its limited resources to a plethora of problem areas – education and training, housing, health care, agricultural and industrial productivity, employment, transportation.

While there is considerable activity on the part of Islamic (and other) PVOs, the principal question raised by this activity boils down to this: Is 'Islam the solution' *(al-Islam huwwa al-hall)*, as the Muslim Brotherhood's political campaign slogan claims, to Egypt's myriad socio-economic and political problems? From this question, we may ask whether Islamic groups of various size and ideological commitment are substituting for the government in the realm of socio-economic development? If so, do Islamic organisations pose a significant alternative to the national government in Cairo and its sub-units across the various governorates, cities and villages?

Egyptian society does face the phenomenon of a more socially involved Islamic movement. Whether the grassroots, *social* organisations (which are but one part of such a movement) pose a challenge to governmental legitimacy is an important concern of the Egyptian government and its supporters. And if there is such a challenge, whether that is an open, direct, or intentional challenge, is uncertain.

The history of Islamic organisations and enterprises in Egypt supports the notion that Islam is not in 'resurgence';[1] it *has* received greater attention from domestic audiences that are more willing to tolerate or support traditionalist 'solutions'. It has also received greater attention from Western researchers, media[2], and the general public. Egypt's contemporary Islamic

social and political activity dates its emergence to the founding, in 1928, of *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, the (Society of) Muslim Brethren, led by Hassan al-Banna.[3] Despite King Farouk's and Nasser's attempts to smash this organisation, it has survived and has even become a part of the political process of Egypt, with its support becoming the primary basis of any successful opposition in the People's Assembly *(Majlis al-Shab)*, or Parliament.

After all, *jama'at Islamiya*, or Islamic (student) associations, 'became the dominant force on Egyptian university campuses during Sadat's presidency'.[4] One month before his death, Sadat ordered that these groups be disbanded, their infrastructure destroyed, and their leaders arrested. While these and other groups remain active, such militant groups seem to have lost their appeal, or at least have lost their 'ability to constitute a movement that might serve as the mouthpiece of civil society in its confrontation with the state'.[5] The personification of that confrontation is, after all, gone now and President Mubarak is adeptly utilising, confronting and perhaps manipulating the various sub-groups that make up an Islamic 'force' in Egypt.

An 'Islamic wave' is not sweeping over Egypt, winning over adherents to a revolutionary Islamic cause. Egypt is changing, evolving in many ways. While it continues to be a cosmopolitan society with an interest in 'things Western', it is also gaining a greater sense of self-worth, self-respect, and thus a greater appreciation of its own way of doing things, whether that be Islamic or Egyptian or Arab. While President Mubarak continues to be criticised for his seeming inertia, his plodding pace toward decision-making none the less deserves credit for representing, if not encouraging, this sense of Egyptianness, much more than Sadat ever did or could. For better or worse, Mubarak's attention is on restoring Egypt to a leadership role in the Arab world, all-the-while maintaining his country's peace treaty (a 'cold peace' though it is) with Israel and close ties with the United States and other Western powers. His efforts include increased attempts at limited democratisation, freedom of speech, and even government self-criticism. And he is tolerating, if not encouraging, Islamic groups' participation in this process, again in a limited way.

ISLAMIC INVESTMENT

One area over which Mubarak nearly lost control, through his toleration of establishment, mainstream Islam, is in the realm of Islamic investment companies (IICs). These companies operated for years beyond the control

of government. In the name of Islam, IICs mobilised billions of dollars in customer deposits and provided a return on investment of more than 20 per cent, or so they have claimed since about 1985.

The government was unable or unwilling to control these enterprises up until June 1988. At that time, a new law (number 146) called upon the IICs to issue investment and financing notes – instead of deposits – and open their books to official inspection. The total amount of investment notes was to be limited to 10 times the capital available to the company from its shareholders.

Of over 100 Islamic investment companies in 1988, roughly 50 were considered large or medium-sized. Total funds of the latter were estimated at over $4.3 billion.[6] Depositors numbered over 400 000 and included Muslims and Christians alike. Economic ventures were largely in commodity speculation, hence the concern of the traditional banking system and the government. Other ventures were in tourism, industry, agriculture, trade and real estate.

With several of the large IICs unwilling to cooperate with the government's call for public disclosure of investment activities, the government cracked down. In early November 1988, it seized the assets of al-Rayan, Egypt's largest Islamic investment group with over 190 000 investors and LE1.5 billion in deposits, and attempted to retrieve overseas funds estimated at over $400 million. Economists in Egypt were predicting that depositors' claims of up to $3 billion would be unmet as a result of illicit practices of investment company owners. Primarily through the corruption and mismanagement of the three largest IICs (the second largest, el-Sherif, is also facing difficulties), the Islamic solution to banking and investment has been dealt a terrible blow and the confidence of hundreds of thousands of investors has been lost.

PRIVATE ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS

In contrast with this large-scale corruption and manipulation of Islamic symbols for personal gain, a potentially more significant (in terms of economic development, among other measures) phenomenon has been consistently and quietly emerging in Egypt. This phenomenon is perhaps the least well-known aspect of the Islamic 'movement' and is developing on a wide scale throughout Egypt, in various villages and towns as well in the major cities, principally Cairo. This aspect is diffuse, not organised or even well coordinated, but has tremendous potential to achieve significant

advances in economic and social development. It therefore has the potential to challenge the government, which has promised (but often failed) to achieve those very objectives.

Traditional (governmental) bureaucracies, entrusted with the responsibilities of formulating, planning, executing, and monitoring Egypt's development objectives, have, to a large extent, failed in their task.[7] 'The main effort at development is from locals through PVOs, not from the government'.[8] Other organisations, most notably the Egyptian army and Islamic groups (the 'non-traditional' bureaucracies, in the sense that their original goals did not include promoting development), have recently taken on these tasks. The army is building roads, developing cities (including providing a basic infrastructure to support these), growing crops to feed its own troops and even marketing and distributing the surplus to the Egyptian public – for a profit.

Islamic groups have developed efficient social services, most notably schools, trade-skill centres (carpentry, sewing), and day-care and health-care centres (some to the extent of being hospitals), out of frustration over the government's inability to recognise the needs of specific communities and to target these communities with development projects in response to those needs. In some cases, filling this gap in services is extremely profitable.[9]

Thus, the entrepreneurial role so necessary to promote growth and development is not being taken up by the government of Egypt or by most of its individual ministries. Moreover, development is further inhibited by these ministries competing against one another, either in their individual approaches to development or in their sheer struggle to survive, to maintain their power, their position, their 'status'. Bureaucracy in Egypt has become very defensive and non-activist, as the government struggles with economic crisis. Instead of being able to work to promote development, the government is, by necessity, more involved in crisis management, in averting financial collapse. It has little energy and even less resources to work on such 'luxuries' as *development!* It is, of course, devoting time and money to its development priorities.[10] It is able to do so, to a large extent, with the assistance of foreign donors, principally the United States. Yet, even if such assistance continues for the indefinite future, the government continues to be unable to solve or even deal effectively with a host of basic problems – education, health care, job training, housing, to name a few.

Islamic associations are stepping in to help; many of these become so able, also, because of the large amounts of foreign economic assistance to Egypt. In this author's interview with an official of Catholic Relief Services, an international PVO working in Egypt, it was mentioned that 'mosques

are providing alternative support services [illegible] foreign donors push the GOE (Government of Egypt) *out* of such services in their efforts to reform governmental policies such as subsidization of food, medicine, etc.; privatization; and budget cutting'.[11] Individuals are looking to these associations, instead of governmental agents, for assistance, support, and healing. As government becomes more distant from populace, instead of becoming closer, identification with, and obedience to, this government seem less likely. The legitimacy of such a government could be much in doubt.[12]

Voluntarism *(tatawwa'iyya)*, including that of an Islamic nature, has a long history and solid reputation in Egypt. Islamic associations originated in the nineteenth century, had a rapid growth after the Second World War and in the late 1950s, and began to be transformed in the Nasser era, as government sought an increasing role in the daily private lives of its subjects.[13] Yet, with the failure of government to displace private initiative efficiently or effectively, there has been a gradual reassertion of voluntarism in Egypt.

Private Islamic association are evident up and down the Nile, in villages and large cities. They range from small organisations of five people or so, operating out of satellite villages, to large 'societies' (even corporations) employing scores of health-care professionals, educators, and clerical staff in middle-class suburbs of Cairo. In general, these Islamic PVOs are part and parcel of the *jamiyyaat khayriyya*, or charitable associations, which [illegible] registered by the Ministry of Social Affairs. As to whether the Islamic PVOs' services are determined by their own members or, as in the case of other PVOs, for example, some Community Development Associations (CDAs), by the government or its agencies, the answer varies with the PVO, as is demonstrated below. There is considerable disdain among many PVO managers and boards for governmental interference; there is often appreciation among others for whatever governmental assistance they can receive, even if it is accompanied by bureaucratic control or irrelevant programmes.

At the village level, the focus of many of these PVOs is on education and job training, providing health care to mothers and infants, and in many cases day care. In [illegible] satellite village of Taha, near al-Minia, job training consists of a small room with half [illegible] doz[illegible] Singer sewing machines, run by mothers whose children attend school in the room next door. Other such training, geared most toward males, includes carpentry centres, in which men are instructed on the use of certain machines. The major contribution of these is the mere fact of providing access to equipment, otherwise unavailable to these individuals, for use in building and repairing household necessities. This allows people to maintain their own clothing or

household items as well as contract their services to others in the village in need of such assistance. By contrast, in the Boulaw Society in greater Cairo, the sewing, knitting, cooking, and carpentry training centres are directly related to income generation for trainees, ■ the Society takes a major role in marketing the trainees' goods and services.

In order to highlight more of the workings of societies (PVOs) throughout Egypt, several cases are presented below. The individual cases demonstrate several common characteristics ■ well as their unique contributions to socio-economic development through individual and collective philanthropy, private initiative, and social activism. As Islamic initiatives, these PVOs are having an impact on the lives of hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of people – as did the Islamic investment companies; yet, in contrast with the IICs, the impact of these small and medium-sized non-profit–making societies is both positive and necessary for the long-term development prospects of their communities and of Egypt overall.

The Community Association of Ezbet Zein

The short history of Ezbet Zein, on the southern edge of Cairo, provides an important case study in the development of Islamic association.[14] Originally a squatter community that developed in the early 1960s around a factory, Ezbet Zein still had no public sewerage system and no public schools as late as the mid-1980s. In the late 1970s, leaders of the community approached the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) for financial support to make their mosque a more permanent structure. MOSA officials responded that they could not use public money for mosques and suggested the residents form a Community Development Association (CDA), to which MOSA could contribute some human and financial resources.

After 1979, the CDA of Ezbet Zein began a nursery school and a vocational-training programme. The mosque was rebuilt as a two-storey building, the upper level to be used for community services. The association is run by a 15-member board (all male), the duties of which are to collect *zakaat* (fees given by Muslims for charity) and to supervise the various programmes and community services they have developed over the past decade. These services are:

Teaching the Koran (no charge).
Sewing centre.
Day care – filled to capacity; MOSA provides the teacher, CDA pays one-third of her salary; CDA also receives some 'foreign assistance'.
Medical care – CDA rents ■ room to ■ doctor, who charges low fees.

Remedial tutorial – CDA retains one-half of the charges.
Food cooperative – over 1300 residents participate.
Septic tank cleaning.

The 1983 budget for this CDA was just over LE70000.[15] About four-fifths of this income came from *zakaat* and other donations from the community. The day-care and sewing centres have recovered about 70 per cent of their costs from fees and from selling garments. MOSA's contribution is not included in these budget figures because the staff support it provides comes out of the national government's budget.

Thus, the community is taking up the challenge facing them of providing educational, health, and family services for themselves. They are building organisations to provide for themselves in the absence of continued government provisions; they are developing community participation in decision-making; and they are learning the basics of self-reliance, if not self-governance.

al-Mustashfa Sayida Zeinab

Connected to the Mosque of Sayida Zeinab, in Cairo, is a hospital (*mustashfa*). Founded in the late 1970s, this hospital has four beds and treats anywhere between 100 and 200 patients per day, between the hours of 5 p.m. and [illegible] p.m., though there is a doctor on duty 24 hours per day. In 1989, a patient paid LE2 for a physical examination. (The cost used to be 25 piasters and increased gradually to this level. By 1991, other Islamic PVO-hospitals were charging an average of LE3 for initial visits; some charged LE2, others charged LE5.) The Mosque of Sayida Zeinab pays the doctors for operations as well as the cost of medicine and other treatments which are beyond the capacity of the patients to pay. The doctors work for government hospitals in the mornings and come, in the evenings, to Sayida Zeinab or one of the other mosque-hospitals around Cairo that are affiliated (loosely) with Sayida Zeinab (e.g., Rod al-Farag, Shura, Qalya). These 18 mosque-hospitals are developing an informal network to share doctors, refer patients elsewhere for more appropriate treatment, among other services.

An assistant at Sayida Zeinab hospital says that these are 'good doctors who know the patients and their problems. People have such faith in them that some people come from the Sudan for our services!'[16] This worker stresses that his hospital, and the many others like it, is not affiliated to the government and receives no government money. The mosque raises money through the *zakaat* (charity) and other donations.

By design or default, this Islámic association is responding to specific community needs, in this case for affordable and quality health care, and is meeting those needs. In turn, it is establishing links with similar organisations throughout Cairo, especially in poorer areas of the city, and is building a system of cooperative, popular, and autonomous (from the government) institutions. It even uses the same doctors the government uses, but it pays them more and it decentralises the provision of services in the community, enabling these city doctors to become much more of a known and approachable entity.

Mustafa Mahmud Society

Perhaps the most widely noted of the urban Islamic PVOs is the Mustafa Mahmud Society in Mohandiseen, a middle- to upper-class section of greater Cairo. Mustafa Mahmud is a widely known and generally respected figure. He is an ex-Marxist,[17] 'born again' Muslim, scientist, television personality, author of 60 books, chest-disease specialist, founder of this society, and otherwise entrepreneur. Turning to Islam after years of adhering to Marxism as a solution to Egypt's ills, he initiated a television programme – *al-ilm wa al-imaan*, 'Science and Faith' – dedicated to the precept that Islam and science are completely compatible and self-supportive. He founded his society, much in compliance with this theory, in the name of Islam, to promote general welfare, and not so incidentally to provide top salaries to the medical staff at his health centre.

This Islamic society, founded in 1975, contains an aquarium, library (for the study of Islam), observatory (to mark the precise dates for the beginning and ending of holy days), geological museum, seminar hall, health centre (polyclinic) and hospital. The society also conducts tours to Islamic monuments, presents lectures and films, and sends relief aid abroad, such as clothes and medicines to Afghan refugees, and LE10 000 to the Red Crescent in the Sudan for victims of floods. In 1979, the office of Social Services began providing socio-medical services. By 1990, approximately 8000 families had received financial aid – monthly stipends, medical services (related to kidney, chest, cancer, cardiac, and leper illnesses), aid to poor students and to blind and disabled individuals.[18]

Similar to the Sayid Zeinab operation – but on a much grander scale – the Mustafa Mahmud Society links a mosque with a hospital, the former raising the funds, the latter providing health services. Such services run the gamut from physical examinations, blood testing, urine analysis and diagnoses, to kidney dialysis, appendectomies, CT-scans and heart treatment. Dental and 'psychological' services are also provided. In August

1987, the Society did not yet have facilities for overnight stays (and thus technically was not a 'hospital') for patients; by 1989, a high-rise apartment building in Mohandiseen, across from the Society's offices, was renovated and donated to the Society as a hospital. The benefactor is said to have been someone from the Gulf (probably Kuwait) with strong ties to Dr Mustafa Mahmud.

The hospital has 60 beds, 30 of which are for charitable and low-priced services. There are 10 first-class single rooms with air-conditioning, telephone and television. Twenty beds are located in economy-class double rooms with these same amenities. The hospital has 3 operating theatres and another kidney dialysis unit with 7 machines. The medical staff consists of 94 physicians – perhaps the largest group at any of the Islamic PVOs in Egypt. Specialist physicians receive 25 per cent of the value of their treatment (based on LE1 'tickets', or fees for doctors' visits); the medical-analysis-unit doctors receive 20 per cent of the value of their treatment, with a ceiling of LE600 per month; and Ob–Gyn doctors receive 33 per cent of LE3 tickets.[19]

This capitalist enterprise, founded in the name of Islam, is hardly representative of the vast number of Islamic PVOs in urban (or rural) settings, but it is a model of achievement, with financial benefits accruing to the staff and low-cost health care for thousands of patients.

Jamiyyat al-Shaaban al-Muslimiin (Young Men's Muslim Association, YMMA)

The YMMA is a national PVO with branches throughout Egypt. The branch in Tanta, Egypt's third largest city, in the middle of the Delta, has a membership (18 years old and over) of 1000. In addition, this PVO has 1200 members (12 to 30 year-olds) in a Cultural and Social Club, *al-Nady al-Thagaafy wa al-Itjtimaay*. The Association also includes a preparatory school (6–12 year-olds), two day-care centres (3.5 to 5-year-olds), two libraries, sports facilities (karate, volleyball, swimming pool, soccer), computer training, English language instruction, a video collection and television, a lecture series (for which religious figures, such as Sheikh Yassin al-Rushdi, make presentations, as do agricultural engineers and sports teachers), and job-training centres for men and women. The YMMA organises trips to Alexandria and beaches on the Mediterranean for its members and helps community members make the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca).

> Many of our activities – films, trips, sports, job training – are to keep kids off the streets and give them something to do, something that they can

> enjoy and learn from. The kids want to watch a log of American and Japanese films, especially karate movies. We give them religious and other films, like Indian movies.[20]

The YMMA operates a *mustawsaf tibby,* medical centre, next to the Sayyid Badawi Mosque. Sayyid Badawi is the patron saint of Tanta and his shrine is the site of an annual pilgrimage for tens of thousands of Egyptians. Placing the YMMA's health centre next to the mosque places this PVO's health-care facilities at the centre of community activity in Tanta. The centre, not a hospital with overnight care, has three doctors providing general medical services. A physical examination, *kashf,* costs LE1.5, which is less than virtually all other Islamic, Christian, and secular medical centres investigated for this research. The other range from LE2 to LE3; the YMMA's lesser charge may be due to the lower standard of living of the community in Tanta as opposed to that in Cairo and Alexandria. Yet, many medical cetres in Fayoum, al-Minia, and other areas outside the main cities did charge the higher fee (usual LE2), although their standards of living are likely to be less than Tanta's.

At YMMA headquarters, some distance away from the Sayhid Badawi area, the PVO's schools and clubs operate all year round. The Association employs 26 teachers for its 20 preparatory classes, exceeding the government's requirement of 1.2 teachers per classroom. Yet, with 900 students at preparatory school, this puts 45 students in each class. There are 440 children in the two day-care centres, the parents of whom pay LE 150 per year in tuition, *masruufaat.* Parents of the 900 children in the preparatory schools paid LE175 per year in 1990–91. Tuition revenues to the YMMA from these two programmes alone total LE223 500. There are two buses used to transport children to and from school. The cost of this service is LE180 per year, more than the cost of tuition. Other revenue comes from the Children's Summer Club (cost: LE3 per month for 4 to 12 year-olds) and the computer-training programmes, which are a mere LE10 per course, catering for only three students per course, who meet three times per week for three months. 'Go anywhere else in the private sector computer-training programmes and you'll see tuition rates of LE1000!', according to the director of the YMMA.

The YMMA provides training programmes for men and women college graduates without jobs, for free. 'We used to charge LE10 – which was nothing, really – but no one came. So we offer carpentry and sewing and other training for free and we get many applicants. The government has stopped hiring graduates so this is now our most important activity – to provide training and help graduates find jobs or become self-employed.' The Association also provides courses in Arabic language and the Koran

without charge to primary and secondary students. Its English language course has a nominal fee.

Other resources, beyond tuition, include foreign aid, some private donations, and a volunteer service. Young women do not serve in the army, as is required of all young men in Egypt, but we expected to do a *khidma aama*, public service, of one year after graduation from high school. YMMA asks MOSA for one to five public servants each year. In 1991, they had three young women helping out, who were also enrolled in a Social Service programme at Tanta University.

With American foreign assistance, the YMMA has constructed a salon for receptions, burials and wakes. This is one of their most demanded services. The salon is in use nearly every night. YMMA receives LE85 per use of the facilities. Occasionally, there are two services per night.

The Majlis *al-Idaarah*, Board of Directors, is made up of 15 individuals, three of whom are professors from Tanta University and technical institutes. Several years ago, the *Majlis* asked MOSA for a *Mudiir* (director) and the government sent the current director, a man who had served 12 years in the army in Assiout in Upper Egypt. He takes his salary from the government, 'plus I get a percentage from the UMMA'. This percentage is usually 30 per cent. Service in the army in Assiout, a city known for its pitched and often violent sectarian strife, has probably prepared this *mudiir* very well – both as a government employee, whose responsibility is to monitor and control various aspects of community activity, and as director of a PVO in a community that has a large proportion of Chirstians in a largely Muslim city.

The 26 teachers receive what a public teacher would receive from the government, approximately LE250 per month. In addition, the YMMA pays the teachers' Syndicate (*niqaaba*) or Union dues, as well as an additional 15 per cent (minimum) above the standard salary 'to attract better teachers to our school'. Using LE310 per teacher per month as an average figure, the YMMA pays nearly LE100 000 in annual salaries and benefits to these teachers alone. Thus, half of the LE 223 500 in tuition revenues is spent on teachers' salaries. The rest goes to cover the cost of books, supplies, and overheads. With subsidised utilities, rents and other overhead expenses, it is possible that there are considerable resources available from tuition revenues to recycle into the YMMA – though this has not been confirmed by anyone at the YMMA – making education provision a potentially 'profitable' enterprise for the Association.

The significant contributions from Tanta's YMMA to the poor, the unemployed, and youth in its community is an indication as to why the national YMMA is so highly regarded throughout Egypt. National reputations are not as important to Egyptians in need as is active, caring

community service. There are over 200 such notionally registered PVOs – Islamic, Christian, and other – many of which do provide a vast array of desperately needed services. The national Islamic orgnisations, such ■ the national YMMA, perhaps pose the most critical challenge, among all the PVOs in Egypt, to the failing state system that is nominally secular and socialist.

Al-Jamiyyaat al-Tibbiyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Medical Associations)

The Islamic Medical Society at Farouq Mosque in Ma'adi is one of 14 branches of the Islamic Medical Society, which was established in 1973 with headquarters in Babeluq. The Farouq branch was set up in late 1990. It is ■ hospital with 14 doctors (generalists and specialists) including a number of specialists who come at night. Farouq Islamic Medical Society is ■ CDA registered with MOSA.

One of the more interesting aspects of this CDA is the fact that there already exists in Ma'adi a very successful and visible Islamic hospital, the Faith Complex. Thus, we might expect considerable competition between the Faith Complex and Farouq Hospital. Still, given the population of Cairo in general and the popularity of Islamic hospitals, two highly visible mosque-hospitals are not likely to absorb all who are in the market for health services. Nevertheless, MOSA regulations prohibit more than one CDA from operating in the same area unless they provide distinctly different services. Moreover, there are several other smaller PVOs (Islamic and other) in the Ma'adi area which provide medical services – again suggesting a large market that has not been saturated by health-care (or other) providers. This also suggests that MOSA regulations are being circumvented, with MOSA's acquiescence. This may be due to MOSA's acknowledgement that the government cannot provide all the medical, educational or other services that communities need.

The Faith Mosque Society was registered with MOSA in 1976 as a multi-functional Islamic Society. It thus conducts various tasks associated with a CDA. It has a hospital; ■ outpatient clinic; ■ pharmacy; kindergarten, preparatory and secondary schools; an Azharite Institute for boys; a training centre for girls; and ■ orphanage. It gives out pensions to over 300 needy families (through *zakaat*) and has ■ committee for the *hajj* (for members only). Led by Sheikh Muhammad, the Board of Directors consists of 9 members, 2 of whom are prominent sheikhs with national reputations. The 80 specialist physicians working in the Polyclinic receive 50 per cent of the LE5 'tickets' that are sold to patients who come to see ■ doctor. (Foreigners pay LE10 for a ticket.) The Faith Hospital has 9 surgeons, 1 obstetrician–gynaecologist and 21 resident physicians (14 in the

Intensive Care Unit) on fixed salaries (at a level somewhere between public and private-sector hospital salaries). Nurses, secretaries and housekeepers are also on fixed salaries. Islamic dress is required of women employees, and the mothers of children attending school must also be veiled or children will be not accepted in school.[21] 'Veiling' in fact varies. Some nurses cover the entire head with a slight separation for the eyes, while others just cover the head and hair but not their faces.

The Farouq mosque-hospital prides itself on being cheaper than the Fath Society and thus sees Fath as its principal competition. As regards a general coordination of the Islamic medical Societies, Dr Muhamad of Farouq asserts that there is no cooperation between hospitals or between the branches of this *al-jamiyya*. 'This is an autonomous branch', according to Dr Muhamad.

The coordination that does occur is often individually motivated, since doctors do continue to work at various hospitals. Dr Muhamad, for example, works in Farouq, Fath, and Kasr al-Aini (run by Cairo University) hospitals. Also, doctors come from Kasr al-Aini and other hospitals to provide services at night for patients at Farouq. This double and triple work load is an institution of moonlighting, as in the case of taxi drivers (or is it the other way round?); medical students double as health-care providers and doctors travel from government hospitals (their day job) to private clinics (usually their own) and to PVO hospitals catering for the poor and middle-class. Such 'moonlighting' is quite lucrative (see above) and is in many cases the main source of a doctor's income.

Most doctors interviewed for this research tended to criticise the government-run hospitals and to praise the private and PVO hospitals and health centres. The image of poor-quality public-sector hospitals and superior quality (in relative terms) private centres is certainly the norm in Egypt, from patients and doctors alike. The perception of quality and of care is a powerful force. However, there are numerous examples of poor treatment at private and PVO hospitals as well as the endless examples from public-sector hospitals.

Islam – The 'Other Path'[22]

Thus, the perception of the public at large[23] is that a patient receives better care from PVO hospitals. Moreover, many patients come to an Islamic hospital because it is Islamic. They consider 'Islamic' as something between 'public' and 'private'. 'Islamic' has the positive elements of both: it has the concern for the poor that the public sector is supposed to have, and it has the efficiency and quality that the private sector is supposed to have. A maid visits a Fath Hospital for family planning services and pays several

pounds (LE) for services she could receive for free from a public-sector hospital, because, she says, 'it is Islamic and therefore better'.

The doctors who serve in both public and Islamic/private settings have varying reasons for wanting to work in the Islamic centres at night. Dr Muhamad of Farouq, for instance, is very religious. He praises the glories of Islam generally, not simply those of Islam and health care. In addition to his religious devotion, Dr Muhamad wants to specialise (in cardiology) 'to be proud of myself. As a generalist I can do everything but I want to show that I can do one thing especially well. Then I will feel happy in my career.' So, his three jobs provide him with personal satisfaction (both in terms of his career and spiritually) as well as with necessary income.

Others are not as committed to personal growth and religious commitment [illegible] Dr Muhamad. At the main branch of the *al-jamiyya al-tibbiyya al-islamiyya* (Islamic Medical Society),[24] there are over 35 doctors who serve the hospitals throughout the week. These doctors are GPs, surgeons, oncologists, paediatricians, Ob–Gyn specialists, cardiologists and dentists. The hospital performs cancer operations, cares for heart patients, and provides kidney dialysis. If there are serious cases, which they cannot treat, they refer them to other hospitals – usually Kasr al-Aini Hospital of Cairo University. The fees for check-ups and for operations and treatment are very low. A check-up is LE2. Operations range from LE200 upwards. The doctors who provide treatment receive from 40–60 per cent of the fees, depending on their seniority and the treatment. The hospital is visited by 150–250 patients per day. With check-ups, follow-up treatment and operations, a doctor can supplement his income considerably by providing a benevolent service to PVOs. 'While the idea of providing low-cost medical care as a service, in the name of a wider cause, seems common';[25] in fact religious PVOs/medical centres provide significant income for medical personnel and improved health care for patients.

There are, of course, many doctors who do work out of a higher interest, beyond that of self-preservation. But even among those doctors interviewed for this research, those who are concerned for the poor and interested in serving the community out of Islamic charity were almost always the young doctors – like Dr Muhamad at Farouk – fresh out of university, who were also working in two or three different places. And this suggests that they are combining their need for experience, training, and income with their desire to serve their community.

This chapter is not intended to present simply a one-sided, over-optimistic view of the potential and power of Islamic PVOs. Indeed, there are many examples of corrupt and ineffective PVOs in Egypt. *Hoda and Nour*, an Islamic society in Giza, was highlighted by the semi-official press for its corrupt practices. The President of the *Majlis al-Idaarah* (Board of

Directors) of the benevolent society was arrested for embezzling funds and pocketing money he had collected to help people attend the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca). He stole over LE100 000 and opened accounts in the names of his children.[26]

There have been numerous examples cited by *Al-Ahram*, *Al-Joumhouria*, and other presses highlighting the corrupt practices of Islamic enterprises. While the government tolerates and even encourages criticism of these enterprises, it will also continue to use the enterprises when it is deemed useful. For instance, many people are outraged that the society of the prominent physician, author and oppositionist, Dr Nawal Saadawi – the Arab Women's Solidarity Association (AWSA) – was disbanded by the government and that its assets were handed over to the little heard of Society of Women in Islam. This society does not serve the same functions as AWSA. Women in Islam does not address women's rights issues; it provides housing and other services for female students from the provinces who are studying in Cairo. Moreover, its director, Mr Farouq el-Fiel, also serves as Director General of Social Affairs in the ma'adi District. Not only is he a government employee, he also receives 10 per cent of AWSA's assets as a liquidator's fee. When Middle East Watch, a committee of Human Rights Watch of New York, reported on AWSA's predicament, it suggested 'that the conflict-of-interest in Mr El-Fiel's appointment as liquidator is apparent.'[27]

For the government, Islamic organisations can be useful in cases such as this – i.e., to promote a conservative view of women's rights and to undermine progressive women's organisations which also serve to criticise governmental practices, whether gender-related or not. In other instances, however, the government promotes secular organisations to compete against Islamic forces that might challenge the secular nature of the state by demonstrating the power and potential for socio-economic development that Islamic organisations are indeed good at.

CHALLENGE TO THE STATE

It is the latter issue, of an emerging and demonstrably efficient and effective Islamic sector, that worries the government most. Nor is this a recent concern.

> It was the troubles with Islamic associations in the early '60s that led the government to inaugurate law 32 of 1964 to regulate and monitor associations. Now, CDAs are encouraged by the government over benevolent societies *(al-jamiyyaat al-kharyriyya)* because the latter are

> usually associated with a church or mosque. It is easier to register a CDA than *jamiyya kharyriyya* because they do not do cultural/religious work. Plus, CDAs are semi-governmental.[28]

Thus, the government has greater control over their activities.

The increasing role of religious organisations, in providing basic social and economic services in various communities throughout the whole of Egypt, is a direct challenge to the (until now) presumed role of the government in these fields. As Tendler reminds us, such services are now widely recognised not just as 'relief' but as actual 'development' efforts. Even if one insists on distinguishing between the two and on considering these religious organisations to be 'merely' relief organisations, 'effectively providing services for the poorest members of a society is no mean feat, and it would be wrong to let a concern with development obscure their contributions.'[29] Regarding the role of government, such local organisations

> will find it easiest to focus on providing services. Such an emphasis … provides tangible benefits to local residents and hence makes it easier to gain their support. They will also look for other resources in order to be less dependent on the government and to enable them to build an organization around their own priorities.[30]

The Egyptian government does recognise the benefits provided by such organisations, as is demonstrated by the willingness of the Ministry of Social Affairs to fund thousands of these CDAs and PVOs throughout Egypt. Much of this is no doubt an aspect of control, or an attempt to have some influence in these groups and to take some credit for their successes, which are many.

International donors, principally USAID, also encourage and try to fund these local organisations directly. The Egyptian government, especially the Ministry of Interior, has been adamantly against this.[31] The Ministry of Social Affairs also wants to maintain central control and does not support decentralisation. This leads to speculation that, while these Islamic associations are far from posing a serious threat as strong pressure groups, central government takes them seriously enough as a potential opposition force to seek to co-opt them or prevent them from gaining a national cohesion that they now lack.

Islamic Society vs Secular State

While the Egyptian government scrambles to take credit for a grass-roots religious campaign that has achieved much in terms of providing basic

services for millions of poor people that the central government seems to have forgotten, the US Embassy in Cairo feels secure in its belief that 'fundamentalism' has peaked in Egypt.[32] The fact is, however, that it is 'secularism' that may have peaked in Egypt and that it is the 'Egyptian Revolution' of Nasser, Sadat, and to some extent Mubarak that seems to have failed. The forces of secularism have failed to provide the quality of services that they have continued to promise they would and could provide – basic educational, nutritional and health services; employment and job training; housing and transportation. While these are being provided by the government, many of them are far from being adequate and all of them are even further away from being of a quality that would make them desired by the Egyptian public.

Al-Azhar, which has bought into, and participated in, the secular promise of the 'Free Officers Movement', has not provided a clear message, let alone support for a specific programme of action. The *ulama* are not saying or effectively demonstrating how to end the economic crisis that Egypt continues to wallow in. They are not saying 'our plan is for ...'; they are not saying how to raise capital; how to create jobs, etc. The Muslim Brotherhood is taking on a slightly more active role in providing answers to Egypt's myriad problems than are the *ulama* of al-Azhar. But even their programme is too abstract, lacking both specific solutions as well as concrete actions.

Such actions are, of course, evident throughout Egypt, provided by thousands of small-scale, grass-roots, local and religious organisations. They are everywhere, but they are diffuse. They lack a single, unified, central organisation – there is no Islamic charitable organisation at a national or even governorate level – and the question is: will they in fact get organised?

Regardless of the answer to that question (it may be a mute point, if, for instance, such groups can continue to promote national development without central authority, which may in fact inhibit their activities), the larger question is: have we crossed the threshold of the secular as the state declines in Egypt, as elsewhere in the socialist, authoritarian world; and, as the private sector takes on a larger role, Islamic groups (inherently private) will want to get involved (or stay involved if they are involved already) in economic and social activities, especially if such activities fit in with their own philosophy or way of life.

A Positive Force for Change

In the case of Egypt, the Islamic 'movement' is evident throughout society, from the halls of government, to university campuses, trade unions, the army, and throughout village communities. The interests of the more

militant elements of this fragmented, uncoordinated 'movement' are under threat. President Mubarak has taken much of the wind out of their sails by bringing in ■ greater variety of interests than was allowed by Sadat. The economy continues to be in a state of crisis and Egypt maintains its peace treaty with Israel (two points that could be used to rally disgruntled elements against the government), but Mubarak has done much to bring Egypt back into a leading position in the Arab world. There is considerable public appreciation for his role in achieving this *rapprochement* with All Arab states.

While defusing much of the militant Islamic activity on campuses, and essentially coopting the politically active groups led by the Muslim Brethren, the Government of Egypt has not done enough to encourage the more truly representative Islamic organisations active in thousands of Egyptian communities. These are the groups that are stepping in to provide services that the government cannot or will not provide – education, job training, and health care being the most prominent of these services. By supporting these groups, which are often religiously based, the government would be associating itself in a positive way with groups that have won a great deal of local support and respect. In the name of Islam, good things are coming out of the efforts of thousands of devoted and committed Egyptians. These good things, essentially and primarily, are benefits to various local individuals and their communities, yet they have the potential to promote a grass-roots transformation of Egyptian society: a transformation towards greater self-reliance, economic and social (and probably political) development, with continued respect for traditional (religious and human) values.

Islam may not be *the* (that is, the sole) solution to Egypt's socio-economic conundrum but it is certainly an indispensable part of any other solution that may be offered.

NOTES

1. 'The Islamic world is no more Islamic today than it was a decade or ■ quarter century ago. It only seems more so, because mobilization has succeeded in bringing into the political arena classes and individuals traditionally cowed by political authority and convinced that power is the realm of people other than themselves.' Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 187.

2. Islamic schools have been highly publicised in the Western press, *The New York Times* and *The Economist*, especially, attributing much to their existence. The Dar al-Andalus Islamic primary school in Asyut is presented to Western audiences with its anti-American, anti-Russian banners and its slogan, 'echoing an Iranian one', *Islam, neither East nor West*. In lumping all things with an Islamic label (especially those that are not run by the government) into the same category and then presenting one of these as 'reactionary' or 'traditionalist' or 'chauvinistic', such reports automatically discredit the entire category, however wrongfully or ignorantly constructed it may be. This is a blatant disservice, if not a total distortion of the facts, to those thousands of PVOs that are run for a much more narrow and admirable purpose: the betterment of the lives of particular communities. Whether this also serves to promote Islam throughout Egypt is, in general, secondary to the main impetus behind these associations.
3. Needless to say, Richard P. Mitchell's *The Society of the Muslim Brethren* (Oxford University Press, 1969) is the most enlightening account of the founding, development, and programme of the *ikhwan*. For more recent accounts of the *ikhwan*, see Gilles Kepel's *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, in which the author compares the neo-Muslim Brotherhood not only with the original leadership of the *Ikhwan* but also with leaders of other contemporary Islamic organisations in Egypt; and see Emmanuel Sivan's *Radical Islam*, for a general comparison between the Eyptian and Syrian organisations, both known as the Muslim Brethren.
4. Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh*, transl. by Jon Rotchild (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) p. 129. This book is an indispensable resource for any student of contemporary Egyptian and/or Islamic social and political movements.
5. Ibid., p. 241. See Chapter 5 of that text for a complete analysis of the student *jama'at*.
6. *Middle East Economic Digest*, Special Report on Egypt, 14 October 1988, p. 44.
7. For an analysis of Egyptian bureaucracies and their efforts to promote development, especially in conjunction with the American economic aid programme in Egypt, see my *American Economic Aid to Egypt, 1975–86: Political and Bureaucratic Struggles over Aid Disbursement and Development Choices*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1987.
8. Interview with official in Ministry of Social Affairs, Cairo, 3 August 1987.
9. Perhaps the most visible and atypical example of a lucrative Islamic association is the Mustafa Mahmud Mosque and Society, located in the middle-class section of Muhandiseen in Cairo. The health centre, and soon a hospital, which are part and parcel of the Mosque, provide top incomes for many of its doctors. The general impression one gets of this society is that it is essentially 'capitalism with an Islamic face'.
10. In Egypt's Second Five Year Plan, 1987/88–1991/92, investment is projected at LE45.5 billion, up from LE39 billion in the 1982–87 plan. Priorities are new land reclamation and desert community development as well as scientific research and technology development, and projects that use existing, under-utilised capacity, most of which are in the public sector.
11. Interview with Catholic Relief Services official, Cairo, 2 August 1987.

12. Michael Hudson recognised that most Arab governments lacked legitimacy and were attempting to correct this situation through various techniques and ideologies. Since 1952 Egyptian governments have probably suffered least from such crises of legitimacy, but this may now be slowly changing – the principal question of this research. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
13. Morroe Berger, *Islam in Egypt Today: Social and Political Aspects of Popular Religion* (Cambridge University Press, 1970). See especially, chapter 4, 'Voluntary Benevolent Societies'.
14. Most of the information on Ezbet Zein is taken from Louise G. White (1986), 'Urban Community Organisations and Local Government: Exploring Relationships and Roles', *Public Administration and Political Development*, vol. 6, no. 93, pp. 239–53.
15. Ibid.
16. Interview with assistant at Sayida Zeinab, 27 March 1989.
17. Lawrence argues that Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East is a reaction against Marxism and that ex-Marxists have turned increasingly to Islam as an anti-modernist ideology. He suggests that as many as 60 per cent of Islamic fundamentalists in Gaza are ex-Marxists. (Lecture on his book, Harvard University, February 1988.)
18. Imam Roushdy Hammady, *Religious Medical Centres in Egypt*, thesis, American University in Cairo, 1990. p. 42.
19. Ibid., p. 45. Hammady speaks of a cap of LE600 per month for Medical Analysis Unit personnel, but does not mention any specifically for the specialist physicians. In my own interviews with some of these physicians in 1987, there did not appear to be a cap put on income, as some doctors told me that they appreciated working at the then-polyclinic (now a full-blown hospital) because they could make up to LE2000 in a month, depending on the services they provide.
20. Interview with *mudiir* (director) of YMMA, 14 August 1991.
21. Imam Roushdy Hammady, 1990, pp. 37–8. Also, interview with a woman whose sons were rejected by Sheikh Muhammad: The woman suggests that his decision may have been due to her appearance (not veiled, she wore 'Western'-style clothing).
22. Borrowed from Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World*, trans. by June Abbott (New York: Harper & Row, 1989). While Islamic and other legally registered PVOs are not comparable to the informal sector, the underground economy highlighted by de Soto, there are parallels between the two. PVOs in Egypt, while ostensibly part of the formal sector, nevertheless continue to skirt legality by bending many of the regulations in Law 32 of 1964. This and many other characteristics of these organisations place PVOs in a tenuous situation, both formal and informal.
23. Sample of patients at PVO hospitals and at two large private hospitals, and discussion with medical students and physicians in and out of university settings.
24. *Al-jamiyya al-shariyya bi-masjid al-Saahah* (al-Saahah is a street name, also known as Rushdie Street).

25. Imam Roushdy Hammady, 'Religious Medical Centres in Egypt', Master's Thesis, American University in Cairo, 1990. Quote is from Abstract; see also, p. 97.
26. *Al-Ahram*, 14 March 1991, p. 8.
27. Virginia Sherry prepared this report for *Middle East Watch*, 'Egyptian Government Moves to Dissolve Prominent Arab Women's Organization', September 1991.
28. Interview with Egyptian development specialist, 12 Feb. 1991.
29. White, op. cit., p. 250.
30. Ibid., p. 250.
31. Interview in Cairo with PVO director, March 1989.
32. This attribution of an Embassy 'belief' was given to me by an official from an international PVO who works closely with Islamic PVOs in Egypt, March 1989.

11 Russia and the Muslim States of Central Asia and Afghanistan

Mikhail Konarovsky

The disintegration of the Soviet empire and the formation of the CIS have not defused tensions in the vast region of what was known, until recently, the USSR. Not only are fellow members of the CIS suspicious about Russia, the giant among pygmies in the CIS, but ethnic minorities (with the potential to emerge as nations) within Russia continue to feel insecure about their coexistence within Russia.

The ethnically Turkish Muslims of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Chechenia, not long after the dismemberment of the USSR, have been hinting at coming out of the Russian state as independent entities. Tatarstan, with 26 per cent of the oil reserve of Russia and quite developed industrially, has a 50 per cent Turkic along with another 50 per cent Slavic population. It has not signed the Federation Treaty of March 1992, demanding a bilateral agreement with Russia. So, too, with Turkic Bashkortostan and the Caucasian Muslim Chechenia, in the north, which have not signed the Treaty as yet, expressing clear sentiments for independence. Chechenia has meanwhile urged Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to demonstrate their Islamic and ethnic solidarity against Russia.

Signs of Muslim-cum-pan-Turkic movements are also noticeable among Siberian Tatars. Muslim members of the CIS are playing the role of *agents provocateurs* to incite the Tatars within Russia; this, if not handled well, might eventually lead to Islamic Resurgence and turmoil in the region.

The swift debuts of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in international and regional arenas, aimed at ensuring their new political and economic concerns, reflected quite concrete spheres of interest. The Ukraine, Belarus and, to marked degree, Kazakhstan have a known specific interest in North America and Europe. South-west Asia and the rich Islamic and Arab world are top priorities for Central Asia and part of Transcaucasia. All expect an increase in ties with the Asian-Pacific area as well.

Russia has inherited the bulk of the former Soviet global policy, referring to its 'particular responsibility conferred on it by history'.[1] Such an approach is predetermined by the strategic dimensions of the country's territory, and its significant human and natural resources.[2] Nuclear status, which Russia is unlikely to give up, supports this outcome as well. New dramatic reductions of nuclear arsenals on the basis of new agreements reached during President Yeltsin's visit to Washington in June 1992[3] is evidence of further Russia–West *rapprochement*, which is of strategic need for Moscow to overcome comprehensive crises and to build a completely new economic and social infrastructure.

Russia's possible geopolitical advantages in the future, as the principal bridge between the West and the East, might nevertheless be seriously restrained by many old and new dilemmas. Central among them are relations with CIS counterparts. Mutual ties are considerably burdened by their suspicions and concerns about Russia's intention to inherit the former USSR's ambitions in dealing with the newly independent republics. A few ill-considered steps in relations with these republics, taken by Moscow before and after the CIS was created, have resulted in a rise in such anxieties, anxieties that needed to be dispelled in order for Moscow to strengthen the 'belt of good-neighbourliness' along the entire perimeter of its borders. This is one of the main tasks in order to ensure Russia's national security in the country's new shape, and against the background of comprehensive Westernisation in its economy and social life and ■ general *rapprochement* with the West. Ties with 'more distant' countries, that is, Third World and developing nations, make up the triangle of Russia's foreign policy priorities.

But, in its present shape, Russia may be considered predominantly an Asian nation. Most of its borders, with both foreign and CIS nations, are in Asia and the Pacific. The eastern regions might in the long run ensure Russia's economic revival and its political fate. That is why dimensions of foreign policy in general, and in Asia in particular, became ■ matter of hot discussion in the media and in Parliament just after the CIS was born. Having expressed concern about 'over-close' relations with the West, at the possible expense of ties with strategically important neighbours in Asia, analysts were concerned about the fact that ■ long-term vision of policy in the East, including the neighbouring Islamic world in the Southern Tier, had not been outlined.

Such concerns are quite evident and naturally determined, since dealing with 'more distant' states means, for Moscow, primarily the large Muslim zone along the southern borders of the former USSR. Developments in the Near East and in South-west Asia over the decade since the mid-1980s

have had a serious impact on Soviet foreign and domestic policies. Now, in the unravelling new geopolitical situation there, evolving directions of policy by Muslim states such as Pakistan and Turkey may exert a further dramatic influence on the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics, which are Russia's immediate neighbours in the South. These countries' swift leap to the Islamic world makes it more urgent that Moscow's attention be paid to the region. The emergence of new regional economic associations, with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in key roles, makes it particularly expedient for Moscow to review developments here carefully in order to take an active part in them, and to save itself from possible isolation.

The uncertainties and ambiguities of the situation in Central Asia, and the creation of the CIS after the downfall of the former Soviet Union, have made them the principal 'battle field' of neighbouring Muslim countries for predominant influence, and this, in due course may affect political stability in Russia. This pattern has a special significance for Moscow since, in its present unstable situation, it is predominantly the domestic aspects that will determine the political future of the country. The painful transformation to a completely new socio-economic structure is significantly burdened in Russia by deep economic and social crises and political instability. Salient moves towards the disintegration of the Federation are significantly fed by the rise of pan-Turkic notions and Islamism in several economically important parts of the country, echoing a similar trend in neighbouring Central Asia.

A new Federation Treaty, which was initiated by a majority of Russia's republics and regions in March 1992, did not eliminate doubts about the country's future as an integrated state. Significantly, Tatarstan, one of the most industrially advanced parts of the country's central regions (producing, in particular, 26 per cent of its oil), the second largest populated area, with an approximately 50–50 Turkic and Slavic population, declined to sign the Treaty, and insisted that its bilateral relations with Russia be built on a separate agreement. Disagreements with another, larger, territory with significant industrial capacity, the Turkic Bashkortostan, were watered down at the last moment before the Treaty was concluded. North-Caucasian Muslim Chechenia, having proclaimed independence from Russia, also refused to participate in the accord. To counter Moscow's pressure, it called on Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, as well as on Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, to collectively demonstrate their religious and ethnic solidarity in order to pool their mutual efforts to oppose the alleged 'anti-national policy of the Russian leadership'[4] Uncertainties in these areas, as well as the newly emerged Muslim and pan-Turkic movements in Siberia where separatist notions are being directly fed by extracts expressing

religious and nationalistic sentiments in order to create 'a sovereign republic of Siberian Tatars'[5], are additional developments of deep concern to the Russian leadership.

The swift diplomatic recognition of the Central Asian states by their Near East and South-west Asian neighbours has brought new impetus for further expansion of their comprehensive relations with the belt of Muslim states in the South. Political, economic and cultural cooperation with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan is at the core of the move that actually started in the late 1980s, on the eve of the political disintegration of the USSR. Special stress, in economic ties, is laid on enhancing bonds in the reconstruction of infrastructure, and in the exploitation of mineral resources such as oil and gas. Hard currency revenues from sales abroad are considered one of the main sources to provide self-sufficiency in local economic and social programmes. On this basis all regional players, both traditional and new, are drawing up the framework of a new broad common economic space, which embraces structures that existed before. In February 1992 Central Asia as well as Transcaucasian Azerbaijan, were admitted to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), an economic grouping that included Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

Ankara is no doubt a driving force in these efforts. During high-ranking visits from Turkey to Central Asia in 1992, a sort of 'Turkic Common Market' was on the agenda. To bolster the efforts, Ankara has put forward the idea of creating a Development Bank for Central Asia and of incorporating the Turkic republics in the recently established Black Sea Economic Zone.[6] In May 1992, a high-level meeting of Central Asia, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan discussed measures aimed at implementing joint projects. These efforts, against the background of the earlier understanding to link regional railroads together to provide Central Asia's access to the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and China, indicate the impending emergence of a new, large Asian economic community, which might at the same time be based on a strong ethnic and religious identity.

The interest of the regional states in Central Asia has its 'nuclear angle' as well. Though the principal plutonium and highly enriched uranium producing plants are located in Russia,[7] the bulk of the former Soviet uranium mines are predominantly concentrated in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan, as well as, probably, in Uzbekistan.[8] In the light of Iran's and Pakistan's intentions to speed up nuclear co-operation among the Muslim countries, not only for economic, but also for political reasons, Central Asia, rich with strategic mineral resources, may become one of the main sources or targets in this regard. Historical, religious, and ethnic ties to the region might bring new ideological impetus to such a cooperation.[9]

Of significance here is the fact that the rise of Turkish–Iranian competition for influence in the region is taking place against the background of the rise of Islamic and pan-Turkic tendencies. Fundamentalist sentiments, bolstered by Iran and Pakistan, and openly advocated by the *mojahideen* movement in Afghanistan before and after the overthrow of the Najibullah regime in that country, in late April 1992, is a distinguishing feature of the regional developments too. Essentially, one can say that the 'struggle for Islam' in Central Asia has been gaining momentum since the mid-1980s, when the republics first started moves towards obtaining sovereignty and independence. As is to be expected, these tendencies have spiralled since the dissolution of the USSR, having tinged significantly the domestic political make-up of Central Asia.

The emergence of Islamic political movements in Central Asia, which are strongly bolstered by the growing influence of 'non official' *mullas* among both rural and urban populations, must mean that Islam is on the political agenda in Central Asia.[10] The official clergy nevertheless seems to exhibit a careful approach to its prospective role in politics, emphasising that the main objective today is 'to let Islam re-emerge as a belief.'[11] But inevitably the next step after such a development would be an increase in Islam's involvement in the domestic and foreign policies of the affected states. The specific nature of the situation in Central Asia over the many years of Soviet rule predetermined such ■ scenario.

It is plausible to argue that the formal Communist ideology had embraced only the superficial layer of the social structure, it having retained untouched all traditional institutions with their close ties with religion. Soviet rule only adjusted itself to realities.[12] The USSR's gradual decline since the mid-1980s, parallel to the growing social openness, has generated popular appeals to return to historical, cultural and religious 'roots'. Severe economic deterioration over the years of 'perestroika' gave a new domestic impetus to a revival of traditionalism, since a considerable part of the population regards it ■ the only moral formula to overcome deep economic and social crises. The extension of comprehensive ties with neighbouring Muslim Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, and the geographically more distant, but religiously and culturally close Arab world, must surely speed up the process.

The alliance between the clergy and local intellectuals in Central Asia can be explained by the fact that both are deeply 'infected' by overstressing national traditions, rules and customs. For most local intellectuals, who are mostly humanists, deep family and clan ties with the clergy help maintain their religious, traditional consciousness[13]. Such ■ alliance seems to be natural given the present conditions, but in the near future it can be expected to give way in favour of traditionalism. The secular intel-

ligentsia is not numerous, and its influence spreads, for the most part, to urban areas. In contrast, religious institutions, both official and non-official, have ■ wide-spread network which extends all over the region. As an illustration, a democratic candidate for presidency in the 1991 elections in Tajikistan could obtain over 34 per cent of votes only after he had received the strong support of the official clergy and the recently legalised 'Islamic Rebirth Party'. The developments there, from late 1991 until now, have been characterised by an increase in pressure on the presidential power from the alliance of local intellectuals and Islamic movements, under the slogans of not only 'more democracy', but also 'more Islam'.[14]

Since then, in the political and cultural sphere, which is a major battlefield in relations between Iran and Turkey and to some extent Pakistan, a policy based on Turkic nationalism and ■ secularism in the economy on one side, and Iranian Islam, backed by the country's rich historical heritage, on the other, have been weighty arguments in each's dealings with Central Asia. Revival in that region, where the Muslim population remains predominantly Turkic,[15] however, may suggest a more favourable position for Turkey in the long-term. The economic advantages of the breakthrough in the ties of the Central Asian republics with the neighbouring Southwest Asian nations are unlikely to bear fruits immediately. But the rapid extension of religious and cultural ties with these countries may exert additional influence on the shaky domestic political equilibrium in the near future.

Anxiety about the direct influence of religious and ethnic intolerance in Central Asia on several million of Russia's Muslim Turks (who live in industrially developed and economically important regions) is one of the main issues on Moscow's agenda, in relations with her new neighbours in the South. The second is the future of Russian minorities here. Despite the permanent decrease in numbers since the 1960s, the Russian-speaking population in Central Asia still remains significant and numbers about 16 million.[16] An increase in Russophobia and intolerance of 'infidels' all over the region might be a stumbling block in relations between Russia and Central Asia in the long run. It was thus not surprising, against the open and latent discrimination against the Russian-speaking population in other CIS countries, to see Moscow making the protection of the Russians outside the Federations 'a top priority' in relations with her newly emerged neighbours.

The tendency on the part of non-Muslim minorities in Central Asia to leave the region has become evident since 1986–87. But, in the case of their influx from Central Asia as a result of nationalist intolerance, not only Russia, but also the Central Asian nations, may find themselves in ■ difficult and ambiguous political and economic situation. Russia will face the

problem of their settlement and of providing them with jobs. In present conditions, characterised by a drastic budget deficit and impending mass unemployment, it will be extremely difficult for Moscow to meet this challenge without the risk of inviting serious new social problems. The massive influx from Central Asia and Kazakhstan might swing the pendulum of public opinion in Russia towards an increase in its own nationalism and isolationism as well. This fact may also pour oil on the flames of the general debate about the expediency of continuing traditional ties with the regions, whereas in the past, 'by any objective criteria, the imperial masters were subsidizing their reluctant subjects'[17] during both the Czarist empire and the Soviet rule. For their part, the Central Asian nations might encounter a further economic recession since the Russian-speaking population forms the bulk of the skilled labour force in local industries, management and business administration.

That is why both Russia and Central Asia, in building their post-Soviet relations, have little choice but to show mutual discretion and consideration. A transfer of the intolerance and suspicion, shown by all of them toward 'the Centre' over the years of 'perestroyka', to mutual relations in this new situation, could lead to new dilemmas. Moscow has to be extremely conscious of the political, cultural and economic expediency and appropriateness for the Central Asian republics to extend comprehensive relations with the Near East and South-west Asia, while, at the same time, maintaining reasonable balances with Russia in the north, and their neighbours in the south. The maintenance of Moscow's high profile here might significantly protect Russia from aggressive intoleranee from the Southern Tier.

Close relations with Kazakhstan seem to be, in this respect, a matter of particular importance for Russia's strategy in the region. After all, the greater part of the country's border with its southern-neighbours is with Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan possesses the third largest industrial capacity in the CIS (after Russia and the Ukraine), with a still remaining nuclear capacity, and with strategically important space-launching sites. The specific demographic situation (a non-Turkic population of more than 40 per cent) must mean that the government has to pursue a balanced domestic policy. This mainstream still enjoys support from the official clergy, as well as maintaining a negative view of the direct involvement of Islam and pan-Turkism in domestic politics.[18] Kazakhstan's intention to expand comprehensive relations with the West, as a new linchpin between Asia and Europe, is evidence that not only may influence Kazakhstan's more efficient bilateral regional coordination with Russia, but also might determine a cooperation in the triangular Russia–Kazakhstan–USA. co-operation. Alma-Ata's good neighbourly relationship with Beijing[19] is

significant for Russia as well, in coordinating its approach towards developments in the region with these two nations. The desire to overcome a perennial image of ethnic inferiority in the eyes of the rest of the Central Asian nations, and in particular the Uzbeks and Tajiks,[20] is a factor that might make Kazakhstan pursue a policy that is broader than that of other Central Asian republics.

But, nevertheless, a hidden process, similar to that found elsewhere in Central Asia, is also under way in Kazakhstan, challenging its domestic policy.[21] The recently adopted Status of language and citizenship was considered by many non-Kazakh residents as 'discriminatory'. They requested more rights on governmental bodies in the country's northern areas, where the predominant non-Kazakh population is concentrated in basic local enterprises.[22] In May 1992, Russia and Kazakhstan initiated a Collective Security Treaty, signed with three other Central Asian republics (minus Kirghizstan) and Transcaucasian Armenia. All national armed forces were to be included in the new bloc;[23] each country, if attacked, would enjoy military support. Ukraine, the second industrially powerful CIS member, did not sign the Treaty. Given its salient intention to secede from the CIS, and Kiev's declaration of intention to obtain, in the future, a neutral status, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine will sign the document. Belarus has still not shown interest either.

Such a disengagement among the three CIS Slavic founders might make the new Treaty (if it survives), a precursor of the emergence of a new political, military and economic association which might replace today's CIS. The new dimensions of economic integration that are gaining momentum in the vast space from the Black Sea and the Near East to South-west Asia (Black Sea Economic Zone, enlarged ECO, Caspian Council) may stimulate such a move. Such a process, which embraces the newly post-Soviet Central Asia and Transcaucasia, as well as Russia, might lead to the emergence of new regional structures, with the traditional economic ties among the CIS members as only one of their integral parts.

But the differences in specific economic conceptions, in starting points and paces towards implementation of economic reforms, may, to a great extent, torpedo the mutual efforts of a newly emerging identity in introducing a market-oriented economy in the common economic space. Possible differences in views on building up political relations in regional dimensions might also be a stumbling block in the drawing up of joint security strategy. In the short term, such differences may emerge in the approach to the Armenia–Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. It will be remembered that Transcaucasian Muslim Azerbaijan, with its growing shift towards Turkey, did not join the Treaty. Christian Armenia did, as a guarantee for its political survival in predominantly Muslim (Azerbaijan,

Turkey, Iran) surroundings. But it is unlikely that the Central Asian Muslim nations will show great enthusiasm in backing Christian Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan.

Domestic instabilities, also, will cause uncertainties for the regional bloc. The present secular regimes in Central Asia might be replaced by a combination of Islam-oriented traditionalist or nationalist governments. As a result, new and significant shifts in their foreign priorities may emerge, even more inclined to the South. In such a case their interest in strong military–political ties with the other Treaty members, and primarily with Russia, might be put into question. Moscow, for its part, will face a dilemma between expediency and political calculations in her attempts to maintain close ties with Central Asia, if the latter is influenced by a fundamentalist type of Islam.

Russia and Kazakhstan are essentially at the core of the hexagron; the state of relations between them will significantly determine the fate of the new grouping. At the same time, Uzbekistan, given its 17 million population, rich resources and historical heritage as a dynamic Turkic nation, can be a principal future challenger to Kazakhstan in Central as well as possibly in South-west Asia. This fact makes it necessary for Russia to build up close relations with Tashkent, which will be important in dealing with this vast, predominantly Turkic region.

Iran, Turkey and Pakistan are the main outer-regional players, which exert increased influence on Central Asia and its internal and foreign policy. In the new political conditions in the region, Moscow has begun reviewing it past relations with Teheran and Islamabad with the main goal of maintaining continuity of economic, and to a marked degree, political cooperation with them. At the same time, however, Russia's relations with Tehran and Islamabad might remain controversial, if not difficult, in the longer term. Thus it is expedient for all three nations to search more scrupulously for points of understanding and collaboration, to prevent their hidden competition in the region from being turned into new hostility. One of the main objects for such cooperation might be a new Afghanistan.

THE AFGHANISTAN FACTOR

In late April 1992, the Najibullah regime in Kabul was overthrown by the *mojahideen*, and the country was quickly proclaimed an Islamic Republic. This fact has significantly strengthened regional Islamic and ethnic controversies, having exerted new pressure on Central Asia and particularly on Tajikistan. The new instability in Kabul, a result of the struggle for power-sharing on new terms, may cause a new long period of uncertainty

in the country, with ethnic rivalry ■ its core. If such moves gain momentum, they could seriously worsen the situation in the region, and might embroil neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Proceeding from different considerations, these states have, however, seen the necessity to prevent any serious aggravations in Afghanistan, since these may create obstacles in their domestic affairs and in regional strategy aimed at a 'soft break-through' to Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Uzbekistan, the largest and potentially most powerful of Afghanistan's immediate neighbours in Central Asia, as well as Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (all with population kindred to Afghanistan's northern areas) are momentarily preoccupied with economic crises and watering down domestic uncertainties. But if ethnic rivalry in the Pushtun–Tajik–Uzbek triangle in Afghanistan were to escalate, Central Asia would not be able to avoid getting involved in the conflict. Mutual suspicions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan might arise, embroiling other Central Asian nations such as Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan, and possibly Kazakhstan, something which would be of grave concern to Moscow.

These facts also call for Moscow to keep, to a marked degree, a high profile in the new Afghanistan. But its influence on developments there is now seriously limited. Hence, Afghanistan now, politically and geographically, is a 'distant state' to Russia, a fact that will most probably diminish political relations in the long run. Moscow's principle approach to Kabul will very probably be drawn up by taking into consideration Russia's relations with Central Asia, as well as with Iran and Pakistan. Nevertheless, it is in Russia's long-term interest to take part in watering down any possible new rise of general instability in Afghanistan. A workable relationship with Pakistan, Iran and the United States, let alone Central Asia, is in this regard, clearly necessary.

During talks in Moscow in November 1992, the *mojahideen* insisted that all Soviet–Afghan agreements, signed after the April 1978 coup in Kabul be regarded as invalid. As a result of bargaining it was stated that they would be reviewed by a new Islamic government. Such a government is now in power. But the revision may contain many reefs for Russia. Kabul's main target will be primarily the 1978 Soviet–Afghan Treaty, on which basis the Soviet troops had been brought to Afghanistan. With the Treaty abolished, the former *mojahideen* may again raise the question of repayment of damages, which were inflicted upon the country during the eight and a half years of Soviet occupation.

Given Moscow's heritage, this burden would fall predominantly on Russia. But given the present economic crises in the country, it seems unrealistic for Kabul to expect massive rebates from Moscow. Russia has actually made this quite clear, having recently confirmed that it 'does not

consider itself responsible for the sufferings and destruction caused by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan'.[24] The Central Asian and other republics of the former USSR may take the same stance as well. The former Soviet POW's, however, might remain the *mojahideen*'s lever in exerting pressure on Moscow. To break the possible joint Russian–Central Asian efforts to release POWs, Kabul might again embark on its previous practice of dividing them according to whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim.

These regional and domestic considerations, it can be argued here, will prompt Russia, despite its preoccupation with internal problems, to participate in the post-civil war reconstruction in Afghanistan. The former USSR's massive economic assistance to that country was shared by several union republics, including those of Central Asia. Thus, it seems expedient for Moscow to cooperate closely with them on the matter. Such cooperation will not only assist Russia in having all its POWs released, but will also help build a common standing with Central Asia in their long-term relations with Afghanistan.

Today, the West in general, and Washington in particular, is unlikely to pay special attention to the new trends in the policies of Russia's new neighbours in Central Asia. Its general approach to the region seems to be similar to the traditional (till 1978, and from 1989) one of Afghanistan as a region which is outside of its sphere of political and economic priorities. American specialists are even somewhat inclined to the US being deeply involved in Central Asia. But the new world situation, characterised by the growing conflict between the North and the South, a phenomenon which might take the form of a conflict between the West and the Muslim world, might change Washington's view of that region. This might occur if the newly emerged regional nations were actively embroiled in a regional arms race, or if nuclear instability resulted from a vast access of Islamic Iran or Pakistan to the Central Asian uranium mines. In this case the US might attach more political significance to coordinating its regional policy with Russia. But it is in Moscow's interest now, so that the 'Struggle for Central Asia' does not result in the 'defeat of secularism' to show more dynamism in encouraging Washington's high profile here.

NOTES

1. A. Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 'Russia: Chance for Survival', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 6, Spring 1992, p. 12.
2. By the end of 1991, 51 per cent, i.e. 148 million, of the total USSR population lived in the Russian Federation. At the same time Russia produced

more than 90 per cent of the oil, 80 per cent of the timber, more than 60 per cent of the electricity, about 60 per cent of the steel, more than 50 per cent of the coal, grain and meat. *The Economist*, 2–8 Nov. 1991, p. 44.

3. *New York Times*, 17 June 1992, pp. A-1, A-10.
4. Moscow Interfax, 6 March 1992; FBIS-SOV-92-046, 6 March 1992, p. 33.
5. Moscow, TASS International Service, 17 Feb. 1992; FBIS-SOV-92-034. p. 73.
6. Prime Minister S. Demirel of Turkey. Interview for *Time* magazine, *Time*, 10 Feb. 1992, p. 40.
7. Robert S. Norris, 'The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 22, no. 1. Jan/Feb. 1992. p. 27.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 34.
10. According to the public poll carried out in October 1991 by National Public Opinion Studies Centre in Moscow, more then 60 per cent of those who were questioned in Central Asia considered the installation of Islamic government in their republics as quite possible in the near future, FBIS-SOV-91-0219, 13 Nov. 1991.
11. Interview with the Chairman (*mufti*) of the Kazyat of Muslims of Tajikistan, Kazi Kolon Khodzi Akbar Turadzhonzoda, for *Berliner Zeitung* on 22 Nov. 1991, p. 7; FBIS-SOV-91-229, 27 Nov. 1991, p. 73.
12. 'The Soviet regime in Central Asia represented itself as a sort of deformed tangle of Communist ideas and ways of governing, and customs and rules of local khans, let alone tribe relations and religious forms', *Izvestiya*, 13 Sept. 1992, p. 3.
13. S. Polykov. *Traditionalism v sovremennom srednesadiatskom obshestve* (Traditionalism in Central Asian society today) (Moskva: 'Znaniye', 1989) pp. 88–9.
14. *New York Times*, 9 June 1992, pp. A-1, A-16.
15. In Central Asia only Tajiks are non-Turkic. Among the total 56.4 million population in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, ethnic Turks are estimate take about 33 million, Tajiks, who constitute only 60 per cent of the population in Tajikistan itself, about 3 million, and there are 13.5 million 'Russian-speaking', compiled on the data issued in the *Washington Post*, 24 Nov. 1991.
16. By the 1980s it comprised in Kazakhstan about 41 per cent, in Kirghiztan about 26 per cent, in Turkmenistan about 13 per cent, and in each of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan about 11 per cent of total population. *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, ed. by G. Smith (London and New York: Longman 1990) Appendix 2, Table 3.
17. Dimitri Simes, 'Russia Reborn', *Foreign Policy*, no. 85, Winter 1991/92. p. 49.
18. Mufti of Kazakhstanl, R. Nysanbayev, strongly opposed the idea of the creation of an Islamic Party in the country, since 'if it were established, the republic would certainly be swept by pan-turkic ideas which could inflame hostility between the adherents of various religious convictions', FBIS-SOV-91-221, 15 Nov. 1991, p. 88.
19. In March 1992, Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, S. Tereschehnko, visited China. A joint Communiqué outlined the principles of bilateral political relations and stressed the need to develop economic ties. Agreements on cooperation in economy, transport, and in setting up a Joint Economic and

Technological Commission were signed. The two sides positively assessed the results of Soviet–Chinese border talks and decided to continue their respective discussions, TASS, International Service, 28 Feb. 1992; FBIS-SOV-92-048, 11 March 1992, p. 59.

20. Statement by Prof. G. Mirksy. Congressional hearings 'United States Policy toward Central Asia', 28 April 1992, *Central Asia Monitor*, no. 2, 1992, p. 30.
21. It should be remembered in this respect that it was the ethnic–religious rioting in Alma-Ata, as far back as December 1986, after the ousting of the corrupt Republican Communist Party chief, D. Kunayev, and his replacement by an ethnic Russian, that essentially became a first challenge to M. Gorbachev's domestic policy.
22. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 29 Feb. 1992, p. 7.
23. *Izvestiya*, 16 May 1992, p. 1.
24. ITAR TASS, Moscow, 14 May 1992; FBIS-SOV-92-095, 15 May 1992, p. 14.

12 Muslim National Communism in Tatarstan: The Dream of Sultangaliev Revisited

Masayuki Yamauchi

The demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States did not solve the problems created by different centrifugal forces within Russia. This conveys the ominous message to peace-loving people everywhere that the Russian Federation, still the biggest country in the world in land mass, is under threat of disintegration like the former Soviet Union.

Tatarstan, 800 kilometres east of Moscow, has followed Chechenia by refusing to sign the 'Federation Treaty' of March 1992, expressing its desire to come out of the Russian Federation. If Muslim-dominated Tatarstan were to come out of the Russian Federation, it need not be assumed that it would be an Islamic State. Rather, it appears that the state would adopt Muslim National Communism, as espoused by one of is greatest leaders, Mirsaid Sultangaliev (1892–1940), who was executed by Stalin in 1940 for being an independent 'Muslim' leader.

The Russian Federation is no exception to the present disintegration of the former Soviet Union. There is the potential for further worsening of ethnic troubles. The Republic of Tatarstan, just 800 kilometres east of Moscow, has followed the lead of Chechenia in declaring its wish for independence. By refusing to sign the Federation Treaty, it has highlighted a serious miscalculation on the part of the Russian Federation. The 'dream of Sultangaliev' may soon be realised.

Mirsaid Sultangaliev (1892–1940) was one of the highest-ranking figures among Muslim Communists in the Russian Communist Party hierarchy in the early 1920s during the Stalinist regime. His promotion through the Party hierarchy had been meteoric. He became simultaneously a member of the Central Muslim Commissariat, Chairman of the Muslim

Military Collegium, a member of the Collegium of the Peoples Commissariat of Nationalities, editor of *Zhizn' Natsional'nostei* (Nationalities Affairs), and a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Tatarstan Republic. However, in 1923, as the Muslim Tatar leader, he was accused of nationalist, pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic deviations, for which he was arrested and ejected from the party. Stalin was not sympathetic to his attempts to synthesise Islam, nationalism and communism for a revolution in the East in general and the Muslim world in particular.[1]

On 1 June 1990, Sultangaliev and 76 comrades were rehabilitated as a result of investigations under the direction of Yakovrev. New material and studies have since become available in Tatarstan.[2]

We shall here discuss two, heretofore unknown, aspects: Sultangaliev's family and private life: and the June 1923 conference on the nationalities question, and the background of his fist political arrest.

SULTANGALIEV'S EARLY LIFE

Sultangaliev was born in the poor village of Elimbetvo, Ufa Guberniya, on 13 June 1892. His father, Khaidargali Sultangaliev, was a *muderris* (religious teacher) of the village *mekteb* (college). After receiving instruction from his father, he entered the Tatar Teachers' College (*Tatarskaya Uchitel 'skaya Shkola*) in Kazan, rather than entering a *medrese* (religious school), as his father seems to have wished. He was infected by revolutionary ideas like other young people in Russia at the time. After graduating, Sultangaliev found employment in a village *mekteb*, but he was poor and nearly starved. He moved to Ufa in order to work enthusiastically to solve the root causes of social injustice. He was also a great reader of the Russian literary masterpieces, and translated works by Tolstoy and Pushkin into the Tatar and Bashkir languages. Unfulfilled by translating, he tried to write stories.

His private life remains largely veiled in mystery. But thanks to the recent publication of new material,[3] we know that he was twice married, had one child by his first wife, and two by his second. He married Rauza Chan'sheva in 1913; she was a niece of Yakup Chan'shev, who rose to become the Tatar general in the Red Army.

The newly-weds moved to Baku in Azerbaijan to seek employment. Sultangaliev began to publish articles in Baku newspapers and magazines. It was in Baku that this future leader of Muslim National Communism got his practical experience.

Sultangaliev returned to Kazan in 1917 to join in the civil war being fought in the Middle-Volga and rural region. In Kazan, he collaborated with Mulla Nur-Vahitov to form the Muslim Nationalist Committee, which would later become a kind of self-styled Muslim Communist Party (Bolshevik). Around the same time, Sultangaliev joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), in which he would remain until his expulsion on 4 May 1923. He was one of the most outstanding Tatar figures involved in establishing Soviet power in the Middle-Volga. He seemed to unite the best qualities of the politician and of the military leader, as embodied in Muslim standards of the time. According to the contemporary Tatar historian, Sultanbekov, Sultangaliev, was 'highly endowed by nature with the skilful talent of ■■ organizer, had firmness of character, was ■ highly gifted propagandist, and had strong will even in the most extreme situation.'[4]

During this time, Rauza had become known as a leading women's rights activist in the Muslim areas of the Russian Empire. She was ■ woman of fashion and independence, cutting quite ■ figure in pre-revolutionary Russia. Rauza was also free in her relations with others. Sultangaliev fired a Browning revolver at one of her lovers, and was arrested because the man died. He was let off after a week, through the intervention of Stalin. This was the first of Sultangaliev's several arrests after the Revolution.

Sultangaliev divorced Rauza in 1918. She died of typhoid in 1920 or 1921, leaving behind her daughter Rashida. Rashida's life was an exception under Stalinist rule: she would never suffer serious persecution. She spent most of her life as a librarian in Saratov (where by chance Sultangaliev was permitted to live, under strict conditions, for a time after his release from prison). She bore a daughter from an unhappy marriage with a Russian, which would end in divorce, and died in her bed in Moscow at the end of the 1950s.

Soon after his divorce from Rauza, Sultangaliev remarried, in the same year. The new spouse, Fatima Ezina, was the daughter of ■ wealthy Tatar merchant. It seems the two were brought together by a mutual love for the arts. Their life together would not endure long: Sultangaliev was arrested on ■ May 1923, for the second time.

THEORY AND STRATEGY

Sultangaliev enjoyed Stalin's confidence, having worked capably and conscientiously in the Commissariat of Nationalities, over which Stalin presided. The theories of Sultangaliev, the Muslim National Communist,

were tempered by an 'Eastern strategy'.[5] This new strategy stressed that the revolution should be exported beyond the borders of the former Russian Empire, incorporating into the National communist universe millions of oppressed people – mostly Asian Muslims. Sultangaliev argued that this strategy was feasible for two reasons.

First, the revolution in Europe was dead and showed no signs of resurrection; 'The fire of revolution in Europe no longer burned'. Secondly, Asia was a powder keg which would explode when exposed to the flicker of revolutionary flame. According to Sultangaliev and his supporters, successful national liberation movements in the colonies could sound the death knell of Western capitalism. The basis of his thinking was the idea of 'proletarian nations'. Sultangaliev argues that all classes of Muslim colonised peoples had the right to be called 'proletarian' because of the rude oppression imposed by imperial colonisers. Priority had to be give to national liberation, while social revolution through the class struggle postponed indefinitely.

These ideas came from the conflict between the Muslim National Communists and the Russian Bolsheviks. He left no doubts as to the identity of the imperial colonisers: the Russians, including the Bolsheviks, whom he thought incapable of solving the nationalities problem. He wanted to give Marxism a 'Muslim' national face. The struggle for organisational independence from the Russians was carried on in two important areas: the formation of independent or autonomous communist parties and the formation of national military units. These were designed to develop in the future into the Muslim Communist Party, with its own elected Central Committee, and the Muslim Army, with Muslim commanders and officers.

However, with their organisational base cut away from under the Muslim National Communists, and their independent military units diluted in the larger Red army, Sultangaliev and the National Communists, after 1919, espoused increasingly radical solutions to the nationalities problem. It was in the period between 1919 and 1923 that Sultangaliev elaborated his eastern strategy. The concepts of the Colonial International, independent from the Comintern, and the Muslim–Turkic Republic, which would have stretched from Kazan to Baku, the Crimea to the Pamirs, were designed. Both were then considered less realistic and less realisable.

BATTLE FOR NATIONALITIES

Despite enjoying Stalin's confidence, Sultangaliev was arrested on Stalin's orders. The reason was that he had incautiously begun to publicise results

of the twelfth Congress on the question of nationalities, and in particular the ideas contained in Lenin's letter.

The conflict between Lenin and Stalin over nationalities policy in Georgia in 1922–23 is well known. In January 1923, Lenin drafted a famous letter in which he denounced Stalin and Dzerzhinsky (head of the GPU) for their 'Great-Russian nationalist campaign' in Georgia, and criticised Stalin for his 'hastiness and administrative enthusiasm, as well as his hostility toward "socialist nationalism"'.

At the end of March, at the Tenth Soviet Congress, Sultangaliev blamed Stalin for his nationalities policy, which made 'a discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children'. His speech was greeted with cheers from the audience.

The letter that got Sultangaliev into trouble was entitled 'On the Question of Nationalities Policy', or 'Autonomization', and was meant to be presented at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923. Conveniently for Stalin, Lenin suffered a stroke on 10 March, from which he would never recover.

Three months after the Twelfth Congress, the Party Central Committee called an expanded conference on the 'national' question. Kamenev would be chairman; participants included party activists from the national republics and regions, including Ibragimov, Enbaev and Saidgaliev from Tatarstan, Firdevs from Crimea, Turar Ryskulov from Kazakhstan, Adigamov from Bashqordistan, and Akmar Ikramov from Uzbekistan. Of the eleven members and candidates of the Politburo elected at the Twelfth Party Congress, nine participated in the expanded conference.

Lenin was absent, but Trotsky was present. Other participants were twenty members and candidates of the Central Committee, and six members of the Central Control Commission. Thus, the expanded conference was a kind of expanded plenum of the Party Central Committee.

Stalin had convened the conference with two aims in mind. One was to discredit Sultangaliev, by coining the political epithet 'Sultangalievshchina', and to call for the expulsion of 'national deviationists' by talking about the danger of local nationalism. Stalin's other aim was to discredit Lenin and his letter. At this time, Sultangaliev was already aware that the GPU was watching him.[6]

Stalin tried to use Sultangaliev's case to change party policy in a direction opposed to the line established by the Twelfth Party Congress. He thus slighted the issue of great-power chauvinism and sought to combat local nationalist deviation. Stalin was already using extreme methods to depose his personal enemies, a method he would employ increasingly in future years.

It is clear that the Sultangaliev case was a politically sophisticated provocation, planned and executed by Stalin himself with consummate skill

and the participation of the GPU. Throughout the four-day conference (9–12 June), participants denounced Sultangaliev. He had no opportunity to reply, having been arrested before the conference opened. The charges were trumped up.

The testimony of a Kazakh delegate, Turar Ryskulov, is worth citing. Sultangaliev had written in a letter to Ryskulov of his desire to speak out, along with other Muslim comrades, in defence of local interests in national border regions, at the next Congress of Soviets. He had not been thinking in terms of an illegal secret organisation, as some charged.

Sultangaliev had been incautious in his letter to Adigamov, People's Commissar of Education of Bashkir republic. In that ciphered letter, he had urged Adigamov to make contact with Zeki Validov (Togan), who had been involved in the anti-Soviet Basmachi movement in Central Asia. In his own defence, Sultangaliev explained that he had attempted to convert Validov to the Soviets' camp, and that he had once persuaded Validov to deliver Bashkir troops to the Soviets in 1919.

The Ukraine delegate, Skrypnik, commented astutely on the proceeding: 'I fear that every approach to the Sultangaliev case at this conference will lead to a certain shift in our political line.'[7]

The First Trial: Imprisoned in Lubyanka

On 4 May 1923, the telephone rang in Sultangaliev's office. He easily recognised the shrill voice of the speaker. 'This is Shkiryatov speaking. Come here now I want to deal with a problem.' (Matvei Fyodorovich Shkiryatov [1883–1954], leading figure of the Central Control Commission, would later be the unforgettable butcher of the Stalinist death machine).[8]

Leaving his office, Sultangaliev walked over to the Central Control Commission. While walking he thought about the circumstances around him that recently had put him under a dark cloud. Sultangaliev had become aware that his colleagues had been giving him the cold shoulder. A close superior, G. Briodo, Deputy Commissar of the Nationalities, had explained his attitude towards Sultangaliev.

> 'Please don't get angry at my letter addressed to the Organisation Bureau. In that letter I requested that you be released from membership of the collegium of the commissariat of the Nationalities. It is *him* that ordered me to do so.'

They did not dare to mention *his* name. The hinted person was Stalin himself, who had been their superior in the Commissariat.

Sultangaliev had become well aware that he had been followed ever since the previous spring, in 1922. However, he had known nothing about the reason for it – the secret operation by the GPU called 'the Second Duma Operation'. The plan was to expose 'deviant' policies and the 'heterodox' ideas of the Muslim National Communists, and, if necessary, to frame these deviants. The Sultangaliev case was an indispensable part of the secret plan that had been elaborated by Yakob Peters, Head of the Eastern Department, GPU, and Ya. Agranov, its preliminary judge.

When Sultangaliev was shown into the office room of Shkiryatov, he found five people waiting for him. One was Shkiryatov himself, sitting at his desk; ■ second was Yakob Peters, in an armchair. Sultangaliev was unable to identify the other three. While talking with Peters, Shkiryatov said: 'Well, let Sultangaliev speak from now on. Which is more important for him, the Party or Validov in the Basmachi camp?'

Shkiryatov continued to talk. 'Well, out with it now!' Won't you tell us the plain truth? Look! We have obtained full evidence to bring your matter before the court.' At this moment, Sultangaliev, for the first time, had doubts about Stalin's design. How could Shkiryatov have obtained such evidence? Was there any other possibility but that Stalin himself had assisted in producing such documentary evidence? Sultangaliev never recognised that his close friend had betrayed him. However, he now realised that he had been the victim of a mysterious trick. His examiner read to him a typewritten page about his expulsion from the Party, in a matter-of-fact way.

GPU personnel escorted Sultangaliev to Lubyanka prison, a few minutes away by car. He had never imagined that, even in the worst case, he would ever be arrested. He was not ready for arrest either physically or spiritually.

The prison cell in the GPU was empty except for a bare-boarded bed and a backless chair. The rules and routines in Lubyanka had never entered his mind. He appealed to his wife and to party members, including Trotsky and Stalin, with many letters. Did he naively believe that those letters would safely reach their destination? One of his early letters showed his naivety.

> 'To Comrade Peters, Head of the Eastern Department of the GPU. Please don't decline my request to have my wife send the things I need: a towel, a set of underwear, leather jacket, soap, tooth powder, some teas and sugar, medicine, and blanket.'

However, to his regret, Sultangaliev soon realised his miserable but very real predicament. Then he requested directly from Peters ■ blanket, towel, shirts and pillow.

The first interrogation began in Peters's office on morning of 7 May 1923. Some of the more interesting parts of the interrogation are set out below in order to show what was of particular interest to Stalin:

> *Question*: All evidence proves that you are involved in the conspiracy by some party members and non-party people who are discontented with our policies. Why did you send out detailed information about the deliberations of the Central committee of the Party? Why did you dispatch instructions to those groups seeking to exercise influence on the C.C. Didn't you feel any guilt about such moves?
>
> *Answer*: I have never participated in any organisation hostile to the C.C. within or outside the Party. It is true that I gave to several comrades news about the problems of the Second House [which had been discussed at the plenum of the C.C. in February 1923]. I also wrote a letter to Firdevs in Crimea about the nationalities problem of Georgia. However, I have never informed anyone about the secret decisions or the deliberation process of the C.C. So far as my memory serves me correctly, I wrote letters about the plenum of the C.C. concerning the nationalities problem to the following comrades: Khalikov, Kushaev and Adigamov in Bashqordistan, Mukhtarov in Tatarstan, Firdevs in Crimea, Ryskulov in Turkestan. All of these are members of the Communist Party and in responsible positions.
>
> *Question*: When you stayed in Bashqordistan in preparation for the Third Soviet Congress of Bashqordistan [December 1922], did you organise a Bashkir faction composed of party and non-party members against Russian communists?
>
> *Answer*: I had never organised any kind of faction there. I had talks with several Bashkir comrades. I wanted them, as officials of the Commissariat of Nationalities, to explain to me the situation in Bashqordistan.

Judging from the above exchanges, the story of Sultangaliev's anti-Party activities seems to have been fabricated, in order to furnish a pretext for the suppression of Muslim National Communists in the Central Asian republics. His activities in the Middle-Volga and the Urals were implicated in the conspiracy against the Soviets, as activities seeking to establish an anti-Russian decentralised network among the Party cells. In fact, however, these activities had been part of his official responsibilities as the Collegium member of the Commissariat of the Nationalities, and as the Chairperson of the All-Union Land Committee. None the less, Peters

managed to implicate Sultangaliev's correspondence in an illegally formed secret plan.

On the forty-fifth day after the arrest, he was released from prison. While in jail, he wrote a statement entitled 'Who am I' in Russian. In it he swore an oath of loyalty to the cause of the Revolution and stressed that the arrest had been a misunderstanding. Soon after his release, he telephoned the Secretariat asking to talk personally with Stalin. At the beginning of September he was able to see Stalin. One is tempted to ask why Stalin had agreed to meet Sultangaliev? It seemed that Stalin had been afraid of the possibility of Lenin's recovery from illness. Lenin's progress towards recovery seemed to be satisfactory from July to December 1923. If the leader of the Revolution were to be reinstated in his former position, Stalin would face formidable danger of a severe dispute with Lenin over 'the Tatar problem', as well as 'the Georgia problem'.

Stalin and Sultangaliev spoke for many hours. But Sultangaliev talked mostly about his analysis of a widespread revolution, which he believed was imminent in the east. Stalin's attitude was in general favourable to Sultangaliev, although the latter was shaken when Stalin used the expression 'your friend Trotsky' in the conversation. Both even remembered Sultangaliev's trip to Bashqordistan for Validov's switching of sides to the Soviets.

Stalin was alone with Sultangaliev in the room. At the end of their conversation, Stalin promised Sultangaliev, after one year, to sound out the opinion of the Central Commission on his being reinstated in the Party. Stalin even offered him a position, either in the Comintern or at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. But this became an empty pledge. Lenin died in January 1924.

The Last Phase: Solovki and...

Between his expulsion from the Party in 1923 and his execution, Sultangaliev lived a lonely life under the strict surveillance of the GPU. However, until 1928 he was permitted to take trips to various places on behalf of *Okhot Soiuz* (the Hunting Union). He may also secretly have been in touch with Muslim cadres, but this is not known with certainty. He seems to have contributed to supporting his family by taking translation jobs and writing book reviews. He had two children with Fatima, his second wife – a daughter, Gurinar, and a son, Murat. His family endured many hardships for being so close to an 'enemy of the people'. During the Stalinist period, spouses of 'enemies of the people' tended to divorce, to avoid being involved. Sultangaliev's wife and children could not escape

from being victims, however. Fatima, whose affection for her husband had remained unabated till the divorce in 1938, died in a concentration camp in 1939. Their daughter, Gurinar, was arrested in 1947–9 and met an untimely death in the camp of Krasnoyarsk. Murat died peacefully in a hospital sick bed in Kazan.[9]

The persecution went beyond Sultangaliev's immediate family. In 1928, 'Sultangalievism' was framed as the GHQ of international imperialism'. Sultangaliev was arrested for a third time on 12 December 1928, after which an energetic campaign against him was inaugurated throughout the Tatarstan Autonomous Republic. In his native village, people demanded that his father request his own son's execution. Being an Islamic leader, this old *muderris* was too proud to sell his honour and refused, at some risk to his own life.

By the end of 1929, many activists in Tatarstan had been arrested as Sultangalievists – Mukhtarov, Mansurov, Sabirov, Budaili and Enbaev. They were charged with drafting parts of the section of the Trotsky–Zinov'ev opposition programme dealing with the nationalities problem. More severe charges were framed to implicate them in intrigues: preparations for an anti-Soviet armed uprising, collaboration in foreign espionage, and attempts to sabotage collectivisation. The GPU Collegium decided to 'inflict severe corporal punishment on them'. Most were deprived of freedom for ten years.

Sultangaliev's fortune varied dramatically at this time. He was sentenced to face a firing squad on 28 July 1930, and waited for his end during six months in jail. Then came news of a commutation to ten years of prison. It seems that he served time on Solovki Island in the North sea until March 1934. There are no clues about his life there, except for a brief mention by Oman Karabiber, a Crimean Tatar émigré to Turkey, in his memoir. In that book, Karabiber describes how he was sentenced to forced labour for ten years for conspiracy against the Soviets, and his deportation to Solovki:

> Hundreds of renowned nationalists came to Solovki, from Turkestan, Kazan and Crimea. Among them were Sultangaliev from Kazan, Ismail Firdevs from Crimean, Doran Airli. Those communists in disguise had been arrested for establishing the 'Turan' Party, in which they were active in Moscow.[10]

Good fortune once again visited Sultangaliev, for a time. He was released from Solovki in 1934, and permitted to live in Saratov. Sultangaliev and Fatima were prohibited from living together. His heart must have

fluttered in the knowledge that his daughter Rashida lived there too, although there is no evidence that they met. In any event, his joy did not last long, for he was arrested in March 1937, his fourth arrest. In May, he was ordered to move to Kazan, where he was interned until September 1938. Brutal torture was enough to obtain the necessary confession of 'criminality'. Sultangaliev was sentenced to die, and executed on 28 January 1940. It would not be known until the time of Perestroika that he died in a 'zastenok', which means torture chamber.[11]

We cannot know his feelings at the moment of death. One can only recall his famous expression in 1917: 'Love for my nation which burdened my heart led me to socialism.' It will be interesting to see how his dreams and aspirations will resurface in Tatarstan at a time when new questions on old issues are being asked by an increasing number of Muslims Tatars.

NOTES

(I wish to thank Dr B. Sultanbekov for obtaining the materials in Tatarstan.)

1. In 1985, I wrote a book entitled *The Dream of Sultangaliev*, the date of publication of which coincided fortuitiously with the Alma-Ata unrest. The book describes Sultangaliev's ideas and actions. But, at the time, various aspects of his life remained obscure. I was unable to determine the exact dates of his birth, his death, or even whether he had married or not. Masayuki Yamauchi, *Surutangariefu no yume* (The Dream of Sultangaliev) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985).
2. In this chapter, I would like to elaborate on the discussion in my earlier book, and to modify information advanced by Bennigsen and Chantal-Quelquejay, in their 1960 study, and by Bennigsen and Wimbush, in 1979. Alexandra Bennigsen and Chantal-Quelquejay, *Les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie: le sultangalievisme au Tatarstan* (Paris: Moutan, 1960); Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World* (Chicago University Press, 1979).
3. Especially, cf. B Sultanbekov, 'Sultan-Galiev: lichnost'i sud'ba', *Sovetskaya Tatariya*, 24 July 1989; B. Sultanbekov, *Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev: Sud'ba Lyudi, Vremya* (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1991) pp. 7–44; Masayuki Yamauchi, *Radeikaru Historii* (Radical History) (Tokyo: Chuo-Koronsha, 1991) pp. 213ff.
4. Sultanbekov, *Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev*, pp. 9–10.
5. For more detail, cf. Yamauchi, *Surutangariefu no yume*, pp. 164–89; Masayuki Yamauchi, *Shingun Ryokugun Sekigun* (*The Divine Army, the Green Army and the Red Army: Soviet Communism and Islam*) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1988) pp. 227–63; Marie Bennigsen Broxup, 'Volga

Tatars', *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*, ed. by G. Smith (London and New York: Longman, 1991) pp. 280–1.

6. Anton V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, 'Stalin I ego vremya', *Voprosy Istorii*, no. 1, 1989, pp. 82–104; no. 2, 1989, pp. 84–102.
7. Yamauchi, *Radeikaru Historii*, pp. 225–35.
8. On this chapter, I am indebted generally to Sultanbekov, *Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev*, pp. 22–44.
9. Yamauchi, *Radeikaru Historri*, p. 236.
10. Osman Karabiber, *Kirimli Bir Turkun Rusyadaki Maceralari* (Ankara, 1954) p. 24.
11. Yamauchi, *Radeikaru Historii*, p. 245.

Part III
Islam and Muslims in Muslim-Minority States

13 God's Government: Jama'at-i-Islami of India

M. S. Agwani

The Jama'at-i-Islami's founder, Maulana Maududi, left India for Pakistan after establishing the organisation, but the movement continued to make an impact in Hindu-majority India. Despite many apparent contradictions in the Jama'at's philosophical or ideological thrusts (for example, its dislike of democracy, some similarity with Fascism and Communism, and its opposition to nationalism and secularism), the organisation has been surviving and flourishing among significant segments of Indian Muslims.

In India, the Jama'at has mainly adopted the role of a missionary movement with long-term aims. It has established scores of schools, colleges and libraries, and published hundreds of books in Urdu, English and Hindi, with ■ view to spreading its ideology not only among the Muslims but also among the Hindus. It is interesting that it has more than ■ thousand non-Muslim 'helpers' in India. The Jama'at also has branches in Indian-occupied Kashmir, where it is said to have aided in the cause of Kashmiri militants, although the latter group is independent of its Indian counterpart.

The organisation, in short, aims at dispelling the doubts and misgivings about Islam among non-Muslims; and protecting and promoting the religious and cultural identity of Indian Muslims.

In the long history of Islamic thought and practice in India, Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi is perhaps the first religio-political figure of note to have advanced the thesis that the *supreme* purpose of Islam was to establish the sovereignty of God on earth, or an Islamic State. In 1941 he founded the Jama'at-i-Islami (Islamic Party) to realise that goal.

MAUDUDI'S THOUGHT

Maududi's genealogy has been traced back to Khwaja Qutub-ud-Din Maudud Chisthi (d AH527) – a remote spiritual mentor of the well-known sufi saint, Khwaja Mu'in-ud-din of Ajmer. Son of Sayyid Ahmad Hasan

Maududi, Abul A'la was born at Aurangabad on 25 September 1903. His early education, which was strictly of a religious and literary character, was abruptly discontinued owing to his father's illness, and he went to Bhopal to look after him. He secured a second-class result in the *Maulawi* examination in 1914, as he happened to be rather weak in mathematics. The next higher course, of *Alim*, he left incomplete.

In 1918 Maududi joined the staff of the Urdu newspaper, *Madina*, of Bijnor. About this time he started learning English. Two years later he became editor of *Muslim* (Delhi), an Urdu mouthpiece of Jami'at-ul'Ulama-i-Hind. He also served on the staff of *Al-Jami'at*, which succeeded *Muslim* in 1924, and was its editor until 1928. This was followed by a period of self-education. In 1933 he started a journal called *Tarjuman al-Quran* in Hyderabad. Five years later he moved, along with his journal, to Pathankot, Punjab, where he prepared the ground for launching the Jama'at-i-Islami.[1]

Shortly, before the Jama'at was started, Maududi circulated its draft constitution among those who had shown interest in his journal, explaining that no member of the proposed Jama'at should acknowledge anyone except God as political sovereign. Nor should he obey any government not based on the sovereignty of God nor recognise the right of anyone except God to legislate. Whosoever deviated from this rule would be expelled from the Jama'at.[2]

Maududi was a prolific writer. His first major work was *Al-Jihad fi'l Islam* (Holy War in Islam) published in 1927.[3] From that time, until his death on 22 September 1979, he wrote profusely on various aspects of Islamic history and doctrine, including a voluminous commentary on the Quran.[4] He soon emerged as a peerless writer of Urdu prose who scared many a contemporary dissenter with his polemical prowess. It is neither possible nor necessary here to go into the ramifications of his literary output. For our present purposes it should suffice to underline the rationale and nature of the Islamic State whose actualisation remained the overriding aim of Maududi's endeavour.

Maududi argued that the principles and modalities for setting up God's Government on earth were clearly spelt out in the Quran and the Hadith. In his book *Khilafat wa Mulukiyat* (Caliphate and Kingship),[5] he tried to show that all that mankind was required by God to do was to submit to His 'legal sovereignty', and to perform, on his behalf, the task of enforcing and adjudicating the norms of individual and social conduct already laid down by Him for all times and climes. At any rate, Muslims had no choice in this matter and certainly no room for innovation.[6]

Maududi frankly admitted that an Islamic State thus conceived could not be democratic. For 'democracy is the name given to that particular form of government in which sovereignty ultimately rests with the people,

in which legislation depends, both in its form and content, on the force and direction of public opinion, and laws are modified and altered to correspond to changes in that opinion. Since Islam did not accept the doctrine of popular sovereignty, an Islamic State 'cannot be called democratic in this sense of the term'. A more apt name for it would be 'Kingdom of God', which might be said to correspond to the English term 'theocracy'. Maududi then went on to add that an Islamic State was not a theocracy either, as there was no priestly class in Islam: 'The entire Muslim population rules the State in accordance with the Book of God and the example of His Prophet.' Maududi, therefore, coined the terms 'theo-democracy' and 'divine democratic government'. In other words, in an Islamic State, in so far as there was an explicit command of God and His Prophet, no Muslim ruler or legislature had the right 'to make the least alteration in it'. This was true of its constitution, which stood already, 'enacted by God', and was 'unchangeable'.

Since Islam was a comprehensive way of life, the jurisdiction of an Islamic State could not but be unlimited. 'A state of this sort', confirms Maududi, 'cannot restrict the scope of its activities.' He added:

> It seeks to mould every sphere of life and activity in consonance with its peculiar concept of morality and programme of reform. In such a state no one can regard any of his affairs as personal and private. Considered from this aspect, the Islamic State bears a kind of resemblance to the Fascist and Communist regimes. ...No doubt the Islamic State is a totalitarian State and comprises within its sphere all departments of life. But this totalitarianism and universality are based upon the universality of Divine Law which an Islamic ruler has to observe and enforce.[7]

Non-Muslims could also live within the confines of Maududi's 'theo-democratic' and totalitarian Islamic State, but only as subjects (*dhimmis*) with 'specific rights and privileges'. However, 'they will not in any case be allowed to influence the policy of the State inasmuch as the Islamic State belongs to the party which believes in the particular ideology inculcated by Islam'. Maududi hastened to note here that despite 'some sort of resemblance between the Islamic and Communist states', the treatment 'meted out by the Communist State to persons holding creeds and ideologies other than its own bears no comparison with the attitude of the Islamic State'.[8]

As to the methods of setting up an Islamic State, Maududi said that the *amir* (leader) would be 'selected' on the basis of the Quranic principle that 'the most respectable among you is he who is the most virtuous' (XLIX: 13). Once selected, the *amir* would exercise full authority in all respects, and he 'will be fully obeyed so long as he follows the laws of

God and His Prophet'. He would not be above criticism. He would in fact be liable to deposition for any deviation by him from the sacred laws. The *amir* was, moreover, obliged to take counsel with his advisory council, which he might form by election or nomination; but he was not in duty bound to accept the latter's advice, since Islam 'does not regard numbers as a criterion of truth and rectitude'. At any rate, 'party politics' would not be allowed to sway decision-making in an Islamic State.[9]

Curiously enough, much of the evidence from the Quran, the Hadith, and the practices of the first four Caliphs that Maududi marshalled in his *Khilafat wa Mulukiyat*, in support of the case for an Islamic State, can be cited to prove the opposite thesis. First, his concept of an Islamic State based on God's sovereignty is derived from certain verses of the Quran which have no direct bearing on political procedures concerning how political authority ought to be constituted, exercised and transferred in a given political community. The Prophet also considered it unnecessary to indicate any definite guidelines on this subject to warrant Maududi's conclusions.

Secondly, as Maududi himself showed, after the first four Caliphs, who together ruled for barely 30 years (i.e., from AD 632 to AD 661), the early Caliphate, which he regarded as the model Islamic State, became transformed into outright kingship, and it remained so until its abolition by Kemal Ataturk in 1924. Again, as he was himself aware, throughout this centuries-long period politics remained in command, not the Islamic faith. Indeed, the historical data adduced by Maududi, to show how the Islamic Caliphate degenerated into an unbending despotism, clearly underlines the perils of mixing up religion and politics.

Thirdly, in trying to explain the emergence of despotic rule, Maududi cited a Prophetic tradition according to which the Caliphate would last for 30 years and be followed by kingship. If we take this argument at its face value, as Maududi did, the Muslims are doomed to live under kingship for ever.[10]

Finally, critics of Maududi have often spoken, not without justice, of his dominant passion for political power.[11] This is evident from the arbitrary and far-fetched meanings he gave to familiar verses of the Quran. A typical example is the Quranic verse which says: 'He revealed iron, wherein is mighty power and uses for mankind.'[12] Maududi asserted that the word 'iron' in this verse 'symbolises political powers'.[13]

Maududi's Role in Indian Politics

It is necessary at this point to make a brief reference to Maududi's role in Indian politics before the partition. He set out with the premise that India 'had never had the opportunity to taste a genuine Islamic rule, an unadulterated Islamic morality, or a real Islamic culture'. In the past, Muslim kings,

princes, officials, clerks, soldiers, landlords, aristocrats, and commoners had presented a model of Islam before India which could never galvanise the masses of the country. On the contrary, conflict over mundane interests had kept Muslims and non-Muslims to enduring historical prejudices against Islam in the minds of non-Muslims.[14] Hence the need for an Islamic revolution, which could be brought about only by an Islamic movement based on Quranic ideas and concepts and on the Prophet's life and character, and determined to change all intellectual, moral, psychological, and cultural foundations of collective life through powerful struggle. 'The question before us', said Maududi, 'is not one of revival of a community but of revival of the Islamic way.' And he invited both Muslims and non-Muslims to work for this goal.[15]

Maududi wanted the Jama'at-i-Islami to act as the instrument of Islamic revival by emulating the example of Germany's National Socialist Party, which, under Adolf Hitler's leadership, reaped the benefit of the specific moral, psychological, and cultural soil prepared by Hegel, Fichte, Goethe, Nietzsche, and other thinkers. He minced no words about his intention to create an ideological State. He also believed that his would be the first such State in history, as all other experiments in the past, such as the ones in Revolutionary France and Bolshevik Russia, had ended in failure in consequence of the negative influence of nationalism.[16]

In an essay entitled 'Nationalism and India', written before the Second World War, Maududi assailed the idea of Indian Muslims subscribing to nationalist ideas. He praised the Marxists in Europe, who, on the outbreak of the First World War, in which their respective countries were involved, refused to support either of the two warring camps. 'Exactly like a Communist,' declared Maududi, 'a Muslim also possesses an ideology of his own.' It was, therefore, meaningless for a Muslim to adopt a nationalist stance. Indeed, the term 'Muslim nationalist' was self-contradictory; it was comparable only to propositions such as 'Communist Fascist', and 'chaste prostitute'. Maududi argued that the mind that Islam sought to build could not be reconciled to a nationalist outlook; for those who accepted the principles of Islam transcended the distinctions of race, country, and nationality. A nationalist, on the other hand, was obliged to place the interests of his own nationality ahead of all other groupings. And his ultimate goal was 'a nation-state rather than a world-state'.

As Maududi saw it, Indian Muslims were at that time divided between 'nationalist Muslims' and 'Muslim nationalists'. While the former believed in Indian nationalism, the latter were interested only in the political and economic well-being of Indian Muslims. Maududi denounced both, charging that they had forsaken the universal principles of Islam.[17] His scathing criticism of Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani's advocacy of the concept of

composite Indian nationalism, ■■ the one hand, and of Jinnah's demand for Pakistan, on the other, must be ■■■ in this context. In ■■ article published in *Tarjuman al-Quran*, of February 1939, he mounted ■ frontal attack on Madani, arguing that, in advancing the concept that country, not religion, made the nation, the latter had allowed himself to be swayed by his anti-British sentiment and by his solicitude for the Indian National Congress, and he had thus tarnished his reputation for piety and religious learning.[18]

Maududi also opposed the concept of Pakistan, but on different grounds. He reasoned that there was no basis in history for the belief 'that once you create ■ Muslim national State, even if it be non-Islamic, you can subsequently transform it into an Islamic State through education, training, and reform'. According to him, no change could be effected in governmental structured as long as the underlying social structure remained unchanged. Even a ruler like 'Umar bin 'Abdul 'Aziz,[19] 'who was backed by a large group of pious people, proved a complete failure in this matter.'[20] In particular, Maududi questioned the Muslim League's credentials for carrying out an Islamic revolution, arguing that a lemon tree could not bear mangoes.[21]

However, no sooner did Pakistan come into being than Maududi and his staff left Pathankot, the headquarters of the Jama'at till then, and arrived in Lahore. By January 1948 he was ready to climb down from his earlier position and to declare that Pakistan was destined to become an Islamic State. It is not necessary to dwell upon Maududi's political career[22] any further, as it has no direct bearing on the developments in India. Mention must, however, be made of his testimony before the Munir Commission, appointed by the Government of Pakistan to inquire into the anti-Ahmadiya riots in West Punjab in 1953. When asked by the Commission how he would feel if, as a reaction to the clamour for an Islamic State in Pakistan, the Hindus of India decided to adopt a constitution based on Hindu religion for India, Maududi replied:

> Certainly, I should have no objection even if the Muslims in India are treated in that form of government as *shudras* and *malishes* [sic] and Manu's laws are applied to them depriving them of all share in government and the rights of a citizen.[23]

THE JAMA'AT AFTER THE PARTITION

Already in April 1947, when ■ partition of India appeared to be imminent, Maududi had declared in ■ speech at Madras that the Jama'at would have

to split into an Indian and a Pakistani organisation, each working within its respective political framework.[24]

According to one source, the membership of the Jama'at in undivided India stood at 999.[25] Maududi went over to Pakistan with a majority of the party members, leaving behind only 240 in India. The rump designated itself Jama'at-i-Islami Hind and adopted its own constitution, which came into force on 13 April 1956.

Under this constitution,[26] the basic creed of the Jama'at requires its members to recognise the sovereignty of no one except Allah and 'to take the Book of God and the *Sunnah* of His messenger alone as the real sanction and authority and the ultimate source to fall back upon in every matter of his life' (Article 3). The main object of the party is to establish the faith of Islam, the real motive being the achievement of divine pleasure and of success in the hereafter. The faith encompasses all aspects of life, ranging from beliefs, rituals and morals to economic, social and political matters (Article 4).

For the achievement of its object, 'the Jama'at shall adopt constructive and peaceful methods'. It should reform 'the mental outlook, character, and conduct' of the people through propagation of the Islamic ideals, and thus prepare public opinion for the desired revolution in the social life of the country. To bring this about, it should strictly adhere to moral precepts and should 'never' resort to means incompatible with truth and honesty or those which might cause communal hatred, class friction or social chaos (Article 5).

In keeping with its political philosophy, the Jama'at lays emphasis upon ideological rectitude and centralised guidance. Thus, any person seeking membership of the Jama'at must, besides adhering to the party's creed, relinquish any key position which he or she may be holding under an 'ungodly' political system, including membership of a legislature or judiciary (Articles 6 and 8). The organisational structure of the Jama'at consists of a network of local (*maqami*) and zonal (*halqa*) units at the base, and a central body (*markaz*) at the apex comprising a Council of Representatives and an *amir*.[27] The Council of Representatives is elected by the members of the Jama'at. This body, in its turn, elects the all-India *amir* and a Central Advisory Council to assist him in his work. Decisions in the Advisory Council are made by consensus. However, if the Advisory Council fails to achieve consensus on any issue, and if more than one-third of the members concur with the *amir*, the latter's opinion is allowed to prevail. The *amir* appoints a *Qayyim* (secretary-general) in consultation with the Advisory Council. He also nominates *amirs* of the zonal and regional units in consultation respectively with the zonal and local advisory councils.

The constitution requires all members to deposit their *zakat* (poor tax) and *'ushr* (tithe) with the treasury of the local, zonal or central organisation as the case may be.

In 1981, the strength of the Jama'at was officially put at 2831 members. The number of Muslim 'sympathisers', who did not qualify for full membership, was stated to be 36 243; there were 1240 non-Muslim 'helpers'. These were unevenly dispersed across the country. The bulk of the membership was accounted for by Uttar Pradesh (894), Kerala (450), Andhra Pradesh (385) and Maharashtra (335). Andhra Pradesh, however, has the largest number of sympathisers (9250), followed by Bihar (6077), Kerala (4444), and Karnataka (4000). Andhra Pradesh also leads [illegible] regards the numerical strength of helpers (595), with Karnataka as a runner-up (297). The Jama'at functions through 13 zonal organisations, each comprising one or more units, at the state level. The headquarters, located in Delhi, directly supervises the work of the party in the capital city [illegible] well as in Orissa and the Andamans. The area-wise break-up is as shown in Table 13.1.

TABLE 13.1

Area	*Number of Local Units*	*Members*	*Sympathisers*	*Helpers*
Headquarters	1	16	—	—
Delhi	1	41	92	6
Orissa	—	2	20	—
Andaman Islands	1	6	—	1
Assam	1	7	500	—
West Bengal	24	142	2 855	28
Bihar	34	192	6 077	83
Uttar Pradesh	144	894	3 857	127
Punjab	1	10	87	—
Rajasthan	8	54	391	28
Gujarat	2	16	250	4
Maharashtra	56	353	3 520	46
Madhya Pradesh	21	125	500	—
Andhra Pradesh	39	385	9 250	595
Karnatka	18	105	4 000	297
Tamil Nadu	7	33	400	7
Kerala	78	450	4 444	18
TOTAL	436	2 831	36 243	1 240

In addition, the Jama'at claims to have established informal contracts with 285 395 men and 26 253 women of the Muslim faith and with 29 692 non-Muslims. It counts 29 162 Muslim boys and 9 058 Muslim girls among its supporters.[28]

The Jama'at functions through a wide range of institutional arrangements, including individual contacts, study circles, libraries, schools, and an extensive publication programme. To that end, it has set up 548 libraries, 386 reading rooms and 240 regular study circles all over the country. For the religious education of Muslim boys and girls it runs 266 nursery schools, 344 part-time *maktabs* or elementary schools, 36 junior high schools, and 23 colleges. In these institutions religious education is imparted side by side with other subjects taught in secular schools and colleges. The Jama'at also runs a *Markazi Darsgah* (Central Institute) at Rampur. Above all, its speakers address weekly Friday congregations in over 700 mosques. As of 1981, the Jama'at had published 491 books in Urdu, 77 in Hindi, and 78 in English, on the Quran, the Hadith and various facets of its ideology. The number of publications in Bengali and Malayalam is steadily growing. It also brings out newspapers and journals from Delhi, Rampur, Calcutta, Guwahati, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad, Mangalore, Calicut and Madras.[29]

The Jama'at conceives of its mission in India in terms of a two-pronged programme: dispelling the doubts and misgivings about Islam that exist in the minds of non-Muslims, and protecting and promoting the religious and cultural identity of Indian Muslims. Addressing the Sixth All-India Session of the organisation, held at Hyderabad in 1981, the Jama'at *amir*, Maulana Muhammad Yusuf, proclaimed:

> It is the duty of the Muslims to act in accordance with the teachings of Islam, to preach the message to those unaware of it, and to establish the creed in its entirety so that God's religion may be enforced in all its dimensions, including the Shari'ah. It is only thus that the Muslim *ummah* will have done its duty and its efforts will be considered successful by the Lord.[30]

This point is reiterated in the programme adopted for the period 1981–86, which states that 'Islam offers the best remedies for the intellectual, moral, social, economic and political crises afflicting the people of India' and that it is the duty of the Jama'at to convey this message to its 'non-Muslim brethren'. It also states that the Jama'at will seek the cooperation of non-Muslims in promoting 'programmes of public welfare' and in 'combating evil'. Non-Muslims willing to cooperate with the Jama'at would be treated as *mu'awinin* (helpers).

As for safeguarding the religious and cultural identity of Indian Muslims, the programme lays special emphasis on a country-wide programme of religious education and a common struggle by Muslim organisations in defence of the Muslim personal law, *awqaf* (religious endowments), the Urdu language, and the Islamic character of Muslim educational institutions, making full use of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India.[31]

An interesting feature of the Jama'at's political stance is its ambivalence towards electoral politics. At the Hyderabad session, the *amir* lamented that with politicians defecting from one party to another and unseemly scenes being created in the Parliament and the State legislatures there was 'hardly any trace of morality left in [Indian] politics'.[32] This, he explained, was 'one of the reasons for our being aloof from parliamentary politics'. The party programme, on the other hand, asserts that the Jama'at can 'participate in elections within the framework of its own principles, and at an appropriate time'.[33]

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

Broadly speaking, the Jama'at ideologues in post-partition India can be credited with little more than going over and over the ground that Maududi had already covered with an air of finality. The variations, if any, relate to the changed Indian context and to the course of international events. What follows is a conspectus of the Jama'at's doctrinal output since 1947.

Anis Uddin Ahmad's *Islam: The Only Way* 'aims at exposing the hollowness' of the contemporary capitalist and Communist models contending for world supremacy, and at presenting Islam as the one and only solution to the challenges faced by mankind. He argues that, not withstanding claims to the contrary, 'both capitalism and communism are one and the same as far as their approach to men's problems is concerned'. Both assert that 'the real cause of our miseries is economic disorder'. Hence, all the remedies they propose are economic in nature. In reality, however, the economic prosperity they promise cannot but exacerbate individual selfishness and societal corruption. At any rate, mere satisfaction of material needs does not bring peace and happiness to mankind.[34]

Islam, on the other hand, aims at moral rather than economic amelioration. And in as much as the Islamic approach is one outlined by God through revelation, 'it does not suffer from the weaknesses and defects inherent in man's thinking'. Ahmad argues that belief in the living idea of God, the Day of Judgement, and the life hereafter, is the surest way of creating a society free from selfishness and crime.

Ahmad then explains why all mankind will eventually turn to Islam. For one thing, it is a creed revealed successively to '124 thousand prophets'. Prophet Muhammad is the last and the final one of these prophets. With the last revelation the creed has been completed and saved for ever. In other words, all religions now known by different names have emanated from the same source. But only the Quran is fully preserved in its original purity without any change, distortion, or carnation. For another, the current apathy or hostility of the followers of other religions towards Islam is due mostly to the failure of Muslims to live up to the Islamic ideal. Accordingly, if the original teachings of Islam are placed before the followers of other religions, the latter's resistance to Islam will disappear altogether.[35]

In the Indian context, the two issues that have particularly attracted the attention of the Jama'at are nationalism and secularism. Sayyid Anwar 'Ali argues that the Jama'at opposed the Muslim League from the very start because it subscribed to the concept of Muslim nationalism, and rejected Indian nationalism on the ground that 'it [Indian nationalism] would submerge the identity of the Indian Muslims into a Hindu nation.' It frankly invites the Muslims to turn away from nationalism in all its various forms and to accept the guidance of Islam, which prohibits the pursuit of sectarian interests.[36]

What does the Jama'at expect Muslims to do in post-Partition India? It exhorts them to stop fighting for representation in legislative assemblies, for jobs, and for such-like demands. According to it, their salvation lies in becoming genuine Muslims in thought and action and in spreading the message of Islam among the non-Muslims of India.[37] Curiously enough, Sayyid Anwar 'Ali assails the Indian National Congress for doing away with separate electorates. According to him, it did so just to forestall 'true representation of Muslims' in the elected bodies.[38]

Secularism is no less inimical to Islam. The modern secular State, says M. M. Siddiqi, rests on the denial of Allah's sovereignty. Consequently the State, not God, becomes the source of moral law. Devoid of the attributes of justice and infallibility, the secular State can neither establish 'the reign of justice within its own borders in relation to the various classes of its subjects nor act justly towards peoples outside its domains'. Hence war and bloodshed follow, and the earth is 'filled with tyranny and injustice on a scale hitherto unknown.[39] The remedy lies in accepting the doctrine of the sovereignty of God and the supremacy of divine law in all spheres of life; for, 'considered rightly, the entire realm of human conduct comes within the domain of the spiritual'. The Jama'at, therefore, wants 'men who would transform the State into an agency of spiritual instruction and moral education.'[40]

The perils of secularism in a world infested by ungodly political creeds are set out by In'amur Rahman Khan, the Jama'at *amir* in Madhya Pradesh, in a booklet entitled *Secular Democracy and Islam.* The author contends that secularism, democracy, and nationalism – the three components of Western civilisation – are incompatible with the teachings of Islam. Islam demands that the human spirit and human thought should not be straying away from divine guidance. Modern secularism, on the other hand, requires man to liberate himself from transcendental guidance so that the direction and purpose of his life may be governed by the concept of 'humanism'. Seen thus, secularism is fraught with serious consequences, for, even if a secularist chooses to believe in God in his personal life, he will not allow this belief to influence his social life. In consequence of this discrepancy between individual and social life, the latter will 'naturally advance towards atheism, that is Communism'. Who does not know, asks the author, 'that Communism is the final destination of any journey that begins with secularism?'[41]

It may be mentioned here in passing that the Jama'at's literature conveys the impression that it is not only nationalism and secularism, but also science that is incompatible with Islam. A zonal *amir*, for example, tells the story of a devout Muslim who committed suicide when he heard the news that a man was about to land on the moon. The gentleman in question, so the account goes, could not bear the thought of human meddling in the domain of God.[42] Historically, the Jama'at views with distaste the flowering of science and philosophy under the Ummayid and 'Abbasid rule, which eventually paved the way for the European Renaissance. Maududi indeed regarded it as a retrogressive step induced by the deviation of the Muslim body politic from the straight path of Islam. He derisively spoke of the 'downpour of all admixtures of philosophy, literature and science from the Greek, Iranian, and Indian skies on the Muslim soil' and took Shibli Nu'mani and Ameer 'Ali to task for lauding the 'ugly' arts of that age as manifestations of Islamic culture and civilisation.[43]

Over the years, the Jama'at has felt the need to make a systematic study of the Hindu religion, with a view to identifying parallelism, if any, between Islam and Hinduism. However, the effort made in that direction has been meagre and the results obtained so far are not very promising. A Jama'at intellectual, who claims to be conversant with the Hindu religious tradition, introduces his booklet, *Hindu Dharma: a Study*, thus:

> What [the Hindu religion] is or is not is a question which cannot be answered with precision. Even the leading researchers among Hindus appear to be uncertain. ...Hindus do not posses a holy scripture like the

Quran, which [the] various sects of Hinduism can commonly accept as the main source. Nor do ... Hindus point to any personality whose teachings would carry the seal of ultimate authority. In the circumstances, what can one expect save disorder in the realm either of thought or [of] practice?[44]

Muhammad Faruq Khan, the author of this study, takes a dim view also of the syncretic propensities of the Hindu tradition. Hinduism has assimilated Buddha as an incarnation of Vishnu and is prepared to accord the same status to Jesus Christ. Because of his open-ended approach the Hindu is inclined to see the truth in every religion. Thus he comes round to favour the theory of the unity of all religions. The Hindu thus behaves 'as if religion is not a serious matter at all'.[45]

The author has, nevertheless, a good word to say on the *Upanishads*. 'Here', he observes, 'one finds some very profound discussions which are exhilarating indeed.' He cites Dara Shikoh's[46] view that the *Upanishads* offer the key to the divine secrets and higher truths pointed out in the Quran. But the main difficulty with the Hindu scriptures, as he sees it, is that, unlike the Quran, none of them has survived in its original form and hence they cannot be accepted as a 'correct, comprehensive and authoritative' source of guidance.[47] As for Hindu practices, he again finds some common ground in the ancient tradition of India carrying traces of the Islamic injunction about *purdah* (the veil).[48]

In conclusion, the author says that contemporary Hindu society is not aware of the real attribute of *Dharma*. Nor does the Hindu realise that his 'religion has been ruined' and that his 'religious texts are neither authentic nor well-preserved'. In the event, 'Muslims conversant with the Hindu *Dharma* could very well impress upon their Hindu brethren that the anchor they rely upon is not strong and dependable.' It would then be 'easier to make them see the merits of Islam'.[49]

The foregoing survey of the Jama'ats literary output since Independence offers little evidence of intellectual creativity of dynamism. This may be mainly due to its total reliance on Maududi's interpretation of Islamic doctrine and history. Some people, who differed from Maududi, honourably withdrew from the party or fell by the wayside. But a great many, who found comfort and fulfilment under the protective umbrella of Maududi's thought, stayed within the fold. A conspicuous exception to this rule is Najatullah Siddiqi, a former Aligarh don currently based in Saudi Arabia.

The Jama'at's ideologues and activists commonly assert that their supreme goal is to resurrect the Prophet's model State, or that of the righteous

Caliphs of Islam, in its entirety and that any new ideas or insights into human affairs are to be shunned. Siddiqi questions this approach on several grounds, albeit in a very mild and unabrasive fashion.

JAMA'AT AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

The Jama'at makes a distinction between the 'Islamic movement', on the one hand, and various other organisations and institutions that negate the social, economic and educational welfare of Muslims on the other hand. The latter might be doing useful work to preserve and protect Islamic values; but they are unable to 'carry the Islamic community forward' or 'extend the sphere of its influence'. The Islamic movement addresses itself to these latter tasks. It comprises all those organised efforts that are guided by the belief that Islam governs the entire life, and which are aimed at initiating the struggler to enforce it as a political, economic and social order.[50]

Specifically, the Jama'at sees itself as part of a wider Islamic movement encompassing the Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brothers) in the Arab world, the Jama'at-i-Islami in Pakistan, and the Masyumi Party[51] in Indonesia. Their common denominator is the commitment to introduce Islam as 'a comprehensive system of life and to struggle for the establishment of an Islamic State'.

According to Najatullah Siddiqi, the Islamic movement is the culmination of certain new trends in Islamic thought which have evolved over the past century and a half. During this period, Muslim thinkers in various countries have laid the foundation of a new line of thought which emphasises the centrality and comprehensiveness of Islam and underscores the importance of the Caliphate, or an Islamic State. Among these thinkers, Siddiqi includes Shah Muhammad 'Abdul Wahhab of Arabia (d. 1791), Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (d. 1897), and Shaikh Rashid Rida of Egypt (d 1933).[52]

Siddiqi divides the history of the Islamic movement in the twentieth century into two parts, with the year 1948 constituting the dividing-line. The quarter of a century before 1948 was the formative period; for it was then that the basic doctrines were elaborated and the organisational structures created. It was also the period when the Ikhwan al-Muslimun of Egypt extended its influence to other Arab countries, the Jama'at and the Ikhwan translated each other's literature, and the literature of both found its way into Indonesia.

In 1948, the Islamic movement plugged into politics. In Egypt, the Ikhwan joined the battle against Zionism and was consequently banned by the Government of Egypt. Hasan al-Banna, its founder and head, was assassinated in February 1949, following the murder of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nuqrashi Pasha. In Pakistan, the Jama'at mounted a campaign for an Islamic constitution which resulted in the adoption of the Objectives Resolution by the Constituent Assembly of the country. In Indonesia, the Masjumi leader, Muhammad Natsir, was elected to the office of Prime Minister under President Soekarno. Political activism, however, attracted political retaliation and in recent decades the Islamic movement has had to reckon with the political restrictions imposed by 'vested interests'.[53]

Siddiqi goes on to point out that, although the Islamic movement has suffered setbacks, the slogans originally raised by it have been adopted by some Muslim rulers, even though superficially. Both Libya's Colonel Mu'ammar Gaddafi and Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat have succeeded in creating the public image of being supporters of an Islamic order. However, the stand of the Islamic movement in this respect is far from clear in the eyes of the Muslim masses.[54]

In the aforesaid context, it is hardly surprising that the Jama'at should attach considerable importance to the Islamic Conference Organisation, founded in 1971 on the initiative of the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The Jama'at extols it not only because of its value as a symbol of Islamic unity, but also because of the interest it has shown in the affairs of the Muslim minorities in a number of non-Muslim countries. At the Sixth Session of the Jama'at, held at Hyderabad in 1981, Maulana Muhammad Yusuf, the *amir*, observed that the Muslim countries ought to have paid attention long before to 'the fact that about one-third of the world's Muslims live as minorities in different non-Muslim majority countries. In some countries, these Muslim minorities are quite backward, educationally and economically.' 'These distressed minorities', he added, 'should be given a helping hand and earnest efforts must be made to redress their difficulties.'[55]

THE JAMA'AT IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The Kashmiri chapter of the Jama'at, which calls itself Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, claims to be independent of its counterpart in the rest of the country – a not too subtle way of hinting that neither of the two

accepts the finality of the states' accession to India. The Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir was founded in November 1953 – ■ few months after the dismissal of Sheikh 'Abdullah from office following his strong disagreements with the Union Government in New Delhi. It did not, however, attract much following until the 1970s, when the younger generation of Kashmiri youth, especially students, began to respond to its call for an Islamic order in the state.

In the autumn of 1977, the Jama'at created ■ students' wing called Islami Jami'at-i-Talaba (Islamic Students' Organisation). It is important to note that even though the constitution of the Jama'at, like that of the parent body,[56] does not question the states' accession to the Indian Union, its public pronouncements are patently secessionist in tone and content. In his inaugural address to the first annual session of the Jami'at-i-Talaba, held at Srinagar in July 1978, the founder-president, Ashraf Sahrai', referred to 'the Kashmir question' and compared the struggle of ■ section of the people of Kashmir for independence to the ongoing liberation struggles elsewhere in the world. 'Despite the sermons delivered at the UN headquarters in New York on "live and let live",' he declared,

> ...the Kashmir question, the Palestine problem, the civil war in Lebanon, the freedom struggle in Eritrea, the Philippines Muslims' demand for regional self-determination, the question of independence for the Cypriot Turks, and the issue of transferring power to black majorities in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, threaten armed conflagrations in the regions concerned, nay in the whole world.

He further lamented that, despite the change in the country's leadership following the victory of the Janata Party, 'the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved.'[57] A leaflet issued by the Jama'at's Srinagar office, welcoming its new members, was even more specific. It said: 'As Kashmiris it is our duty to struggle for the independence of oppressed, dependent, and enslaved Kashmir and to establish that social order in the state which we would like to see triumphant in the whole world.' The Kashmiri chapter of the Jama'at is thus more outspoken in projecting its political aims than its counterpart in new Delhi. It also has no inhibitions about electoral politics. In the elections to the Legislative Assembly of the state held in 1978, the Jama'at fielded several candidates but only won seats in a 60-member house. Of course, the Jama'at's real strength cannot be measured by the electoral yardstick.

Curiously, the Jama'at finds the older generation of Muslims in the Valley cold and indifferent to its mission. This may be due to the influence of Kashmiri patriotism, which, in the opinion of some Muslim intellectuals

in the Valley, can come to terms with Indian nationalism and still hope to retain the Kashmiri identity. By the same token, the doctrine of Islamic nationalism propounded by the Jama'at is perceived as a threat to Kashmiri patriotism. However, the younger generation of Muslims in the Valley has become increasingly apolitical in recent years, mainly because of inertia and neglect on the part of the National Conference, the dominant political party in the state. And the Jama'at has been fairly successful in stepping into this vacuum.[58] Over ten years it has set up 125 schools of various categories, with an estimated enrolment of 17 000 students.[59] And its students' wing, the Jami'at-i-Talaba, has registered its presence on the university and college campuses in the Valley by articulating the demands of students and by organising debates, lectures and seminars on religio-political themes.[60]

NOTES

This chapter is an abridged version of one originally published in the author's book, *Islamic Fundamentalism in India* (Chandigarh, 1986).

1. Dr Sayyid Anwar, 'Ali, *Raddi-i-'Fitna-i-Maududiyat*' (Refutation of 'Maududian Sedition') (Delhi, 1980) pp. 23–27. Anwar Ali's book is a refutation of Maulana Muhammad Zakariya's critique of Maududi entitled *Fitna-e-Maududiyat*.
2. Amin Ahsan Islahi, *Jama'at-Islami ke Khilaf Qarardad-i-Jurm* (Chargesheet against Jama'at-i-Islami) (Delhi, 1981) p. 40.
3. Abul A'la Maududi, *Al-Jihad fi'l Islam* (Delhi, 1981), 3rd impression.
4. Abul A'la Maududi, *Tahfim al-Quran*, in six volumes.
5. Abul A'la Maududi, *Khilafat wa Mulukiyat* (Caliphate and Kingship) (Delhi, 1969).
6. Ibid., chapter 1.
7. Abul A'la Maududi, *Political Theory of Islam* (Delhi, 1973) pp. 27–9 and 34. Originally an address delivered at Lahore in October 1939.
8. Ibid., p. 30.
9. Ibid., pp. 36–8.
10. Maududi, *Khilafat Mulukiyat*, chs 1, 2, 4 and 5.
11. M. S. Agwani, *Islamic Fundamentalism in India* (Chandigarh, 1986) ch. 5.
12. Qur'an LVII: 25.
13. Maududi, *Political Theory of Islam*, p. 28.
14. Abul A'la Maududi, *Islami Siyasat* (Islamic Politics), Part III (Delhi, 1979) p. 145.
15. Ibid., pp. 152–3 and 165.
16. Ibid., pp. 156–7 and 165.
17. Abul A'la Maududi, *Nationalism and India*, 4th edition (Delhi, 1965) pp. 5–10, 22–3 and 34–5.

18. The article is reproduced in Abul A'la Maududi, *Mas'ala-i-Qawmiyat* (Problem of Nationalism), 2nd impression (Delhi, 1977), pp. 77–108.
19. 'Umar bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, the Ummayid Caliph, who ruled for barely two and a half years (AD 717–20) is generally regarded by Muslim historians as the only pious ruler in the century-long Ummayad dynasty.
20. Maududi, *Islami Siyasat*, p. 169.
21. Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif., 1961) pp. 95–100.
22. Maududi was sentenced to death for his involvement in the anti-Ahmadiya riots of 1953 but was later freed. In the early 1960s, the Jama'at-i- Islami of Pakistan aligned itself with anti-Ayub groups. After a brief spell in prison in 1964, Maududi came forward to support the candidature of Miss Fatima Jinnah for President of Pakistan, against Ayub Khan. In the first ever free election, held in 1970, the Jama'at fielded a large number of candidates but won only four seats in West Pakistan and none in East Pakistan in the 300-member parliament. Having failed to win power through the ballot box, Maududi hailed Zia-ul-Haq's military *coup d'état* and gained four seats for the Jama'at in the Federal Cabinet. Maududi died on 22 September 1979 in America, where he had gone for medical treatment.
23. '*Shudra*' stands for the untouchable and '*malishes*' (strictly 'mlechchhas') for the impure. Quoted in Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia*, 2nd edition (Lahore, 1980) p. 65. For details, see *Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbance of 1953* (Lahore, 1954) p. 228.
24. Binder, op. cit., pp. 95–100.
25. Munir, op. cit., pp. 55–6.
26. *The Constitution of the Jama'at-i-Islami Hind* (The Secretariat, Jama'at-i-Islami, Delhi, 1980). As amended up to May 1977.
27. The word '*amir*' literally means prince, but here it stands for commander or leader.
28. *Chey Salah Report* (Six Year Report) (October 1974 to September 1980), *Da'wat* (Delhi), 'Ijtima' Number', 14 April 1982, p. 39. Muslim students subscribing to the Jama'at's creed have been organised under the banner of the Students' Islamic Movement (SIM). SIM has attracted some following in colleges and universities, especially those run by Muslim endowments or societies. It has been particularly active on the campuses of the Jami'a Millia Islamiya (New Delhi) and the Aligarh Muslim University.
29. Ibid., pp. 29–38.
30. Ibid., pp. 19–28.
31. Jama'at-i-Islami Hind, *Policy and Programme: October 1981 to March 1986* (Delhi, n.d.) pp. 1–10.
32. *Chey Salah Report*, pp. 19–28.
33. *Policy and Programme*, p. 1.
34. Anis Uddin Ahmad, *Islam: The Only Way*, 2nd edition (Patna, 1978) pp. 44–55.
35. Ibid., pp. 49–55.
36. Sayyid Anwar 'Ali, *Islam, Musalman aur Hindustan* (Islam, Muslims and India) (Delhi, 1979) p. 124.

37. Ibid., p. 125. Another writer [illegible] that if a Muslim accepts the concept of composite nationalism he will also be required to agree on a uniform civil code. See In'amur Rahman Khan, *Secular Jamhuriyat aur Islam* (Secular Democracy and Islam) (Delhi, 1970) p. 95.
38. Ibid., p. 77.
39. M. M. Siddiqi, *After Secularism What?*, 4th edition (Delhi, 1981) pp. 4–5. This booklet was originally written in October 1946.
40. Ibid., pp. 35–6 and 44.
41. I. R. Khan, op. cit., pp. 71, 74 and 96. An observation by Sayyid Anwar 'Ali reveals an interesting dimension of the controversy over secularism. He says: 'It is surprising yet true that in a secular state like India the books of Maulana Maududi and Maulana Abul Hasan 'Ali Nadwi are freely studied and taught; but in the Muslim state of Libya, where the leaders are Muslims and the population is hundred per cent Muslim it is forbidden to possess, buy, sell or read these books.' See S. A. Ali, op. cit., p. 150.
42. Ibid., p. 134.
43. Abul A'la Maududi, *A Short History of Revivalist Movement in Islam* (Delhi, 1981) pp. 28–30. Shibli Nu'mani (d. 1914) was a great classicist of his time and founder of the Dar-ul-Musannifin at Azamgarh; and Ameer Ali (d. 1928), the author of *Spirit of Islam* and *A Short History of the Saracens*, was a leading figure among the Muslim modernists of the early twentieth century.
44. Muhammad Faruq Khan, *Hindu Dharma: Ek Mutali'a* (Hindu Dharma: A Study) (Delhi 1981) p. 5.
45. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
46. Dara Shikoh (d. AD 1659) was well known for his liberal and mystical predilections. In contrast, his brother and rival for the Mughal throne, Aurangzeb, was stringently orthodox. Dara translated 52 *Upanishads* into Persian under the title, *Sirr-i-Akbar* (The Great Secret).
47. Faruq Khan, op. cit., pp. 36–8, 43 and 52.
48. Ibid., pp. 54–6.
49. Ibid., p. 56.
50. Ibid., pp. 165–6.
51. Masjumi is an acronym of the Majlis Shura-i-Muslimin (Muslim Consultative Council) set up in 1948.
52. Siddiqi, op. cit., pp. 167–70.
53. Ibid., pp. 175–7.
54. Ibid., pp. 186–7.
55. *Chey Salah Report*, pp. 19–28.
56. The constitution of Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir runs parallel in all respects to that of the Jama'at-i-Islami Hind.
57. Islami Jami'at-i-Talaba, *Khutba-i-Sadart* (Presidential Address) (Srinagar, July 1978).
58. Based on informal conversations with groups of Kashmiri intellectuals at Srinagar in October 1981.
59. Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, *Jama'at-i-Islami aur Firqa Parasti Tarikh ki Roshni Men* (Jama'at-i-Islami and Communalism in the Light of History) (Srinagar, n.d.).
60. *Arabia: The Islamic World Review* (London), August 1982, p. 32.

14 The Islamic Movement in Israel

Alisa Rubin Peled

The establishment of Israel in 1948 led to the expulsion of most Palestinian Muslims from their ancestral homeland to neighbouring Arab countries. The remaining Palestinian Muslims were living as minorities, with little hope of asserting their rights. The situation changed with the annexation of further Arab/Palestinian territories by Israel in 1967 – an event which also coincided with ■ substantial rise in the Arab population after the Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

The post-1967 Arab–Israeli War occurred against the backdrop of a period of Islamic resurgence throughout the Arab world, after the Arabs discovered that Arab Nationalism had been ■ poor match for Zionism. Since 1967, Israeli Arabs have been responding to the new ideology of Palestinisation and Islamisation. The 1967 War, paradoxically, also led to the spiritual rebirth of Islam as a political force among Israeli Muslims, preventing their assimilation with Israel. The period between the 1970s and 1980s also saw the rise of ■ Islamic underground movement in Israel. The movement later broadened its support base through its provision of ■ wide range of community services among Israeli Arabs. The movement also incorporated both militants as well as reformists, some of whom have been espousing the preservation of Arab interests, even at the expense of Israel's stability and security.

SOURCES OF ISLAMISATION

The Unique Nature of the Islamic Movement in Israel

The existence of an Islamic Movement in Israel is ■ synthesis of many contradictions.[1] After becoming ■ minority in 1948 and losing the leadership of the Supreme Muslim Council, an institution which combined Islam with ■ Palestinian form of Arab nationalism, the Muslim community in Israel took many years to reorganise itself. During the 1980s, ■ vibrant Islamic Movement emerged to mobilise the 700 000 Muslims who are citizens of the Jewish state. Today, Islamic leaders control local government

in several Arab villages and cities and enjoy good working relations with the national government.

According to Yvonne Haddad, 'For Islamists, the danger facing the Muslims is not the "Palestinian problem" as much as the "problem of Israel".'[2] Yet, as a minority in a Jewish state in the middle of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, the Islamic Movement in Israel is constrained to address this problem. Ideologically, the movement fuses several contradictory elements: for coexistence with Israel. With a skilful blend of ambiguity, pragmatism, provision of social services, and outreach to the wider Islamic world, the Islamic Movement has become a major political force among the Arabs in Israel.

The Rise of the Movement: Internal and External Factors

Scholars mark the 1967 War as the source of the wave of religious resurgence in the Arab world, when the value of secular nationalism came into question in the wake of military defeat. For the Arab citizens of Israel, the 1967 defeat and the subsequent Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip initiated a process of 'Palestinisation' and 'Islamisation.' First, the renewed access to friends and relatives in the West Bank and Gaza exposed Israeli Arabs to the nationalist agenda and activism of the PLO. In the light of continued discrimination and a perception of second-class status in Israel, this Palestinian identity appeared increasingly attractive.[3]

Moreover, with access to the holy sites in Jerusalem and the well-established West Bank Islamic establishment, Israeli Muslims rediscovered their religious identity after years of secularisation. In the face of modernisation and the disintegration of traditional social frameworks, religion was especially appealing as a focus of identity and as an authentic protest against the secular society of the majority. This process of religious revival was intensified by Israel's increasingly lenient policy, enabling its Muslim citizens over the age of 30 to perform the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca, a policy initiated in 1978. According to Shaykh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, spiritual leader of the Islamic Movement in Israel: 'The 1967 War was a military holocaust but also a spiritual rebirth.... It injected Islam into Israeli Muslims to prevent their assimilation.'[4]

In the Occupied Territories, Israeli Arabs discovered thriving institutions, bookstores and libraries.[5] The Muslim High Council of Jerusalem became the spiritual authority for Israeli Arabs. The Council sent Muslim preachers and educators from the Occupied Territories to Israel, finding receptive audiences. Young Israeli Muslims began to study at the Islamic colleges of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During this period, the Israeli

Ministry of Religious Affairs encouraged this process, appointing West Bank religious functionaries to posts in Israel and subsidising the studies of Israeli Arabs in West Bank seminaries. The rationale behind the policy was that the contacts would demonstrate to the West Bank and Gaza the advantages that the Israeli Arabs enjoyed, and thus preclude opposition to the occupation.[6]

One of the most important, yet frequently overlooked, factors explaining the religious revival was the state of the Islamic establishment within Israel. In 1948, the Ministry of Religious Affairs created a Muslim establishment to administer the *sharia* court system, to provide religious services in the mosques and to maintain the other religious sites in the country. Employees served at the discretion of the state and were often selected on the basis of political views in addition to religious qualifications. While, in the early years of the state, this was largely overlooked because of the secularisation of the community, the situation became a matter of public concern as a result of the religious revival of the 1980s. Today, the Islamic Movement has begun to challenge the state Islamic establishment actively for control of the religious institutions. Yet, alongside government control of the religious establishment, which lacked support from the population, was a strong policy of freedom of practice. Therefore, the mosque became the natural haven for dissidents to organise activities, free from the intervention of the Israeli security forces.[7]

The Islamic Movement crystallised after 1979, and was unquestionably influenced by Khomeini's victory in Iran and the wave of Islamism it sparked in the Middle East. Many argue that the appearance of Islamic organisations in Israel was also a response to Jewish fundamentalism, particularly the rise of the powerful interest group advocating settlement of the Occupied Territories, Gush Emuni; however, when the Islamic Movement first appeared in 1979, the Likud government, which strongly favoured the Jewish fundamentalists, had only been in power for two years.[8]

The exposure to Islamic ideologies in the Occupied Territories was the most direct ideological influence, particularly that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamic publications in Israel frequently refer to Hassan al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1930s, when he mobilised urban migrants through the provision of religious and social services. In the 1940s, al-Banna mobilised support around the Palestinian cause, both as a struggle against the colonialism of the British and because of the religious significance of the Holy Places. Although not openly expressed, perhaps this involvement in the Palestinian struggle further heightens al-Banna's status as a role model among the Israeli Islamists.[9]

The Islamic Movement stressed the religious rather than the secular roots of Palestinian nationalism: the organised links between the Palestinians

and the land were those of creed and the holiness of Palestine for Islam.[10] In this respect, another strong ideological impetus came from the Islamic Resistance Movement in the Occupied Territories, *Hamas*, which resorted to violent opposition to the Israeli occupation during the 'Intifada'.[11]

PERIODISATION OF MOVEMENT: IDEOLOGY, TACTICS AND DEMOGRAPHICS

1970s–Early 1980s: Rise of the Islamic Underground

The spiritual leader of the Islamic Movement, from its outset in the 1970s, is Abdallah Nimr Darwish of Kafr Qasim. Born in 1948, Darwish was briefly involved in the Israeli Communist Party, *Rakah*, during his teenage years. In 1969, he joined the Islamic Institute in Nablus, receiving a licence to teach Islam in 1972. He then obtained a job teaching Islam in a primary school in Kafr Qasim and gave public lectures on Islam, attracting a large group of young followers. In 1975, he published a 95-page work entitled 'Toward Islam,' in which he called for a return to Islam in order to resist imperialism and because of its supreme value as a divine revelation.[12] In 1979, Darwish was dismissed from his teaching position after repeated warnings from the government. He continued his Islamic activities, focusing on education and solidarity and denouncing the use of military tactics. This moderate stream has remained dominant.

At the same time, influenced by the ideological fervour spreading throughout the Arab world as a result of the Khomeini Revolution, Fardi Ibrahim Abu Mukh founded and led a quasi-military clandestine organisation called *Usrat al-Jihad* ('Jihad Family'), composed mainly of young men in their early twenties from lower-middle-class families. Members included high school students, simple workers, educators, clerks and merchants.[13] The group initiated its *jihad* against the Zionist State by acquiring and training with weapons and then striking at what it considered to be major economic targets, such as fields and forests. The organisation also resorted to violence for the purpose of religious coercion. In Umm al-Fahim, for example, *Usrat al-Jihad* burned down a cinema which, in their opinion, screened inappropriate films.[14] Ties were also maintained with the Muslim Brothers in Syria and Jordan.[15] Abu Mukh and his organisation exemplified a more radical stream, which used Islam in the service of nationalism and did not refrain from violent means.[16]

By 1981, the Israeli security services had exposed and apprehended the entire membership of *Usrat al-Jihad*. Sixty individuals were brought to

trial at the Military Court in Lydda. Prison terms ranged from three years for Darwish to fifteen years for Abu Mukh. After the arrests and highly publicised trials, support for the Islamic Movement decreased drastically among the Muslim population. Religious activity continued, however, in the Ramla prison, because the correction-facility director was eager to offset support for the PLO among the detainees. Prisoners from a wide variety of political backgrounds united through an interest in Islam which knew no political boundaries. Upon their release, these prisoners would become the leaders of the revitalised Islamic Movement in Israel.

1980s: Broadening Support Through Community Services

Beginning in 1983, as Jihad family members began to be released from prison, they regrouped in a more moderate form of organisation. In addition to adopting some liberal and reformist elements, they advocated a policy of tolerance and dialogue and openly declared their intentions to work within the Israeli legal system. A loose network of organisations arose throughout Israel, collectively known as the Muslim Youth, generally registering as non-profit-making organisations designed to fulfil the social and religious needs of constituents. Darwish appeared again as the spiritual leader, openly declaring his commitment to peaceful relations with the Jewish majority, but not disguising his ardent Palestinian nationalism.[17]

In this period, Islamists pressed forward with education and public works projects, convinced that Israeli Arabs must help themselves to combat years of government neglect. In this way, the Islamic Movement sought to fill the role of socio-religious leadership which the *qadis* had not been able to carry out.[18] The Movement placed particular emphasis on religious education and pointedly criticised the inadequate Islamic education in the state schools.[19] Such youth activities were extremely popular among a community concerned with rising rates of juvenile delinquency. Funding came from public charitable contributions to newly established *zakat* (alms) committees, known as *lijan zakat*. In all likelihood, co-religionists in the Gulf provided additional funding.[20] The Movement redistributed the *zakat* funds to needy families and built infrastructure using volunteer labour camps, an idea pioneered by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt during the 1930s.[21] In Umm al-Fahim, for example, Islamists set up a library, a clinic and a religious secondary school. During the 1980s, the Movement gained renewed momentum through these peaceful activities, which enjoyed government support and demonstrated to the Muslim public the value of freedom of action and the possibility of independence from state resources.[22] The Movement also tried to provide alternatives to

vocal groups promoting Western culture. Mosques were turned into community centres and religious observance increased markedly.[23]

In contrast to the situation in Egypt and the Occupied Territories, the Israeli Islamic Movement did not attract many university students or professionals. The increasing numbers of Arab university graduates in Israel continued their traditional affiliations with the secular nationalist parties. Islamic leadership during this period consisted of lower-middle-class youth, who received Islamic education in the seminaries of the West Bank and were successful in attracting mass support by providing for the needs of the people.

The Islamic Movement benefited from the fact that the process of Palestinisation during the 1980s went hand in hand with an increasing focus on local Arab concerns. Yet the renewed sense of Palestinian identity also created frustration with the traditional nationalist parties in Israel, such as *Rakah*, the Communist Party, which focused solely on national politics. The Islamists and the communists openly competed for the support of Muslim youth during this period. During the 1980s, the Islamic movement significantly diminished the support base of *Rakah* and created the possibility of a bid for future Knesset elections.

In 1984, Islamic candidates ran for the first time in local elections, winning seats in several villages. Yet, during this period, the Islamic movement did not coalesce into a national political force or seriously challenge the leadership of the Islamic Establishment, which, by and large, chose to ignore the new movement.[24]

1989–PRESENT: LOCAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS AND EMERGING IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS

Municipal Elections

The 1989 municipal elections were a watershed for the Islamic Movement, in which Islamic candidates won 5 mayoralties and local chairmanships, in addition to 45 seats on 11 municipal and local councils, campaigning with the slogan 'Islam is the answer.' Since Arab parties have never participated in the Knesset coalitions which govern the country, the local level is the main arena for Arab political expression and competition. Becoming a mayor or local chairman ensures representation on the Committee of Chairmen of Arab Local Councils, the only representative national body of the Israeli Arab population.[25]

The Islamists enjoyed such a remarkable success in the 1989 elections for a number of reasons. First, the Islamic lists (candidates) capitalised on the widespread dissatisfaction with the Arab nationalist parties, who were high on rhetoric at the national Palestinian level but low on delivery of essential local services. Islamic lists also benefited from the perception of Arab nationalist parties that the Islamists were not 'political' and therefore did not represent an electoral threat. Finally, the Islamists employed a strategy of cooperation with the popular traditional family-clan lists, emphasising their shared concern with family values.[26]

Umm al-Fahim, a Muslim city which is the heart of the Islamic Movement and its electoral success, exemplifies the reasons for its triumph in 1989. By the late 1970s, the city faced severe economic problems and a wave of criminal activity among the high proportion of unemployed youth.[27] Traditionally, the heads of the four leading clans shared power with Arab nationalist parties. In the middle 1980s, the mayor was Hashim Mahamid of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (the successor to *Rakah*), a man in his late 30s with degrees in linguistics and educational psychology from Tel Aviv University. An avowed secular nationalist, he attributed the severe problems of the city to government discrimination at the national level.[28] In his focus on national politics, he alienated the public through poor management of the municipality. In contrast, Shaykh Raed Mahajnah, the mayor elect in the 1989 elections, was a 30-year-old graduate of the University of Hebron, with a long history of community involvement in Umm al-Fahim.

After the election, the Islamic leaders of Umm al-Fahim continued their informal style of leadership. A central coordinating body, the Islamic Association, supervised the activities of 17 committees and associations formed to address the various aspects of urban life. But an informal style does not imply democracy: members of committees are appointed by the leadership. At the lower levels of organisation, volunteers play the primary role; one joins the Islamic Movement simply by participating in its activities. Islamic leaders from the various towns do meet together to discuss issues of mutual concern, but there is no formal mechanism for decision-making.[29]

With its new official status, the Islamic Movement entered a new phase marked by partial dependence on the Israeli government and increased public scrutiny. Umm al-Fahim's government is characterised by excellent working relations with the Israeli authorities and the popularity necessary to introduce draconian policies, such as a 25 per cent tax increase, with little public dissent.[30] The Movement plays down its cooperation with the authorities, a tactic pursued to obtain the freedom of action necessary to pursue its primary agenda, implementation of *sharia* codes. Thus, for

example, the Movement published a manifesto forbidding the people of Umm al-Fahim from hosting in their homes secular Muslims who do not observe the fast of Ramadan. According to the spokesman of the Movement, Hashem Abd Ar-Rahman, 'Wherever there is a loophole in the law, we will use it to establish *sharia* laws in the city.'[31] Islamisation has become particularly apparent in the schools, where single-sex classes and Islamic dress for girls are now the norm. In 1990, Farson Agbariah, a local high school teacher, was dismissed from his job for teaching a poem by the secular Syrian poet, Nizar Kabani, who, although well known, is considered a heretic by the Muslim municipality.[32]

Ideological Ambiguity

The Islamic Movement has not yet expressed a coherent and consistent political ideology nor produced an official statement of its platform. While certain principles have been developed, lines are left obscured, perhaps in the hope of maintaining wide popular support and avoiding a crackdown by the Israeli government. Both in articles in its weekly paper, *Sawt al-Haq w al-Hurriya* (Voice of Justice and Freedom) and in the extensive interviews provided to the Hebrew and Arabic press, Islamic leaders are circumspect in their choice of words.[33] Yet a cleavage between moderates, such as Shaykh Abdallah Nimr Darwish of Kafar Qasim, and the more radical 'Northern Group' in the Galilee region, led by Shaykh Raed Salah, mayor of Umm al-Fahim, and Shaykh Kamal al-Khatib, is becoming increasingly apparent. Because the internal debate is not openly expressed in any public forum, the relative strengths of each side are difficult to determine. At the present, moderates such as 'Darwish and Sarsour' appear to be dominant.

Shaykh Raed Salah has expressed three levels of identity motivating the Islamic Movement: Muslim, Arab and Palestinian. Interestingly, he did not distinguish between Palestinians in Umm al-Fahim, Gaza or Beirut. Israel was not mentioned as a source of identification.[34] In contrast to its closest counterpart, *Hamas*, the Islamic Movement in Israel has chosen to focus its efforts on the social and religious realms rather than the political–Palestinian arena. While *Hamas* activists directly challenge the programme of the PLO, Israeli Islamists rarely attempt to challenge the status quo of Israeli Muslim public support for the PLO platform. Thus, leaders currently do not challenge the consensus of the Arab public, which supports the PLO and the 'two-state solution' to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.

Despite this declared support, the Islamic Movement regards the peace process with suspicion. In the eyes of the radicals from the Galilee region,

the peace talks will result in the 'sale of the homeland,' and the Israeli Islamic Movement should therefore promote the rejectionist party line of the international Islamic Movement. Shaykh Darwish, on the other hand, although circumspect on the subject, has focused his public statements on the need for Palestinian consensus on a universally accepted minimum programme. The Islamic Movement offered no alternative plan for settling the conflict. Whatever its assessment, the Islamic Movement, at this stage, does not want to challenge directly the majority support for the peace process and the current Palestinian leadership. Since the population might not accept the *bona fide* political platform of the Islamists, they choose not to present one directly; moreover, such a debate would inevitably result in a sharp split within the movement.[35]

While some articles in the Islamic press do lean towards the alternative solution of a revived Islamic State in Palestine, leaders such as Shaykh Darwish stress their pragmatic and moderate approach, based on political realism concerning their situation in Israel. They openly support *sharia* rule in majority-Muslim states but do not call for it in an Israel with a Muslim minority. Ultimately, however, the Movement clearly prefers an Islamic solution for Palestine:

> The problem of Palestine and the Muslim nation is solely an Islamic problem, which can be solved only by means of fundamental Islamic solutions.[36]

This contradiction exemplifies the Movement's difficult position as a Muslim minority in a Jewish state, where pragmatic short-term tactics must be relied on while long-term goals cannot be stated.

In the light of this commitment to an Islamic state, scholars debate the Israeli Islamist interpretation of *jihad*. In the words of Shaykh Darwish:

> I unequivocally reject military *jihad*, but *jihad* can also be waged through politics, education and the media.[37]

Scholars such as Ibrahim Malik believe that Darwish's true interpretation of *jihad* is moderate, focusing on the spiritual aspects rather than the militant ones. Others, such as Reuven Paz, disagree, pointing out the Islamic Movement's continuing hostility to Israel and Judaism, combined with a growing nationalism; he considers Darwish's statement an example of short-term tactics rather than genuine ideological commitment. Asa'd Ghanem, on the other hand, believes that the Israeli Arabs as a whole have become 'Israelised', or reconciled to their minority status in Israel. Thus, when the Islamic Movement voices criticism of Israeli policies, it expresses the political views of the Israeli Arabs but does not imply irredentism.[38]

Whatever the ultimate goals of the Movement, in the short term it has focused much of its attention on gaining power within the Muslim community in order to implement religious reform through the legal system in Israel. While the Islamic Movement clearly desires cultural autonomy, and is in fact creating *de facto* Muslim autonomous regions in the towns whose governments it controls, it refrains from using this terminology. However, Islamists state this goal most openly. Thus, for example, Kamal al-Khatib has advocated complete control of the Arab school curriculum in order to introduce Muslim values, and has also called for a separate education system and an Arab university in order to foster Arab culture and heritage.[39]

In 1992, the Islamic Movement neither organised a national party for the Knesset elections nor expressed a clear endorsement of any existing party. The Movement did, however, advocate support for Arab parties rather than Zionist ones with little concern with the Arab agenda.[40] The situation is likely to change by the time of the 1996 Knesset elections.[41] While participation in elections would clearly result in more influence, it would also require direct recognition of Israeli sovereignty. Radicals such as Kamal al-Khatib object to the requirement for an oath of allegiance to Israel for Knesset members, declaring it to be prohibited by the *sharia*.[42] According to Raed Salah, mayor of Umm al-Fahim, 'The Knesset represents a type of legislative system inimical to that commanded by God.'[43] If an Islamic party does emerge, it will oppose both the right-wing Likud, on nationalist grounds, and the Labour and left-wing parties, the traditional allies of the Arab citizens, because of their secular platforms. Even within the Arab political camp, no party has escaped Islamist castigation, including their closest allies, the Arab Democratic Party.[44] Clearly, the formation of an Islamic party in 1996 would change the Israeli–Arab political map.

GOVERNMENT REACTION TO THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT

Reaction to Usrat al-Jihad and the 1980s Reorganisation

The two main opponents of the Islamic Movement have been the government and the state Islamic establishment. The state has not interfered in the peaceful religious activities of the movement, but has been swift to curb any violent activity. When *Usrat al-Jihad* was exposed in the early 1980s, the government reacted sternly but calmly, treating the organisation

as an isolated group of extremists. Binyamin Gur-Arye, the Advisor to the Prime Minister for Arab Affairs at the time, stated:

> The goal of the Islamists is not negative. But the attempt on the part of some of them to turn religion into a tool to harm the security of the state, that is a very severe matter.[45]

In the light of Islamic Movement charges of incompetence and their attempts to introduce an alternative form of religious leadership, the Islamic establishment was put on the defensive and voiced open opposition.[46] Shaykh al-Tabri, *qadi* of Jaffa and Jerusalem, denounced what he considered a misuse of religion, emphasising that Islam forbids the use of violence to achieve political aims.[47] Yet al-Tabri also took some of the criticism to heart, bemoaning the establishment's singleminded focus on the *sharia* court system at the expense of providing spiritual leadership and youth-education programmes, creating a vacuum which the Islamic Movement attempted to fill.[48] Although the Islamists attempted to discredit the establishment with charges that acceptance of salaries from a non-Muslim state was inimical to Islam, the *qadis* still carry weight, particularly among the adult population.

When the Movement changed its course and turned inward to concentrate on community affairs, the government reacted with caution. In the 1980s, the government had supported the burgeoning Islamic Movement in the Occupied Territories as a counterweight to the PLO, a policy it came to regret.[49] Unable to determine whether the shift was merely tactical, the authorities remained vigilant, not hesitating to resort to house arrests or suspension of publications when articles were too critical of Israeli policies or too supportive of the *Intifada*.[50]

After the *Usrat al-Jihad* leadership was released from prison, by 1985, the government cautiously observed the reorganisation of the Movement, concluding that its primary goal was to provide services and obtain government funds through participation in municipal elections. As long as this activity remained within the bounds of the law, the government raised no objections, adhering to, in the words of Interior Minister Arye Deri, a policy of 'live and let live.'[51] Yet, by summer 1992, the government became concerned with the emergence of a younger, more radical group of leaders, such as Kamal al-Khatib, aged 34, of Kafar Kanna in Galilee, who were opposed to the Zionist State and its electoral process and to whom the use of violence was not anathema.[52] Although the government did not change its policy toward the Movement, it has been keeping a close watch on the internal debate and power struggle.

The Fight for Control of the Islamic Establishment in Israel

In contrast to the acceptable short-term goal of participation in local government, state authorities strongly object to what they consider to be the ultimate goal of the Islamic Movement: the establishment of a Muslim state in Palestine. They regard the Islamist attempt to gain control of the Israeli Islamic establishment as the first step in this process, and therefore have resisted it strongly.

Some academics and former government officials have criticised the government for having reached this situation of conflict with the Islamic Movement. Scholars such as Eli Rekhess have advocated weakening the Islamists' attractiveness by directing more resources towards the Arab sector to address local needs.[53] Josh Palmon, the first Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs (1949–55), has called on the government to allow the existing Muslim institutions, such as the *sharia* courts, to grow stronger 'on a democratic basis' rather than to undermine them and give them a 'collaborationist' image by appointing Israeli 'yes-men.' The current system of appointments, he argues, is a 'death kiss' for such officials among their constituency.[54]

While the government has considered the former policy suggestion, it has unequivocally rejected the latter. The state enjoys complete control over religious appointments and has repeatedly denied positions as *imam* and *qadi* to members of the Islamic Movement. A highly publicised case involved the candidacy of Islamist, Abbas Zakur, for the position of *imam* of the largest mosque of Acco, *Masjid al-Jazzar*, after the death of the previous officeholder. A 26-year-old graduate of the Islamic University in Jerusalem, Zakur enjoyed widespread public support and the recommendation of the mayor. He was rejected on security grounds through the legal appointment process of the Ministry of Religions and was subsequently arrested for inciting disturbances in the mosque against the new *imam*. In his defence, he decried the illegitimacy of the religious establishment's appointment process, stating that the 'General Security Services were behind the appointment of the *imam*,' and the fact that cooperation with the authorities was an inflexible prerequisite for a religious position.[55]

Clearly, members of religious establishments are expected to display moderation and cooperation with the state. Recently, Israel rewarded the organisation's Muslim religious-sector workers the Minister's Prize. The government praised the efficiency of the staff and their complete cooperation with the Ministry of Religions, based on the principle of mutual understanding between the two peoples, and their prevention of extremism on all sides.[56]

The Islamic Movement has responded to this policy by establishing its own alternative religious institutions, staffed by its own personnel and independent from state funding. For example, the Islamists established the Islamic College in Umm al-Fahim to train clerics, since it considers the state appointees ignorant and unqualified.[57] The background of its dean, Musa Usmul al-Bait, stands in sharp contrast to the typical state religious employee: after graduating from a *sharia* high school in Jerusalem and obtaining a doctorate in Medina and Riyadh, he served as a lecturer at King Saud University in Riyadh for over a decade.[58] In contrast, the most recent senior appointment in the religious establishment, that of *qadi*, went to Farouk Zuebi, a law graduate of Hebrew University, who is a member of the second generation of his family to serve the state as a *qadi*.[59]

Since their additional victories in the municipal elections of 1992, Islamic mayors now have greater access to government officials to express religious concerns and to highlight the shortcomings of the Islamic establishment. For example, in a meeting with Minister of the Interior, Arye Deri, in January 1992, Islamist mayors such as Shaykh al-Ktsa'tsi, of the Negev town of Rahat, expressed concern over the destruction of Muslim Holy Places and the desecration of cemeteries.[60] The Movement is active in trying to reclaim cemeteries such as Abu Kabir, near Tel Aviv, which the government has ear-marked for development purposes. When Islamists have attempted to reopen these endangered cemeteries with new burials, their entry has been blocked by the authorities. Islamist leaders such as Shaykh Raid Salah, mayor of Umm al-Fahim, have not hesitated to use their pulpits for official condemnations of the state-run establishment's failure to protect Muslim interests.[61]

To protect Muslim religious sites, local Islamic Associations have been formed throughout the country, representing another attempt to supplant the existing religious establishment.[62] In addition, the Islamic Movement has created a National Islamic Association to research Holy Sites, *waqf* properties and cemeteries, which belonged to the Muslim community prior to 1948. Requesting existing documents, maps, books or photographs, the Association plans to document its claims and then bring them to the attention of the United Nations and the Islamic world.[63] The Association is also involved in restoring Muslim cemeteries and mosques in settlements which had Muslim populations prior to 1948. Current efforts focus on the mixed Jewish–Arab cities of Jaffa, Haifa and Beersheva. In conjunction with this renewed focus on the Muslim historical significance of Palestine, the Movement organises large-scale trips to sites of religious significance in the Western Galilee in order 'to create an attachment between the Muslims and their history, heritage and beliefs.'[64] The Islamists hope one day to unite all of these organisations in a revived Supreme Muslim Council.

Most disturbing to the authorities ■■■ attempts by the Islamic Movement to regain control of the religious endowment (*waqf*) property taken over by the Custodian for Absentee Property upon the establishment of the state in 1948. As ■ result of this policy, the Muslim community is the only religious group in Israel that does not directly control its own funds.[65] Islamists have demanded the right to regain control of *waqf* assets, particularly in view of the inability of the Committee for the Disbursement of *Waqf* Funds to carry out its duties: in 1992, 30 075 000 shekels of funds were frozen because of a power struggle between committee members from the offices of the Treasury and the Advisor to the Prime Minister for Arab Affairs.[66] To preclude ■ repeat of such a situation, Islamic leaders have been in contact with the Turkish Embassy in an attempt to gain access to the Ottoman archives to discover which Islamic monuments were destroyed and which properties were originally theirs before the establishment of Israel.[67] In all of these activities, the Islamic Movement has demonstrated ■ new trend of turning to the legal system to redress its grievances concerning the state of Islam in Israel, a practice acceptable to the government.

Islamists are not the only ones eager to regain control of the *waqf*, an institution imbued with both political and religious significance. Since the late 1950s, *Rakah* and members of the religious establishment have made several attempts to revive the Supreme Muslim Council and to regain control of the *waqf*. In 1992, communist M. K. Hashme Mahamid proposed ■ bill for the release of *waqf* property to redress government discrimination against the Muslim community and to grant it the religious autonomy long enjoyed by the Jewish and Christian communities.[68] The Islamic Movement, rather than the staunchly secular communists, enjoyed much greater success in rallying support around this issue.

In response to Islamist protests against the *waqf* administration system, the government has highlighted the gradual process of its release into Muslim control.[69] In 1976, the Israeli government began to return municipal *waqf* properties to the Muslim population in mixed Jewish–Arab cities (Jaffa, Acco, Haifa, Ramla and Lod), under the administration of government-appointed trustee committees. The Islamists counter with charges of gross incompetence and corruption: *waqf* trustees in Jaffa have been implicated in criminal activity including murder, and by April 1990 had run up debts of several million shekels. In fact, 60 *waqf* properties in Jaffa have been completely lost as ■ result of neglect and mismanagement.[70] In 1992, the government began to reverse its policy and created a temporary committee to administer the Jaffa *waqf* under the leadership of Dr Alexander Bligh, the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, with the authorisation of the Israeli Supreme Court. The government is considering similar measures for the other mixed-city *waqf* boards.

To deflect attention from this controversial reversal of policy, the government has recognised the need to improve the level of religious services. In response to the shortage of cemeteries, insufficient funding for establishment staff and inadequate mosque maintenance, Dr Alexander Bligh has been directed to submit a bill to the Knesset to improve Muslim religious services, using the income derived from absentee property.[71] In contrast to the increased governmental control over the *waqf*, this proposal recommends the establishment of autonomous local religious councils, which would be responsible for meeting the religious needs of the community.[72]

The Israeli government fears most what it considers to be the ultimate goal behind all of these short-term tactics: the establishment of an Islamic State in Palestine. As proof, the government points to the Islamic newspaper, *Sawt al-Haq w-al Hurriya*, which frequently includes anti-state diatribes, comparisons of Jews and Nazis, denials of the holocaust and references such as the 'cancer of Zionism'.[73]

As Islamist ties with *Hamas* strengthen, Israelis fear a growing radicalisation of the Movement.[74] The influence of this linkage was concretely manifested in February 1992, when four Israeli Arabs, who professed membership in Islamic Jihad in the Occupied Territories, hacked and stabbed to death three Israeli soldiers in an army camp in Galed in the Galilee. Shaykh Darwish immediately condemned the attacks, asserting:

> The Islamic Movement does not permit itself nor anybody who belongs to it to transgress the law or to thwart the process of cultural coexistence between the two nations.[75]

The four suspects, consequently sentenced to life terms, hailed from Umm al-Fahim and the neighbouring village of Mushereifa, the heartland of Islamic Movement support in Israel. While the appearance of an Islamic Jihad cell within Israel appears to be an isolated incident, no one can deny the increasing influence of *Hamas* on the Islamists in Israel. Israeli officials cite numerous unofficial meetings and identify the Islamic Studies Centre in Hebron on the West Bank as a centre for interaction.

Currently, the Islamic Movement is working hard to forge ties with the wider Islamic world. Movement members highlight their unique role as protectors of the Islamic Holy Places in Palestine. This creates a natural tie with the Organization of Islamic Conference, founded in 1969 in reaction to the perceived threat to the Holy Places of Jerusalem under Israeli rule, despite all Israeli assurance to the contrary. Not surprisingly, the closest ties are with fellow Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. During Ramadan, for example, the Movement called for followers to devote one

day to visits to the West Bank and Gaza to distribute donations and food.[76] During the summer of 1992, in the Gaza Strip, Israeli Islamist mayors participated in high-level delegations to mediate between feuding *Fatah* (PLO) and *Hamas* factions.[77] Moreover, leaders such as Raed Salah were active in organising educational exchange programmes with Islamic universities in the Middle East, such as *Al-Hiyat* in Turkey.[78] Israeli Islamists also initiated a programme to adopt Bosnian Muslim orphans in the summer of 1992, and participated widely in international conferences and missions.[79] These contacts increase the legitimacy of the Israeli Islamic Movement both at home and abroad.

Israel believes that its best hope is to continue to encourage the participation of the Islamic Movement in the democratic process in Israel, hoping that cooperation will lead to moderation. While officials speculate on the likelihood of a return to violent insurrection, they seek to forestall it by giving the Movement a stake in society. Recently, government officials have made public pronouncements promising more resources to the Arab sector.[80] Yet the 1992 budget for the Muslim Section of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, of under 5 million shekels, was recommended for the following year, not enough to cover the demands of a rapidly mobilising religious community.[81] Notably, the increased funding has been allocated for the physical maintenance of mosques and cemeteries rather than for mosques' education programmes, feared for their potential to transmit radical Islamist doctrine.[82] For the present, the Israeli government is content to 'keep its hand on the pulse' of the Islamic Movement and to crack down immediately on any illegal activity against the state.[83] According to Dr Alexander Bligh, the government is walking on a tightrope, attempting to 'determine where freedom of expression ends and incitement begins.'[84]

Shortly after the election of the Labour government in June 1992, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin abolished the position of Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, in accordance with a coalition agreement with the major Israeli Arab parties.[85] From now on, direct, unmediated relations with the Arab citizens of the state will be maintained. The significance of the Labour government in the continuing peace process, for the Islamic Movement remains to be seen. However, the Movement, has clearly established itself as a commanding force on the Arab political scene in Israel and will undoubtedly continue to challenge the Islamic establishment and to implement policies leading towards religious autonomy for the Muslim population. Whatever the outcome of the internal ideological debate within the Movement, ■ Islamic party could form a strong challenge in the 1996 Knesset elections and has the potential to change the political map in Israel.

NOTES

1. I have adopted Yvonne Haddad's use of the term Islamist, a translation of *al-Islamiyyun*, the current self-designation of the various Islamic groups in the Arab world, including the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots. See Yvonne Haddad, 'Islamists and the "Problem of Israel": the 1967 Awakening', *Middle East Journal*, 46 (Spring 1992) p. 266.
2. Ibid., p. 284.
3. More than 505 of the 643 000 Israelis living under the poverty line are Arabs. See *New York Times*, 23 May 1990.
4. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 6 September 1989, as quoted in Issam Aburaiya, 'Developmental Leadership: The Case of the Islamic Movement in Umm al-Fahim, Israel', Master's thesis, Clark University, 1991, p. 106.
5. Thomas Mayer, 'Islamic Resurgence among the Arabs in Israel' (Givat Haviva, 1986) p. 4. (Mimeographed.)
6. *Maariv*, 11 May 1980.
7. *Haaretz Supplement*, 6 March 1981, as cited by the Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, *Leket* (Hebrew), March 1981, p. 25.
8. Thomas Mayer, 'Islamic Resurgence among the Arabs in Israel', p. 3.
9. Yvonne Haddad, 'Islamists and the "Problem of Israel": the 1967 Awakening', p. 273.
10. *Kol Haemek*, 7 April 1988.
11. Don Peretz, *Intifada* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990) p. 104. *Hamas* is an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement and means ardour or strength in Arabic. Its leadership derives from both the Muslim Brothers and the Islamic Jihad.
12. Thomas Mayer, 'Islamic Resurgence Among the Arabs in Israel', p. 6.
13. Israel Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, *Leket*, p. 2.
14. Ibid., p. 25.
15. *Haarets*, 6 March 1981.
16. Thomas Mayer, 'Islamic Resurgence Among the Arabs in Israel', p. 16.
17. Ibid., pp. 27, 33.
18. Ibid., p. 38.
19. *Haaretz*, 17 June 1988.
20. Amina Minns and Nadia Hijab, *Citizens Apart* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990) p. 19.
21. Thomas Mayer, 'Islamic Resurgence among the Arabs in Israel', p. 37.
22. Reuven Paz, 'The Islamic Movement in Israel and the Municipal Elections of 1989', *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 53 (Winter 1990) p. 12.
23. Thomas Mayer, 'Islamic Resurgence Among the Arabs in Israel', p. 52. The number of mosques in Israel has tripled since 1967.
24. Ibid., p. 54.
25. Although not officially recognised, the Committee has gained legitimacy among the public and the political parties. It was established in 1974 in response to the internal needs of the Arab towns and to discrimination in government budgets.
26. Reuven Paz, 'The Islamic Movement in Israel and the Municipal Elections of 1989', p. 4.

27. *Maariv*, 7 June 1989. In 1986, 65 per cent of the city's population was under the age of 18.
28. Hillel Schenker, 'Umm el-Fahm: From Village to City', *New Outlook* (March 1986) p. 9.
29. Issam Aburaiya, 'Developmental Leadership: The Case of the Islamic Movement in Umm al-Fahim, Israel', p. 128.
30. Binyamin Nueberg, *Government and Politics in Israel* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Open University, 1991) p. 91.
31. Binyamin Neuberg, *Government and Politics in Israel* (Hebrew).
32. *New York Times*, 30 June 1990.
33. *Sawt al-Haq w-al-Hurriya*, published in Umm al-Fahim, began in October 1989 and publishes news on the Islamic world and the international Islamist movement, sports results from its Islamic League, and articles on *Hamas* and the Intifada. On 28 June 1990, it was forced to cease publication for three months on the charge that it 'endangered public safety.'
34. Ibrahim Malik, *The Islamic Movement in Israel: Between Adherence to the Sources and the Refuge of Pragmatism* (Hebrew) (Givat Haviva: Institute of Arabic Studies, 1990) p. 3.
35. Sarah Ozack-Lazar and Riad Kabaha, *The Arabic Press in Israel on the Madrid Peace Conference* (Givat Haviva: Institute for Arabic Studies, 1991) p. 23.
36. *Sawt al-Haq w-a-Hurriya*, 19 January 1990, as cited by Ibrahim Malik, *The Islamic Movement in Israel: Between Adherence to the Sources and the Refuge of Pragmatism*, p. 5.
37. *New York Times*, 16 September 1992.
38. For more on this debate, see Institute for Peace Research at Givat Haviva, *Islam and Peace* (Hebrew) (Givat Haviva: Institute for Arabic Studies, 1990) p. 15.
39. Sarah Ozack-Lazar and Asa'd Ghanem, *Autonomy for the Arabs in Israel: An Initial Discussion* (Givat Haviva: Institute for Arabic Studies, 1990) p. 15.
40. Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'The Islamic Movement and the Elections', June 1992, p. 6.
41. Nadim Rouhana, 'The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence to Challenge', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 18 (Spring 1989) p. 50. Rouhana argues that Palestinisation precludes family or religious loyalties as a basis of national political activity.
42. Ibrahim Malik, *The Islamic Movement in Israel: Between Adherence to the Sources and the Refuge of Pragmatism*, p. 11.
43. Jamal Zayid, 'The Islamic Movement in Israel' (Hebrew) Seminar paper, Department for Middle Eastern Studies, Haifa University, 1991, p. 27. (Mimeographed).
44. Kamalal- Khatib sharply criticised the Arab Democratic Party for using Quran quotations in the elections for purely political purposes. See Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Sharp Condemnation of the Use of Quran Quotations by the Democratic Arab Party', June 1992, pp. 6–7.
45. *Yediot Aharonot*, 6 March 1981.
46. Israel Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, *Leket*, p. 24.
47. *Al Hamishmar*, 6 March 1981.

48. Thomas Mayer, 'Islamic Resurgence Among the Arabs in Israel', pp. 21–22.
49. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada*, translated and edited by Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990) p. 223.
50. Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, *Leket*, p. 22. See also, Issam Aburaiya, 'Developmental Leadership: The Case of the Islamic Movement in Umm al-Fahim, Israel', p. 124.
51. *Jerusalem Post*, 10 March 1989.
52. Interview with Gadi Hitman, Assistant to the Adviser on Arab Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel, 17 August 1992.
53. *Jerusalem Post*, 22 March 1989.
54. *Jerusalem Post*, 17 December 1987.
55. *Hadashot*, 19 September 1991.
56. Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Herbrew), 'Minister's Prize for Religious Affairs to the Organization of Muslim Workers in Israel', February 1992, p. 5.
57. *Yediot Aharonot*, 7 April 1989. The government has never opened an institution dedicated to the training of clerics, relying on existing institutions in the Occupied Territories or elsewhere in the Islamic world.
58. *Sawt al-Haq w-al-Hurriya*, 7 February 1992, as cited by Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'At the Islamic Seminary in Umm al-Fahm', March 1992, p. 7.
59. Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Lawyer Zuebi: New Sharia Qadi', January 1992, p. 6. For the similar case of Shaykh Zaki Madlaj, *qadi* of Jerusalem and also a law graduate of an Israeli University and the son of a *qadi*, see *Yom Hashishi*, 19 February 1988.
60. *Sawt al-Haq w-al-Hurriya*, 31 January 1992, cited by Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Al-Aqsa Mosque: Friday Sermons,' February 1992, p. 4.
61. *An-Nahar*, 22 February 1992, as cited by Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Al-Aqsa Mosque: Friday Sermons,' p. 4.
62. Amina Minns and Nadia Hijab, *Citizens Apart*, pp. 46–7.
63. *Sawt al-Haq w-al-Hurriya*, 21 February 1992, cited by Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Establishment of the National Islamic Association', March 1992, p. 6.
64. Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Visit to Holy Sites in Tiberias and the Western Galilee', May 1992, p. 6.
65. For more information on the controversial issue of Israeli policy towards the Palestinian *waqf*, see Michael Dumper, 'Muslim Institutions and the Israeli State; Muslim Religious Endowments (Waqfs) in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 1948–1987', Ph.D. dissertation, University of Exeter, 1991. Dumper argues that Israel's constant policy objective has been to acquire land and to constrain Palestinian political aspirations.
66. *Kol Hair* (Jerusalem), 26 January 1990.
67. *Hitman*, 17 August 1992. See also Ministry for Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Shaykh Riad Salah Turns to the Turkish Embassy', May 1992, pp. 5–6.
68. 'Mahamid Proposal to Hand Over Waqf Assets to the Muslims', in *Arabs in Israel*, vol. 2, No. 1 (Jerusalem: Israel Government, 1992) p. 9.
69. Under the British Mandate, the Supreme Muslim Council, under the leadership of Haj Amin Al-Husayni, controlled *waqf* properties. After the

establishment of Israel in 1948, the Custodian of Absentee Property assumed control of *waqf* properties which amounted to hundreds of dunams of land and extensive municipal property. In 1954, the government promulgated ■ law to confiscate agricultural lands which had formerly belonged to the *waqf*. In 1965, the government began the process of returning the *waqf* to Muslim hands. See Alexander Bligh, *Israeli Arabs – the Effort for Equality: Policy Suggestions* (Jerusalem: Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister for Arab Affairs, 19 August 1992) p. 30.

70. Alexander Bligh, *Israeli Arabs – the Effort for Equality*, p. 8.
71. *Arabs in Israel*, p. 9 (see note 68).
72. Alexander Bligh, *Israeli Arabs – the Effort for Equality*, p. 8.
73. *Sawt al-Haq w-al-Hurriya*, 7 February 1992, as cited by Israel Ministry of Religions, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Jews and Judaism in the Eyes of Islamic Elements', March 1992, p. 7
74. *Davar*, 29 July 1990.
75. Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Murder of the Soldiers at Galed', March 1992, p. 4. See also, *New York Times*, 5 March 1992.
76. *Sawt al-Haq w-al-Hurriya*, 3 February 1992, as cited by Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Islam and Muslims in Judea, Samaria and Gaza', March 1992, p. 5.
77. *Boston Globe*, 12 July 1992.
78. Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'Shaykh Raed Turns to the Turkish Embassy', May 1992, p. 5.
79. Alexander Bligh, *Israel Arabs – the Effort for Equality*, p. 16.
80. For example, Minister of Interior Arye Deri visited the Negev town of Rahat, promising its Islamic mayor a new central library, renovation of the cemetery and a change in official status from village to city, and ■ guarantee of a larger share of resources. See Israel Ministry of Religions, *Newsletter* (Hebrew), 'The Islamic Movement in the Negev', March 1992, p. 7.
81. Alexander Bligh, *Israeli Arabs – the Effort for Equality*, p. 15. Even with the proposed increases, most of the cash for mosque construction in recent years has come from private Muslim funding because of the insufficient government budget.
82. *Hamodiya*, 6 May 1988.
83. *Hitman*, 17 August 1992.
84. *New York Times*, 16 September 1922.
85. *New York Times*, 5 October 1992.

15 Islam and Muslims in America

Gisela Webb

Islam is the fastest growing religion in America, having more than four million believers and an estimated 650 mosques. The faith is, however, the least known and understood among Americans in general. Most Americans tend to perceive Islam as a religion which advocates violence, hence the negative image of Muslims in the United States. The American media and the government are also responsible for creating such negative images of the Muslims. However, there has been some awareness about Islam and Muslims among a section of the American population in more recent times.

Most Muslims are either immigrants or descendants of immigrants from the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa, and other Asian countries. One-third of American Muslims are African Americans. Timothy Drew, who later became Noble Drew Ali, started an Islamic movement in 1886, mainly to protect Black Americans' interests. Later on, another black leader, Elijah Muhammad, championed the cause of Islam through his movement of the 'Nation of Islam', which was avowedly anti-White. With a new leader, this orientation was later changed to ■ non-racial, liberal one.

This chapter also sheds light on various other Islamic movements in America, highlighting the inner conflicts and problems of American Muslims. It also portrays the American government's attitudes towards Islam and the Muslims, which is responsible for the perception gap and lack of understanding between American Muslims and the American public.

The situation of Islam in America is extremely complex and rapidly changing. Islam is the fastest growing religion in America, with about 4 million members and 650 mosques. It has more members than the Episcopal Church, one of the most mainstream of Protestant churches in the United States, and yet it is scarcely in the consciousness of the general American population as ■■ 'American' religion. Americans tend to think of the United States in terms of its 'Judaeo-Christian heritage', an appellation whose source and usage has been ■ product of recent political history ■ much as past religious roots.[1] What Americans do know about Islam has been formed primarily through the media – by the absence of positive

images of Muslims, on one hand, and by the presence of one-sided, negative images or stereotypes on the other (e.g., 'Arab terrorists,' 'rich Arab sheikhs', 'Muslim fundamentalists').

Most Americans do not know about the quiet but constant growth of the Muslim religion in North America, beginning with the arrival of Middle Eastern immigrants in the early twentieth century, and continuing with the more recent arrivals of refugees, foreign students, and professionals from a variety of Muslim-populated countries besides the Middle East. Americans outside the urban centres of the US have not seen the growth of Islam among African-American populations, although there is growing awareness of this phenomenon with the recent movie about, and revival of interest in, the figure of Malcolm X, the powerful spokesperson for the black separatist 'Nation of Islam', and then for 'orthodox' Islam, before his death in 1964. Most invisible is the growth of Sufi groups, Sufism being the 'mystical dimension' of Islam, whose participants range from the most traditional, foreign-born Muslims to white middle-class 'indigenous' Americans from Jewish and Christian backgrounds.[2]

There are hints that this lack of awareness of Islam is beginning to change. A perception of Muslims as our neighbours, colleagues, friends, 'one of us,' not 'one of them' is dawning. There is currently an open, vibrant, sometimes heated discussion in academic, political and popular circles on the multicultural nature of America and the need to reformulate the historical and sociological presentations of who 'we' are as 'a people'. The concern to 'foreground' the contributions of traditionally marginalised groups in the United States (such as racial and ethnic minorities, and women) has led to the reviewing and restructuring of curricula in schools across the country, and this has had an impact on the presentation of Islam in public school textbooks. Establishment churches are beginning to engage in dialogue and ecumenical efforts with Muslims and to offer educational programmes on Islam. Some Muslim groups, particularly the larger, ethnically mixed mosque communities, are now becoming involved in outreach and communication with other religious groups.

Thus the current situation of Islam in America must be seen as a particular configuration of historical, sociological, political and hermeneutical issues, which must be understood together in order to make any accurate assessment of either the influence of Muslims and Islam on American culture or the influence of American culture and government policy decisions on Muslims and Islam.[3] The purpose of this chapter will be to give a cursory examination of some of the important elements in this configuration that is 'Islam in America'. The reader is urged to refer to the end-notes for resources that deal with these issues in a more extensive

fashion, such as Yvonne Haddad's collection of essays in *The Muslims of America*, and Yvonne Haddad and Adair Lummis's study on *Islamic Values in the United States*.[3]

What will be evident from our brief discussion is: (1) that the forms – the expressions – that Islam takes in America are dependent on the particular understanding of Islam brought to the United States by its foreign-born transmitters, and that that situation has varied over the years as changes in the international political climate have occurred; (2) that the development of Islam in America inevitably reflects the transmission and adoption of Islamic values within the context of certain cultural forms, norms and problems particular to America; (3) that, at least for the time being, there are contradictory forces at work in America shaping attitudes toward Islam and Muslims, some serving to promote Islam as one of the major religions, and Muslims as active participants in a pluralistic and democratic America, some serving to divide the world between a righteous 'Euro-American/Judaeo-Christian/secular West' and a mono-lithic, fundamentalist, hostile Islam. The 'shape' that Islam takes in America as we approach the twenty-first century will have much to do with the working out of these forces.

'IMMIGRANT' ISLAM

Approximately two-thirds of all Muslims in the United States are immigrants and their descendants.[4] Muslim immigrants arrived in waves, beginning in the late 1800s, the first groups emigrating primarily from what now constitutes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine. Communities began to crystalise in the manufacturing centres of the Midwestern United States – Cedar Rapids, Toledo, Detroit, Michigan City, Chicago – as these mostly uneducated and unskilled 'Middle Easterners' sought economic opportunities in America. The extended families of these first Muslim immigrants became founders of the first mosques in the United States. Finding difficulty in integrating into American society, most of these immigrants maintained social bonds exclusively with fellow Muslims. Until the 1940s, immigration of Muslims generally consisted of the relatives of the earlier immigrants. The function of the mosques during this time was to keep the families close, offer solidarity in this new land, and provide community for rites of passage.[5]

Another wave of immigrants arrived between 1947 and 1960 and included Muslims not only from the Middle East, but from India, Pakistan, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and other parts of the Islamic world.[6]

Some were children of ruling elites, some were refugees, and some came simply for higher education.

The last wave, from 1967 to the present, have come for both political and economic reasons. Many, especially Pakistanis and Arabs, are educated professionals, and substantial numbers have come from Pakistan, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iran after the revolution. Muslims of other nationalities are represented, though in lesser numbers: Egypt, Jordan, Turkistan and Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan.[7] Among the newest arrivals are Muslims from the Sudan, Uganda, Guyana, Bermuda, and the former Yugoslavia.

The variety of forms of Islamic community life in America developed in accordance with the political and social concerns of the various immigrant groups. The earlier Muslim communities, because their focus was, for the most part, social and non-political, placed little emphasis upon strict observance of traditional mosque functions. There were adaptations made that conformed to American church patterns, for example, the scheduling of congregational prayers and religious education classes on Sundays and the adopting of community social events in which men and women together participated in activities such as dancing.[8]

Later groups of Muslim immigrants brought different experiences and a heightened religio-political self-consciousness, in no small part due to the wide-ranging political and religious effects of the loss and occupation of Palestinian lands.[9] They came with commitments to a variety of religio-political ideologies, and more religious training, usually more 'conservative,' than their predecessors in America. It is not unknown for situations of tension to have developed in some of the long-standing communities as more recent and conservative Muslim arrivals attempted to integrate and inform their more Americanised brothers and sisters of 'correct' Islamic belief, practice and customs.

Indeed, virtually all Muslims in America who have been raised in traditional Muslim cultures – whether Sunni or Shiite – speak of the inevitable tension that arises in trying to remain close to linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious roots while trying to find a sense of belonging in their adopted home. American lifestyle patterns are often experienced to be at odds with the needs of Muslim life and practice. Work schedules do not easily accomodate the five-times-daily *salat* prayers or the Friday congregational prayers. Institutional eating facilities (schools, prisons) are not set up to accommodate Muslim dietary restrictions. The pervasiveness of alcohol in America and the cultural acceptance of sexual permissiveness and immodesty (in clothing and behaviour) are seen as problematic influences on the faith community, particularly the youth.[10] Nevertheless,

the *shariah* is maintained as the ideal pattern of life, to be striven for in the midst of American culture.

Mosque governance in America seems to have taken the pattern of certain Protestant denominations, such as the Baptist Church, where each community has autonomy in deciding its local leadership and ideological bent, but where each community and each member shares ■ commitment to sacred scripture as the ultimate source of guidance for fundamental principles of faith and practice.[11] Mosques, ■ churches in America, are self-supporting, and therefore must rely on some form of membership contribution. The *imam* of the American mosque is usually thrust into ■ role that goes beyond the traditional function of reciter of prayers. He often takes on the role of the pastor, with administrative and counselling duties.

There are differing styles and emphases in mosque communities of the United States. Some mosques function in the way of America's 'ethnic churches,' so common in urban areas of the United States, where ethnic ties are emphasised, cultivated, preserved. These communities tend to become centres for learning and sharing information about American life as much as they are centres for prayer. Some mosques become centres of religious rituals and social activities, but also emphasise 'outreach,' doing their part to educate Americans about Islam, utilising the Islamic cultural tradition of hospitality in order to establish communication and goodwill with the surrounding community.[12] A new trend is emerging in America: large 'mega-mosques' that are serving the needs of large, racially and ethnically diverse communities, such as the Los Angeles area.

In the middle of the twentieth century, Muslims were still relatively few in number and scattered over the continent. The need for a unifying organisation led second-generation Muslim immigrants to create a federation of mosques that would provide a pooling of resources and contact with other communities.[13] It was originally named the Federation of Islamic Organisations; it is now the Federation of Islamic Associations (FIA) in the United States and Canada, and its headquarters are in Detroit.

Meanwhile, a number of Muslim student organisations had been organising on college campuses since the Second World War. In 1963 the Muslim Student Association (MSA) was created to coordinate activities, expand the services of the student groups, and provide outreach. The MSA represented the international diversity of Islam as well as the ideological concerns of a more activist Islam. Islam was seen by these students as a way of life, ■ mission, and the organisation's goal was to help create ■ 'ideal' community and to serve Islam.[14] The MSA remains one of the largest, best-organised and most active of Islamic organisations, and it has spawned a number of other service organisations, including the Muslim Community

Association (MCA). As the needs of the large number of newer immigrants went beyond the 'student' community, a new umbrella structure was created, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA).[15] This structure 'houses' a number of Muslim professional and service organisations, such as the Islamic Teaching Centre, American Muslim Social Scientists, American Muslim Scientists and Engineers, Islamic Medical Association, North American Islamic Trust, Canadian Islamic Trust, Muslim Youth of North America, Malaysian Islamic Study Group, and the American Muslim Mission (which will be discussed further), along with the MSA, MCA, and the older FIA, already mentioned. These groups have their own committees and boards, but their financial, legal, and administrative affairs are joined at the centre by ISNA's legislative body, the Majlis al-Shura.[16] National, zonal, and profession-specific congresses provide the ISNA-affiliated groups with opportunities for social, business, and intellectual exchange and a connection to the larger international Islamic community.

A number of noteworthy developments characterise the present development of political activity in the United States. First, ISNA itself has taken steps toward political action in the United States under the encouragement of Abd ar-Rahman of the Washingon-based Islamic 'think-tank,' the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). It was always the case that leadership in ISNA tended to be by individuals with affiliation to or backing from politically minded Islamist groups, such as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin and the Jamaat-i-Islami.[17] But there has never been consensus on the idea of political action in the United States. Opposition to such involvement came from such groups as the Tablighi Jammat (comprised mainly of Indo-Pakistanis and African-Americans who see such political activity as participation in an already *kufr*, or 'unbelieving,' system, i.e., the US government) and the ultra-orthodox Salafiyya (comprised mainly of Gulf Arabs and some African-Americans), as well as from pockets of African-American 'utopian separatists'.[18]

However, in trying to create some balance to the influence of more than 75 pro-Israel Political Action Committees (or 'PACs'), a number of Muslim PACs have emerged since 1985, including ISNA's own ISNA-PAC. The Islamic Society of Greater Houston established the All American Muslim Political Action Committee (AAMPAC), whose youth wing has encouraged the participation of young Muslim adults in political campaigns. Recently emerging from the very progressive Islamic Centre of Southern California (under the leadership of Maher Hathout and, more recently, Fathi Osman) is the Muslim Political Action Committee (MPAC), and from the Pakistan Muslim community in Michigan has developed the Pakistan-Political Action Committee.

Not all politically oriented Muslim organisations are specifically PACs. Among the groups wishing to engage in American political activity are Arab American groups (composed of both Christians and Muslims) which emphasise the cause of Palestine. The National Council on Islamic Affairs, under the supervision of Mohammad Mehdi, has effectively used the media – especially television – to publicise Middle East issues, and political issues in the United States that have an impact on the Middle East. Mehdi is also a strong supporter of inter-faith work. Also, a growing number of Muslim groups, such as the United Muslims of America, encourage participation in the mainstream American activities of registering and voting in elections, engaging in the support of political candidates, and even running for political office. Indeed, one of the results of this public visibility in the political system is that candidates sometimes find criticism coming from conservative elements within the Islamic community, for such things as not using an Islamic name, dressing in what is perceived as an 'overly western' manner, or making other accommodations to American culture.[19]

This situation points to an important reality of Islam in America: there are many sincere and divergent voices engaged in the discussion of issues revolving around interpreting, maintaining and applying traditional Islamic principles within the context of 'modernity' and, specifically, within America's democratic, secular and pluralistic society. What is clearly evident is that not all Muslims share the same political and ideological goals. In fact, differences have emerged not only between 'traditionalist' and 'modernist' elements, but along Sunni and Shiite lines, between Salafis and Ikhwanis, and among Ikhwanis themselves. On one hand, this infighting among Muslim groups has had the negative effect of causing a certain amount of disillusionment among American converts, who have come to Islam because of the appeal of unity and brotherhood.[20] On the other hand, it has contributed to the development of strong local organisations, such as the Islamic Centre of Southern California and the Muslim Community Centre of Chicago, as alternatives to existing, more ideologically-based organisations. Their focus is on correcting misunderstandings about Islam by inviting non-Muslim groups (including Christian missionaries) to visit their centres, offering lectures and discussions, and informing the public about common elements of faith. Members of these groups serve as watchdogs in public schools, working for changes in history or social-studies textbooks where Muslims are depicted in demeaning or stereotypic ways (such as sword-carrying Bedouins, as was the case in a California text book).[21] Groups such as the Islamic Cultural Preservation Society and Information Committee, based in Philadelphia, offer workshops and services to educators, including the reviewing of school curricula. During the

activity surrounding the opening of Spike Lee's film on Malcolm X, efforts were made, for example, to provide school children – particularly in the inner cities – with information on the differences between normative Islam and the black separatist Nation of Islam.

Other Muslim organisations represented in North America that are less political and more education/missionary/ministry (*da'wa*) oriented are the Muslim World League, the Shiite-based Islamic Societies of Georgia and Virginia, the Ahmadiyyah Movement, and the Islamic Circle of North America, based in Montreal.

Finally, the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) was formed in 1981 as a research and educational organisation to promote Islamic scholarship in a variety of fields. The IIIT has linked with the Association of Muslim Social Scientists in publishing *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* and in sponsoring AMSS's annual conference. A cursory examination of some of the topics dealt with in the 1992 Annual AMSS conference shows that there is special attention being paid to the issue of Islam and Democracy (for example, 'The Islamicist–Secularist Dialogue,' and 'Islam, Liberty and the Free Market'),[22] and to the issue of Women and Gender in Islam ('Opinions of Female Muslim American Leaders on Selected Women's Issues,' 'Women and Islam: Some Unresolved Issues in Islamic Literature').[23] The reason for mentioning these discussions is because they mark the presence and importance of the Muslim activist–scholar in America as well as the lively, creative, critical and self-critical discussions emerging in American Muslim gatherings, where there is perhaps less pressure to conform to particular ideological stands associated with certain revivalist and reform movements abroad. Not only is 'Islam in America' being shaped by such discussions, but 'Islam' is being shaped by the discourses emerging in America, and the Muslims involved clearly see these discussions as part of their Islamic legacy of *ijtihad* (interpretation) and *shura* (consultation).

African-American Islam

The majority of 'non-immigrant' Muslims in America – about one third of the total – are African-American converts to Islam. It has been suggested that since the dominant representation of Islam in America has been the religion of 'the other,' for many African-Americans, Islam became a means of self-definition and of 'choosing' to identify with a religio-cultural system that was 'other' than the one (the Christian West) that had failed to establish a truly racially inclusive society.[24] Clearly the phenomenal growth of Islam among African-Americans, even the injection of Islamic terminology

into black popular culture (such as rap music), is related to the meaning that 'Islam' holds for black Americans, namely, identifying with a religious faith that gives integrity to their African heritage.[25]

In 1886, Timothy Drew, a poor North Carolina black, began preaching what he understood to be Islamic principles as a means of uniting Americans of African heritage. He changed his name to Noble Drew Ali and founded the Moorish American Science Temple in Newark, New Jersey in 1913.[26] His goal was to unite an oppressed people and give them a sense of pride, and the organisation spread to a number of cities. After Drew Ali's death in 1929, a movement was begun in Detroit by Wallace Fard Muhammad, about whom little is known except that he was probably of Turkish or Iranian origin. He preached doctrines that were marginally Islamic; he spoke of submission to Allah and of the need to repudiate such vices as alcohol, sex outside of marriage, the eating of pork, and gambling. He also preached that African-Americans were really Muslims separated from their true identity and who must be brought back to the fold; thus he created 'The Lost–Found Nation of Islam in the Wilderness of North America'.[27] The group continued under the leadership of Elijah Muhammad, whom Fard proclaimed to be the 'Messenger of God' who was to bring the black 'nation' to the realisation of its true nature. He advocated hard work, self-respect, economic independence, and ethical integrity. However, a number of his doctrines countered traditional Islamic teachings, most noteworthy, his teaching of the 'white man as devil' and his quasi-scientific theory of the origins of human history, which he called 'Yacub's history'.[28] Elijah Muhammad demanded total commitment of his converts to the 'Nation of Islam,' as the organisation came to be called. The most well-known convert to 'the Nation' was Malcolm X. His fiery expositions of Elijah Muhammad's teachings during the 1960s became the most influential vehicle for bringing membership to the Nation of Islam. Malcolm X's pilgrimage to Mecca and his experience, as he relates, of a 'universal brotherhood' in submission to Allah, without colour lines, led him to break with Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam in favour of what he saw as 'true Islam'.[29] He was assassinated shortly afterwards. Malcolm's teachings in his brief post-Meccan period became a major catalyst for generating interest in 'orthodox' Islam among African-Americans (including Elijah Muhammad's own son, Warith Deen Muhammad) , and he has become the archetypal hero for millions of African-Americans.

After the death of Elijah Muhammad in 1975, Warith Deen Muhammad took over the leadership and formally brought the organisation into mainstream Islamic belief and practice. He repudiated the preaching of racial

hatred, that identified the white man ■ devil, declared that his father was not a prophet, and instituted the use of traditional Islamic rituals. The organisation went through a number of name changes, from 'The Lost–Found Nation of Islam ...' to 'The Nation of Islam' to 'The Americal Bilalian Community'[30] to 'The World Community of Islam in the West' to 'The American Muslim Mission'. In 1985, Warith Deen Muhammad decentralised the organisation, delegating most of the central responsibilities to local *imams*. These moves were not accepted by all of the membership. Louis Farrakhan is the most well-known current spokesperson for Elijah Muhammad's original teachings. He has retained the name 'Nation of Islam' and the form of the organisation.[31] Farrakhan's organisation has tended to draw more media attention in America than the American Muslim Mission, and his preaching has clearly served as an outlet for the frustration of poor, inner-city blacks. The intertwined history of these organisations has contributed to ■ confusion in the public mind of what 'Islam' is.

The decentralisation of the American Muslim Mission has not hampered the effectiveness of its nationwide system of schools, known as the Clara Muhammad Schools. There are more than 60 of these academically certified schools, mostly in larger urban centres, including Detroit, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Atlanta, Boston and Los Angeles. These schools are gaining recognition as an alternative for many families, particularly in the trouble-ridden inner cities of the United States. They are playing an important role: first, in raising the quality of life and education of inner-city youth, and secondly, in drawing children of recent immigrants into already established African-American Muslim communities, thus fostering ■ sense of community across ethnic lines. The teachers tend to be immigrants themselves, often with advanced degrees in their native countries, but not certified to teach in the US public school system. Islamic studies are interwoven with subjects like English and history, and Arabic is taught from kindergarten. They maintain a philosophy that is racially inclusive and preach tolerance of those of other faiths.[32]

The Clara Muhammad Schools are an example of the symbiotic relationship that is emerging between indigenous and immigrant Muslims. As mentioned earlier, friction tends to occur when already-established mosque communities – whether earlier immigrant or African-American communities – gain new immigrant members who, perhaps both sincerely and insensitively, attempt to change things to the 'really traditional' Islam, or who imply that they are 'better' Muslims. This tension has, in ■ sense, become heightened in the current climate of growing emphasis on the cultural self-affirmation of minority groups

within the United States. However, the larger pattern that seems to be emerging is one of cooperation, increased interaction, and even intermarriage between indigenous and immigrant Muslims. African-American Muslims continue to be recognised for the impact they have made on the moral and social fabric of American society, especially their role in combating drugs in the cities.[33]

There have been other African-American groups, mostly Sunni, that developed parallel to the Nation of Islam. The Dar al-Islam maintained a doctrine that was basically mainstream, although in the 1960s, like many black movements, it was considered to be 'militant'. The group grew into a national organisation with twenty mosques in the New York area and some in Canada.[34] Its leader, Imam Yahya Abdul Karim, was named Amir al-Mu'mineen, leader of the faithful, and ministries of defence, finance, education, external affairs and social services, and mosques were established to serve the community.[35]

The Ansarullah, another product of the sixties, 'tried to accomodate black nationalism, radicalism, and Islam in one stroke'.[36] Its founder, Imam Isa, saw the Nubians of Egypt and the Sudan as heirs to the original civilisation of the black man in Africa. Its members advocated learning Arabic, community life centred on the mosque, and service to the community. The leader's genealogical claims and use of the Bible as well as the Quran as authoritative texts are problem areas for 'orthodox' Muslims. Imam Isa, in order to prevent assimilation into mainstream Islam, changed the name of the organisation to the Nubian Islamic Hebrew Association.[37]

One of the most important constituencies of African-American Muslims consists of black Americans who are incarcerated in prisons and who are converting to Islam while in prison. The repercussions are numerous. The first, of course, is that Islam becomes for these (mostly) men, an important means of identity formation. The impact of this situation cannot be measured. Secondly, since many mosques, including Sufi groups, are involved in ministry to prisons in their areas, important linkages to stable communities are being forged for these men in prison. Thirdly, this particular population is raising important legal questions regarding the constitutional freedom of religious expression. Certain accommodations regarding time and space for worship, dietary requirements, and so forth have been guaranteed for Christian and Jewish prisoners as being consistent with the constitutional protection of religious liberty. It appears that the court's treatment of Islam has not been uniform in dealing with such cases, and it remains to be seen how Islam and Muslims, or other 'nonconventional' faiths, will fare in the application of justice with regard to religious liberty inside prison walls.[38]

Sufism

The Vietnam War and the Civil Rights struggles of the sixties helped to create a 'counter-culture' generation of mostly young Americans who questioned the values of the American system and looked for alternative religious movements and philosophies that offered ideals of inner, spiritual transformation and a unitive vision of the human race. Many of these 'spiritual seekers' looked to Asia for inspiration, spiritual teachings, and teachers. Interest in Sufism (the 'inner' dimension of Islam[39]) and Sufi-influenced movements arose during this time.

Sufism had been a part of the Islamic landscape at least as early as the second Islamic century (eighth century AD), with the ascetic-devotional writings of Hasan al-Basri and Rabia. Sufism represented – especially when formal orders began to crystalise around the teachings of particular saints and sages in the twelfth century – an additional mode of Quranic exegesis, a vehicle of popular piety and devotion, a path of constant 'remembrance of God,' and the goal of annihilation (*fana*) of the self in God. Sufism was and is also an important part of women's spirituality in the Islamic world. Certain teachings and practices that developed among the Sufis came to be frowned upon in the dominant juridical or theological discourses; for example, Ibn Arabi's teaching on the 'unity of being,' and in the modern era, veneration of saints and the pilgrimages to their tombs. Nevertheless, Sufism has been a historical constant in the Islamic world, taking a variety of forms.

Paralleling the growth of Islam through immigrants and African-American converts has been a small but steady rise in the number of Sufi groups in America, with differing degrees of conformity to traditional Islamic belief and practice. A number of groups are clearly tied to traditional orders, including the Qadiriyyah, Shadhiliyyah, Mawlawiyyah (Mevlevi), Chishtiyyah, Nimatullahi, Naqshbandiyyah, and Khalwatiyyah-Jerrahiyyah, and Tijaniyyah Orders. The groups have the traditional teacher–disciple relationship, with the teacher (*shaykh*) tracing his spiritual lineage to the founder of the order. The American groups tend not to be politically active or ideologically oriented. Rather, their members quietly and regularly gather together for traditional prayers and *dhikr*, the ritual of remembrance of God (which takes different forms in the various groups). Sufi teachers were historically among the major transmitters of Islamic belief and practice to cultures beyond the Middle East, and Sufi teachers and expositors seem to be continuing this tradition in America.

A number of Sufis and Sufi groups in America are involved in publishing – both at popular and at academic levels – translations and

explanations of the 'classical' Sufi masters (such as Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, Rumi, Ibn Arabi) and/or the discourses of their own teachers (for example, Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, Muzaffer Ozak al-Jerrahi). There are a number of periodicals devoted to the subject of Sufism and to the reviewing of new scholarship on or by Sufis. The importance of the exposition of Sufi thought and practice by American-based scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr or William Chittick cannot be underestimated. Sufism has been one of the most successful bridges for American audiences to gain appreciation of the texture of Muslim devotion, with its appeal to both the heart and the intellect, and its addressing of the spiritual longing felt by many Americans who see problems in the materialism and consumption that characterise their society.

There are a variety of ways in which individual Sufi groups have developed in America, but the Bawa Muhaiyaddeen Fellowship will serve as an example of one community's development over time. The group's founder, Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, was a teacher 'of wisdom' to both Hindus and Muslims in Sri Lanka before he came to the United States. In 1971, when Bawa Muhaiyaddeen was invited to come to Philadelphia, he was not identified by his followers in America as 'Islamic'. Without exception, the original members of the community maintain that it was Bawa's 'love-in-action,' his capacity to teach 'what we needed, when we needed to hear it, and how we would be able to hear it,' that won their affection and commitment. There were no formal religious practices, but mostly private counsel and discourse. In looking back, members now see 'Islamic' or 'Sufi' themes that most did not recognise as such at the time; for example, the advice 'to remember God at all times', and saying 'La ilaha illa Allahu' (the creedal statement, 'There is no God but God'). A more clearly articulated connection with Islamic practice began when Bawa taught a formal 'silent *dhikr*,' which is described as a dispelling of the mind, desires, all 'sections' of the world and self, 'such that when one is at that point ... the man does not exist. He is nothing'.[40] The *dhikr* was to be preceded by ablutions, the proper intention, and the recitation of Quranic verses. He also taught a 'out-loud' *dhikr*, which included recitation of the 'Ninety-Nine Names of God' and blessings on Muhammad and the other prophets and saints, including Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, the patron saint of the order, and of course Bawa. His teachings emphasised the attainment of wisdom and the divine qualities of compassion, tolerance, patience, and unity which 'is the state of Islam'.[41] The universal qualities of his teachings attracted a wide variety of followers to the Fellowship, and, to the present day, some members emphasise the goal of the path as being beyond the distinction of race, class, religion, or caste; some describe it more as the essence of 'Islam'.

By the early eighties, Bawa had proceeded to institute the five-times-daily *salat* prayers, including the requirement of an *imam* trained in the Islamic tradition such that the Quran could be recited properly; and in 1982, he began discussions on the building of a mosque in Philadelphia. It was built in 1984 by the members. Since then, there has been continued expansion of opportunities for traditional Muslim learning (Quran, Arabic, *fiqh*), life-cycle rituals, customs (*mawlids*, commemoration, of the Prophet or Qutb), as well as an expansion of the numbers attending mosque congregational prayers. There are also regular meetings to discuss or witness (through video tapes) Bawa's own discourses. The growth in mosque attendence (and I find this in many Sufi groups) consists of many new immigrants, African-Americans, and the earlier members, who are mostly Anglo-American. The community is involved in ministry to prisons, outreach to the larger Islamic community in Philadelphia, and outreach to the still larger American society, through the publication of Bawa's discourses. Bawa's book, *Islam and World Peace*, which has become a significant primary source of contemporary Sufism in America, has served the function of presenting an alternative to what Americans perceive as Islamic holy war (*jihad*), by focusing on the 'greater *jihad*' of conquering the lower self and embracing the divine qualities that lead to 'peace'. The heart of the community's work remains the ongoing transmission of Bawa's teachings on 'wisdom'. Of additional importance from a historical stand-point is the fact that the *mazar*, or shrine, in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, where Bawa is interred, has become a 'pilgrimage' site as visitors from other Sufi groups in the United States and abroad come to pay their respects to this Sufi saint. Thus the tradition of popular Sufism continues in America.

POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF THE 'STATE' TOWARD ISLAM AND MUSLIMS

From the perspective of American Muslims, the United States government gives mixed messages in its attitudes and policies toward Islam. On one hand, Muslims living in the United States are entitled to rights and privileges afforded all Americans, and the courts have recognised Islam as deserving the constitutional protection given to all religions in the United States.[42] On the other hand, Muslims in America, especially Arab-Americans, feel that there is an extraordinary amount of bias against Muslims and Islam expressed in the media's portrayal of them. They point out that positive, or even 'ordinary', images of Muslims (such as an average Muslim family)

are virtually non-existent, and thus an 'Islam' is being created for the minds of Americans by the constant 'framing' of Muslims in situations associated with violence, hedonism, or fanaticism. Muslims generally feel that these images have been shaped by American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Thus, there is an interesting dynamic at work in America today: Islam is growing in the United States during a time of heightened sensitivity to issues related to religious and ethnic pluralism and the perceived need – and pressure, particularly in education – to incorporate standards of fairness, inclusion, balance, and non-stereotyping – with reference to all cultural groups and minorities. However, it appears that Muslims (and Arabs) are perhaps the last of the minority groups for whom public disapproval of stereotyping does not take place, and this is increasingly frustrating for Muslims.

It is clear that the early roots of anti-Muslim feeling in the West lie in the historically confrontational and competitive relationship which Christianity and Islam have had since the seventh century, and in the remembered history of the Crusades. Its roots also lie in the residue of the relationship established during the period of European colonialism, when Islam was identified with the mysterious and exotic, yet backward and primitive 'Orient', which needed to be civilised.

Most Muslims see America's foreign policy with regard to the Palestinians as the major indicator of an American lack of value attached to the Muslim or Arab community. Interestingly, most Americans do not see that Muslims and Arabs experience the creation of the state of Israel as America's condoning and supporting of one of the last vestiges of European colonialist expansion. They do not see the parallel between the portrayal of 'the Arab', as savage, sinister, or terrorist in order to legitimate the loss of land and rights that befell Palestinians, and the portrayal of 'native' cultures in Asia, Africa, and indeed, the Americas, in order to justify the ideological and political objectives of colonisers.

Yvonne Haddad, speaking for many Muslim and Christian Arabs, describes in her article, 'American Foreign Policy in the Middle East', the gradual and silent shattering of the American dream, as Arabs, who as immigrants cherished the American values of freedom and democracy, witnessed policies in the Middle East that seemed inconsistent with those values.[43] She describes how American Arabs wondered why the Truman doctrine of 1947, which promised US support for free people who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures, did not warrant support for the Palestinian struggle. Many Muslims, she continues, wonder why Eisenhower's principle, that nations should not be allowed to hold on to territory acquired by war, should be abandoned.[44]

She says that 'successive American administrations since the 1967 war have placated Arabs over the rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories while concurrently providing Israel with economic and military support to maintain the occupation'.[45] 'Arabs wonder why Americans, who theoretically advocate separation of church and state and tolerate varieties of religious expression under the umbrella of pluralism, support Israel in its insistence on Jewish identity as a prerequisite for citizenship, denying the political and human rights of Muslims and Christians under its occupation'. She points out that 'the dilemma of Muslims living in the United States is exacerbated by an awareness that the truth about the Arab world, Islam, and Muslims is being distorted for political expediency by those in office';[46] that Arabs tend to be cast off by members of Congress and the administration as intransigent and bent on the destruction of Israel.[47]

Haddad also points out the frustration of Muslims who see an imbalance coverage of events when it comes to Muslims or Arabs. It was appropriate for President Reagan to publicly condemn the hijacking and murder of Leon Klinghoffer on the *Achille Lauro*, but why was there no condemnation of the politically motivated killing of the Arab-American, Alex Odeh, or of the bombing of the Houston mosque? Why was there silence in the American press over the 1982 massacres of over 900 Palestinian civilians at the refugee camps of Sabra, but profuse coverage of the terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985?[48] Haddad delineates a number of statements made about Muslims and Islam by political leaders since the beginning of the Reagan years that have helped to create a heightened polarisation between the 'Islamic world' and the 'Judaeo-Christian American' world.

More recent events, the Gulf War and the 'fall' of communism with the break-up of the Soviet Union, can be seen as having mixed results concerning American attitudes toward Islam and Muslims. The Gulf War clearly presented an opportunity to demonise a 'Muslim' leader and crystalise in the minds of Americans the archetypal Islamic villain. But the war also had the effect of breaking down the monolithic view of Islam. Americans in the desert and American audiences at home saw a number of faces representing 'Islam,' some of them friendly, some of them not. This terrible war had the ironic effect of hinting at the notion of diversity at the same time as America was creating the face of 'the other'. This is not to say that the picture is rosy. In fact, John Esposito shared his view, at the American Academy of Religion Meeting in 1992, that a heightened, virulent rhetoric of 'Islam as the greatest evil and threat' is emerging in the vacuum of America's former greatest threat, communism.

Two recent events – the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York and the lack of decisiveness on the part of America and its European allies in handling the situation in Bosnia – had clearly reinforced the negative stereotypes of Muslims and the Western desire to rid itself of the 'Muslim problem'.

There is clearly much work to be done in building bridges of understanding and trust between the Islamic world and the 'West'. However, as I maintained earlier, I believe that the greatest hope for a better understanding of Islam in America – and for combatting the problem of distortive stereotypes – is that our Muslim neighbours, colleagues, and friends – here in America – will be our educators and dialogue partners in a common search for justice and tolerance in a pluralistic world.

NOTES

1. See Yvonne Haddad, 'American Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Its Impact on the Identity of Arab Muslims in the United States', in Y. Haddad (ed.), *The Muslims of America* (New York: Oxford Press, 1991) p. 221.
2. Such terms as 'indigenous' and 'immigrant' Islam are categories of demarcation that are currently under scrutiny as they become less helpful in accurately depicting the sociological changes that have taken place in Muslim communities, as 'immigrant' communities become 'establishment' communities, as children grow up and marry or intermarry, as foreign-born Muslims become American citizens, as the term 'indigenous' is utilised more in the context of 'native' cultures, and as the terms become suspected of contributing to the reifying of a division between European immigrants and immigrants of Asian and African descent (while simultaneously being used in describing African-Americans, who might see irony in their inclusion in the categories of 'immigrant' or 'indigenous'). Since there is not yet a consensus on more helpful terms, we will use these divisions of immigrant, indigenous, and Sufi as the three major 'groupings' of Islam in America.
3. Yvonne Haddad is an active contributor of articles on Islam in the United States.
4. Yvonne Haddad and Adair T. Lummis, *Islamic Values in the United States* (New York: Oxford Press, 1987), pp. 3 ff.
5. Ibid., p. 14.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Gutbi Mahdi Ahmed, 'Muslim Organizations in the United States', in Haddad (ed.), *The Muslims of America*, p. 12.
9. Haddad and Lummis, *Islamic Values in the United States*, p. 14.

10. See John Voll, 'Islamic Issues for Muslims in the United States,' in Haddad (ed.), *The Muslims of America*, pp. 205 ff.
11. Frederick Denny, 'Emerging Forms of the Muslim Community (in America)', paper delivered at the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies Annual Meeting, January 1992.
12. An example of this type of mosque community that has become known for its friendliness and hospitality is the Islamic Center in Toledo, Ohio, built in 1954. See Frederick Denny, *Islam* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 111 ff.
13. Gutbi Mahdi Ahmed, 'Muslim Organisations in the United States', p. 12.
14. Ibid., p. 14.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 16.
17. Steven A. Johnson, 'Political Activity of Muslims in America', in Haddad (ed.), *The Muslims of America*, p. 112.
18. Ibid., p. 113.
19. Ibid., pp. 114–18.
20. Ibid., pp. 119–123.
21. Gustav Niebuhr, 'American Moslems: Islam is Growing Fast in the U.S., fighting Fear and Stereotypes', in *The Wall Street Journal*, Friday 5 Oct. 1990.
22. 'The Islamicist-Secularist Dialogue', by Ibrahim Abu Rabi; 'Islam, Liberty and the Free Market', by Imad A. Ahmad.
23. 'Opinions of Female Muslim American Leaders on Selected Women's Issues', by Sharifa al-Khateeb; 'Women and Islam: Some Unresolved Issues in Islamic Literature' by Najmi Junaid. Listed in 'Program of the Twenty-First Annual Conference of the AMSS at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan', 30 Oct.–1 Nov. 1992.
24. Abubaker al-Shingiety, 'The Muslim as the "Other": Representation and Self-Image of the Muslims in America', in Haddad (ed.), *The Muslims of America*, pp. 53 ff.
25. For a concise history of the Nation of Islam and some of its offshoots (such as the 'five-Percenter') that have growing popularity among young African-Americans of the inner cities and that utilise adaptations of Islamic ideas (such ■ 'he who knows himself knows his Lord') in order to preach 'the Black man's godhood', see Prince-a-Cuba, 'Black Gods of the Inner City', *Gnosis Magazine*, no. 25, Fall 1992, pp. 56–63.
26. Yvonne Haddad, 'A Century of Islam in America', in *The Muslim World Today*, no. 4 (Washington, DC: Islamic Affairs Program, The Middle East Institute, 1986).
27. Ibid., p. 3.
28. See Malcolm X, *Autobiography of Malcolm X*, (Ballantine Publication).
29. In his autobiography, Malcolm also identifies his disillusionment over Elijah Muhammad's sexual indescretions as ■ reason for his break with the Nation of Islam.
30. Bilal refers to the black companion of the Prophet Muhammad.
31. Gutbi Mahdi Ahmed, 'Muslim Organizations in the United States', p. 20.
32. Ari Goldman, 'Reading, Writing, Arithmetic and Arabic', *New York Times*, 3 October 1992.

33. Ibid.
34. Gutbi Mahdi Ahmed, 'Muslim Organizations in the United States', p. 20.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 21.
37. Ibid., p. 21.
38. Kathleen Moore, 'Muslims in Prisons: Claims to Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty', in Haddad (ed.), *The Muslims of America*, pp. 150–51.
39. See AnneMarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Spirituality: Foundations* (New York: Crossroads Press, 1987); and S. H. Nasr, *Islamic Spirituality: Manifestations* (New York: Crossroads Press,1991).
40. ARS 7404-05, 'How to do Zikr', 4/21/74, Sri Lanka (Philadelphia: Fellowship Press).
41. APT 8404-06, 4/84, 'Love and Unity in Islam', and 'Islam and Congregational Prayer' (Philadelphia: Fellowship Press).
42. See above, note 38.
43. Yvonne Haddad, 'American Foreign Policy in the Middle East', in *The Muslims of America*, pp. 219–20.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 224.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 222.

16 Islam and Muslims in Australia

Qazi Ashfaq Ahmad

The Muslims began to penetrate Australia to some noticeable degree from the middle of the nineteenth century, when the 'Ghan' camelmen from the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia visited the Australian continent to trade and to work on the railways. Since then, Islam and the Muslims have encountered many problems and challenges, resulting from government policies and the make-up of the Muslim population.

Attempts at improving the collective voice and influence of the Muslim community have been somewhat hampered by the diverse and generally low-income character of the Muslim community, representing some 64 distinct ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Organisationally, the Muslim community has been trying to band together in a more cohesive fashion, but its success has been somewhat limited as such attempts went through periods of transition, through consolidation, into the present era of reconstruction.

Many outstanding issues have to be tackled if the community is to aim for a higher and more effective role in the country: capitalising on the opening up of new Muslim trading areas in the world; resolving their relatively low educational and professional competence; greater involvement in mainstream activities; and the probability of a reducing Muslim population as a result of tighter immigration controls by the Australian government.

THE MUSLIMS—BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

From evidence of the remains of settlements and burial places to be found along the northern coastline of Australia, it seems that as far back as the sixteenth century, and throughout the nineteenth century, Muslim fishermen from Macassar, in the eastern islands of Indonesia, had visited the west and north of Australia. It was not until around 1860, however, that Muslim camelmen, later commonly known as 'Ghans', apparently arrived from Karachi, from the Indian subcontinent. Their arrival continued for the next sixty years, from Rajasthan, Baluchistan, North Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Ghans made a significant contribution towards transportation and the erection of telecommunications and railway lines.

Railway and motor vehicles, in the 1920s, made the camel transportati system redundant, which resulted in the return of many Ghans back their homelands. Some of the pioneering Muslims managed to mainta their Islamic faith, practising Islam and building mosques in vario places known as 'Ghan Towns'.

The first mosque was built in Broken Hill, NSW, followed by mosqu in Adelaide in 1890, Perth in 1904 and Brisbane in 1907. Other mosque were abandoned and demolished as the camelmen left Australia. Th Broken Hill Mosque, now a museum, is presently maintained by th Broken Hill Historical Society. It is estimated that there were 393 Ghan in 1901, but by 1933 the number was reduced to 153. As a result of inade quate education, low socio-economic status and possibly a weakened faith the Ghans were unable to establish permanent religious bases and failed to transmit Islam to their children, who tended to enter marriages with non Muslim partners.

In 1901 the camelmen were declared to be 'prohibited immigrants', with the enactment of the Immigration Restriction Act, and from 1911 until 1951, as a result of the Australian government's 'White Australia Policy', very few Muslims entered Australia. However, after the Second World War, Muslims from Albania, Yugoslavia, Lebanon and Turkey were recruited, mainly to provide labour and to work in factories faced with a shortage of labour. The 1950–75 era saw a substantial number of professionals and skilled tradesmen, such as teachers and engineers from Egypt, doctors from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, and tertiary students from Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.

According to the 1981 census the number of Muslims in Australia was 67 792, and in 1986 this had increased to 109 500. It should be taken into consideration, when looking at these figures, that there could be a substantial number of people who chose not to identify themselves. However, the estimated figure according to the Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) is around 350 000.

Muslims in Australia are from 64 distinct ethnic backgrounds (1986 census), 82 per cent of which are Turkish, Lebanese, Arab, Indian, Malay, Yugoslav, Albanian, Indonesian, Egyptian and Iranian. The total percentages are Lebanese 38 per cent, Turkish 25 per cent, Yugoslav 16 per cent, Albanian 12 per cent, Egyptian 3 per cent, Indo-Pakistan: 3 per cent, Indo-Malay 2 per cent and others (Australian, Fijian) 1 per cent.

Over 98 per cent of Muslims live in urban areas; 53 per cent living in New South Wales, and 34 per cent in Victoria; 65 per cent of Muslims were born overseas. Over 54 per cent do not have tertiary qualifications and it is only a minority of Muslims that can be classified in upper-income groups.

According to census figures and general perceptions by the Australian community, the Muslim community is seen to be lowly-educated, predominantly overseas-born and therefore lacking English skills, and living in major urban areas of Australia.

The census, however, overlooks the fact that ■ majority of the 65 per cent born overseas may possess skills and tertiary qualifications from their home countries which are not recognised in Australia. Thus, employment as labourers becomes necessary and so these Muslims are categorised as working-class.

ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Muslim community in Australia is composed largely of recent migrants who arrived since the 1960s and have tried to organise themselves in a well-planned manner. It is interesting to narrate the organisational development of the Muslims in Australia, tracing some key periods of development since 1973.

The Islamic Society of New South Wales was formed in Sydney in 1957, while in 1960 the Lebanese Muslim Association of Sydney was established. In 1962 The Islamic Society of Victoria came into being in Melbourne. These were followed by societies in Adelaide, Perth and Brisbane, where mosques had already been established by the early 'Ghans'. In 1964 the Australian Federation of Islamic Societies (AFIS) was constituted, with headquarters in Melbourne, and the Islamic Council of NSW was formed in 1973. In 1976 AFIS was converted to a three-tier structure comprising local societies, state councils and a national federation. The organisation was renamed ■ the 'Australian Federation of Islamic Councils' (AFIC), with the head office situated in Sydney.

Period of Transition (1973–8)

This is the crucial period in which ■ change of orientation took place. The organisational transfer from Australian Federation of Islamic Societies (AFIS) to Australian Federation of Islamic councils (AFIC) was accompanied by ■ lot of thinking, negotiations and dialogues. It represented a transfer from ■ socio-cultural to a socio-conceptual outlook. The Muslims, engrossed in their ethnic cultures, formed a common platform for the ideology of Islam. A desire and campaign for the identification of Muslims ■ the advocates of Islam commenced.

Muslim thinkers, leaders and activists took part in meetings and discussions. An atmosphere was created which fostered the desire to practise Islam more fully. Part of the essential requirement for identifying individuals as Muslims was the establishment of mosques and/or Islamic societies. Muslims in Australia were not themselves able to provide the necessary expenses for such projects, especially if these were to be large enough to cater for Muslims in the coming years, and therefore assistance from Muslim countries was solicited.

King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took a personal interest in the matter and sent a delegation to investigate, and two major recommendations were made. First, that Islamic societies aimed at practising Islam be formed; and secondly, that an overall organisational three-tier structure – of societies, councils and the Federation – be formed. These decisions were implemented and the new set-up started functioning in 1976. The first two years after the formation of AFIC were spent on much of what one might call ground work, done to establish the organisation on a sound footing. The shifting of the centre of activity from Melbourne to Sydney was not without difficulties. The AFIC Executive Committee approached the task with vigour and responsibility. It soon realised that, without full-time workers, the AFIC would have great difficulty in carrying out the numerous and urgent tasks that lay ahead.

After much effort and careful consideration, a secretarial assistant was appointed, followed by a full-time Executive Officer, who assumed duties in mid-1977. After an initial orientation, the work of AFIC administration was placed in the right direction. The Executive Committee worked hard to establish the AFIC structure on a sound footing. A solid and substantial building was bought in Zetland, an inner-city suburb of Sydney, and a permanent home was thus established for the many tasks that were growing at a rapid rate. Closer contacts were established with the growing number of Islamic societies and Islamic Councils, and more Islamic Councils were established in states where they had not already been formed. Office procedures were streamlined for the proper administrative and financial operation of the new organisation. Contacts were established with the Australian Government authorities on the many matters affecting the social and religious needs of Muslims. Closer and more effective contacts were established with many Muslim countries and overseas Islamic organisations, which subsequently resulted in much moral, material and financial support for Islamic activities in Australia.

AFIC's official journal, *Minaret,* was published with greater regularity. A Muslim Youth Camp was started with active support form the Islamic Council of NSW (ICNSW), and to meet the growing demands of Muslim

countries, Australian Muslims exported '*halal*' meat to those countries for many years. To meet the requirements of the importers, various private individual Muslims were involved in the 'certification' work. Most of these persons were operating in a private capacity and were not subject to any scrutiny or checking. In the beginning, the extent of this export was limited, but as it began to grow, and with the increasing awareness of the Muslims in the importing countries, certain concerns were expressed about the genuineness and authenticity of this '*halal*' meat. This resulted in questions being asked by various sources overseas, particularly of AFIS. These developments caused the former AFIS to become involved in the process of certification of the '*halal*' meat in Victoria, and the Islamic Society of South Australia to become involved in that State.

During the initial period, up to 1978, a tremendous amount of work was done to reorganise the activity on a national basis to cover the entire country. A proper and systematic approach was undertaken to ensure that the meat so prepared was properly slaughtered by AFIC-registered Muslim slaughtermen and was adequately identified and certified by AFIC's own supervisors and certifiers. Because of these arrangements, a majority of the important importing countries of the Islamic world, particularly in the Middle East, headed by Saudi Arabia, required that all *halal* meat from Australia be certified as being '*halal*' by AFIC before any shipments were allowed to be imported. For economic and other reasons, the meat industry in Australia was unhappy about AFIC certification and made repeated attempts to undermine this procedure, as was later exposed by the official Royal Commission set up to investigate malpractices and rackets in the meat industry.

Period of Consolidation (1978–80)

With the foundations laid down in the first two years, the new AFIC Executive, which took over in April 1978, found the burden of responsibilities and work-load beyond the scope of the existing staff of three and the voluntary officials. Much effort was required in the '*halal*' meat affairs and the Executive was continuously besieged with disputes and problems among the Muslims and the Islamic societies, particularly in Victoria and South Australia.

However, AFIC's contact with local communities and with the Australian Government authorities increased substantially. As a result of regular visits to Australia by many personalities from Muslim countries, and AFIC officials' visits to Muslim countries and participation in international Islamic conferences, AFIC and the Muslims of Australia became

well-known and recognised in international as well as national circles. This brought about much encouragement and material support for Islamic work in Australia. AFIC became recognised in Australia as the national organisation of the Muslims and more attention was focused on the Australian Muslims, with frequent reports in the media.

However, because of these preoccupations, full attention could not be directed towards the strengthening of the organisational aspects of the secretariat and the functioning of the Executive Committee, even though there was a growing realisation of their shortcomings. Mainly through paucity of funds, no concrete steps could be taken to overcome the problems associated with acute staff shortage, which in turn led to an accumulation of unfinished work and projects.

Period of Administration (1980–4)

The most salient event in this period was the arrival of the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This eliminated the physical distance between AFIC and Saudi Arabia. The close links and ties between the two resulted in the following:

1. The Saudi Government took a keen interest in the establishment of an Islamic school. A grant of A$300 000 was given to AFIC to purchase land for the school.
2. Unlike other ambassadors, the Saudi Ambassador was interested in the affairs and organisation of the Muslim community.
3. Strong and close bonds were generated between the Saudi Ambassador and AFIC, which meant more scope for financial grants, although this was taken by some as AFIC falling into the lap of the Saudi government.
4. Members of the community who saw this as a threat tried to involve people in AFIC who would make decisions independently of the Saudi influence.

Period of Reformation and Crisis (1984–9)

The leadership of the umbrella organisation of Australian Muslims, AFIC, could not provide a well-thought and balanced line of action for the development of the Muslim community in Australia. The dilemma of AFIC was, on the one side, the desire to be independent from any other Muslim country, while at the same time it needed financial help from Muslim countries because of lack of funds. This resulted in the formation of two

groups – one wishing to proceed with obtaining aid from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the support of the Ambassador, and the other wanting to cut itself off completely from Saudi Arabia and its Embassy. The former may be termed traditional, and the latter, the reformists.

The reformist group won the election, and many drastic steps were taken in the name of reform. The following were the main outcomes of the period:

1. For the first time in the history of AFIC, groupism began. All those who did not want to antagonise the Saudi Kingdom and the Ambassador were condemned and thrown out of the management of AFIC.
2. Questions were raised over the actions of the management of AFIC. While some members disliked the Kingdom and the Ambassador, they still wanted to maintain personal ties. They expected to obtain favours from the Saudi government by bypassing and even antagonising the Ambassador.
3. AFIC leadership became elitist, losing touch with the community. AFIC began functioning as a bureaucracy and was unable to develop and maintain relationships with the Islamic Councils and Societies.
4. The leaders were divided and no substantive work could be done.

AFIC, from the very beginning, suffered from a lack of suitable leadership. Extremism against the Saudi government was diluted by its decision to include the two ex-presidents in the Executive Committee. The following efforts and construction work were done during this period:

1. Negotiations with the Saudi Ambassador were carried out and dialogues commenced between the two groups. Apparently, a compromise was decided upon concerning AFIC and the Ambassador.
2. Enthusiastic efforts were made to establish an Islamic school in Sydney under AFIC. With the recommendation and help of the Ambassador, a grant of one million dollars was approved by the Islamic Development Bank.
3. The annual Assembly of Congress was held in the University of Technology, Sydney, and the image of AFIC was raised in Government circles.
4. The tactics of the President, however, reverted AFIC's position back to that of 1986.
5. The authority for the certification of *halal* meat was taken away from AFIC and given to different societies around Australia.

Period of Negotiation (1989–91)

AFIC activities were somewhat influenced by the person elected as President. After the members had had enough of conflicting groups, it was desired that a President be elected who would unite all the groups and be neutral in decisions.

During this period, negotiations resumed; the relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Ambassador was able to develop favourably, and a more effective and working formula evolved. AFIC successfully opened the Muslim school and began construction of new school buildings.

Today, the organisational structure of AFIC is intact but its functioning and influence over the community is still problematic. Negotiations among different groups have commenced and a general recognition and appreciation of the work of others has been manifested.

AFIC's planning to change its image. It intends to become involved in community work and also to establish business ventures aimed towards self-sufficiency. AFIC, which began in 1976 with seven societies and four state councils, has, in 1992, 94 societies, nine territorial councils and one non-territorial council under its umbrella.

STUDENTS, YOUTH AND WOMEN

Students from foreign countries join different universities for higher studies. Malaysia has decided to send its students to Australia since the 1950s, and in the 1960s the number of students in Hobart, Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide was so large that they formed the Muslim Students Association (MSA) in many Australian universities. In 1968, the MSAs joined the Australian Federation of Muslim Students Associations (AFMSA) in parallel with the non-student body, the Australian Federation of Islamic Societies (AFIS). In 1976, when AFIS was transformed in AFIC, AFMSA was declared to be a non-territorial council of AFIC, consisting of its own chapters as counterparts to societies and Islamic Councils.

Since 1978, young people of permanent residence, born in Australia, have formed youth organisations. These youth organisations were considered as part of the AFIC structure, since they did not have their own national body. The Muslim Youth Association (MYA) was formed in 1977 in Sydney and Melbourne, and organised educational meetings and youth camps. Another organisation, Australian Muslim Youth (AMY), was formed in Melbourne in 1985. These organisations were not able to make a lasting impact, perhaps because their senior members had to give

priority to their exams and gradually took less interest. In August 1992, Young Muslims of Australia (YMA) was formed. Its major activity has been the organisation of a youth camp in 1992–3.

In 1983, when enough members of Australian Muslim groups joined universities, AFMSA was restructured ■ The Federation of Islamic Groups (Al-Ittihad) and the doors of the organisation were opened to non-student youth as well. Since 1991, Al-Ittihad has been changed into the Federation of Australian Muslim Students and Youth (FAMSY), incorporating most students' and youth groups. AFMSA, al-Ittihad or FAMSY have not changed greatly in their nature and approach. These student organisations target Islam and work on a movement-oriented basis.

It was only at the beginning of the 1980s that Muslim women began actively participating in the Muslim community. Women who were part of student organisations had previously become involved in their respective universities, and young Muslim women had been represented in various youth camps since 1974. However, there has not been specific Muslim women's groups, and by and large, Muslim women were not represented on general committees.

In 1981 'Mu'minah' was formed for Muslim women in Sydney. Its main activity was to form regional Usrah groups every month to educate women in the community. It published the first newsletter for Muslim women and organised short-term courses on Islam for both men and women. 'Mu'minah', however, did not become a registered organisation and did not make an impact on the government.

1982 became an important year for the Lebanese Muslim women in Sydney. An Imam arrived in Lakemba, Sydney, advocating the rights of Muslim women and supporting the formation of an organisation called the Muslim Women's Association (MWA). MWA has since made a tremendous impact on the lives of Muslim women. It became a registered association, and has been recognised by the Australian government and has affected its policies, especially after the Gulf War of 1991.

In October 1992 was held the first National Muslim Women's Conference, which sought to educate service providers in Australian government and community organisations. A result of the conference was the decision to create a national Muslim Women's Organisation.

A number or organisations have been started in other states of Australia but there is not much interaction between the states. A National Network of Muslim Women was organised in July 1992 and is in its initial stages.

It can thus be seen that, if compared with other continents, Australian Muslims have ■ wide-ranging organisational structure. It is a great achievement that despite religious, cultural and linguistic divisions, all Australian Muslims are willing to work under ■ umbrella. The future development

of Australian Muslims are willing to work under one umbrella. The future development of Australia and the active involvement of the Muslim community in Australia put heavy responsibilities on the shoulders of AFIC. Time will tell how AFIC meets this challenge.

GLIMPSE OF ACTIVITIES

The Annual Congress of AFIC got underway on 17–19 April 1992 with a resounding affirmation of the belief that Muslims have a vital role to play in the world and in Australia.

AFIC President, Dr Omar Lum, said that Muslims could not be ignored, and that they were going to play a very important role in world peace and development.

Federal Minister for Justice, Senator Michael Tait, speaking on behalf of Prime Minister Paul Keating, said that the days of religious rivalry were over. Referring to the three major monotheistic religions in Australia, he said that Moses, Jesus and Muhammad were all considered prophets in Islam, and that Jews, Christians and Muslims were all children of Abraham, and thus should live together. Senator Tait said that he was personally impressed with the local Australian Islamic societies, that Muslims had contributed to the 'nation-building' process, and that the tradition of fasting and Eid were going to make a positive impact on Australian society. A special international guest at the Congress was Chief Minister for the Malaysian state of Sarawak, and RISEAP President, Tan Sri Datuk Petinggi Abdul Taib Mahmud. Mahmud spoke on the privileges Muslims enjoy in Australian society, and said that Muslims were in a position to 'present' Islam to Australian society.

Echoing Mr Mahmud's praise of the Australian environment, another international guest, Dr Ali Kettani, commented on the opportunities Muslims have in Australia to achieve in every sphere of life. He traced the development of Muslim establishments in Australia from the earliest societies in 1948 to the birth of the 'three-tier system', with AFIC, in 1976. Dr Kettani, however, cautioned Muslims to avoid the 'ghetto mentality', and his views were followed attentively since he is not only the Secretary-General of the Islamic Academy of Sciences in Amman, Jordan; Dr Kettani was a key figure in the establishment of AFIC.

Education

Islamic education for children, on a professional level, has gained ground in Australia. However, Muslim schools, whether part-time or full-time,

face major problems. In Australia, teaching techniques, philosophy, organisation and materials are entirely different from those in many other countries, especially other Muslim countries. Usually there are no textbooks, and teachers have had to spend time and money buying or making the resources they need.

The types of 'professional' education can be classified as follows:

a. Scripture classes in public schools.
   This programme caters for instructors to be sent to various schools to teach Islamic studies approximately one hour per week. The programme was initiated by the Islamic Council of NSW, followed by Victoria and Western Australia, and is now quite common throughout Australia.

b. Weekend/Evening schools.
   (i) attached to mosques/islamic centres/Societies;
   (ii) privately-run by individuals;
   (iii) after-school classes at certain times during the year.

c. Primary Schools.
   There are nine schools recognised in Australia. The first full-time primary school began in a small house in 1983. There was great opposition when the school started, from the government as well as the general public. Now almost all primary schools are being partially funded by the Commonwealth Department of Employment, Education and Training.
   Of the nine schools, four are in Sydney, three in Melbourne and two in Perth.

d. High Schools.
   There is only one high school, which is located in Perth, Western Australia. In 1990, four Muslim schools submitted proposals to Commonwealth Department of Employment, Education and Training for high schools. Every one of these proposals was rejected – and this meant that the 700 or so students who currently attend Muslim primary schools will have no Muslim high school in which to continue their education.

There is no well-structured adult-education programme. Current courses in Islamic Studies, however, exist in certain universities. The Arabic courses offered do not teach Quranic Arabic but only Arabic as a language.

Seminars and short courses have been held to upgrade adult education, but these have never been on a regular basis.

Daawah Work and Relief Work

Since 1971, Australian Muslims and the Muslim visitors from abroad have performed enormous work for the propagation of Islam in Australian society in general and among Muslims in particular. The following are the main *daawah* activities:

1. Jamaat Daawah Islamiah, which started in 1972, has made an elaborate scheme of self-education and training for the propagation of Islam. It trains workers to take up responsible positions in different organisations.
2. Tableegh Jamaat operates from door to door; encouraging people to come to mosques; educating them for *kalimah* and *salaat*; holding gathering once every week and a national gathering once a year; taking people to India and Pakistan for religious training. The Tableegh Jamaat has made a big impact on the confidence of individuals and made them proud of their religious and worship.
3. Mosques and Islamic Centres, 78 in number in November 1992, are functioning as *Daawah* Centres very successfully. The Imams of these centres are very conscientious in delivering Friday sermons to inculcate Islamic beliefs and practices. The *Taravih* and other meetings in mosques in the month of Ramadan make an impact on the community in terms of spiritual awakening.

Daawah Activities in the Regions

The Regional Islamic South East Asia and Pacific (RISEAP) was formed in 1978, with seven national organisations. Now it has nineteen organisations as full and associate members, comprising the countries of the East Asian, South Asian and Pacific regions, namely, Australia, Brunei, Burma, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Macao, Malaysia, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Tonga. It has been playing the role of unification and complementation on issues concerning the Muslim community around the region. It has published simple books on Islam in six languages. *Daawah* work is spreading in the islands of the South pacific region – Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Christmas Island, and Cocos Islands. Through RISEAP, a strong Muslim women is organisation has been set up. The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and RABITAH have provided funding for youth camps and *daawah* work in the region.

Relief Work

On an individual basis, and through AFIC and its associations, relief aid was collected and sent to Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iran. Then it was

decided to form a relief organisation under the name of Muslim Aid Australia (MAA).

After one year of planning, MAA was incorporated in new South Wales as a charitable organization, in September 1991. MAA chairperson, Yahya van Besouw, at the launching of MAA on 1 November 1991, stressed that MAA was [illegible] 'grass roots' organisation, which had no major sponsors or donors, and added that the MAA executive was interested in any ideas or suggestions from the broad community on the issue of aid.

Media

Muslims, though often humiliated by Western media, have been unable to do much to retaliate against their hostilities. Some individuals would write letters to the Editors of newspapers but the majority of these letters were not published. Once in a while, there would be interviews with newspapers and certain television shows, but Muslims were not largely satisfied. Stories and explanations were highly distorted, and so the Muslims' actual viewpoint never really came across.

On the other hand, not enough efforts have been made by Muslims themselves to develop relations with the media and acquire expertise in methods of mass communication in order to disseminate knowledge of Islam in a more professional way and to provide views on current affairs for general public contemplation.

For some time now, a special time has been allotted on the Ethnic Radio for Muslims during the month of Ramadan. Secondly, there is the *Australian Muslim Times* newspaper, launched in 1991; and thirdly, there is the Australian Islamic Media.

1. Ethnic Radio

The programme for Muslims on the Ethnic Radio was mainly for Muslim listeners, since the time allotted was at the time for morning prayers at around 5 a.m. The *Adhan* for *fajr* prayer was followed by talks on Ramadan. Various topics were covered in a number of languages, such as Turkish, Arabic, Urdu, Malay and Bosnian.

2. Australian Muslim Times (AMUST)

The *Australian Muslim Times* was launched in January 1991 and has been published continuously and distributed widely through newsagents, as well as in mosques and shops. It is generally well received by hundreds of Australian and overseas subscribers.

AMUST provides a unique medium for *daawah* and allows easy access to Islamic literature for the common [illegible] in the street to learn about Islam,

Muslims, their views on current affairs. *AMUST* received the prestigious 1992 Multicultural Marketing Award for the category of 'small business' on 9 December 1992, from the Department of Ethnic Affairs, of the government of New South Wales, Australia.

The following citation was made for the *Muslim Times*:

> The founders of this newspaper recognised that the Muslim community in Australia was multi-ethnic, multilingual and multicultural. They set about designing a newspaper that could service this disparate community, as well as bridging the gap between Muslims and non-Muslim Australians. The *Australian Muslim Times* was officially launched by Yusuf Islam (former pop star Cat Stevens). The Muslims felt a need to represent their point of view. Moreover, it was necessary to make the Muslims media-conscious, ■ also to educate them to become better Australians and to learn to develop better relationships with the Australian community. The paper is printed mainly in English, with sections in five community languages. It appears weekly and is produced by volunteers.

3. *Australian Islamic Media (AIM)*

The Australian Islamic Media (AIM) is a young organisation, established in February 1992, aiming at disseminating Islamic knowledge and points of view through media work. It first of all aims at producing radio and television programmes. It is also establishing itself as a correspondent press agency producing press releases and commentaries reflecting mainstream Islamic ideology.

The following services are provided by AIM:

a. Australian Islamic Radio (AIR) – every Saturday for one hour.
b Marketing of video tapes of Islamic international personalities, such as Yusuf Islam, Ahmed Deedat.
c. Video tapes, and audio cassettes on Islam.
d. Any function or activities may be videotaped for ■ nominal charge.

4. *Voice of Islam*

A service network on ■ special phone line was installed in June 1992 for an opinion poll to register Muslim views on issues pertaining to the community or the government.

5. *Islamic Cultural and Information Network (ICIN)*

The Islamic Cultural and Information Network (ICIN) was formed in early July 1992 to develop ■ working channel for Islamic organisations and institutions, and is also pursuing goals that will meet the cultural needs of

the Australian Muslim community, whether through books, magazines or audio and video cassettes.

ICIN is currently negotiating with prominent Islamic organisations and institutions in Australia and elsewhere to establish a mechanism through which an Islamic News Service could eventually emerge, and is providing ■ limited service to the *Australian Muslim Times (AMUST)* and the Australian Islamic Radio (AIR).

6. *Individual Efforts*
Some individual persons and organisations, such as the Islamic Councils of NSW and Victoria, are constantly in touch with the media, scrutinising what the general media portrays and responding to it.

Eid Celebrations

The Muslim community of New South Wales celebrated *Eid-ul Fitr* in 1992 in an event described as 'historic by several of Sydney's leaders.

In Lakemba, tens of thousands of worshippers packed the mosque and nearby streets on a Saturday to perform Eid prayers, which also included a message delivered in Arabic by Imam Sheikh Tajuddin Hilaly. Several leading politicians were also present for the occasion. Addressing the worshippers, NSW Premier Nick Greiner expressed his delight about NSW's ethnicity, harmony and tolerance, and Opposition leader Bob Carr, also present, was reportedly 'surprised' to see such a huge turnout for the Eid celebration at Lakemba Mosque.

In addition to Eid prayers at all the mosques throughout Australia on different dates, a Multicultural Eid Festival and Fair has been organised every year for the six years since 1987. In 1991 about 16 000 persons turned up, and the 1992 estimate was about 18 000. The following message was given by the Prime Minister, P. J. Keating:

> I am pleased to have been asked to send a message to the organisers of and participants in the Sixth Multicultural Eid Festival and Fair at the Fairfield Showgrounds. I send warm greetings to all and in particular to members of our Muslim communities as you celebrate Eid-ul-Fitr and the end of the Sawn (fasting) month of Ramadan. This is ■ time of renewal and of rejoicing with your family and friends. These sentiments are at the very heart of both our multicultural policies and the 'One Nation' statement I made in parliament ■ 26 February 1992. 'One Nation' is about making this nation strong, about take care of those in need, and about Australians realising that their destiny is in their own hands. The

underlying principles of Islam accord well with those objectives. The challenge for all of us today is to stimulate the economy, to promote recovery and to encourage growth and employment. I urge all participants at the Festival and all Muslims to respond to the challenge of 'One Nation' by dedicating your skills and your talents to making this a fruitful and productive year for Australia. I congratulate the organisers of the Festival and hope that this year will see last year's outcome of 16 000 people and thirty-five ethnic groups attending well and truly surpassed.

INTERFAITH UNDERSTANDING

A very positive step towards Christian-Muslim understanding has been taken with a seminar in 1992 on the inner meaning of each faith and relations between the two faiths.

The seminar was the result of an invitation from the Uniting Church to the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC), and was held at the Islamic Community Centre, Chullora, Sydney.

Described in a press release as a 'bridge building exercise' to develop 'a more tolerant and accommodating society in Australia', the day-long seminar also featured workshops on points of contact between Christians and Muslims in Australia, such as common concern on social issues and mutual education about each other.

Issues discussed included human rights, poverty, social justice, theology, discrimination and racism, war, community work, women's issues, religious education in schools, and politics and religion.

The four groups formed for the workshop discussions reported many areas where Christianity and Islam held common views and could work together in Australia. During the course of the meeting, ignorance about each other in multicultural Australia was admitted by both groups. It was felt this ignorance was widely prevalent in the general community, and had contributed to prejudices and stereotyping of Muslims and other minority groups in Australia.

AUSTRALIAN LAW AND MUSLIMS

At the Law Council of Australia Legal Convention, in Adelaide in May 1991, Law Council President David Miles reminded delegates that almost

■ quarter of the people who now live in Australia were born elsewhere. 'Almost one in every hundred Australians is ■ Muslim', he said in a speech calling on lawyers to contribute to the process of change in Australian society and in Australia's laws.

He went on to refer to difficulties which Muslims experience with the Australian legal system, which *AMUST*'s legal writer, Jamila Hussain, had raised in a recent article in the *NSW Law Society Journal*. 'They (Muslims) must observe the law of this country, but they come from and are deeply committed to ■ religious culture in which they own allegiance to Islamic law', she had said, and had concluded by pointing out that Australian law must respond to the needs of a changing society.

In her article, Ms Jamila Hussain had pointed out that the Muslim concept of the family was very different from the normal Australian concept: the Muslim family was not 'mum and dad and 2.2 children'; it was an extended family in which grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins all had rights and obligations. Family disputes were settled within the family. It was ■ disgrace to involve social workers or court counsellors. There was no divorce until every avenue of arbitration and reconciliation had been exhausted within the family:

> As we reflect, we should appreciate that change in the law to meet changing needs is, or should be, the normal thing. The law must not be seen as an immutable, handed-down set of rules.
>
> If it is true that the common law is 'the common sense of the community' crystallised and formulated to take into account the community's needs, surely too it is we lawyers, more than anyone else, who must take up that responsibility [concluded David Miles].

CONCERN ABOUT MUSLIM UMMAH

Australian Muslims are very sensitive about the atrocities and cruelties happening in the world against Muslims. Al-Qudus, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Algeria, Sudan, Bosnia, Somalia, and recently the Babri Mosque demolition in India, have attracted their attention. Demonstrations, protests, writings in media and Muslim papers, Ethnic Radio talk – all these are carried out whenever any high-handedness is observed in other countries.

Australian Muslims are keen to see that these demonstrations are carried on peacefully in order to have a positive impact on the community and to show that Muslims can act reasonably and are not merely reactionary.

ISSUES AT HAND

In the present fast-changing world it is not very realistic to enumerate the current issues and provide solutions for them. It is still, nevertheless, a beneficial exercise in developing source material for future planning.

Australia, though remote from Europe, is still greatly affected by rapid global change. It is influenced equally by two world developments: the events further abroad, such as the US–Europe–Middle East zone, and events in the nearby South East Asia–China–Japan–Korea zone.

Australia is, socio-politically, compelled to shift its emphasis towards its neighbouring zone. The reconstruction programme after the Gulf War was manoeuvred by the US in such a way as to ignore Australia. The US economy is so much shattered that it is desperately trying to take over world markets.

In the neighbouring zone, there is a rapid increase in the economy. Malaysia is developing fast and many industrial development projects are on the way which can boost exports to Australia. The economic and socio-political ties with ASEAN countries can be of great help for overcoming Australia's recession. Japan's economy is even more advanced than that of the US and the trade pact between Japan and Australia will prove beneficial.

Similarly, after Hong Kong has been released from Britain and become part of China, it is going to influence the economic pattern of China. China will then require very rapid industrial development and Australia will be able to provide experts in that field. Labour-intensive projects can be established in Korea and China. Basically, it is becoming more obvious that transferring economic ties to the neighbouring zone is not only preferable, but seems to be the only alternative in order to overcome the recession period.

In this economic scenario, the resurgence of Islam and unification of the Muslim world is a very important factor for consideration. Muslim states, including those of Central Asia, are going to form a consortium and it may have an impact on the world economy.

Australia has to develop its ties with the Muslim world in order to increase its export market after being deprived of the European and US markets. The bias against Islam or Muslims is detrimental in the socio-economic development of Australia. To gain the confidence of the Muslim world, Australia first needs to be considerate and fair with Australian Muslims.

Muslims in Australia are undergoing a tremendous change in their concepts, comprehensions and strategies. More socio-political consciousness has been generated since the late 1980s.

The Muslim organisations' network, under AFIC throughout Australia, and under RISEAP in the South East Asia and Pacific region, has brought

them together to look after each other's interests. This had raised the position of Muslims, and hence they can play an important role in the building of Australia, provided Muslims take a keen interest in the affairs of the country.

The present Labour government, under the leadership of Paul J. Keating, is inclined towards making Australia a republic under the slogan of 'one-nation building'. The multicultural nature of the Australian people is to be integrated in such a way that it emerges as one nation. The present government is developing stronger relationships with ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea. The trend is to become economically independent; not to be tied up with the US, but to be closer to the Asian-Pacific countries such as Japan and China.

BASIC DEFICIENCIES OF AUSTRALIAN MUSLIMS

1. *Education – Professional*

The first generation of Muslim immigrants were not highly educated, and largely did not plan well for the education of the coming generation. Most of the second generation completed their basic education up to matriculation level (10th class), but very few went beyond their Higher School Certificate or sought tertiary level studies. The result: the majority of the Muslim youth moved towards setting up in business without acquiring professional knowledge in the field. Even now, according to the latest census figures, the bulk of Muslims belong to groups of skilled and unskilled labour and small businesses. Very few are doctors, solicitors, accountants, engineers or managers.

2. *Education – Islamic*

Muslims combine Islam as an ideology with the cultures of their countries of origin. When there is a conflict between the two, Islam is generally sacrificed and suffers the most, because there has been a lack of proper guidance and education for developing an Islamic lifestyle in Australia.

Each ethnic group of Muslims has its own interpretation and adopts a particular mode of living. Hence, there is no unified impact of an Islamic pattern of living on the non-Muslim. New Muslims, and non-Muslims wishing to understand Islam, have been confused as to the differences between what Islam says and what Muslims practise. Even in their behaviour, Muslims have not been able to prove moral supremacy. Religiously and ethically, Muslims have a fair way to go.

3. No Australian Islam

Closing the door on innovations has paralysed Muslims in Australia. Insight, methodology and mechanism have not been developed to present a practical and encompassing Islamic way of life in Australia. Muslim youth tends to adopt two different patterns of living – 'Australian' when mixing with mainstream Australian society, and their own ethnic/cultural practices when moving around in Muslim circles.

4. Isolated – not mixing with Australian society

Those very conscious of Islam and its values feel direct confrontation when dealing with Australian society and become afraid that it will endanger their Islamicity. Being unclear about Islamic precepts, and having their willpower and confidence undermined, they prefer to isolate themselves. But in so doing, they are forgoing two advantages. First, they are preventing themselves from having full rights as equal citizens in Australia; and secondly, they are not representing Islam to be public and being proud of it.

5. Participation in Australian Development

Many Muslims are not conscious that they can contribute to making Australia a better place, economically and socially: There is no great effort made to rise beyond the present recession. Muslims tend to take advantage of the 'welfare state' and don't relate to the fact that if they were to succeed in elevating their position economically, they would be helping Australia as well as being a positive element in promoting the position of Muslims. Muslims, as a group, are not seen as greatly contributing to Australian development, by the public nor by government departments. Certainly, some have succeeded in asking for and availing themselves of their rights but they have not made a tremendous impact, nor have they gained respect for their contribution.

No concerted effort has been made to improve trade relations between Australia and Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia by Muslims themselves. No business groups among Muslims have been developed to further ties for developing Australia.

A VIABLE FUTURE FOR ALL AUSTRALIANS

In recent weeks, debate regarding Australia's immigration policy has once again reared its controversial head.

The signal from all quarters, that Australian immigration intake must be reduced, is finally being heeded. In ■ recession-strapped economy it makes good sense to limit numbers on immigration. This is a fact that has been recognised not only by political parties and government agencies but also by the ethnic communities themselves. How many migrants, highly skilled and highly motivated, have arrived on Australia's shores only to be told to wait in line at their local DSS.

However, Australia cannot sustain low migration levels for too long. Australian business needs a substantial up-turn in its domestic market to be able to compete in its export drives. Although there are environmental concerns from ■ rapidly increasing population, it would be a foolish government which took up the alarmist 'green' propaganda that Australia cannot sustain a higher population.

Australia must tread with a fair degree of caution. The last thing it should do is to turn Australia into the underbelly of Asia. Standards must be maintained in the immigration policy and in the execution of that policy. Corruption must be weeded out in the migrant application process in certain Asian countries.

The Asian Agenda

The report released in the first week of December 1992 by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has once again put Australia's drive into Asia, particularly South-east Asia, on the political and economic agenda. The importance of developing closer ties with the region overruns party lines and is emerging as a common goal of the new generation, and presumably future generations of Australians. Paul Keating's Prime Ministership, almost from his first day in office, has made strong overtures to ASEAN and Melanesian neighbours. His tour of the region early in 1993 marked a resurgence in Australian attempts to establish friendlier relations with countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. It was precisely these countries that had a tendency throughout the 1980s to get drawn into political squabbles with Australia over fairly nebulous issues such as human rights. It is also these countries whose economies are growing at 6–7 per cent per year while Australia's stumbling along from setback to crisis. Australian businesses will be encouraged to take solace from a glimmer of ASEAN light beckoning from the end of the trade-deficit tunnel, if only they can survive the current recession.

Australian Muslims should take heart at the suggestion that Australians of Asian origin should figure more prominently in Australian business ventures that deal with Asia. It is unfortunate that this is so self-evident

that it has been conspicuously overlooked up until recent times. Similarly it is not just an accident of colonial history, but an indictment of the lack of foresight of our forefathers, that Australia is only now beginning to recognise its strategic and advantageous position close to the hub of South-east Asia. While economic ties with other English-speaking countries, Europe, America and North Asia will continue to be important, the opportunities that exist for 'riding the tigers' in South-east Asia are also undeniable. An even more important point to consider is that if Australia is able to compete against the ASEAN countries, with their (currently) relatively cheap and plentiful labour supply, it will be sharp enough to compete in larger global markets as well.

The future of Australia, economically, militarily and politically, will inevitably be linked to that of South-east Asia in various ways. The report released by DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) will add further material to the discussion, consideration and development of its relationship with South-east Asian countries.

17 Islam and Muslims in Britain

M. Manazir Ahsan

Muslims in Britain, who number over two million, are mostly non-European migrants or their descendants, coming from different parts of Asia and Africa. They have been experiencing a relatively better standard of living than their counterparts do in Asia and Africa, but, on the other hand, some prejudice, discrimination and hatred is shown by many Britons towards them. Despite their contributions to rebuilding the country, especially in the wake of the Second World War, Muslims in general do not enjoy equal status in Britain in comparison with other religious communities. Consequently they have become protective of their religious, ethnic and cultural identities. And since there has been very little assistance from the British government in preserving their Islamic identities, British Muslims have organised various socio-cultural organisations and built mosques and schools for the preservation of their identities. This, however, does not [illegible] that British Muslims have forgotten their internal differences, based on ethnicity, language and sectarian beliefs and practices. But on broader issues, such as the publication of the sacrilegious *Satanic Verses* or the destruction of the Babri Mosque in India, British Muslims have shown a semblance of unity and solidarity in the recent past.

British Muslims, who now number over two million,[1] like their counterparts in Europe and America, are experiencing, on the one hand, exhilaration at the opportunity to settle down, increase their numbers by gaining new converts and develop their institutions with or without governmental support, and on the other, a degree of frustration and resentment as their experience of prejudice, discrimination, intimidation and even hatred continues unabated.[2] Although Muslims in Britain have, to [illegible] great extent, succeeded in creating a distinct identity and establishing a coherent Islamic community, their image in the media, both print and electronic, has not improved and their many contributions to British life and culture are not fully acknowledged.[3]

HISTORY

Although Muslims lived in and ruled over vast areas of Europe for several centuries (Sicily 831–1091; Spain and the Iberian peninsula 711–1492;

and Ottoman Turks in Eastern Europe), the Muslim presence in Britain is a comparatively new phenomenon, going back to the middle of the nineteenth century. From the 1850s to the outbreak of the First World War, the Muslim community in Britain consisted mainly of seamen coming from Aden, the Yemen, Somalia, Bengal, Gujerat and Sind and settling down mainly in coastal areas such as Liverpool, Cardiff, Bristol, London and Tyneside. An interesting phenomenon of the early history of Islam in Britain is the conversion of a number of influential people in British society. One such person was the solicitor, William Henry Quilliam, who became a Muslim in 1887 and was given the title 'Shaykh al-Islam' by the Ottoman Caliph, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, whom the Shah of Persia made Consul in Liverpool. Quilliam, now known as Shaykh Abdullah Quilliam, founded an Islamic Institute and the second mosque in the British Isles in Liverpool in 1891. The first mosque was built two years earlier, in 1889 at Woking, by the ruler of Bhopal in India.

Another important British personality to embrace Islam was Lord Headley (d. 1933), who publicly announced his conversion to Islam in Caxton Hall in December 1913. In close co-operation with Khwaja Kamaluddin, a lawyer by profession and a follower of the Qadiyanis of the Lahori branch, Lord Headley was instrumental in establishing the 'British Muslim Association' for the purpose of spreading Islam in Britain. The two translators of the Qur'an, Marmaduke Pickthall, a British convert, and the Indian, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, who resided in London, were also associated with Lord Headley's literary and *da'wah* (missionary) activities. Although, following the opening of the Paris Mosque in 1926, Lord Headley, with the patronage of the Nizam of Hyderabad, succeeded in establishing the Nizamiah Mosque Trust, it was not until November 1944 that the Islamic Cultural Centre was opened and, also, that King George VI gave a plot of Regents Park by Hanover Gate in exchange for the site in Cairo donated for the new Anglican Cathedral. The new structure of the Central Mosque and the Islamic Cultural Centre was completed in 1977. The Liverpool Mosque did not survive beyond the First World War, but the Woking Mosque, which was a thriving centre between the two World Wars, survived and is still used by the Woking Muslim community.[4]

The partition of India in 1947, and British Government legislation on immigration, led to the expansion of the Muslim community in Britain. The largest Muslim migration occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s, when family dependants came in large numbers. It was a sort of marriage of convenience between the British government and the Muslims, by which the former reinforced the manpower required to rebuild the country and repair the damage of two wars and the latter sought to improve their economic situation and have a better standard of living. Although the over-

whelming number of Muslims in Britain are from the subcontinent (about one-third from Pakistan, and 10 per cent each from Bangladesh and India), there is ■ sizeable number from the Middle East, South-east Asia, Africa, and members of the British indigenous population that converted to Islam. Although Muslims are to be found in almost every big and small city of Britain, the main concentrations of Muslims are in London, Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester, Leicester, Sheffield, Leeds and Glasgow.

The majority of the Muslims, especially from the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent, have acquired British nationality; and those from Pakistan and Bangladesh generally hold dual nationality. Children born of British nationals and those who have a permanent resident's permit are automatically British. According to the official count, up until 1985 there were around 400 mosques, but Muslims claim that now (end of 1992) there are almost 1000 mosques up and down the country, established generally in terraced houses and large buildings after internal conversion and modification. Almost 50 mosques are built in the mosque design; which enhance the architectural beauty of the city and offer facilities for varied community activities. Although hundreds of organisations are based in the mosque, the major organisations that play a definite role in British Muslim society can be counted in dozens. It is difficult to categorise and identify the Muslim community along theological or what some Orientalists call sectarian lines, as the vast number of Muslims are in the floating category and do not belong to a particular group. However, if one wants to classify Sunni Muslims, they can be lumped together into three broad groups – the Brelvis, the Deobandi/Tablighi Jama'at and the Jama'at-i-Islami. Sometimes the divisive nature of these groups takes on menacing proportions, such as in Pakistan and India, where there have been debates, abuses and, in the 1970s and early 1980s, physical fighting among the Brelvis and Deobandis. With the coming up of the second and third generations, and enlightenment through education, Muslims are increasingly becoming disillusioned by the divisiveness of these groupings, as they are perceived as irrelevant within the British context. The above grouping mainly applies to Muslims from the Indo-Pakistani background, as Arabs and Africans and people from other areas are generally not familiar with the Deobandis and Brelvis.[5] There is ■ small group of Shi'ite, Ahl-e-Hadith and followers of the Muslim Brotherhood among the Arab population.

MUSLIM ORGANISATIONS

The need to establish Islamic organisations mainly arose when Muslims in Britain on a temporary basis decided to stay for ■ longer period or on a

permanent basis and consequently brought their wives and children to join them. The influx of new arrivals obliged the early Muslim community to safeguard their religious values and culture, establish proper mosques and institutions and address themselves to the issues of education, social welfare, *halal* food and *da'wah* in general.

Although there are a number of Islamic organisations, new and old, discussion here has been confined to a few of those who hold a global vision of Islam and are directly or indirectly influenced by the international Islamic movements.

1. UK Islamic Mission

One of the earliest Islamic organisations to be formed in Britain is the UK Islamic Mission, which was established in December 1962 by the followers of, and those influenced by, the Jama'at-i-Islami movement. The purpose of the UK Islamic Mission is not merely to safeguard the spiritual heritage and cultural identity of Muslims and passively resist the onslaughts of foreign ideologies, but to participate fruitfully and to contribute positively to the moral and spiritual betterment of the society they live in. The objective of this organisation is therefore not to quickly gather a large group of people nominally committed to Islam, but to develop a core of dedicated workers as a vanguard to spearhead a life-long struggle in the cause of Islam. To achieve this objective, the Mission organises regular programmes for *tarbiyya* and *tazkiyya* (purification and spiritual growth) through Qur'anic study sessions, distribution of literature and regional and central meetings, seminars and conferences. The organisation is also involved in the establishment of mosques, the education of Muslim children, the organisation of youth and rallying round various social and political issues faced by the Muslim community. It also encourages interfaith dialogue and, whenever possible, responds to international issues faced by the Muslim *Ummah* at large. The Mission's mosques and centres regularly welcome visiting groups and professionals who want to increase their knowledge of Islam and exchange views on issues faced by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It also encourages local officials in government, law, school and church to visit, and invites them to celebrations of Muslim festivals and *Eid*.

The Mission's activities are carried out through a network of some [illegible] centres and branches throughout the UK. Every branch is managed by [illegible] elected president assisted by an executive, selected from the workers [illegible] the branch. For administrative purposes, the branches are grouped in t[illegible] South, Midlands and North under the supervision of an elected zon[illegible]

nazim (supervisor-in-charge). At the national level the activities of the Mission are co-ordinated and centralised by an elected president and a Central Executive Council (*Shura*). The president and the executive council, consisting of ten members, are elected every two years. The Mission has a two-tier membership: full membership (*rukniyat*) is given only to those who, through a period of close association, prove that they are totally committed to Islam and are ready to follow the discipline and programme of the Mission fully. Those who do not qualify for full membership remain associate members and aspire to become members eventually. The total membership of the Mission (both full and associate) during 1992 was 475, and the number of sympathisers exceeded 50 000. The Mission has so far established 28 mosques and 4 other mosques are run under its management. It also runs bookshop/resource centres in London and Birmingham and publishes a beautiful Islamic Calendar highlighting the prayer timing for different cities.[6]

2. The Islamic Council of Europe

The Islamic Council of Europe is the supreme co-ordinating body of Islamic activities in Europe. The objectives of the Council are to assist, support and supplement the activities of the member organisations in matters such as establishing mosques and Islamic centres, publishing and distributing Islamic literature, promoting Islamic education and the fulfilment of other Islamic duties and obligations. For the promotion of its activities and that of its constituents, the Council seeks the co-operation and assistance of Muslim states, governments and national and international organisations, whenever necessary. The Council, over the years, has succeeded both directly and through its recommendations to Muslim governments, international organisations and Muslim philanthropists in providing its members and other organisations with substantial financial aid, which has enabled them to establish mosques and to complete some of the incomplete projects. The Council has already published several books on Islam, Islamic economics and Muslim women, and has organised a number of international conferences and seminars in London, Paris and Islamabad. The high watermark was perhaps the holding of an international conference in 1976 at the Royal Albert Hall, London, during the Festival of Islam celebrations organised by the Festival of Islam Trust.

The Council has not only given the Muslim community a sense of direction, but has heightened the understanding of Islam among the British people. The Council has an elected Executive Committee drawn from its constituents in England and other parts of Europe headed by its Secretary

General, Mr Salem Azzam. Through its regular conferences and seminars, and assistance to Islamic organisations, the Council has attained ■ good reputation among the Muslim community in Europe. However, because of some financial and administrative difficulties recently, it has lost some of its lustre and has not been able to play fully the role for which it was established twenty years ago.[7]

3. Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS)

As the number of overseas students in British Universities started to grow, Muslim students' associations started to be formed in different British university campuses. However, the need was felt to co-ordinate such activities and bring them closer together. For this purpose, delegates from the Students Islamic Societies met in Birmingham in 1962 and decided to form a federal body under the name of Federation of Students Islamic Societies. Over a period of 30 years the FOSIS has grown and matured and has emerged as a well-knit committed body to looking after the interests and activities of Muslim students engaged in higher studies in different British universities and institutes of higher learning.

The basic centres of FOSIS activity are its constituent and associate student societies. Almost every university and polytechnic (recently upgraded to universities) has an Islamic Society, active in organising Friday and daily prayers, holding Islamic Weeks, consisting of lectures, exhibitions and video shows, and arranging various outreach programmes. At the beginning of the academic year the society receives newly arriving Muslim students from all parts of the world and introduces them to their fellow students through 'freshers' receptions. Prayer and Ramadan timetables, the *Muslim Students Guide to Britain* and the Federation's publications are normally distributed free. Special programmes, such as Qur'anic Study Circles, lectures by prominent Muslim scholars, group discussions etc., are held on a weekly, fortnightly and monthly basis, and are attended not only by students but also by local community members.

FOSIS's main publication is the bi-monthly journal, *The Muslim*, which covers ■ wide variety of subjects including Qur'anic commentary, articles on Islamic topics and news of Muslim students in Britain. However, in recent years, the publication has become irregular. The organisation also runs ■ bookshop; mainly to help Muslim students with Islamic literature at ■ subsidised rate. The Muslim Student Centre and Hostel in London, which serves as FOSIS's headquarters and is managed by a trust, provides much-needed facilities for Muslim students and the local Muslim population. The FOSIS maintains regular contact with Muslim student organ-

isations in America, Canada, Europe and other parts of the world. Representatives of these organisations attend the Federation's camps and conferences, providing a unique opportunity for mutual exchange of information and co-operation in areas of common interest.

The Federation sends ■ *Hajj* delegation almost every year and receives regular contributions from the International Islamic Federation of Students Organizations (IIFSO); based in Kuwait, and World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), based in Riyadh. The Federation is a permanent member of IIFSO and is the founding member of the Islamic Council of Europe, London. Because of the formation and growth of Young Muslim organisations and the recently-established 'Islamic Society of Britain' consisting mainly of indigenous Muslim students and youths, the activities of FOSIS have suffered ■ setback. The Gulf crisis and economic recession have also affected its financial base, resulting in the curtailment of some of its activities.[8]

4. Muslim Students Society

While the FOSIS serves mainly the non-Arabic-speaking overseas students, another student organisation, the 'Muslim Students Society' (MSS), was formed in the 1960s to look after the Islamic interests of the Arabic-speaking students coming from all over the Arab world. These students are either directly or indirectly related to the *Ikhwan* or Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Arab world or have been associated with other Islamic organisations and the general activities of *da'wah*. Like the FOSIS, the main aim and objective of the MSS is to safeguard, preserve and enhance the Islamic identity of the students and prevent them falling prey to Western liberal, secular and permissive culture. Since the society is meant primarily for Arab students and Arab activists living in the UK , its programmes, with rare exceptions, are held in the Arabic language. Apart from holding weekly Qur'anic study groups and occasional gatherings to discuss various Islamic issues, the MSS regularly holds summer camps and annual conferences, which are attended by more than a thousand men, women and children. The summer camps are usually held in tents and marquees while the winter camps are held in different university campuses. In the conferences held during the 1980s, over 900 men, 450 women and 600 children attended the three-day programmes.

The MSS runs over 40 study groups in different cities; holds regional conferences in the North, South, West, Midlands and Ireland regions; and publishes ■ monthly Arabic journal, *al-Ghuraba*. It runs an Islamic bookshop, and sells audio and video tapes containing lectures and discourses by

eminent Muslim scholars from all over the world and inspiring Islamic songs for children and young people. During the annual conference, it organises a 'bazaar' containing stalls for food, books, audio-visual materials, handicrafts, and exhibitions of various kinds. Like the FOSIS, the MSS also maintains a good relationship with sister organisations in Britain and abroad.[9]

5. Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO)

The Muslim organisations formed in the 1960s, based both in mosques and outside, although with many similar aims and objectives, did not know each other very well and had difficulty initiating negotiations and contacts with local authorities and central government. Therefore, representatives of 38 Muslim organisations from all over Britain and Ireland, in a conference held in London on 19 July 1970, decided to form a representative body, the Union of Muslim Organisations of UK and Eire (UMO). The main aims of this organisation are to co-ordinate the activities of different Muslim organisations, to cater for the socio-cultural and educational requirements of British and Irish Muslims and to work for a better understanding between Muslims and other communities in Britain. The UMO now claims a membership of over a hundred organisations, mainly mosque-based organisations and some small associations. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the UMO could not persuade the main large organisations to join its ranks. Nevertheless, it has played a significant role in highlighting some of the major issues faced by the Muslim community in the field of education, race relations, family law and social welfare. It has also mobilised a significant number of young Muslims, holding youth conferences whenever possible. Apart from annual and winter gatherings, it also holds an annual *Mawlud* dinner, to celebrate the birthday of the Prophet. Such dinners are held in hotels such as the Hilton and a number of dignitaries from the diplomatic corps, the British Parliament and educational establishments are invited. It has successfully organised special conferences on the themes of Muslim education and Muslim family law, and produced guidelines and syllabuses for Muslim education.

A delegation of the UMO, under the leadership of its Secretary General, Dr Syed Aziz Pasha, has been meeting regularly with different government representatives, and lobbying the three main political parties during their annual conferences and presenting the Muslim case through circulars, memoranda and newsletters. In addition to its annual conferences, the UMO holds regular committee meetings and group discussions and maintains good relations with central government and local bodies. It has

sponsored and participated in demonstrations and public meetings in support of the PLO, Al-Aqsa Mosque, Kashmir Liberation Movement and a host of other causes affecting the Muslim *Ummah* throughout the world. During the Rushdie affair, it collaborated closely with the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs and presented the Islamic perspective on radio and television. Following the destruction of the historic Babri Mosque in India in December 1992, it mobilised its constituents and participated in various protest meetings and marches. The theme of the two-day 20th Winter Conference (Birmingham, 6–7 February 1993) was 'Bosnia and Babri Mosque – Time for Action'. The UMO activities are run from its headquarters in London. The organisation tries to evolve a united approach to solving the problems confronting the Muslim community and rightly believes that British Muslims have an important role to play in the moral and spiritual upliftment of British society as a whole. It has consistently been campaigning for the rights of British Muslims within the legal framework of the country. The UMO also participates in interfaith dialogue and publishes newsletters on a regular basis. However, since it has failed to receive the support of major Muslim organisations in the UK, and has to rely heavily on its permanent Secretary General for policy formulations and implementation of its objectives, it has lost some of its value both to the Muslim community and as a negotiator with the British government.[10]

6. The Young Muslims, UK

Although there are a number of youth associations attached to different national and regional organisations, such as the Young Muslim Organization sponsored by Dawatul Islam and Islamic Forum Europe, the national youth body representing young Muslims born and brought up in Britain is the Young Muslims, UK. Formed in December 1984, with 27 members, the Young Muslims Organisation has at present (early 1993) over 2000 members. The main objective of this organisation is to inspire the youth in Britain to sacrifice for the cause of Islam and bring the individual and society to live in complete submission to the will of God. In other words, to become conscious practising Muslims and, through personal example, attract the peer group to an Islam which represents a complete way of life, a *din*.

Almost 75 per cent of YM members are of Asian subcontinental origin, the rest representing the newly-converted British Muslims and Afro-Caribbean, Arab and Turkish groups. It now has branches in 25 different cities and towns, from Aberdeen to Southampton. It started its Young

Women's section five years ago. The Islamic activities of the young women's group are organised from as many as 15 cities and hundreds of schools and polytechnics; and female college students are finding 'refuge' in the Islamic environment provided by this organisation. In early 1990 two members of this organisation, known as the Alawi sisters, created history by insisting on wearing headscarves in the classroom in a school in Manchester. At first, the head teacher denied them this religious right and sent them home, but, eventually, following media attention and discussion, the school governors agreed to change the rules and allowed the girls to wear their headscarves. A similar dispute in France in 1989, which lasted for nearly six weeks, resulted in the government ruling that discreet wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls should be allowed.

The activities of the Young Muslims are many and varied, ranging from *dhikr* nights to laser shooting, from martial arts to tea parties and scout activities. Core activities are regular study circles, training camps and outreach programmes. The annual summer camp held in 1991, for example, attracted nearly 3000 young men and women from all over Britain, who for three days lived together in marquees and displayed a wonderful sense of Islamic solidarity and discipline. The organisation is led by an elected president, *Amir*, and is assisted in the work of policy formulation and implementation of its programme by an elected council (*Shura*), consisting of ten members. The *Amir* is elected for a period of two years by an elected council (*Shura*), but the members of the *Shura* are elected every year during the annual members' meeting, generally held at the beginning of every year. The YM produces a monthly magazine called *Trends*, which has proved very popular and currently sells 5000 copies per issue. Despite a number of shortcomings, the YM has had an impact on tens of thousands of young people and is engaged in creating a new identity, a new culture, a new civilisation for the new generation of Muslims in Britain.[11]

7. Islamic Society of Britain

With the arrival of Muslims in Britain, as noted earlier, many organisations, Islamic and welfare, were formed to cater for the social, educational and other needs of each migrant community – the Pakistanis, the Arabs, the Turks, Bangladeshis, etc. These organisations carried out educational and training programmes in the native languages, which the new generation born and brought up in Britain followed with great difficulty. To facilitate the work in English, especially for the new generations of all nationalities, whose first language had become English, and to provide an

Islamic platform whose priorities, functions and thinking was geared towards British society, as well as to systematically carry the message of Islam out to the indigenous community, a new organisation, the 'Islamic Society of Britain' (ISB), was formed in June 1990. This organisations, formed after prolonged consultation with major Islamic organisations, aims to portray Islam's image in Britain not as an 'immigrant religion' but as developing its own traditions, programmes and policies to meet the many challenges facing Islam in the West. Fully aware that too many separate and independent organisations are a source of division and disunity, the ISB aspires to bring Muslim groups and organisations together, unite them for the work of Islam, with a British agenda, and remove trivial differences between them, which have been a major source not only of friction but of revulsion in the new generation educated in this country. In addition to organising those who respond to this invitation, the ISB aims at establishing cordial relations with non-Muslims in general, and the people of the Book (Christians and Jews) in particular, so that a better understanding of Islam in a multicultural society can be promoted.

The ISB organises its work at both national and local level through a system of consultation (*Shura*). It has a president, a *Shura* Council and an executive committee, all elected for a period of two years. The *Shura* advises the president in all affairs of the organisation and the executive committee assists him in the implementation of decisions and plans. The president is accountable to the *Shura* Council and the *Shura* Council in turn is accountable to the members. Structurally, the ISB consists of a head office, branches, and circles for men and women throughout the country. The *Shura* Council consists of ten nationally-elected representatives, fifteen local representatives, and ISB's ex-presidents. The executive committee comprises the president, vice-president, general secretary, treasurer, other office-bearers and up to three nominated members.

The ISB organises continuous education and training programmes at both national and local level so as to develop in its members a good understanding of Islam, to become better Muslims and develop in themselves a commitment to strive to realise the right vision of Islam. The training programmes also aim to make members politically and socially aware and to develop in them talents and skills in areas like communication, public speaking, writing, organisation, planning, leadership and management.

The ISB provides a platform for many ex-members of the Young Muslims to associate themselves with Islamic activities, and welcomes new Muslims to be elected to the *Shura* Council and assume leadership of local branches wherever possible. Although it is too early to assess the

ISB's contribution to establishing a caring and sharing Islamic society in Britain, there are pointers that suggest it will occupy an important place among British Muslim organisations and may also replace some of the old and ailing organisations.[12]

POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS AND CURRENT ISSUES

Any discussion on the Muslim community in Britain, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, will remain incomplete if some space is not given to the role of the two newly established institutions – the Islamic Party of Britain and the so-called Muslim Parliament in London.

Similarly, some discussion is also needed to evaluate the effects of the Rushdie affair and the Gulf War on the British Muslim community.

Other issues, such as Muslim education, race relations, Bosnian refugees, interfaith dialogue, Hindu–Muslim efforts to restore relations after the destruction of the Babri Mosque in India, etc., require independent treatment and more space than is available in this chapter.

Islamic Party of Britain

Although there are over two million Muslims in Britain, there is not a single Muslim Member of Parliament in the House of Commons, let alone any representation in the House of Lords, like the Chief Rabbi and the Archbishop of Canterbury representing their respective religious communities. Muslims have traditionally supported the two main political parties, Labour and Conservative. During an election, both these parties give nominations to a few Muslim candidates, but only from those constituencies where they are unlikely to win. Perhaps out of desperation, and political consciousness and a sense of unity among the Muslim community as a result of the Rushdie affair, a handful of newly-converted Muslims, with a token representation of Asian Muslims, launched the Islamic Party in July 1989. As apprehended, the attempt not only backfired but evoked harsh criticism from various Muslim and non-Muslim leaders and organisations. The organisers of the Party failed to realise that even if the two million Muslims scattered across the country voted *en block* for Muslim candidates, there was hardly any chance of winning more than half a dozen seats in Parliament. The reality of the situation is that, for obvious reasons, the Muslim vote is already divided between the Labour and Conservative parties and, no matter how much one plays on the religious

and emotional aspirations of Muslims, it is almost impossible to initiate major changes in their voting pattern. The result of the Bradford North by-election in 1990, where the Islamic Party finished fourth with 3 per cent of the vote, and the 1992 election, where it lost its deposit in the five seats contested, shows the reality.

The declared aims and objectives of the Party,[13] promising a better future for Islam and highlighting radical changes in the economic system, are splendid and hardly any Muslim will disagree with them.

However, these objectives are not realisable in any degree unless there is a radical change in the British parliamentary system, such as the introduction of proportional representation. There is no doubt that the Islamic Party did get some attention in the media and was able to distribute copies of its manifesto and leaflets to thousands of Muslims and non-Muslims. However, since the leaders of the Party did not properly consult the existing Muslim leadership prior to launching the Party, and Muslim leaders have a vested interest in perpetuating their own organisations, the Islamic Party did not receive any sympathy, let alone support, from such quarters.[14]

The Muslim Parliament

Taking advantage of the Muslim unity and self-assertion created by the British Muslim campaign against Salman Rushdie's sacrilegious book, *The Satanic Verses*, Dr Kalim Siddiqi, Director of the London-based Muslim Institute, planned to take over the leadership of the Muslim community. As a precursor to the Muslim Parliament, in July 1990, he published a 'Muslim Manifesto' setting out an agenda for Muslim action to attain satisfactory status within British structures – a programme which almost every Islamic organisation in Britain had on its agenda. The manifesto, among other things, envisaged an 'autonomous community' with a 'special relationship with the Islamic state of Iran'. 'The Council of British Muslims', the name that was originally planned, was changed as ■ result of media pressure to 'Muslim Parliament' and was officially launched on 4 January 1992 at Kensington Town Hall, London. The Muslim Parliament included ■ speaker, four deputy speakers (including two women), some 150 members, and the leader of the house in the person of Kalim Siddiqi himself. The Parliament plans to meet five times ■ year and debate ■ number of issues such as Muslim education, *halal* meat, the Rushdie affair, etc., and to bring out a white paper ■■ key issues. This Parliament at the moment represents the lower house. An upper house, consisting of about 1000 'eminent men and women of proven ability' is planned for the future.

Since the Muslim members of the Parliament (known as MMP) are hand-picked and do not have a very high standing in the Muslim community, the Parliament has been seen by Muslim organisations as divisive and an ill-advised effort which is likely to get Islam a bad name. By and large, the Muslim community has greeted it with indifference, apprehension and outright rejection. They argue that since the leader of the Parliament is a product of media sensationalism, his negative and provocative statements will not only inflict permanent damage on the standing of the Muslim community, but will also marginalise the law-abiding Muslim population. Some critics have even alleged that he was 'advocating apartheid on religious grounds'. Addressing the hand-picked delegates during the inauguration of the Parliament, Dr Siddiqi talked dramatically of withholding taxes, of civil disobedience and defying 'unjust' laws, if necessary going to prison to defend the faith of Islam. He vilified the West as 'the sick man of the modern world' and attacked its political institutions as 'the dictatorship of the majority dressed up as democracy'. Earlier he is also reported to have spoken of a 'lava of hatred' which flowed towards Muslims from every Briton, including the highest politicians in the land. There is no doubt that the Parliament intends to define, defend and promote the interests of the Muslim community in Britain; but the way it has been projected, established and led by self-appointed leaders, is more likely to harm rather than promote the interests of the Muslims and the cause of Islam in the UK.[15]

The Rushdie Affair

So much has been written on the Rushdie affair since it erupted in October 1988, that in the chapter 'Annotated Bibliography' in the book *Sacrilege Versus Civility*, published during the summer of 1991, the editors were able to enumerate 33 books and monographs and over 100 articles published in learned journals and periodicals on the subject.[16] The campaign against the book started in secular India, and it was India that first banned the book, and the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent who bore the brunt of the campaign, resulting in the deaths of over 20 Muslim protesters and injuries to many more. However, it was the Muslim community of Britain who not only vigorously participated in but sustained the campaign throughout its turbulent period, and who continue to carry its banner with almost unabated vigour and dedication. Since 1990, the author of the sacrilegious book has been in the protective custody of the British government; the attempt to get the *fatwa* of Ayatollah Khomeini lifted has failed, and it is very unlikely that it will ever be lifted.

Because of other pressing events at home and abroad, such as ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims, the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992, the bombing of Iraq by the United States in January 1993 and again in July 1993, and domestic issues such as Muslim education and voluntary-aided schools,[17] the blatant discrimination against Muslims on religious grounds by a British company near Sheffield[18] and similar events, the Rushdie affair has slightly receded into the background. However, the deadlock seems likely to persist, as the Muslim demand for the withdrawal of the offensive book and pulping of the remaining copies, followed by an unreserved apology by the author and the publisher, has not been fulfilled and the author, despite his surreptitious visits to eight countries and his meeting with a British Foreign Office Minister on 4 February 1993, remains in 'hiding'.

The Muslim community not only wrote letters of protest to the publisher and demanded the withdrawal of the book and an apology, but made representation to the Prime Minister, to the Queen and to Members of Parliament in an effort to get redress for their grievances. They staged several peaceful and orderly demonstrations at both national and local level and Muslims in Bradford, unaware of its possible consequences, made a token protest by symbolically burning a copy of the book in public. Muslims also invoked the Public Order Act and asked the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute the author – but all to no avail. Some Muslims went to the High Court and filed a case against the author on the grounds of blasphemy. However, despite some initial success, the High Court ruled that the law of blasphemy applied only if someone had blasphemed against the Anglican faith. When Muslims asked that the blasphemy law be extended to Islam, the secular and the communist lobby, supported surprisingly by some church leaders, campaigned to abolish the law altogether. But instead of receiving equal dignity, Muslims were told to accept 'equal indignity', as the law of blasphemy could not be extended to any other faith, not even to Catholics.

In an attempt to diffuse the crisis, Muslim leaders met the Home Secretary and leaders of the opposition parties, and held several meetings with the Commission for Racial Equality, but were unable to achieve anything substantial. They received some sympathy and understanding of the Muslim point of view, that their campaign is not against free speech but against sacrilege and profanity, but failed to mobilise 'friendly' pressure on the publisher. The Muslim community in Britain and the West in general received ample support from the Muslim world through the OIC resolutions and legal pronouncements from the Mufti of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and the Sultan of Sokoto, Nigeria. However, the resolutions of the

OIC Conference, despite their strong tone and sense of urgency, following fervent appeals for punitive measures against the publisher and their collaborators, remained a dead letter. To the utter surprise of the Muslim community in the West, leaders of Muslim states did no more than pay lip-service to the issue. The *fatwa* of Imam Khomeini did not help the Muslim community as it derailed their campaign and diverted media attention from the book and its publisher to the author. Muslims explained that the *fatwa*, though correct in theory, cannot be applied on British soil as Islamic law does not apply in Britain. However, such voices were drowned in the sea of media denouncement. Some secular opponents of Khomeini and his *fatwa* not only pronounced that Islam was a reactionary and intolerant religion, but also demanded that the 'militant' Muslims should be expelled from Britain or else be prosecuted for campaigning against Rushdie, a British citizen.

The Muslim campaign against the offensive, sacrilegious and profane book has brought the entire Muslim community onto a single platform and fused in them a sense of unity and harmony as never before in the recent history of Muslims in Britain. The Muslim community, under the auspices of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA), an umbrella body of major mosques and organisations in Britain, formed in October 1988, has been quietly but persistently campaigning for the withdrawal of the book and introduction of legal provisions to protect Islam and religious sanctities. Representatives of the UKACIA have met British government officials on a number of occasions and also participated in most of the Islamic foreign ministers' conferences held under the auspices of the OIC Conference in Riyadh, Cairo and Tehran. In December 1991, they also attended the Summit Conference of heads of states of Muslim countries, hosted by Senegal in Dakar. It is through their negotiations and pressure that a dialogue between the British government and the Muslim community has been started to look into the possibility of enacting new laws to prohibit discrimination against Muslims on religious grounds and, following the example of Northern Ireland, to make incitement to religious hatred a criminal act. This type of recommendation is not new in Britain. Several years ago, while giving judgement on the *Gay News* case (1979), Lord Scarman also suggested revisions of the law along the same lines. 'In an increasingly plural society such as that of modern Britain', he wrote, 'it is necessary not only to respect the different beliefs, feelings and practices of all, but also to protect them from scurrility, vilification, ridicule and contempt'.[19] Despite such voices of civility, and their prolonged campaign, not least during the Rushdie affair, Muslims are yet to see their religious rights institutionalised in the British system.[20]

The Babri Mosque Tragedy

The destruction of the historical sixteenth-century Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India, on 6 December 1992,[21] sent a shockwave among Muslims all over the world, especially the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent and their brethren abroad. Britain was no exception. Muslim organisations such as the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, Bradford Council of Mosques, Indian Muslim Federation, Muslim Parliament and many small and large organisations up and down the country expressed their shock, sent letters and telegrams to the Indian and British governments and demanded exemplary punishment for the culprits and immediate restoration of the mosque. A few Hindu temples and businesses in Britain were attacked, and in retaliation at least one mosque in London was vandalised.

The Home Office hurriedly called a meeting of Muslim and Hindu leaders (10 February 1993) to review race relations and in an effort to contain any deterioration of relations between the Hindu and Muslim communities in Britain. The eight representatives (four Hindu and four Muslim) and the Home Secretary condemned the riots in India and Pakistan that flared up in the wake of the destruction of the mosque and appealed for calm and observation of the law in Britain. Muslim organisations issued press statements and held special meetings to discuss how to react to the unfortunate and deplorable situation. On 9 December 1992 the International Muslim Organization of Coventry and the World Islamic Council held separate meetings in London and, among other measures, called upon Muslim governments to sever diplomatic and trade relations with India until a pledge was given by the Indian government to honour its obligation of protecting the Muslim minority and to rebuild the Babri Mosque. On 13 December, the Indian Muslim Federation held an urgent meeting in London, attended by delegates and representatives of the major Muslim organisations in the UK. Expressing its outrage and shock, it demanded not only punishment of the culprits and restoration of the mosque, but compensation for the loss of life and vandalism in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, at a special seminar at the London Mosque in Regents Park. Speaker after speaker condemned the failure of the secular Indian government to protect the mosque and the lives of the Muslim minority and demanded a judicial enquiry and restoration of the mosque.

The culmination of the British Muslim protest was the formation of the Babri Mosque Action Committee in late December 1992 and the historic demonstration on 3 January 1993, which was attended by over 8000 leaders and representatives of the Muslim community from most cities of

Britain. After the Rushdie affair, it was the second time that so many diverse organisations agreed to work together and forget their differences. The rally was followed by a march to the Indian High Commission and the handing over of a letter of protest. Seminars and conferences became a regular feature, where Muslim organisations were repeating similar demands and trying to attract non-Muslim participation in putting pressure on the Indian government to put a stop to the communal riots in which several thousand Muslims had been killed by militant Hindus. A one-day national conference on 10 February 1993 in Preston, organised by the Lancashire Council of Mosques, representing more than 50 mosques, on the theme of 'Democracy and Human Rights in India – The Way Forward', was attended by MPs, Euro-MPs, councillors, religious and community leaders and human rights activists. Among other resolutions, the conference demanded the setting up of a Ministry for Ethnic Minority Affairs in India so that life, property and minorities' places of worship could be better protected. A meeting of the Leicestershire Federation of Muslim Organizations was held on 14 February and addressed by non-Muslim speakers including university professors, MPs and councillors, who expressed their dismay and revulsion that the Indian government appeared to be becoming a 'hostage' of the militant Hindu organisations and taking no appropriate measures to restore the mosque and redress the grievances of the Muslim community in India.

Despite the fact that many Indian Muslim families living in Britain have suffered grievous setbacks in the form of relatives killed or businesses destroyed, and that many are forced to live in constant fear and blackmail by Hindu fundamentalists, the Muslim community in Britain has reacted to the Babri Mosque tragedy with calmness, sagacity and fortitude. Though they could have retaliated against the killing of their relatives in India and attacked the Hindu community in Britain, which number less than a quarter of a million, they preferred to listen to their community leaders and showed a great degree of tolerance and maturity by not taking the law into their own hands. Appealing to them to react to the wanton and shameful destruction of the mosque in a peaceful and law-abiding manner, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, in its circular (9 December 1992), asked the Muslim community to behave as true Muslims. 'We should not,' it said, 'in accordance with [the teachings of] our faith, damage, injure or in any way harm the persons or property of believers in other faiths. We must uphold this noble principle in the face of this dire provocation. We urge all Imams and leaders of the Muslim community to counsel patience and to advise the community to do their best to maintain the friendly relations which have hitherto existed between them and the

Hindu community in the United Kingdom'. The appeal was heeded to the letter and, despite provocation, Hindu–Muslim relations in Britain were saved from crisis.[22]

NOTES

1. Since there is no proper census as to the number of different religious communities in Britain, Muslims have to determine the number from estimates. Non-Muslim researchers assert that in the late 1980s, Muslims numbered around or just over one million. Although some Muslim organisations such as UMO have been claiming that the Muslim population in Britain has exceeded three million, the correct estimate is presently just over two million. See, for example, M. S. Raza, *Islam in Britain: Past, Present and Future* (Leicester, 1991).
2. For a discussion on Muslim communities in different parts of Europe, among others, see J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe* (Edinburgh, 1992); Gerholm Thomas and Y. G. Lithman (eds), *The Islamic Presence in Western Europe* (Mansell; London, 1988) and the article in the *New Encyclopedia of Islam* (E. J. Brill) s.v. '*Muslimun*'. For the Muslim community in America, among the latest, see Y. Y. Haddad (ed.), *The Muslims of America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Larry Poston *Islamic Da'wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam* (New York: OUP, 1992).
3. See M. M. Ahsan, and A. R. Kidwai (eds), *Sacrilege Versus Civility: Muslim Perspective on The Satanic Verses Affair* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1991) pp. 40–5; Bhiku Parekh, 'The Rushdie Affair and the British Press: Some Salutary Lessons', in S. Mendus et al., editor, *Free Speech: Report of a Seminar*, organised by the Commission for Racial Equality, 1990, pp. 59–78.
4. For the early history of Islam in Britain, see M. M. Ally, 'History of Muslims in Britain 1850–1980', MA thesis, 1981, pp. 13–36, 46–64; and M. Akram Khan, 'Islam and the Muslims in Liverpool', MA thesis, 1979, pp. 8–17. See also J. S. Nielsen, 'Muslims in Europe', *Renaissance and Modern States*, vol. 31, 1987, pp. 60–2; Peter Clarke, 'Islam in Contemporary Europe', in Peter Clarke (ed.), *World's Religions* (London, 1990) pp. 200–1; and A. T. Tibawi, 'History of the London Central Mosque and the Islamic Cultural Centre 1910–1980', *Welt des Islam*, 21 (1981) pp. 193–208.
5. Deobandi, Tablighi, Brelvi and other groups, see Francis Robinson, *Varieties of South Asian Islam*, Research Paper 8, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick, Coventry, 1988. The classic works on the Deoband school are: B. D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860–1900* (Princeton, 1982) and Ziaul Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Bombay, 1963). The two important books on 'Jama'at Tabligh' are: S. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, *Life and Mission of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas* (Lucknow, 1979) and M. Anwarul Haq, *The Faith Movement of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas* (London, 1972). On the Jama'at-i-

Islami there are dozens of books and hundreds of articles in learned journals. Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari (eds), *Islamic Perspective: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1973) contains, in addition to a comprehensive bibliography (pp. 3–14), three articles written by the editors and admirers of Mawdudi. However, one of the best articles recently published, which covers detailed analysis and history of the Jama'at-i-Islami and Jama'at Tabligh, is Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat', in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalism Observed* (University of Chicago Press, 1991) pp. 457–530.

6. See the annual reports published by the Mission during their annual summer conference; also the bilingual brochure, *An Introduction to the UK Islamic Mission* (n.d.). A brief appreciation of the Mission's work can be seen in J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe* (Edinburgh, 1992) pp. 46–7; *Impact International*, London, vol. 6, no. 7, April 1976, p. 54; and M. M. Ally, 'History of Muslims in Britain', MA thesis, Birmingham, 1981, pp. 171–81.
7. Ebrahimsa Muhammad, 'The Islãmic Council of Europe', *Impact International*, vol. 6, no. 6, 9–22 April 1976, p. 21. M. M. Ahsan, 'Islamic Council of Europe', *The Criterion*, Karachi, vol. 8, No. 6, June 1973; 'Islamic Council of Europe: Foundation Well Laid', *Impact International*, 26 May–8 June, 1978. Also see various reports and policy statements issued by the Council from time to time, such as its Annual Report 1981–82; *Islamic Council of Europe – What It Stands For* (Islamic Council of Europe, 1982); and *Islamic Council of Europe: The Constitution* (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1975).
8. For analysis and information on FOSIS activities, see the volumes of their journal, *The Muslim*, also their occasional news bulletin and reports. See also, an excellent write-up in *Impaet International* entitled 'Federation of Students Islamic Societies', vol. 6, no. 7, April 1976, p. 40, and M. M. Ally, op. cit., pp. 182–7.
9. On the MSS, there is not much published material available. One has to rely on their journal, *al-Ghuraba*, occasional newsletters, the introductory brochure, *Nashra Ta'rifiyya bi-Jam'iyyat al-Talaba al-Muslimin* (Manchester, n.d.) and their constitution, in Arabic, 3rd edition, 1990.
10. See, among others, the newsletters and annual reports published by the UMO in London. Their occasional publications, such as *Islamic Education and Single-Sex Schools*, 1975; *National Muslim Educational Council*, background paper, 1978; *Guidelines and Syllabus on Islamic Education*, 1976; *Why Muslim Family Law for British Muslims*, 1983, are also helpful. See also 'UMO, Annual Conference: Five Years of Progress', *Impact International*, London, vol. 5, no. 17, 1975; 'Union of Muslim Organisations', *Impact*, vol. 6, no. 7, April 1976; J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Europe*, 1992, pp. 47, 53.
11. There is not much printed material available on YM. The best source of information is their regular publication, *Trends*, and occasional reports of their activities. See also, Khurram Murad, *Muslim Youth in the West: Towards a New Education Strategy* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1986) and Salim al-Hasani, 'The Muslim Youth of Britain', paper presented at the *Muslim Education Forum*, Birmingham, 20 January 1990. For the story of

the Alawi sisters, among others, see The *Independent*, 17 January 1990, and M. Anwar, 'Muslims in Britain: Some Recent Developments', in the *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 2, July 1990, p. 353. For the headscarves affair in France, see J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Europe*, pp. 162–4.

12. For ISB see their publication, *Toward a Just Society* (Leicester, n.d.); *Some Guidelines on Da'wah in Britain* (Leicester, 1993?) and *The Constitution of the Islamic Society of Britain*, (n.d.). See also their newsletter highlighting major activities at national and local levels.

13. The IPB declared their nine objectives as follows: (1) to present issues both political and social to the British people in the light of the Divine guidance of the Qur'an and Sunnah; (2) to present ■ viable political, economic and social alternative to the British people; (3) to lobby for political support from the political parties and the government for the needs of the Muslim people; (4) to establish the teaching and the practice of Islam within Britain and Islam's voice within British politics; (5) to establish leadership and unity within the Muslim community here, and ■ sense of direction and purpose in living in this country; (6) to defend the rights of Muslims throughout the Muslim world and establish solidarity with other Muslim countries and communities living under non-Muslim rule; (7) to actively confront media bias and distortion of issues; (8) to establish regular regional and national rallies/seminars to call people to Islam, and participation in action through support or membership; (9) to promote mutual aid services to its members (interest-free banking facilities, enterprise support, legal indemnification, health care plan, etc.). CC Islamic Party letter, dated 27 July 1989, as quoted by M. S. Raza, *Islam in Britain*, pp. 40–1.

14. See the manifesto of IPB and their official party news reports entitled *Common Sense*. See also, among others, Raza, *Islam in Britain*, pp. 40–2; the editorial of *The Independent*, 24 September 1990, *The Times* report, 23 March 1992, and J. J. Le Lohe, 'Political Issues: The Bradford By-Election', *New Community*, vol. 17 no. 3, 1991, pp. 443–6.

15. For the official view of the Parliament, see Kalim Siddiqi's inaugural address, 'The Muslim Parliament of Great Britain: Political Innovation and Adaptation', Leicester: 4 January 1992, published in their organ, *Crescent International*, London, vol. 20 no. 22, 1992; also his article 'The Muslim Parliament will Stand or Fall on the Performance of its Individual Members', ibid., vol. 20 no. 23, 1992; see also, *The Muslim Manifesto* (London: The Muslim Institute, June 1990). For a sympathetic assessment of one year's performance, see Ehsan Masood, 'Happy Birthday Muslim Parliament', *Q News*, London, vol. 1, no. 41, Friday 8 January 1993, p. 3; for analytical assessment, see Neaz Ahmad and Ghazali Khan, 'The 'Parliament' Muslims do not Need', *Impact International*, London, vol. 22, nos 1–4, March 1992, pp. 6–7, 8–9; 'Extremism in a Vacuum', *Independent* editorial, 7 January 1992; M. S. Raza, *Islam in Britain*, pp. 107–8; J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, pp. 161–2; John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat, Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 176. Also the national newspaper reports, January 1992.

16. See M. M. Ahsan and A. R. Kidwai, *Sacrilege Versus Civility: Muslim Perspective on The Satanic Verses Affair* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1991) pp. 343–75.

17. There are some 5000 voluntary-aided schools in Britain, 85 per cent of their cost being paid by the State. Of these, over 2140 are run by Anglicans, 2430 by Catholics, 31 by Methodists and 22 by the Jewish community. Despite the fact that the Muslim community is the largest minority in Britain and 5–6 times larger than the Jewish community, not a single Muslim school has been given voluntary-aided status by the government. Of 25 Muslim schools established so far in Britain, the Zakaria Girls School in Batley, Yorkshire and the Islamia Primary School in Brent, North London, have been campaigning for 6–7 years for voluntary-aided status, but so far with no visible success. The Brent Islamia Primary School which has a waiting list of 1000 pupils, appealed against the government refusal and in May 1992 the High Court ruled that the government decision was 'manifestly unfair' and that the Education Secretary should reconsider his decision. (See among the plethora of documents and statements, the latest report in *The Economist*, London, 19 December 1992, p. 23).
18. Following the conclusion of the Gulf War, a British company in Rotherham, near Sheffield, advertised to recruit staff, but blatantly stated that no Muslim should apply for the post. Under the 1968 Race Relations Act, the Commission for Racial Equality, a government-sponsored organisation, took the company to Court for discrimination against Muslims. After a prolonged hearing in the Sheffield Tribunal Court, Muslims lost the case as, unlike Jews and Sikhs, they do not constitute 'a race'. Hence it is lawful for employers to discriminate against them, no matter how inexcusable and appalling it may seem. (See, among others, *Impact International*, vol. 21, nos. 1–2, 13 September–10 October 1991, p. 6ff.).
19. See the quotation cited in *Impact*, vol. 21, nos 1–2, p. 8.
20. On the Rushdie affair and its impact on British society, see, among others, M. M. Ahsan and A. R. Kidwai, op. cit., Shabbir Akhtar, *Be Careful with Muhammad: The Salman Rushdie Affair* (London, 1989); Ziauddin Sardar and M. W. Davies, *Distorted Imagination: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair* (London, 1990); J. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, 1992, pp. 156–62; J. L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat, Myth or Reality*, 1992, pp. 190–3.
21. The Babri Mosque was built in 1528–9 by Mir Baqi, the Governor of Mughal Emperor, Babar. There is no mention of the existence of a Hindu temple on the site in early Hindu sources. The movement to demolish the mosque began in 1949 and, claiming the site as the birthplace of the mythical god Rama, Hindu militants, on 22 December 1949, surreptitiously installed an idol of Rama near the *Mihrab*. Instead of punishing the culprits, the Indian government closed the mosque. Despite appeal and counter-appeal, the Hindus failed to have the site declared the birthplace of Rama, and, defying the court injunction, on 6 December 1992, took over the mosque by force and razed it to the ground. The destruction was shown on national and international television and resulted in dismissal of the provincial BJP government representing the Hindu militants.
22. For an evaluation of the history, destruction of the mosque, and consequent events, see Abdullah Ghazi (ed.), *The Babri Masjid, Ram-Janam-Bhomi Dispute: History, Religion and Politics* (Chicago, 1993); *Impact International*, vol. 23, nos 1 and 2, 8 January–11 February 1993, pp. 26–31, and nos 3 and 4, 12 February–11 March 1993, pp. 20–4; Files of *India*

Today, in particular issue of 15 February 1993 entitled 'Solutions to Ayodhya', *Radiance Viewsweekly*, Delhi, 13 December 1992–2 January 1993; *Muslim News*, London, Friday 18 December 1992; *Q News*, London, vol. 1, no. 40, 1 January 1993 and no. 41, [illegible] January 1993.

Index

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